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Preface
The 18th volume of the International Yearbook of Aesthetics comprises 
a selection of papers presented at the 19th International Congress of Aes-
thetics, which took place in Cracow in 2013.
The Congress entitled “Aesthetics in Action” was intended to cover an 
extended research area of aesthetics going beyond the fine arts towards 
various forms of human practice. In this way it bore witness to the trans-
formation that aesthetics has been undergoing for a few decades at the 
turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Apart from lectures the Congress presentations were also delivered in 
the form of debates – four plenary panels and about 20 panel sessions. 
The present volume includes all plenary panels and seven selected panel 
sessions. The remaining majority of the papers presented at the Congress 
will be published online. 
Four plenary sessions were prepared by eminent scholars, usually au-
thors of their own conceptions, who expand and modify the research area 
of aesthetics. 
Arnold Berleant organized the session „Aesthetic Engagement” inviting 
Mădălina Diaconu, Nathalie Blanc, Jale Erzen and Cheng Xiangzhan to 
take part in it. 
Outlining the subject of the debate, Arnold Berleant, the author of the 
topical concept, indicated the deep transformations occurring in art in the 
1960s and 1970s. Innovatory artistic practices made art transcend its tradi-
tional limits and, in its new forms, demanded ways of perception different 
than the traditional ones. The aesthetic experience, which had been treated 
as a disinterested perception of a work of art by its perceiver since the days 
of Immanuel Kant, was now founded on involvement and participation. 
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At the same time it assumed a holistic, contextual and multisensual char-
acter. According to Berleant, the concept of “aesthetic engagement” and 
the conception of new aesthetics developed on its basis allow for a better 
understanding of the transformations that take place in contemporary art 
as well as for revitalizing of the perception of traditional art. It is this very 
category that is the focal point of all speeches delivered by the participants 
of the debate, dealing with various topics. For instance, while grasping the 
phenomenon of the wind, M. Diakonu indicates different forms of aesthetic 
engagement, N. Blanc considers the problems of aesthetic engagement in 
urban environment while J. Erzen ponders “how art and images can be 
effective in the symbolic ordering of our social relations.” On the basis 
of the idea of aesthetic engagement and in reference to deep ecology and 
“traditional Chinese aesthetic wisdom”, Cheng Xiangzhan offers his own 
conception of Ecosophy C.
Aleš Erjavec prepared the debate on “Aesthetics and Politics”. Asking the 
questions: Is art political or not? Is it political or politicized? and using 
three selected examples, he demonstrated the diversity and complexity 
of forms that the relation between art, aesthetics and politics may assume. 
Emphasizing that these relations were usually „difficult”, and frequently 
even conflicting, he discussed the problem mostly in reference to aesthet-
ics of realism and formalist aesthetics in the days dominated by Marxist 
ideology. At the end he paid more attention to Rancière’s conception, which 
constitutes a new interpretation of the relations between art, aesthetics and 
politics. The participants invited to the panel session focused their atten-
tion on diverse issues: Miško Šuvaković claims that after the fall of Berlin 
wall and the end of the cold war conditions for re-examination of the 
concepts of “politics” and “the politic” came into being. “In postmodern 
and then globalised neoliberal society, politics has acquired the character 
of techno-managerial cultural practice, moving from fundamental so-
cial, global questions to individual cultural as well as artistic activities…”. 
Tyrus Miller executed a reconstruction of the views of Albrecht Wellmer, 
formed in polemics with the representatives of the Frankfurt School, mostly 
Adorno and Habermas, regarding functioning of art (especially music) 
in a multidimensional context. Gabriela Świtek discussed the problem of 
“architecture as politics” using one selected example – that of an exhibition 
of architecture in Poland in 1953 (the time of Stalinism and socrealism) – 
supporting her interpretations with Rancière’s views on art, aesthetics 
and politics. 
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The participants of the plenary session “Somaesthetics” organized by 
Richard Shusterman included Tanehisa Otabe, Else Marie Bukdahl and 
Krystyna Wilkoszewska.
The author of somaesthetics explained that this new term was neces-
sary to cover the broad range of problems related to our body, our “tool 
of tools”. The body is the basis for our actions, perceptions and thoughts. 
Shusterman indicates that although in the main current of philosophy 
the problems of body were neglected, at the very beginning of Western 
philosophy as well as in the Eastern thought, it enjoyed attention. This 
tradition should be continued, since “our bodies express the fundamental 
ambiguity of human existence”: the body is both the subject and the object, 
it gives us the sense of species community as well as individual uniqueness, 
it makes us different from animals but, at the same time, relates us to them 
through evolution, it draws the limits to our freedom, but it also makes 
this freedom possible, and the same regards our perception (cognition). 
Shusterman emphasizes the meliorative character of somaesthetics; as an 
interdisciplinary research area it serves to improve the culture of life of both 
individuals and communities. The participants of the panel session spoke, 
in turn, about: the position of somaesthetics in the history of Western and 
Eastern thought and culture, possibility of somaesthetic interpretation of 
works of art, trans-disciplinary character of somaesthetics on the boundary 
between the humanities and natural sciences, especially in the context of 
new achievements in biotechnology and theory of evolution.
For the debate concerning “Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics” Wolfgang 
Welsch invited Peng Feng and Eduardo Kac, who are – though in slightly 
different proportions – both artists and theoreticians. He did it in accord 
with his conviction that nowadays artists as well as scientists contribute to 
better understanding of changes taking place in culture. Welsch reminded 
that he used the formula “aesthetics beyond aesthetics” for the first time in 
1995 during the ICA in Lahti, having in mind the expansion of aesthetic 
research to the areas beyond art, especially since they are undergoing pro-
gressive aesthetization. Aesthetics should follow the path of the avant-garde 
of the 20th century, which transgressed the boundaries of autonomous art 
(“art beyond art”). The plenary panel was supposed to be a continuation of 
this idea, especially that certain phenomena had become intensified. And 
so, both philosophers and artists perform a „transition from substance 
to process ontology”. Moreover, nowadays we move from thinking in the 
categories of opposition to that based on the idea of continuity. This regards 
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particularly the relation the man-the world or, in other words, human and 
nonhuman. „The human cannot be understood – as modernity would 
have it – exclusively in human terms”. Numerous artists follow this direc-
tion nowadays. On the basis of an example of the curated by him China 
pavilion at Venice Biennale 2011, Pen Feng showed how “aesthetics and 
contemporary art meet each other when they go beyond their boundaries”. 
Eduardo Kac, a world-renowned artist and the author of the terms “bio-art” 
and “transgenic art” introduced us – in the language of theory – into the 
trail of thought that accompanied creation of his subsequent works of art. 
As regards panel sessions, the papers which were most representative for 
the subject of the Congress, and prepared by European, Japanese and 
Chinese aestheticians were selected for publication. (Unfortunately, not 
all participants delivered their papers prepared for publication.) 
Polona Tratnik prepared a panel session on the subject of aesthetic and 
political aspects of biotechnological art and Michał Ostrowicki (Sidey 
Myoo) – that on electronic art. 
Our friends from Japan were particularly active. The panel sessions 
which they prepared referred both more general issues: ”Aesthetic Practice 
in the Life of East Asia” (Takao Aoki), „City, Ruins and Landscape” (Yuko 
Nakama) and the problems of contemporary Japan: “Applied Social Art: 
The Potential of Art and Criticism after March 11, 2011” (Akiko Kasuya), 
„Aesthetics Accounts on Japanese Pop-culture” (Hisashi Muroi).
The panel session concerning “Chinese Aesthetics and Art”, prepared for 
the Congress by Eva Man, is presented in this volume in a slightly different 
form, thanks to active help received from Wang Keping.
From three to five participants from different countries and, quite fre-
quently, from different cultures took part in each panel session. We do 
hope that the papers comprised in the 18th volume of the International 
Yearbook of Aesthetics discuss the important and most vividly debated 
problems of contemporary aesthetics.
Krystyna Wilkoszewska
Plenary Panel Sessions 

Aesthetic Engagement*  
(Arnold Berleant)
* Articles included in the plenary panel “Aesthetic Engagement” were published in the 
“Contemporary Aesthetics” on line, volume 11, 2013

Arnold Berleant
What is Aesthetic Engagement?
Developments in the arts associated with modernism began in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century with Impressionism and Post-impressionism. 
These movements were followed by a succession of stylistic innovations 
that came to a head in the second half of the twentieth century. In the 
1960s and ‘70s, a proliferation of artistic practices emerged that trespassed 
conventional boundaries. Innovative practices gave rise to new perceptual 
features in the arts, breaking out of the frame of the canvas and extrud-
ing from its flat surface, descending from the proscenium stage into the 
audience, and other such modifications of appreciative experience that 
discarded the traditional separation of audience and art object. Not only 
did the arts incorporate new materials and practices; they reached out to 
incorporate surprising subject-matters. All the arts began to intrude on 
the formerly safe space of the spectator by demanding active involvement 
in the appreciative process. Audience participation became overt and 
necessary for the fulfillment of the art, not only in the visual arts but in 
theater, fiction, sculpture, and other art forms. The traditional separation 
between the sequestered, contemplative experience of art and the world 
of ordinary experience was deliberately breached.
Aesthetics was in a quandary and, for a time, became obsessed with 
the problem of defining art that had far exceeded its customary bounds. 
Moreover, traditional ways of characterizing appreciative experience, in 
particular a contemplative, distancing attitude joined with Kantian dis-
interestedness, seemed inappropriate and irrelevant to the world of art 
that had emerged. This was the context in which attention began to shift 
for some theorists away from a focus on the art object, which came to be 
called by the assumptive term ‘artwork,’ and to the appreciative experience 
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of art. In a series of papers and books beginning in the mid-1960s, the 
American philosopher Arnold Berleant began to develop a theoretical 
account that could accommodate these challenging developments in the 
contemporary arts. The central concept to emerge in this inquiry was the 
idea of ‘engagement,’ later specified as ‘aesthetic engagement.’ Aesthetic 
engagement became the central concept of an aesthetic that emerged as an 
alternative to the aesthetic disinterestedness that was central to traditional 
aesthetic theory.
Aesthetic engagement rejects the dualism inherent in traditional ac-
counts of aesthetic appreciation and epitomized in Kantian aesthetics, 
which treats aesthetic experience as the subjective appreciation of a beauti-
ful object. Instead, aesthetic engagement emphasizes the holistic, contextual 
character of aesthetic appreciation. Aesthetic engagement involves active 
participation in the appreciative process, sometimes by overt physical ac-
tion but always by creative perceptual involvement. Aesthetic engagement 
also returns aesthetics to its etymological origins by stressing the primacy 
of sense perception, of sensible experience. Perception itself is reconfig-
ured to recognize the mutual activity of all the sense modalities, including 
kinesthetic and somatic sensibility more generally.
The concept of aesthetic engagement, then, epitomizes a holistic, unified 
aesthetics in place of the dualism of the traditional account. It rejects the 
traditional separations between the appreciator and the art object, as well 
as between the artist and the performer and the audience. It recognizes 
that all these functions overlap and merge within the aesthetic field, the 
context of appreciation. The customary separations and oppositions be-
tween the functions of artist, object, appreciator, and performer disappear 
in the reciprocity and continuity of appreciative experience. Thus it is no 
longer necessary to maintain the fiction that turns different functions 
into opposed entities. They become aspects of the aesthetic process rather 
than discrete objects or actions, and the appreciative experience becomes 
perceptually active, direct, and intimate. Aesthetic engagement recognizes 
that beauty, or aesthetic value more generally, inheres not in the object or 
in the perceiver but is rather the leading feature of the reciprocal process 
of perceptual participation between appreciator and object.
Understood in this way, aesthetic engagement is a valuable concept for 
understanding and appreciating recent developments. At the same time, it 
reinvigorates our experience of the traditional arts. Aesthetic engagement 
has a transformative effect when applied to seventeenth century Dutch 
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landscape painting and portraiture, to the classical canon of music, to 
poetry and the novel, as well as to the modern arts. Moreover, aesthetic 
engagement lends itself particularly well to the wide interest in environ-
mental aesthetics, where engagement offers a more appropriate description 
of environmental appreciation that has descended from the contemplative 
distance of a scenic outlook to tramping along a woodland trail or pad-
dling a meandering stream. Aesthetic engagement is useful, too, for the 
still more recent interest in everyday aesthetics where, again, the Kantian 
model of disinterested contemplation becomes irrelevant.
The central issue now is not the difference between art and non-art 
but between aesthetic and non-aesthetic. Both for its theoretical value in 
accommodating artistic innovations, for its ability to encompass develop-
ments in aesthetic appreciation that extend to ordinary life and activity, 
and for its ability to provide a unified theory of the arts and the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, aesthetic engagement has proved particularly useful. 
What is needed now are specific studies of the arts and other occasions of 
aesthetic value that will demonstrate its capacity to illuminate the experi-
ence of appreciation.
The papers that follow illustrate the resilience and wide applicability 
of aesthetic engagement.

Mădălina Diaconu
Grasping the Wind? Aesthetic Participation, 
between Cognition and Immersion
“Vent ininterrompu. Que peut-on souhaiter de plus? 
Le vent, c’est de la poésie immédiate.” (Cioran)1 
Aesthetic theory looks for concepts that are able to grasp (Latin: conci-
pere – to conceive, but also to grasp, seize, capture) a specific experience 
that is renowned for its ineffable character. Such attempts to elaborate con-
ceptually what is known without concepts (Kant) may inspire a skeptical 
attitude since a completely satisfactory conceptualization of the aesthetic 
experience is eventually as impossible as catching the wind. At the same 
time, it is precisely the poetical potential of the wind that may exemplify 
diverse aspects of aesthetic engagement. In its own way art succeeds in 
grasping the wind by representing, reflecting and engaging with the wind. 
Thus, just as a “soft side of stone” can be found in art, so can art manifest 
a “graspable side” of the wind.2 That the wind exemplifies aspects of aes-
thetic engagement is essential for the present approach. Engagement “offers 
not argumentation but exemplification” because it is based on experience 
and requires an “empirical demonstration.”3 In particular, the wind poses 
a challenge for the analysis because it has neither sides, parts, nor dimen-
sions, no form and almost no matter. Because of its shapelessness and invis-
ibility it hardly can be considered an object. I [D1] It is still a force that is 
experienced as a dynamic presence. But before going into the typology of 
aesthetic engagement, let us start with an example in which several forms 
of engagement are inextricably linked to each other.
1. Attunement and engagement
The protoaesthetic situation of feeling a gentle breeze seems to confirm 
the Kantian requirement of disinterested contemplation. At first sight, also 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem The Eolian Harp endorses this assump-
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tion. The poet and the “pensive Sara” are sunk in contemplation, watching 
the clouds and the sunset, smelling exquisite flowery scents, listening to 
“the stilly murmur of the distant Sea” that “tells us of silence,” and to “that 
simplest Lute”
How by the desultory breeze caress’d, 
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover, 
It pours such sweet upbraiding, as must needs 
Tempt to repeat the wrong! And now, its strings 
Boldlier swept, the long sequacious notes 
Over delicious surges sink and rise, 
Such a soft floating witchery of sound 
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve 
Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land […]!4
As a matter of fact, the mood of tranquility evoked by the poem stems from 
the continuity and communication between the author and his multisensory 
environment; the gentle light and fragrances, “the soft floating witchery of 
sound,” and the caress of the breeze all pass on the lovers’ mood and fill 
them with cosmic harmony. Instead of focusing on the distinction between 
the subject and the object, such an experience is based upon a deep, almost 
mystical feeling of union between humans and the world, which is described 
as love for “all things in a world so filled.” The breeze that “warbles” in the 
“mute still air,” producing music, is but one of the symbols of “the one Life 
within us and abroad / Which meets all motion and becomes its soul.” Once 
this higher unity is attained, the differences between the senses are converted 
to a synaesthetic experience (“A light in sound, a sound-like power in light”), 
without generating confusion but evoking the well-known motif of the music 
of the spheres: “Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where.”
In such a tranquil atmosphere one is entitled to ask where traces of the 
subject’s activity can be found? First of all, contemplation is by no means 
a passive attitude but an extremely intensive one that requires concentration. 
It is possible to listen to the melodies only if one constitutes the melody 
in a polythetic structure (in several steps) and the unity of the melody as 
a process. The identification of its acoustic patterns and rhythms requires 
perceptual syntheses.5 Also the relaxation unleashes “full many a thought 
uncall’d and undetain’d, / And many idle flitting phantasies” that “trav-
erse [the poet’s] indolent and passive brain, / As wild and various as the 
random gales / That swell and flutter on this subject Lute.” Listening leads 
to the synchronization or attunement (German: Einstimmung) between 
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one’s own feelings, rhythms, and thoughts and the music the eolian harp 
randomly produces. This state of mind suggests to the poet a stunning 
analogy and makes him reflect on the nature of the universe. Immersion 
and cognition become inseparable:
… what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely framed, 
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?
The metaphor of God as “one intellectual breeze” that animates nature is 
consonant with the symbolism of the wind in several religions, including 
Christianity, where it is closely related to the epiphany of the Holy Spirit.6 
2. Perceptive constitution of the object
Strictly speaking, the wind does not exist as such, but has to be verbally 
identified as wind. The same goes for the wind as an object of the natural 
sciences and an object of arts. However, the aesthetic dimension of the 
wind is inseparable from the experience of the wind, which is subjective, 
yet not strictly individual, since we usually agree whether the wind blows 
or not. Only the sensation is strictly individual and unverifiable, not the 
perception, which has a public, intersubjective dimension. According to 
the reinterpretation of aesthetics as aisthetics or theory of perception 
(Berleant, G. Böhme, Welsch), the wind has already an aesthetic dimen-
sion as a perceivable phenomenon. Moreover, even on this level the subject 
is not merely receptive but has to perform perceptual (and, following 
Merleau-Ponty, not intellectual) syntheses in order for a certain flow of 
sensations to qualify as wind. In other words, having the experience of 
wind requires the subject to engage with the environment, and become 
aware of certain aspects, that is, pay attention to them, to activate a selec-
tion of traits, to observe them, and to constitute (not produce!) the object 
phenomenologically.
Further, the phenomenon identified as wind receives a specific aesthetic 
dimension when it produces pleasant effects, given that pleasantness may 
be regarded – against the Kantian dichotomy between pleasure, Lust, and 
aesthetic satisfaction, Wohlgefallen – as a protoaesthetic value. The pleasant 
effects of the air currents are mostly tactile and thermal, but they can be 
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also indirectly auditory (for example, when, in cold winter weather, one 
sits in front of the fireplace and listens to the wind blowing outside), or 
olfactory and even gustatory (when one fells the salted water brought by 
the wind coming from the sea). The famous image of Marilyn Monroe’s 
with her windblown dress records the tactile and thermal pleasure of feel-
ing a refreshing wind on a hot day presented as a narcissistic, autoerotic 
experience or as the erotic engagement with a non-human partner.
Also the multisensory dimension of the wind requires one to amend 
the subject-object-dichotomy of modern philosophy and aesthetics since 
the wind is not perceived as an object placed in front of the subject, as in 
visual experience. The perceiving subject is the body itself, which is im-
mersed within an environment and engages with the natural surroundings. 
Nevertheless, such an environmental perception proves to be pleasant only 
within certain limits. To follow the Kantian theory of the dynamic sublime, 
a strong and dangerous storm is hardly to be appreciated aesthetically by 
one who is not in a secure shelter.
In addition to this, the effects of the wind and weather in general are both 
physical and psychological: weather changes are felt with the entire body. 
Meteo-dependent people know from their own experience to what extent 
weather may affect their mood, state of spirit, sensibility and Gemüt, power 
of concentration, blood pressure, etc., and invalidate once more the Cartesian 
abstract cleavage between body and soul. It is interesting that Leonardo da 
Vinci deliberately chose the wind as a metaphor for the soul that can never 
achieve good effects in a weak or sick body, just as the wind can never pro-
duce good music on an organ when one of its pipes is broken.7 The soul is 
dependent of the body as much as the perception of the wind is dependent 
of an instrument to “capture” its movement and translate it into music.
Frequently the perception of the wind is culturally embedded: a cur-
rent of air is identified as Föhn or Bora on the basis of an entire collective 
historical experience. Further, the wind is also a cultural phenomenon, 
whose natural perception is influenced by the history of a community 
and its corpus of knowledge, literary, or mythological sources. Accord-
ing to Herder and to Tetsuro Watsuji, the cultures are even determined 
by the climate, including the wind. For Watsuji8 the “climate” (Japanese 
fudo, “wind and earth”) belongs to the structure of the human Dasein, 
in the Heideggerian meaning, and cannot be reduced to its scientifically 
objectified dimensions. Watsuji even classifies the cultures according to 
their climates into three types: 1. The peoples from the Far East (India and 
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South-East Asia), who are influenced by the extremely humid “monsoon 
climate,” are prone to passivity and resignation, and to a contemplative and 
emotional attitude. 2. The unfriendly “desert climate” in the Arabian and 
African cultures forces humans to conceive life as a struggle with nature, 
to praise the power of will, and to adopt a practical orientation. 3. The 
“meadow climate” in Europe, in particular around the Mediterranean Sea, 
induces an anthropocentric, tranquil, introspective, and intellectual life.
Watsuji’s theory, which has often been rejected as poetic speculation, 
is indeed subject to various objections; one of them concerns the one-
directional relationship between culture and weather. According to Watsuji, 
the natural environment is a determinant of the culture, while people – in 
spite of the ambitious projects of geoengineering – exert no influence on 
weather. Nevertheless, apart from this interpretation of the weather from 
the perspective of philosophy (Watsuji) or of the history of culture,9 the 
possibility of an aesthetic experience of the wind attests that we are dealing 
with a culturally molded phenomenon.
Last, but not least, the perception of wind raises interesting questions 
concerning its representability. Otherwise stated, how can wind be repre-
sented in the visual arts or, generally speaking, how can it be represented 
by a medium, given that its very medial nature enables perception only by 
remaining in itself unperceivable? A first possible answer to this question 
regards the personification of the wind as in antiquity and on premodern 
maps when winds were named, received anthropomorphic representa-
tions, and became characters of narratives. A second option says that 
the phenomenalization of a medium is possible indirectly, by means of 
its effects. Lighted and shadowed sides of objects make light visible, just 
as “windblown hair, billowing drapery, fluttering ribbons”10 suggest the 
animation produced by the wind.
The aforementioned details are specific motifs for the “classical Victories, 
Horae and, most particularly, Maenads.”11 Warburg called them “bewegtes 
Beiwerk.”12 These motifs “ubiquitously present in classical monuments, lov-
ingly described in classical literature, explicitly recommended to painters 
by Leone Battista Alberti” around 1435 “become a real vogue” in the Italian 
Cinquecento, think of Sandro Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus. Several other 
sculptors and painters, such as Claude Monet, resorted to the same strategy 
to visualize the wind through its effects. In Monet’s Rue Montorgueil, the 
flags flapping on the occasion of a celebration in Paris on the 30th of June 
1878 evoke a vigorous wind that the spectator almost feels in her face. They 
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suggest an animated atmosphere and create a sonorous image. Modern 
natural sciences still use the Beaufort Scale of wind speed, whose quantifiable 
parameters, measured in knots, are accompanied by photographs showing 
the effects of the wind on water and by verbal descriptions of these effects.13
3. Kinaesthetic performance and poetical participation: 
imagination, empathy and atmosphere
Perception is never mere receptivity, Husserl’s Affizierbarkeit ,but has to 
be bodily performed. Tactile perceptions require the subject’s kinaesthetic 
engagement14 and the same goes for sight, the sense of taste, and even smell. 
The correlation between sensation and movement in general is central 
to Erwin Straus’s phenomenology of perception15 while Gilles Clément 
regards activity as an essential attribute of every life being.16 These move-
ments can be performed either consciously, deliberately, and knowingly 
or in a habitual way if they belong to the latent memory of the body; or 
they can occur unwillingly and even reluctantly.
In the direct and aesthetic experience of the wind, a physical engage-
ment appears to be mostly absent; quite the contrary, the exposure to 
a strong wind throws someone out of an aesthetic attitude. The aesthetic 
situation seems to imply a clear division of roles between the active “ob-
ject” and the passive subject.17 The situation is completely different when 
the wind is represented; the subject feels secure and thus free to take an 
aesthetic stance. In such cases, the spectator is engaged in the move-
ment indirectly in an empathic and imaginative manner, for example, by 
watching how man and horse struggle to make their way against a gale 
in the opening scene of the film The Turin Horse.18 The onlooker’s invol-
untary identification with the character(s) is enhanced by the length of 
the scene: when man and horse finally reach their shelter, the spectator 
feels exhausted, too.
However, psychological empathy is not necessary in order to perform 
the observed movement inwardly, as kinetic art well knows and shows. 
The installations exhibited by the Lithuanian artist Žilvinas Kempinas 
(Fountain, Flux etc.) are directly linked to air vibrations and air currents). 
The agitation of the featherlight tapes of a magnetophon that are put into 
motion by ventilators in gallery spaces is transmitted also to their perceiv-
ers who feel light and restless, exposed to outer forces and like dancing 
with magnetic tapes.
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Imagination is universally regarded as having a higher degree of activ-
ity than perception, just as productive imagination or fantasy is more 
intensive than the reproductive imagination in everyday life. This com-
mon distinction between two types of imagination becomes blurred when 
Gaston Bachelard considers that every act of imagination not only forms 
images but changes them, its object being less the image than the imaginary 
(imaginaire).19 In particular, the element of air involves the “psychology 
of the imagination of the movement” and is linked to a strong mobility of 
images.20 For example, the wind Bachelard discusses in a separate chapter21 
is able to unleash the power to invent narratives and to produce and com-
bine images. Most dynamic are the images of the “violent air,” the storm, 
the furious wind and the elemental energy when the air is “all movement 
and nothing but movement,” and its effect on the imagination consists in 
a “participation essentially dynamic that is nothing else than engagement 
and empathic reenactment.”22 
However, Bachelard’s exemplifications are exclusively literary; the fury 
and the cry of the wind are most impressive when they are imagined or 
heard, but not when they are visually represented: “The wind menaces and 
howls, but it takes a form only if it meets the dust: once it becomes visible, it 
is a poor misery.”23 Being devoid of figure and form, the wind seems per se 
to be incompatible with the visual arts; its visible image would lend its rage 
and wrath a rather derisory aspect. In the end the wind is the “imagination 
without figure” and the revery of the storm is guided not by the eye, but 
by the “surprised ear,” since “hearing is more dramatic than sight.”24 Even 
when it is experienced without the intercession of art, such as when one 
watches the infernal hunt of the clouds, the violent and energetic manifesta-
tion of the storm is still conceived in literary terms: “we participate directly 
to the drama of the violent air.”25 The storm symbolizes the pure energy 
that successively creates and destroys worlds; to paraphrase Bachelard, the 
phenomenology of the storm anticipates a phenomenology of the cry that is 
projected on a cosmological scale. Bachelard’s selective imagination of the 
wind may well be set forth by mentioning different musical works (which 
he does not), starting with Debussy’s Le vent dans la plaine from Préludes. 
On the whole the imagination of the wind is a multisensory experience.26 
Bachelard’s conviction that the visualization of the wind is less able to 
produce aesthetic effects may be regarded as a challenge for the fine arts. 
Already the personification of winds had enabled their anthropomorphic 
representation in pre-modern Europe like the representation of astral bod-
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ies and unlike rain and thunder. Later on, Góngora’s images of the wind 
that combs the hair inspired Eduardo Chillida’s sculpture The Comb of the 
Wind, precisely by reversing the poet’s initial metaphor. The three pieces 
of metal placed on the coast of the Atlantic comb the wind itself, which is 
then imagined as being analogous to the hair or to a Maenad’s braids that 
are like snakes. Moreover, their form and material remind one of tongs 
or pliers that present the unpresentable attempt to grasp the wind. This 
artwork is interesting not only because it is integrated in the environment, 
but also because it is no more conceived as end in itself, but as a means for 
arranging, taming, and eventually humanizing a “wild” element. Moreo-
ver, El peine del viento shifts the perception from form to the process of 
forming, from the passive matter to the active masses of air. The artist casts 
the metal in a mould and the metal itself shapes the natural elements by 
filtering them as in a chain of reactions. To understand the sculpture is to 
perform mentally the gesture of using these pieces to comb the air. The 
same idea may even be reenacted bodily: by spreading our fingers, our 
hands, themselves, become combs for the wind. If Ulysses once chained 
the winds and had the hybris to try to subjugate nature, Chillida’s gesture 
complies with a natural force and engages with it.
Also the expressivity of Chillida’s The Comb of the Wind is much in-
debted to the atmosphere, for the wind has a strong poetical value precisely 
as an element that creates atmospheres. The theory of the atmosphere in-
cludes the wind among the so-called “half-things” (Halbdinge), along with 
the gaze, the voice, the darkness, the night, and the coolness.27 Moreover, 
the theory distinguishes atmospheres (Atmosphäre) from atmospheric 
elements (Atmosphärisches): the wind belongs to the atmospheric ele-
ments, which are less vague than atmospheres yet less physical than things, 
while atmospheres are moods and qualities, half-things that have attributes 
(e.g. ‘balmy wind’).28 Besides, experience says that different winds, such 
as Scirocco, Bora, Föhn or the Crivă – to confine myself to the Mediter-
ranean and Central European space – produce various atmospheres and 
represented a valuable source of literary inspiration.29 
From another perspective, storms offer the most appropriate natural 
background for dramatic scenes, either romantic turmoil as, for example, 
in Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights or sudden and profound historical 
changes, insurrections and revolutions, etc. The wind is frequently un-
derstood as the sign of an imminent change when incontrollable energies 
produce social disorders, just as strong winds are feared for causing natural 
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disorders.30 Also, while thunder symbolizes Jahweh’s or Jupiter’s voice, the 
voice of the wind is the people’s voice, whose shout and violent insurgence 
terrifies and snowballs. This analogy is widely used in literature and film 
and touches the reader or spectator emotionally, inspiring fear and aggres-
siveness, insecurity, or even a feeling of liberation.
4. Semantic interpretation
Winds have always enjoyed a rich symbolism, being associated with vanity, 
instability, inconsistency, and fickleness. Various pneumatological inter-
pretations in Hinduism and Christianity equate the spirit with the breath, 
whereas Chinese philosophy integrates the winds in complex correspond-
ences with seasons, tempers, and elements. Some traditions assign the 
wind a cosmological role in organizing the primordial chaos (Bible) and 
regulating cosmic and moral balance (Avesta). The winds can animate, 
punish, counsel, and bring messages, as the angels do (Bible, Koran), and 
they even become deities in polytheistic traditions (Ancient Greece).31 In 
the first place, the wind symbolizes the power of empty space: a stream of 
air usually looks like a void, but its power is stronger than earth, water, and 
fire, stronger than matter, more like a purely spiritual energy.
Given this complex symbolism, artworks and installations that play with 
air currents allow various speculations about their signification. Visualizing 
air currents is like picturing space, time, speed, and force. For example, 
Alexander Calder’s kinetic sculptures or mobiles delicately respond to 
the slightest air movement and suggest the pure lightness of being. Other 
experiments have obvious spiritual connotations and invite the viewer to 
meditation exercises, such as Anish Kapoor’s site-specific installation As-
cension, which was first exhibited in gallery spaces worldwide (beginning 
with Galleria Continua in San Gimignano in 2003, and then in São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, and Beijing) and afterwards in a sacral space (Basilica di 
San Giorgio Maggiore, Venice, 2011).
The transnational artist Anish Kapoor explains the installation as fol-
lows: “In my work, what is and what seems to be often become blurred. 
In Ascension, for example, what interests me is the idea of the immaterial 
becoming an object, which is exactly what happens in Ascension: the 
smoke becomes a column. Also present in this work is the idea of Moses 
following a column of smoke, a column of light, in the desert…” 32 His work 
challenges the history of sculpture understood as the history of material: 
30  Mădălina Diaconu
“I am making works with the history of the non-material, between illusory 
and real, between mythology and ordinariness,” declared the artist.33 And 
critics see in Kapoor’s works “the predicament of two contradictory ele-
ments of modernism, the materiality of a work of art and its opposite, the 
ideal and the transcendental.”34
Ascension is not merely an installation to be looked at (and one should 
add, to be listened to), but to be contemplated in the sense of pondering 
or reflecting on the dream of modern art to make the invisible visible and 
sensible. In front of Ascension, the spectator cannot avoid the vague feel-
ing that the winding column of air is more than a work of art but is a sign, 
an epiphany of transcendence, the materialization of the spirit, a kind of 
Jungian archetype that operates on a subconscious level. The ineffable 
column is not only hard to grasp physically but also conceptually: it moves 
between earth and heaven, material and immaterial, form and formlessness, 
and even – to speak with Kant – between phenomenon and noumenon. 
If Roman Ingarden assigned an active role to the reader of literature, who 
has to fill the empty places in a text and specify what the author has left 
indeterminate,35 such a column is almost a physically indeterminate place 
and the place of indeterminacy. Its perceiver struggles with the need to 
grasp it perceptually and reflectively without being able to apprehend it. 
Anish Kapoor succeeded in Ascension to create a mystery that is at the 
same time here and elsewhere, that manifests itself without delivering its 
essence, and reveals itself, remaining at the same time inaccessible, a sign 
without clear signification.
5. Poietical engagement: making art
Art meets modern technology not only in Kapoor’s installation but also in 
several kinetic installations that use the power of the air as, for example, 
in the previously mentioned installations by Žilvinas Kempinas, in which 
light materials are moved by the air currents produced by a ventilator. This 
poietical engagement with the element air is quite common in music, where 
currents of air produce melodies by touching strings (aeolian harp) or mov-
ing through pipes (wind instruments). In the case of the aeolian harp, the 
wind is natural and the music seems to be produced randomly; the subject’s 
activity consists of making the instrument from several strings with differ-
ent thickness and then letting the wind blow through them. What we hear 
in this case is, as a matter of fact, not the tone produced by the friction 
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between the wind and the strings but the tone produced by the vibrating 
wire followed by a sequence of overtones that are always harmonious from 
a mathematical perspective, but consonant in the lower register and disso-
nant in the higher one.36 Apart from this physical explanation, the aeolian 
harp remains a fascinating instrument because it makes the air appear as 
sound and thus converts a medium into a phenomenon.37 Moreover, the 
sounds made by the aeolian harp pour into the space without any frame 
or border and illustrate most concretely Hermann Schmitz’s definition of 
the atmosphere as something that indefinitely streams out into space. The 
aeolian harp thus produces atmospheric music in several respects.
In the case of wind instruments, it is the musician herself who produces 
and modulates intentionally the currents of air or, otherwise put, it is the 
subject who makes not only the instrument but also produces the wind. 
The aesthetic engagement becomes here the active use of natural elements, 
building them into the instrument and engaging physically in making music. 
To paraphrase Watsuji, the wind makes us rush into the temple and pray for 
protection in the typhoon season, but it also makes boats sail and flutes play.38 
In poietical engagement, the artist does not confine herself any more 
to feeling the wind or watching its effects but, for research or for practical 
purposes, makes devices that mediate between the body and the wind. Let 
us mention a technical and artistic experiment. Etienne-Jules Marey was 
well-known in the second half of the nineteenth century for his chrono-
photographs about the movement of men and animals. In 1888 he built 
a special aquarium in order to investigate the aquatic locomotion of the eel, 
and in 1893 he published a study of the velocity of fluids. From the water 
streams he then turned his camera to air currents. He first documented his 
photographic research in Le vol des oiseaux (1890) and then he moved to 
the very medium for the flight of birds. In other words, “he began by pho-
tographing the wing moving through the air and ended by photographing 
the air moving around the wing.”39 Marey’s experiments on the movement 
of air awakened high interest at a time when aviation research was making 
its first steps. Marey was a consultant, adviser, and for some time even the 
“éminence grise of French aviation, yet he was aware of his limited capabil-
ity to interpret his photographs mathematically and physically.”40 Among 
other photographs, he produced images of smoke fillets and then of air 
streams that he studied in a wind tunnel he constructed specially for this 
purpose. Retrospectively it is considered “the grandfather of those still in 
use today to visualize how air flows around an airplane wing.”41 
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Let us move now to the classical example of building screens between 
the body and the wind: architecture. We begin with the literary description 
of a residence that was built to protect its inhabitants from strong winds:
Wuthering Heights is the name of Mr. Heathcliff ’s dwelling, ‘Wuther-
ing’ being a significant provincial adjective, descriptive of the atmospheric 
tumult to which its station is exposed in stormy weather. Pure, bracing 
ventilation they must have up there, at all times, indeed: one may guess the 
power of the north wind, blowing over the edge, by the excessive slant of 
a few, stunted firs at the end of the house, and by a range of gaunt thorns 
all stretching their limbs one way, as if craving alms of the sun. Happily, the 
architect had foresight to build it strong: the narrow windows are deeply 
set in the wall, and the corners defended with large jutting stones.42
Walls and roofs, arcades, pergolas and other elements provide shelter for 
the body on one side against wind, precipitation, and extreme tempera-
ture, while on the other side, windows enable the air to circulate between 
indoors and outdoors. Therefore it would be short-sighted to consider 
that architecture builds only against the natural elements. As important 
as the protection from severe weather conditions is provision for open-
ing oneself to outer space. Apart from border cases, such as bunkers or 
other exceptional capsules, buildings do not block but only regulate and 
filter communication with the environment. Houses, like bodies, are open 
systems with various degree of permeability depending on the climate. In 
recent decades, architects opposed to the uniformity of modern interna-
tional architecture have returned to the vernacular traditions of building 
that integrate the natural elements (light, local building materials, air, etc.) 
into the construction.43 
On a larger scale, urban planning has to take into consideration the most 
frequent direction and intensity of the winds in order to decide conveni-
ently the placement and orientation of what will be built.44 As a matter of 
fact, architecture and urban planning are themselves filters or combs of 
the wind since they build solid masses that hinder the natural air circula-
tion and city highways that become channels for the wind. Thus artifacts 
do not only manifest (make visible or audible) the air streams; they also 
conduct the air and eventually shape it. By means of artistic engagement 
the impossible gesture of grasping the wind is converted into various suc-
cessful attempts to form and lend sense to the immaterial.
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6. Political commitment
This vision may well be dismissed as the product of a poetical fantasy. 
However, a radical change of context occurs when we move to the last 
type of aesthetic engagement, political commitment. It has already been 
mentioned that this can be expressed indirectly by using stormy weather 
as an atmospheric symbol for swift political changes. But the air belongs 
also to what Arnold Berleant has called “the perceptual commons,” the 
very ground of perception, and this requires a responsible and democratic 
“aesthetic politics of environment” to regulate the quality, the availability, 
and the access to basic natural resources.45 The wish to breathe pure and 
fresh air instead of being exposed to atmospheric pollution counts among 
the “perceptual claims” that differ from other claims because of “their im-
mediacy in experience and their primacy for sustaining life itself.”46 One 
may certainly find examples of artists who make such claims and qualify 
their ecological and political engagement as an aesthetic (i.e. aisthetic) 
engagement. However, here again, as in perceptual engagement, aesthetics 
transgresses the realm of art to become, or rather to rediscover, its initial 
meaning as a theory of sensibility.
As a matter of fact, all the forms of engagement mentioned above are 
based upon sensibility, if sensibility is not reduced to the receptivity to stim-
uli of a passive subject but is understood as the faculty for reacting to the 
outer world and producing something new: new images, new emotions, 
new reflections, and new artifacts. In the case of the wind, this stimulus 
activates various faculties of the subject, those of perceptual discrimination, 
emotional empathy, reflection, taste, and inventiveness. The famous idea 
of aesthetic disinterestedness in the sense of the absence of any practical 
interests does not at all exclude the subject’s interaction with the environ-
ment and a highly participatory attitude. What eventually distinguishes 
the art of feeling, (re)presenting, symbolizing, and making the wind from 
any passive exposure to natural elements is precisely the attempt to capture 
the essence of the wind in a never-ending adventure.
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Nathalie Blanc
Aesthetic Engagement in the City
This article aims at showing how environmental aesthetics relates to the 
common environment, the ordinary environment that we discuss, share, 
and live in. Aesthetics has primarily been understood in relation to art 
and art history, but it has now been emancipated from this framework 
of interpretation. In the wake of John Dewey, aesthetics has become the 
problem of experience as ordinary sensitivity. One can even think that it is 
a question of adequately defining the world of sensitivity that rests on the 
faculty of perception: both the capacity to perceive and the concept of the 
perceptual commons that follows from this. The forms that are perceived 
could then very well be understood as those we have in common and that 
we discuss in questions of policy (formal commons). 
Arnold Berleant, in his essay The Aesthetic Politics of Environment, ex-
plains:
Such a vision brings us to the need for recognizing and shaping environ-
ment. It may be that the perceptual commons identifies the establishing 
conditions of the human environment, that is, of the human world, and 
that in shaping environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its 
participating constituents.1 
In the remarks that follow I would like to show just how much aesthetic 
engagement, involving active participation in the appreciative process, 
sometimes by overt physical action but always by creative perceptual in-
volvement,2 concerns urban lives and also, in spite of the eminently artificial 
nature of the urban environment, how much it draws on the depth of the 
perceptual experience involved. Indeed, if there is knowledge in our city-
dwellers’ gaze, it is not this erudition that gives the aesthetic experiences 
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their depth and liveliness, but the human capacity to project ourselves into 
these environments, to feel connected to them ecologically.
1. Aesthetic engagement in urban space
Today’s worldwide urbanization has profoundly transformed humans’ 
relations with their natural and built environments. The latter is often 
considered as an entirely artificial setting, but the presence of ecological 
dynamics shows that it remains a living environment for many species. 
Experiencing the city, in fact, attests to a natural dimension that contributes 
to a renewed appreciation of the urban life setting. The numerous mobili-
zations in favor of nature in the city are accompanied by an appropriation 
of the urban environment that has been encouraged by the awareness 
of overall ecological issues. The fact that urbanites are expressing a desire 
to reconnect with nature in the city is in keeping with the elimination 
of the subject-object dichotomy. But before going any further, I would like 
to make several remarks about the debates around aesthetic engagement, 
environmental aesthetics, and eco-aesthetics.
First of all, it is important to stress the practical experience of the urban 
environment and the relationships that make it a framework for experienc-
ing the city. This practice constitutes the heart of a vital process that we 
can term environmentalization, that is to say, the creation of environments 
proper to the human being. The sensory materiality of the city contrib-
utes to this. Consequently, the representation of the environment is the 
result of a process involving keen aesthetic engagement. The individuals 
and communities sharing such aesthetic engagement do not dissociate 
the urban experience (as something appreciative, creative, central, and 
representational) from the production of the urban environment. Giving 
the urban setting its full meaning, this aesthetic engagement brings into 
play a learning experience, narratives, visions, landscapes, and panoramas.
Second, this experience of the city has recently taken a new turn that 
might be termed aesthetic and environmental. City-dwellers have gradually 
become aware not only of the importance of nature in the urban setting 
but also of the environmental issues arising from the damages caused by 
human activities, locally and globally. This growing awareness, through 
mobilizations, has gradually produced a change in the shaping of the city 
and has contributed to the creation of a new urban aesthetic (especially 
visible in eco-neighborhoods and other such experiments). In short, the 
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aesthetic experience of the city is not limited to what has been constructed 
but includes living environments as well.
Third, the idea of aesthetic engagement involves an active experience 
so that the aesthetic experience of environment increases the value of 
the environment and provides an opportunity to talk about it and about 
oneself at the same time. By simultaneously enhancing the self and the 
environment or a particular aspect of it, aesthetic engagement constitutes 
a recognition of oneself in the environment.3
Fourth, the perceptual habits governing our daily lives blot out part of 
the spectacular, monumental nature of the built city in favor of a singular 
syncopated experience that tends to be associated with urban rhythms. To 
cite one example, a contemporary analysis of aesthetic engagement inevi-
tably refers to an experiential framework caught between the extremes of 
mobility and immobility. This gives the city and its different urban spaces an 
uncertain appearance, like a kind of hesitation waltz between the extreme 
fixity of the spaces as setting and the great fluidity of the processes – a phe-
nomenon that is tied at once to contemporary capitalism and a desire to 
make urban spaces physically safe. Such a reading takes into account phe-
nomena of mobility (roads and motorways, flows of data and persons, etc.), 
regardless of the speed, as well as relations between the built and the natural, 
and the tangible and the intangible. The particular aesthetic that emerges 
foregrounds the inhumanity of the situations encountered (from the high-
speed motorways of urban networks to the traffic jams of the city taken as 
machine). All the same, the spread of mobility networks comes up against 
local and/or environmental resistances that take inspiration from novel 
forms of action to defend precious or endangered environments and species.
At the micro level, the city proclaims itself the site of friendly movement, 
such as flâneurs, improvised byways, and shortcuts. Various sources of 
legitimacy are invoked: pollution, the need to slow down, new perceptions 
of the urban landscape, all sorts of leitmotifs in remarks about the need for 
a “friendlier” aesthetic perception of the city, as well. In less than twenty 
years, we have gone from the hegemony of the automobile, in Western 
cities at least, to the renaissance of so-called friendly transport and the 
re-emergence of figures until now lost in modernity: the pedestrian, the 
cyclist, even the farmer.
This trend opposes two forms of disengagement. The first is tied to the 
professionalization and highly technical process of urban planning, which 
has altered the sensory features of the city and prohibited many customs 
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and practices (sleeping on the grass, savoring the odor of springtime, watch-
ing the stars, feeding the birds, etc.). The second form of disengagement 
comes from the privatization and commodification of the “public” space, 
where a significant portion of the road network is reserved for automobiles, 
advertising, and various means of blocking and closing off the space.
Here it must also be emphasized that the aesthetic experience, whether 
individual or collective, reflects forms of engagement in the environment 
that lead to understanding it in such a way as to resist normative injunc-
tions concerning our ordinary behaviors. In this sense, turning the envi-
ronment upside down means doing the same to ourselves. City-dwellers 
and their environment are closely interdependent on a conceptual level, 
which might be qualified as cultural ecology, and they perceive the depth of 
this interdependence. Thus, the beauty of neglected urban neighborhoods 
claimed by certain residents raises questions of ethics, individual dignity, 
and environmental justice.
The issue here is to elaborate an alternative way of understanding en-
vironmental processes. This alternative path rejects the social construc-
tionism that endows societies and individuals with a kind of pure power 
to shape the environment. It also rejects a kind of naturalism or realism 
that would grant scientific objectification a higher power for revealing 
reality. This alternative path draws on research dealing with agency and 
intra-action. To begin by explaining these terms, we can say that the on-
going relations human beings maintain with their environments lead 
them to jointly construct and elaborate a shared world as a frame of 
reference.4 Aesthetic engagement is a powerful means of shaping envi-
ronments. Consequently, it is no longer possible to understand a given 
event without including the observational setup and even the ways in 
which the observation, the environment, and the actors are constructed. 
A few examples will allow us to illustrate the way aesthetic engagement 
accompanies thinking about the city.
2. The cockroach in the city: a shady animal
The first example deals with a truly urban creature, the cockroach. Inter-
disciplinary research on the population dynamics of this species in three 
French cities: Paris, Lyons, and Rennes, have demonstrated the usefulness 
of aesthetics to characterize the behaviors it sets off. The cockroach (or 
Blatta, to use its scientific name) is specifically urban because, like other 
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increasingly numerous animals, it profits from the ecological conditions 
provided by the modern city (constant, year-round heat in buildings, mois-
ture, abundant hiding places, and the presence of food). In this sense, we 
are studying the ecology and ethology of this species of insect by situating 
it in a context that has not often been studied, that of the representations 
and practices it engenders.
This pioneering study, in both its form and content, has led to appreci-
ating the significance of the aesthetics of the cockroach and the practices 
that characterize our reactions to it. In addition to bringing out its formal 
qualities and the way it is perceived (a dark insect with many feet, highly 
mobile, taking refuge in dirty places, fleeing human beings and light), the 
aesthetic experience of this creature includes a large place for the imagi-
nation. The same imagination is brought to bear on the aesthetics of the 
neighborhood and the people living there. This kind of insect contributes 
to a debate that makes its presence an element full of meaning, as an indi-
cation, for example, of the stigmatization of disadvantaged neighborhoods 
in which they proliferate.
A woman who used to live in the countryside thus conveys the shame 
she feels through this account of her life in an urban housing block: 
People weren’t used to seeing us in this kind of environment. That’s how 
you discover who your friends are. It’s the same for the building. People 
say, “Do you see where you’re living, how it smells, what the people are 
like, their color?” For me, it was clear, I warned the people who were com-
ing here: “There are cockroaches, if that bothers you, you leave, and if it 
doesn’t bother you, you stay.”
Her way of dealing with the cockroaches stems from a broader struggle 
to adjust to a place that represents the “slum belt” and the behavior of some 
of the residents (reciprocal intolerance, irresponsibility, etc.). She is trying 
to improve her living conditions.
People imagine that the animal is dark and associate it with building 
technology: the plumbing, the interstices between buildings, all kinds of 
crevices constitute its “home.” This is where it settles, takes refuge when 
someone chases it, lies low in preparation for invading the nooks and 
crannies of private space. In other words, it is a shady animal taking up 
residence in the recesses of the everyday.
By extension, this animal of the shadows represents the foreigner, the 
other, who, in these housing blocks in the south of Rennes, a French city in 
Brittany with some 292,000 inhabitants, may be seen as a problem. As one 
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of the women queried explains: “One year, we came back from vacation 
and the walls were crawling. That must have come from somewhere. People 
say it’s because of the Arabs. Where it comes from and how it got there, 
but I don’t really know…” Two reasons are advanced: first, the insect is 
dark and likes the night, and second, it likes heat: “I’ve never studied the 
cockroach’s behavior. I’ve just noticed that we didn’t see any in the daytime 
and that it comes out in the evening.
Once I was in Tunisia and went into a store and there were [cockroaches]. 
It seems that there are a lot of them in warm countries.” These two features 
of the animal serve to associate it with the foreigner who, in France, comes 
from the South and has an olive-colored skin. In Man and The Natural 
World, Keith Thomas offers a striking example of this.5 The author analyzes 
the exclusion affecting animals and parts of humanity between the 16th and 
19th centuries. He cites a letter written in 1879 by an animal-lover whose 
house has been overrun by black beetles: “I hate making war even upon 
black beetles,” it runs, “they have as much right to live as black Zulus. But 
what can one do in either case?”
The metaphorical dimension of the approach to the cockroach also dem-
onstrates the power of aesthetic engagement. The metaphorical universe, 
a bridge suspended over reality, brings out the latter’s illusory depth. The 
judgment that confers greater importance on one metaphor or another, to 
the point that some of them, like the sunset, seem perfectly obvious, rec-
ognizes the universality of the aesthetic experience. The metaphor creates 
a link with reality, offers the possibility of increasing the value of certain 
places: when we attribute one term to another, we are not simply enhancing 
the description of the first but giving it a value. The metaphor increases 
the value of an imaginative, poetic way of grasping the real; it manifests 
an awareness of relationships uniting us with the environment.
By way of example, the etymology of the word cockroach in French – ca-
fard – is a marvellous tracer of the metaphorical construction of relation-
ships between human beings and things. The two terms used to designate 
this insect in French, the scientific name Blatta and the common name 
cafard, bring out the fact that both refer to its nocturnal habits.6 Indeed, 
cafard (1589) is probably borrowed from the Arabic kāfir, “unbeliever.” 
The pejorative suffix –ard replaced the original ending and the word was 
adopted with the religious sense of “poser” or “hypocrite” employed po-
lemically in the sixteenth century, especially during France’s religious wars 
between Catholics and Protestants. It seems that the everyday meaning 
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of Blatta(blatte in French), attested from 1542, is a metaphorical use of 
“religious hypocrite” now applied to a dark-colored animal hiding from the 
light. This meaning was initially regional (Normandy, Berry) but spread 
into French as a whole by the nineteenth century. The term blatte, from 
the Latin blatta, which covers various insects “fleeing the light” (Pliny), 
follows the same lines. Through the intermediary of scientific Latin, the 
naturalists of the second half of the eighteenth century established Blatta 
as a genus of cockroaches. The animal’s night-time habits thus play a large 
role in the representations and practices surrounding it, as demonstrated 
by many literary texts (where the cockroach swarms, threatens, should be 
exterminated, renders uncomfortable, etc.).
3. Natural spaces in the city: sensory experience 
and scientific knowledge
Second, studies attempting to characterize people’s relationships to 
nearby patches of nature, and more specifically, to the greenways in 
the greater Paris area, have shown that sensory, aesthetic engagement 
permits the richness of nature to be characterized other than by the use 
of scientific terms that usually attest to particular knowledge. Thus, if 
neither the ecological dimension of biodiversity nor the spatial dimen-
sion of the continuity is clearly perceived, do we still have to conclude 
that there is no link between the attachment mentioned above and the 
existing biodiversity? Several questions from the survey addressed the 
users’ sensory perceptions in these spaces. On the basis of the find-
ings, these perceptions bring out an ecological dimension that, even 
if it is not consciously defined, is reflected nonetheless in the interest 
these spaces generate. The presence of animals, for example, is impor-
tant: no fewer than 88% of the sample state that they see animals. Even 
if we remove replies concerning pets such as cats and dogs, there are 
still 65% of the replies mentioning birds, more than 30% citing dif-
ferent kinds of mammals, 5% mentioning fish and nearly 3% talking 
about insects. On the average, users thus declare that they have seen 
between two and three animals and cite a total of nearly eighty species.
Vegetal diversity is also perceived. With regard to trees, 70% of those 
surveyed indicated that they have distinguished several species, with half 
of them able to cite at least two. The percentages are slightly lower for 
grasses (52% of users identified several kinds), with a total of nearly eighty 
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herbaceous plant species named by those surveyed. This attention paid 
to animal and vegetable species is also part of the attractiveness of these 
spaces, and even more interestingly, of the well-being they may generate. 
Forty-two per cent of the respondents declared that they heard pleasant 
sounds and 39% that they smelled pleasant odors. This feeling is directly 
tied to biodiversity: the pleasant sounds primarily come from animals 
(72%), and secondarily from vegetation or water (13%), while the odors 
depend above all on plants (69%). Sounds and odors related to biodiversity 
thus contribute directly in the well-being felt in these greenways, as well as 
the sites’ “aesthetic quality” that is cited among the terms best describing 
these spaces, just after “calm” and “verdure.” We thus observe a profound 
difference between the knowledge of biodiversity (practically non-existent) 
and its perception that constitutes a large part of the attraction felt for these 
spaces. The role of these sensory perceptions as “gateways” to a greater 
awareness of biodiversity ultimately brings out the importance of the places, 
considered both from the standpoint of their biological diversity and from 
that of their aesthetic qualities as landscapes.
4. The experience of illness: rediscovering the senses
Third, aesthetic engagement helps to treat the symptoms of today’s illnesses. 
In terms of the link with nature, this does not just involve a spiritual re-
connection but everything affecting city-dwellers, directly and physically.
Here, the University Hospital in the north-eastern French city of Nancy 
offers an extremely interesting case in its “therapeutic garden” created 
by the hospital in 2008 for patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. 
Conceived within the logic of horticultural therapy, the Art, Memory 
and Life Garden, as it is called, brings together elements stimulating the 
cognitive mechanisms of Alzheimer’s patients. To that end, it is divided 
into four sections evoking the classical elements: air, earth, water, and 
fire.7 The idea is to mobilize all the senses: sight, through the colors and 
landscapes; hearing, through the sounds of the fountains and sound 
sculptures; touch, through the plants; smell, through the scents and 
fragrances of the flower beds. Memory, language, and emotion are so-
licited by the cycle of the seasons and exchanges with the support staff. 
Strolling in the garden also provides a spatial and temporal frame of 
reference. Because it is outdoors and accessible to visitors, it is a place of 
openness and thus of mediation.
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5. The senses and science
A final example concerning atmospheric pollution demonstrates how 
the capacity of aesthetic engagement for enhancing the value of everyday 
experience is such that the scientific knowledge that might be associated 
with it is sometimes not even mentioned. The study in question was based 
on nearly sixty semi-structured interviews concerning ordinary residents’ 
practices and representations with regard to air pollution in the eastern 
French city of Strasbourg. Half of the sample was composed of individuals 
suffering from asthma or allergies to grass pollen, following the principle 
of the “case-control” study widely used in epidemiology. Two interviews 
with heads of the local Association for the Monitoring and Study of At-
mospheric Pollution (ASPA, the organization that officially monitors air 
quality in the Alsace Region), as well as a study of ASPA articles in the 
press, complemented the survey. These elements were then compared 
with measures of air quality indoors and outdoors carried out by physi-
cians and chemists. The findings of this study may be summarized in 
three main points:
1– The individuals queried paid little attention to information about air 
pollution. They relied on sense information (odor, sight, noise) to construct 
their understanding of the phenomenon.
2–The standard, objective scientific information disseminated about 
air quality by the ASPA was quite remote from the residents’ empirical, 
sensory knowledge of air pollution. This was reinforced by an attachment 
to a concrete social context with which they identified. The opposition 
between these two spheres of knowledge about the physico-chemical phe-
nomena is striking.
3–For the city-dwellers, the practical form of involvement against pollu-
tion is a way of linking it symbolically to other environmental phenomena. 
Some of those surveyed believed, for example, that the vegetation protected 
them from pollution.
Such reasoning was based less on scientific knowledge than on the 
feeling that greenery purifies and that the “garden” it suggests – Paradise 
in many religious cultures – could shelter them from the pollution they 
considered to be a product of unnatural human activities. We can thus see 
that the cultures of nature, relying on an engaged aesthetic perception of 
the environment, play a fundamental role in understanding that environ-
ment and, consequently, on the practices people follow.
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6. Conclusion
If it is essential to take aesthetic engagement into account in urban develop-
ment, it is just as necessary to remain critically vigilant about the methods 
and objectives of this integration. Indeed, today’s decision-makers and 
developers do take aesthetic experience into consideration; but it nonethe-
less contributes essentially to an aestheticization of the environment that 
favors a spectacular vision of the city. But is it not possible to think of the 
city as an experience of discontinuity and syncopation? The light used 
to create striking night-time images of places that become impossible to 
miss, the greenery or the mix of city and nature all contribute to turning 
the city into a spectacle. The objective is to create hypnotic images of the 
urban space, to capture the tourist’s eye, to produce instantaneity and 
silence, “ghostliness”, or images that, coming back to haunt us, obliterate 
the reconstituted fluidity of the different experiences.
The city also becomes a mirror, a place reflecting a singular condition, a look-
ing-glass. Urban policies, notably in France, tend to multiply sensory experi-
ences to create a backdrop. (The Paris-Plages artificial beach is an example of 
this). Thus, the setting is increasingly understood as an attempt to improve 
urban well-being. The importance assumed by quality of life is symptomatic 
of this situation. Public authorities, but also representatives of civil society, 
are expressing a new demand for well-being that is deemed essential to the 
urban life of cities. It thus marks the transition from an urban aesthetic (space 
as setting) to an urban aesthesis or sense perception (urban environment as 
atmosphere), from a space of decors to a space of well-being. Urban strategies 
thus reflect this shift toward an ecological urbanism in the sense of a multitude 
of possible experiences. Certain places in the city would be able to produce 
emotions or new aesthetic experiences. It should be noted, however, that rep-
resentatives of civil society, such as community garden movements, consider 
this environmental approach as a change of lifestyle. Nonetheless, these various 
changes tend to enlarge the place for the sensory and the living in systems in 
order to increase the value of the urban environment.
Do our bodies now contribute to the environmental fashioning of urban 
space?8 The “sensorial” standards thus being created are now integrated 
into environmental policies, town-planning, and “landscaping” practices 
where artists participate as well. In a broad sense, the development of these 
ecological events plays a de facto role in producing public space. This in-
volves, first of all, ejecting inhabitants deemed undesirable, whether these 
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are living species, such as pigeons, or the homeless, who are prevented 
from staying in the protected urban space. Second, the multiplication of 
sensory experiences in that space and the creation of a living environ-
ment that meets city-dwellers’ demands for leisure activities underscore 
the theses of aesthetic capitalism:9 capital is invested and produced in the 
commodification of the urban environment. The production of a green 
environment is part of the branding of the product “ecology” that is ap-
propriated by capitalists and urban policy-makers to inject dynamism 
into a society keen on consuming new experiences. For the cities’ political 
leaders and technical experts, the artist often appears to be the means of 
rehabilitating damaged or ailing environments in the “green” imagination 
of an ecology-oriented society. Navigating between local development and 
political manipulation, the artist offers the potential of a new reading or 
experience of the sites. The urban space, formerly dedicated to specific 
urban functions (services, production, etc.), becomes the very locus of 
experimentation and the creation of new events. Animals, vegetation, air, 
and climate are all part of this rereading of the city.
Translated from French by Miriam Rosen
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Jale Erzen
Aesthetic Engagement: Art Into Politics
This paper is in three parts: first I will compare aesthetic and practical 
perception; second I will articulate ideas about the image and its engag-
ing power; this will lead my argument to the investigation of how art and 
images can be effective in the symbolic ordering of our social relations.
1. Aesthetic and practical perception
We can claim that all perception is aesthetic, actively involving a sensory 
response through which the imagination constructs meaning. Today, 
however, both media transmissions and the industrial and mechanical 
forms imposed on the environment inevitably create an uninvolving 
practical perception that abandons its objects as soon as a functional 
interpretation results that causes immediate action. Many spaces, such 
as offices, coffee shops, supermarkets, shopping centers, airports, etc., 
are designed in a mechanical way where space is rendered shallow and 
the sense of place is negated.1 In such places and under such condi-
tions aesthetic perception and engagement are excluded to give way to 
operational behavior.
An example is the traffic light, a sign on the perception of which a prac-
tical response is given. Of course, traffic lights can also become aesthetic 
through artistic articulation, as seen in the above artwork. Practical per-
ception consumes its object and does not leave any option for seeing or 
interpreting symbols. Aesthetic perception, on the other hand, is open 
ended, leading to changing interpretations and the creation of symbols; it 
abandons itself to the different and myriad interpretations and meanings 
afforded by a mental commitment to the object.
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Engagement is an attraction that mentally and often emotionally com-
mits the subject to the object without limitation of time or space. Looking 
at a work of art, reading a book involves us beyond time and space; we 
assume a kinship with an author from centuries past or from an unknown 
place. Engagement is total abandonment through the senses to the object 
without critical judgments or analyses; one is involved with the whole. Life 
could be seen as a total engagement: engaging with the world, with others, 
with society. Life is possible first through aesthetic engagement, through 
sharing the expressions of the world as our senses become involved with 
the objects of perception. According to Arnold Berleant, who has for many 
years developed a philosophy of engaged aesthetics, “Aesthetic engagement 
is not based on the demands of a logical structure or a philosophical sys-
tem. It therefore rejects aesthetic experience and the presence of aesthetic 
value throughout human activity.”2 However, it may be that an engaged 
and emotionally charged relationship to the world is mostly possible today 
in the arts.
Yet with the exception of mass media images, art images and images 
transmitted through the social media have a forceful effect in creating 
new spaces of solidarity, new concepts of the self and the other, new urban 
environments and social spaces. The visual image, more than any kind 
of sensory form, gives one immediate credibility of the real. Therefore, 
today, no matter how much one discredits media transmissions, televi-
sion, films, videos and photography are effective tools in conditioning our 
relationship to the world.
There are images that are seen, those that are revelations of the invisible, 
images in blindness, dream images, images created in the vast realm of 
art, and images of social or political references that pave the way to the 
solidarity of resistance. Aesthetics, as the investigation into the meaning 
of form rather than that of content or narration, emerges as a discipline 
and a regime of thought with the Enlightenment. It is especially with Hegel 
that aesthetics begins to designate thinking related to art. Representation 
in whatever way it is understood, either as the mental image that is cre-
ated in perception, as in the explanation of Kant, or as an interpretation, 
description, or created image of the thing seen or experienced, as Rancière 
claims, involves a relationship between knowledge and action.3 However, 
as the discourse on art and on the image becomes intensified, at the same 
time as Hegel proposes, in the modern age the spirit is disconnected from 
art and, for that matter, from the image. Giorgio Agamben claims, in line 
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with Hegel’s reasoning, that images or artworks today do not engage us 
any more as they used to before the medieval era. According to Agamben, 
involvement today with an image or with art is simply critical and inquisi-
tive.4 However, I will not dwell on this controversy.
2. The image and its engaging power
When we confront an image there is always a kind of shock at the first 
encounter. Seeing, confronting an image, especially images with the paint-
erly touch, refuse any narrative explanation and lead to a silence. Adorno 
has written that all real experience is accompanied by a shudder. An im-
age creates a kind of total empowerment, as in confronting a work of art. 
Ranciére explains that all great works of art give us a certain shock when 
thought becomes paralyzed. He goes on to say that although we always 
read an image with thought, the moment we are hit by the image we can no 
longer think, calculate, or assess. We are engaged totally. Aesthetic engage-
ment at first creates a kind of incapacity, whereas in practical perception 
we are led to immediate practice, a way out of engagement.5 According 
to Lyotard, the force of the image (of art) makes us powerless: the subject 
is disarmed by the sensible, which hits the naked soul confronted by the 
power of the “other.” For him it is like the striking of the sublime, which 
elevates pathos and is irreducible to logos.6 The power of art, then, is the 
immediate identity of the contradictions of logos and pathos (thought 
and passion). In Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, these are symbolized by the 
trance represented by Dionysus coupled with the discipline and order of 
Apollo. It is a process where the trance is then followed by the perception of 
intelligible order and form: This shift from one state to the other is typical 
of aesthetic engagement, which does not forsake its object but becomes 
open to continuous interpretations and sensory states. The symbol can 
never be consumed; it is open to myriad interpretations.
According to George Didi-Huberman, “there is no innocent gaze before 
the one that we place on an image… a knowledge precedes all approaches, 
all reception of images;…but something strange happens the moment our 
knowledge…is shattered…when the image appears.”7 “With the appear-
ance of the image all our language is questioned… and suspended. Facing 
the strangeness of the image our language becomes enriched with new 
combinations and our thought with new categories.”8 According to him, 
this incapacity before the image has to do with the wider anthropological, 
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historical, and political dimension of images. Even in front of familiar 
images, there are breaks that emerge suddenly and put us in a state of be-
wilderment. As the image emerges in our consciousness, it opens a break 
in our thinking and we enter a museum of empty words; it is impossible 
to find words for this experience. According to Didi-Huberman, the image 
is only worth as much as it can change our thinking.9 Even when we see 
the same image, we look at it through a new time dimension and a new 
space dimension. On the other hand, images of the media do not emerge; 
they bombard us.
Until now I have talked about the perception and involvement of the 
person who looks, of the spectator with the image or with the art work. 
The involvement and perception of the artist with the work of art is almost 
Dionysian, without any recourse to distancing and critical judgment.
In Agamben’s words:
To look at a work of art, therefore, means to be hurled out into a more 
original time: it means ecstasy in the epochal opening of rhythm, which 
gives and holds back. Only by starting from this situation of man’s rela-
tionship with the work of art is it possible to comprehend how this rela-
tionship – if it is authentic – is also for man the highest engagement, that 
is, the engagement that keeps him in the truth and grants to his dwelling 
on earth its original status. In the experience of the work of art, man 
stands in the truth, that is, in the origin that has revealed itself to him 
in the poietic act. In this engagement, in this being hurled-out-into the 
έπoχη of rhythm, artists and spectators recover their essential solidarity 
and their common ground.10
3. How art/images can be effective in the symbolic 
ordering of our social relations
Art becomes work when it is shared with another person. Sharing is also 
engagement in the most basic sense. In articulating the relationship be-
tween art and politics, Jacop Lund refers to Bernard Stiegler’s claim that 
the “[artist’s] work is originarily engaged in the question of the sensibil-
ity of the other. The political question is, in essence, the question of the 
relation to the other in a common or shared sensing…”11 “The political is 
aesthetic in that it has to do with the symbolic ordering of social relations 
and our coexistence.”12 “Perception, sensation, feeling and taste are not 
only individual but at the same time social phenomena.”13 As Lund claims, 
“Art is directly associated with engaging members of a society in common 
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symbols and in common experiences afforded by cultural expressions, i.e., 
sounds, and cultural activities… Politics is the art of securing the unity 
of the city, the polis, in its desire for a common future… a political com-
munity is thus – in agreement with the Kantian idea of sensus communis, 
i.e. our shared ability to have feelings in common.”14 
According to Rancière, artistic ‘means’ are the ‘means’ of participating 
in the configuration of a specific milieu.15 On the other hand, a large part 
of the world population has been turned into passive consumers (even 
of symbols) through global culture industries. For many people today 
aesthetic engagement is seldom possible; global culture industries subject 
people to alienating aesthetic conditionings through media imagery and 
through exposing people to spaces and phenomena devoid of meaning. 
“Politically active art changes the conditions of what we see and we speak 
about; it challenges the borders between the visible and the invisible…. 
[I]t is thus through art that the world can be articulated in new ways.”16 In 
this relation, a lot of contemporary art that diverts people from established 
canons of commercially viable art through its dissonance has contributed 
to political awareness. “Art’s relative autonomy and difference from every-
day life…makes it possible for dissonant art to openly show the tensions, 
contradictions and aporias of the capitalist system.”17 
I believe that because digital imagery can be shared on such a large scale, 
it also has great engaging power, as we have witnessed in the spreading 
of political uprisings of the last several years. Images of activist dynamics, 
images of how city spaces are turned into interactive communal areas, have 
had an immense power of engaging people.
All political uprising involve people mentally and ideologically, not 
only through concepts, but aesthetically through a sensory engagement 
that is triggered by images and sounds that are interpreted as symbols and 
stimulate one into direct response. The image engages us personally, both 
as a symbol that appears within our private mental space and as something 
that connects us to the world. Recent political actions have created their 
own ways of belonging to the city and claiming urban space.
Through these images we identify with the actors and engage in a com-
mon cause.
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Image 1 (Drawing by Jale N. Erzen – 1985 mixed media)
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Cheng Xiangzhan
Aesthetic Engagement, Ecosophy C, 
and Ecological Appreciation
1. Introduction
With the aim of healing the earth and sustain a healthy ecosystem for all 
life forms, not humankind alone, ecoaesthetics emerges as a critique of 
Enlightenment mentality and of modern aesthetics as it is embodied in it. 
This mentality contributes greatly to the global ecological crisis and to other 
problem areas, such as population, economic, political and religious ones. 
In my understanding of aesthetics, ecoaesthetics is defined as the theory 
of ecological aesthetic appreciation.1 
With ecoaesthetics as my research horizon, there are at least two reasons 
for me to pay special attention to American philosopher Arnold Berleant’s 
conception of aesthetic engagement and his aesthetic theory based on it, an 
aesthetics of engagement. The first is our shared theme, which is the critique 
of modern aesthetics. The second reason is more complex for it involves the 
crucial question of the proper manner of aesthetic appreciation. From the 
perspective of ecoaesthetics, the contemplation of objects by a separated 
perceiver, an approach that is based on the modern philosophical dualism 
of subject and object, is unsatisfactory and inadequate. Berleant’s aesthetic 
engagement is a more satisfactory account of appreciation that is aesthetic 
and ecological. This emphasizes the ecological continuity or interrelated-
ness between the human appreciator and objects.
Of course, any theory can occasion critique and development. Based on 
Berleant’s idea of aesthetic engagement, I would like to propose Ecosophy 
C. This can be contrasted with Ecosophy T proposed by the Norwegian, 
Arne Naess, and with traditional Chinese aesthetic wisdom. In contrast with 
these, I would like to develop my own view of ecological understanding. In 
order to construct a more comprehensive and reasonable ecoaesthetics, my 
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Ecosophy C contains eight points that are crucial in building an ecological 
model of aesthetic appreciation for this period of ecological crisis.
2. Aesthetic engagement as a model of aesthetic 
appreciation and its revolutionary significance
Arnold Berleant’s idea of “engagement,” later specified as “aesthetic engage-
ment,” started to appear in the literature in the 1970s and ‘80s. His 1991 
book Art and Engagement offers a detailed discussion about the idea and 
challenges the entire tradition of modern aesthetics, especially its dualism 
of subject and object. Berleant asserts that the concept of aesthetic engage-
ment “claims continuity rather than separation”2 and proposes that this 
conception of aesthetics centers on appreciative “experience characterized 
by continuity, perceptual integration, and engagement.”3 With his criticism 
of modern aesthetics’ reduction of experience to a subjective response, he 
emphasizes “experiential continuity” and even calls his aesthetic theory 
based on this idea as an “aesthetics of the continuity of experience.”4 In 
contrast with the dominant approach of contemporary aesthetics that 
focuses mainly on art, Berleant proposes moving “through intuition and 
empathy to involvement and engagement,”5 it is possible to go beyond the 
aesthetic realm of art to investigate other kinds of experiential continuity, 
such as environmental experience. Indeed, Berleant has received interna-
tional attention for his work in the area of environmental aesthetics. So for 
Berleant, the central aesthetic issue now is not the difference between art 
and non-art but between aesthetic and non-aesthetic. The prevalent prac-
tice of equating aesthetics with the philosophy of art is thus transcended.
In order to support his new aesthetic conception of experiential continu-
ity and its related idea such as empathy, Berleant borrows the idea of intel-
lectual sympathy from Henri Bergson, the idea of Einfühlung (empathy) 
from Theodor Lipps, and the idea of “the interaction of the live creature 
with his surroundings” from John Dewey.6 In brief, Berleant’s aesthetics 
of engagement is based on his key idea of the continuity of appreciative 
experience, which asserts that artist, object, appreciator, and performer 
are no longer understood as separate constituents but become functional 
aspects of the aesthetic process.
From the perspective of my ecoaesthetics, I want to raise a more fun-
damental question: how should we understand philosophically some key 
terms contained in Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement, such as continuity, 
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empathy, and process? Is it possible for us to interpret them from the per-
spectives of scientific ecology, philosophical ecology, and ecosophy so as 
to support the ongoing project of constructing ecoaesthetics? Ecoshophy 
C will offer an answer to that question from the perspective of traditional 
Chinese aesthetic wisdom.
3. Key points of Ecosophy C
In order to understand Ecosophy C as proposed in this paper, it is necessary 
to know something about Ecosophy T as proposed by the Norwegian Arne 
Naess. Naess is most famous for the idea of deep ecology. The opposite 
of the word ‘shallow,’ the word ‘deep’ expressed “the most general and 
basic views.”7 As a branch of the field of biological research, ecology is an 
interdisciplinary scientific study of the living conditions of organisms in 
interaction with each other and with the surroundings, organic as well as 
inorganic. As compared with the science of ecology, the essence of deep 
ecology is to ask “deeper questions” and the adjective “deep” stresses the 
point that we ask “why” and “how,” i.e. questions related to value theory. 
So, ecosophy or deep ecology involves “a shift from science to wisdom.”8 
Given the hard fact that Homo sapiens is a kind of organism, Naess 
raised a “deeper” question. Do all possible studies of humankind’s relations 
with all possible kinds of surroundings belong to ecology? This question 
inevitably implies a philosophical pursuit rather than scientific inquiry 
into the place of humanity in nature.
In response to this philosophical pursuit, Naess realized clearly the lim-
its of ecology and proposed what he called ecophilosophy or ecosophy. In 
Naess’s understanding, ecosophy is combined of the prefix “eco-“ found in 
economy and ecology, which has an broader meaning than the immediate 
family, household, and community and means “earth household;” and the 
suffix “-sophy” found in philosophy, which denotes insight or wisdom. So 
ecosophy becomes “a philosophical world-view or system inspired by the 
conditions of life in the ecosophere.”9 Given that every situation is unique 
and specific, Naess introduced Ecosophy T to denote his own ecosophy. 
The ‘T’ referred to Tvergastein, a mountain hut where he wrote many of 
his books. He encouraged his audience to develop his or her own systems 
of guides, say, Ecosophies X, Y, or Z.
Inspired and encouraged by Naess, I propose my personal ecosophy, 
Ecosophy C. ‘C’ here means eight expressions with the capital ‘C:’ 1. Chinese 
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culture, which is my cultural background; 2. Confucianism, which I view 
as the cultural symbol of a global cultural ecosystem; 3. Continuity of 
being, the metaphysical and ontological promise of Chinese aesthetics; 
4. Creating life, which is viewed as the great virtue of Heaven and Earth 
expressed significantly in one of the Chinese classics, The Book of Changes; 
5. Compassion, which is mainly embodied in Zhuangzi’s philosophical 
story of appreciating the fish’s joy and means to have the faculty to share 
empathy with all life; 6. Cheng Hao, a philosopher in the Song Dynasty, 
whose aesthetic thought represents the most systematic expression of 
ecological appreciation in Chinese aesthetics; 7. Community, a key term 
in ecology, based on which Leopold developed his idea of ecological con-
science; and 8. Cultural evils, a key idea proposed in Cheng Xiangzhan’s 
aesthetic theory, an aesthetics of creating life. Within the context of this 
paper, the following section only discusses points 3, 5 and 7.
First let’s talk about point 7, community. In today’s ecological theory, 
‚community’ is a general term applied to any grouping of populations of 
different organisms found living together in a particular environment. In 
his 1947 essay entitled “The Ecological Conscience,” Leopold defined ecol-
ogy as “the science of communities” and consequently defined ecological 
conscience as “the ethics of community life.”10 He asserted that what is 
lacking in philosophy, ethics, and religion is ecological conscience and 
a change in philosophy of values should be promoted. In order to develop 
his land ethic, Leopold put the community concept in the central place. The 
single premise of all ethics is that an individual is a member of a community 
of interdependent parts. His land ethic simply enlarged the “boundaries of 
the community to include soils, waters, plants and animals or, collectively, 
the land” and affirmed the right of these resources to “continued existence 
in a natural state.”
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror 
of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect 
for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.11 
It is clear that Leopold’s statement is not a view of scientific ecology 
but an ecosophy: an ecological philosophical view about values. Based 
on his emphasis on the concept of community, Leopold expressed his 
value standard in a widely cited maxim: “A thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. 
It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”12 Scientifically speaking, from the 
perspective of geological time or scale, say 10,000 years, the planet earth 
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is continuously changing dramatically. There is no integrity or stability 
at all. However, philosophically speaking from the perspective of human 
civilization, humankind should take preserving the integrity and stability 
of the earth as its value orientation. Only by doing so can humankind face 
the challenges of the global ecological crisis.
Compassion generally means sympathetic pity and concern for the 
sufferings or misfortunes of others. However, with the awareness of the 
community concept and an ecological conscience based on it, it would be 
most reasonable to understand that “others” should include any individual 
member sharing the same community, no matter whether it is a plant or 
an animal. What is more, we can reinterpret the meaning of the word 
‘compassion’ positively to investigate the possibility of sharing others’ joy or 
satisfaction and not only the negativity of their sufferings or misfortunes. 
There is an appealing philosophical story about the joy of fish in Zhuangzi, 
the Chinese classic of Taoism:
Travelling with Huizi over a bridge on the Hao River, Zhuangzi said, 
“The fish is swimming at ease. This is how the fish enjoy themselves.” Huizi 
said, “You are not a fish. How do you know the fish are enjoying them-
selves?” Zhuangzi said, “You are not me. How do you know I don’t know 
about the fish?”
The philosophical question here is related to what we call intersubjec-
tivity applied here to the relation between human beings and non-human 
things. Is it possible for us to know a fish’s joy or not? If yes, how? Zhuangzi 
did not answer these questions directly. He just said that from a bridge on 
the Hao River, he could know the fish’s joy. The key here is how to under-
stand the word ‚know’ as a human activity. We may “know” something 
scientifically, philosophically, or aesthetically. It is reasonable to think in 
biological terms that when a fish’s desire for survival is satisfied by its liv-
ing environment, it can experience a kind of joy, satisfaction, or absence 
of stress. To some extent, it is a natural faculty of humans to understand 
or know this point. I argue that from the perspective of today’s ecological 
ethics, mankind should respect non-human things’ intrinsic value and 
their right to enjoy their lives. Briefly, the positive feeling of compassion 
is a kind of human ability and sensibility based on ecological ethics, which 
exemplifies the aesthetic intersubjectivity between human beings and 
non-human life.
Community as a key term in ecology shows the interconnectedness or 
connectivity among community members, and compassion shows that 
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the boundaries between things may disappear to some extent. How, then, 
should we understand connectivity and compassion philosophically or 
metaphysically? From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, we may pro-
pose the concept of “the continuity of being,” which is the title of an essay 
by Tu Weiming, a Harvard professor of Chinese history and philosophy. 
In his paper, Tu introduces Chinese visions of nature and asserts:
The Chinese belief in the continuity of being, a basic motif in Chinese 
ontology, has far-reaching implications in Chinese philosophy, religion, 
epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics.13 
This belief is based on the Chinese mode of thought about cosmogony 
as an organismic process, that thinks, in F. W. Mote’s words, that “all of the 
parts of the entire cosmos belong to one organic whole and that they all 
interact as participants in one spontaneously self-generating life process.”14 
The most basic stuff that makes up the cosmos is a vital force or vital power, 
ch’i (i.e., matter-energy). This kind of metaphysical assumption is signifi-
cantly different from the Cartesian dichotomy between spirit and matter. 
In the unified cosmos consisting of ch’i, all modalities of being, from a rock 
to heaven, are integral parts of a continuum that is often referred to as the 
“great transformation” (da-hua). Within the continuum, “the chain of being 
is never broken and a linkage will always be found between any given pair of 
things in the universe….The continuous presence of ch’i in all modalities of 
being makes everything flow together as the unfolding of a single process.”15 
Briefly, if we follow the way of thought proposed by deep ecology and 
always ask deeper questions, we will finally meet metaphysical questions. 
We may explore Berleant’s ideas, mentioned earlier, of “experiential conti-
nuity” and of “aesthetics and the continuity of experience” in this way and 
raise a question: what is the philosophical or metaphysical foundation of 
continuity? To some extent, the Chinese mode of thought about ch’i and the 
cosmos consisting of ch’i is very close to the worldview interpreted through 
today’s science of ecology and philosophical ecology, which emphasizes the 
connectivity and interrelatedness between community members.
4. Ecological appreciation: from aesthetic engagement 
to ecological engagement
The strategy of this paper is to reinterpret Berleant’s theory of aesthetic 
engagement from the perspective of ecosophy C so as to develop an eco-
logical model of nature appreciation: ecological engagement.
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I define ecoaesthetics as the theory of ecological appreciation. The basic 
assumption behind this working definition of ecoaesthetics is the follow-
ing statement: we can appreciate something aesthetically and ecologically. 
Based on Berleant’s aesthetic engagement and aiming at the construction 
of an ecoaesthetics, I shall rewrite the above statement as follows: we can 
engage with something aesthetically and ecologically. So aesthetic and 
ecological engagement are the core of my ecoaesthetics. The following 
section of the paper will explain ecological engagement from the perspec-
tive of ecosophy C.
First, ecological engagement inquires into the question of “why:” Why 
should we appreciate nature with respect and awe and believe that every-
thing enjoys its intrinsic value rather than have only instrumental value? 
The answer is that ecological engagement is based on the ontological as-
sumption that everything within a community enjoys connectivity and 
continuity (the continuity between mind, body and world) with each other. 
Community may vary according to different geological and spatial scales, 
from a small pond to a mountain area, from the planetary earth to the 
entire universe. Scientifically speaking, the inherent tie among all things 
in the universe is energy (or ch’i the Chinese philosophical term), which 
means that the whole universe is a great process of the transformation of 
energy and everything within it is an intrinsic part of that process. Ecoaes-
thetics should rest its philosophical base on this ecological worldview. An 
important part of ecological literacy, which includes an enhanced respect 
for and deeper feeling of connectivity with the different parts of the natural 
world, should be cultivated by ecological education.16 
Second, ecological engagement inquires the question of “how:” how are 
we able to appreciate nature? With the ontological assumption and world-
view just described in mind, to engage with something ecologically means 
to be able to experience compassion for all life, human and non-human. 
Human beings’ natural ability to have compassion for others’ positive joy 
or negative sufferings should be explored scientifically, psychologically, 
and philosophically.
Third, ecological engagement inquires into the question of “what:” what 
should we appreciate in the natural environment? The answer to this ques-
tion is that we should be aware of and appreciate the great transformational 
processes of the universe. This means that the perception of a landscape is 
not simply the awareness of scenery but of the complex and dynamic fields 
of energy transformation that are present. In terms of Chinese aesthetics, 
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it is the appreciation of nature’s vitality (shengji) or spirit resonance (qi-
yun). We have arrived at a new model of nature appreciation. In brief, as 
an ecological model of nature appreciation, ecological engagement may 
be called a “why-how-what” model of nature appreciation, which is the 
core of my ecoaesthetics.
Endnotes
1. Cheng Xiangzhan, On the Four Keystones of Ecological Aesthetic Appreciation in East 
Asian Ecocriticism: A Critical Reader, eds. Simon C. Estok and Won-Chung Kim, New 
York: Macmillan, 2013, pp. 213–228.
2. Arnold Berleant, Art and Engagement, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991, 
p. xiii.
3. Ibid., p. 4.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Ibid., p. 16.
6. Ibid., pp. 16–17
7. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, trans. and 
revised by David Rothenberg, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 28.
8. George Sessions (ed.), Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc., 1995, p. 27.
9. Arne Naess, Ecology…, p. 38.
10. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1949, p. 340.
11. Ibid., p. 204.
12. 12. Ibid., pp. 224–225.
13. Tu Weiming, The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature in Confucianism and 
Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, eds. Mary Evelyn Tucker 
and John Berthrong, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 105.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 108.
16. Laura S. Ronald and Matthew C. Cotton, Empathetic Education: An Ecological 
Perspective on Educational Knowledge, London: Palmer Press, 1999, pp. 162–73.
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Aleš Erjavec
Art, Aesthetics, and Politics
*
Those among us who come from former socialist countries and are old 
enough to remember them when they were still socialist – be they the 
former Soviet Union, the European East, or the persevering Cuba and 
China – still recall well the infinite and meandering discussions about art 
and politics. Is art political or not? If it is, is it always political? Is it politi-
cal or politicized?
Case One: In 1978 the Slovenian student newspaper “Tribuna” of whose 
editorial board I was then a member, featured the poetry and an interview 
with the East German dissident Wolf Biermann (the East German “Bob 
Dylan”). As soon as it was printed, the Biermann issue of “Tribuna” was 
confiscated, sent to the paper mill, and shreded. When we inquired why, 
the answer was: in the very same week in which we published Biermann, 
Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe was taking place in 
Belgrade (at that time the capital of Yugoslavia). Slovenian and Yugoslav 
politicians feared that the East German participants of the Belgrade confer-
ence would get the impression that Yugoslavia had published Biermann to 
provoke – for whatever reason – their country and its representatives at the 
Belgrade meeting. In this way the purported addressees of the Biermann 
issue of “Tribuna” were not readers of the students’ newspaper in Slovenia 
but the imagined representatives of East Germany.
Case Two: Political art exists already in the nineteenth century, much 
of which remains within the frame of traditional representational artistic 
framework and involves “content-based commitment” (as opposed to the 
formal “commitment” exemplified by the specific use of collage, montage, 
etc.). An instance of the former would be the art of an artist such as Gustave 
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Courbet (1819–1877), the realist painter of works such as The Stonebreakers 
(1849) who became a politician during the siege and the Commune of Paris 
in 1870–71 and, in his own words, a member of “four of the most impor-
tant offices in Paris.” He was imprisoned during the political persecution 
of the Communards, only to return later to the life of an artist. His artistic 
activities were related to his political beliefs and were interdependent with 
them in a direct way, as in social and critical realism, i.e., via content. His 
art was “political” by its motif but not “revolutionary” in a formal artistic 
sense – by its style and technique – nor avant-garde in the sense that his 
painterly work extended beyond the confines of autonomous art. In other 
words, “Courbet as an exemplary artist-revolutionary thus does not exem-
plify the overlapping of art and revolution, but rather the rapid succession 
of the roles of artist and revolutionary politician.”1
Case Three: Expressionist writer Franz Kafka is considered to be one 
of the most important modernist novelists of the twentieth century. Lit-
tle is known today that his work underwent a series of contradictory and 
mutually excluding ideological and political interpretations. Immediately 
after his death in 1924 appeared in “Rudé právo”, the journal of the Czech 
Communist Party, an obituary in which Kafka was declared to have been 
a sympathizer of workers and to have had an insight into their suffer-
ing. Different and opposed interpretations followed: between the two 
world wars Kafka was declared to have been Marxist, Jewish, Protestant, 
Catholic, and Existentialist writer, while after the second world war he was 
proclaimed to have a premonition of the inhumanity of Communism: his 
work was interpreted not only as criticism of Nazism (especially with his 
short story “In the Penal Colony”) but also as criticism of Stalinism. Due 
to this latter interpretation Kafka’s writings met with official denigration 
among French Communists who in a 1946 issue of their official party 
magazine Action on the cover page raised the question: “Fault-il brûler 
Franz Kafka?” Of course, the question whether Kafka should be burnt was 
a poignant one for Kafka asked his friend Max Brod to burn his works 
(something that Brod did not do but instead spent his life editing and 
publishing Kafka’s novels, short stories and parables). In the fifties Kafka 
was not published in Czechoslovakia (or, for that matter, elsewhere in the 
East bloc). Although he was published in the sixties in Soviet Union the 
editors of the edition tried hard to persuade the reader that reading Kafka 
would be a waste of time. Then in 1963 the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ences organized in Liblice a symposium on the work of Franz Kafka.2 Was 
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its purpose to set the record straight and to depoliticize his work? On the 
contrary: the purpose of the Liblice conference was to prepare the way for 
the emergence of the Czech version of “socialism with a human face” that 
culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968. In Liblice Kafka and his literary 
works thus served as proof that under socialism too alienation and reifica-
tion occur. It was only later, in 1975, that Deleuze and Guattari published 
their book on Kafka (Toward a Minor Literature), that was concerned not 
with ideological and political issues so typical for previous interpretations 
and evaluations of Kafka and his oeuvre. It was only after the sixties that 
Kafka became an object of non-politicized literary studies. Was this newly 
acquired autonomy good or bad? Was it better or worse than the previous 
heteronomy? Art is never only autonomous or heteronomous but both, 
but to different extent.
**
Is art really the highest form of creativity and is it essentially linked to 
emancipation? Should it be regarded from a class perspective or from 
a universally human one – and, either way, what does this mean? Is all 
art a part of the class struggle or is it a part of the relatively autonomous 
superstructure? Is it a form of ideology but if it is, how is it possible (as 
Louis Althusser claimed) that art also makes ideology visible?
From the sixties and well into the early eighties of the previous century – 
which is the time frame of dilemmas confronting us under circumstances 
described above – art and politics, as well as politics and philosophy, existed 
in a permanent uneasy relationship that often erupted into conflict. This 
happened because art, theory, and in particular philosophy were some of 
the rare venues wherein critical positions and questions could be enunci-
ated or implied, all of them revealing themselves as symptoms of chaotic 
and disorganized relations within socialist societies, thereby allowing 
various conflicts or divergences to appear or at least be hinted at. While 
art and philosophy – and thereby aesthetics as philosophy of art – were 
always drifting between the always the same two seasons – from winter to 
spring and back – they at the same time revealed and constituted the unre-
solvable internal and external political limits of these politicized societies 
within which every segment of the social field was subsumed to politics. 
They formed part of the socialist superstructure that existed within the 
frame of political struggles, this being so even when it appeared that the 
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conflict between the official and the unofficial was raised on the basis of 
controlled and controllable facets of society – a situation made worse by 
the inability of socialist countries to allow for any substantial measure of 
criticism and self-criticism for they would shatter their fragile social and 
political fabric. On the other hand, this situation invested art and artists 
with importance they hardly possessed in other kinds or realms of society. 
In this respect the outstanding situation was that of transition of socialism 
into postsocialism that in period that in most countries lasted one or two 
decades. Within this period art, philosophy etc. attained freedom which 
was so much more precious for it existed and were created in societies in 
which only recently it was sanctioned and prohibited.3
Within this ideological and political universe aesthetics was of no great 
import: it was either subsumed under philosophy or under an abstract and 
well-intentioned but shallow notions of beauty, art and form.
The dominant forms of twentieth-century aesthetics that were related 
to politics were of course content-oriented aesthetics – whose ideal was 
realism in art – and formalist aesthetics – whose ideal was modernism in 
art. The former was defended by Marxist critics and the latter by modernist 
and modern theorists and critics. (Often “modernist” art and its theory 
were associated with Greenberg and Adorno and “modern” art with Manet 
or Cézanne.)
Content-oriented aesthetics was often personified by Hegel and formalist 
by Kant, with a similar division occurring among Marxists also in art: for-
malist art was bourgeois while figurative, and “typical” art was supposedly 
proletarian. (Such was for example Tretyakov’s “literature of fact” that was 
a combination of journalism and literature.)
Since aesthetics was predominantly viewed as a philosophical discipline, 
aimed at defining art and beauty, it was not surprising that a large seg-
ment of leftist authors doing aesthetics attempted to find an ideal balance 
between content and form: too little content purportedly led to undesir-
able formalism, while too little form led to raw art and to the defense of 
the motif or plot at the expense of the aesthetic and well-structured work. 
A special auxiliary criterion was “partiinost” or political or ideological 
orientation of a work.
In all such instances aesthetics represented a part of a philosophical 
system: its purpose was to develop an intellectual edifice that could help 
determine what an art work was or should be, for such aesthetics was 
mostly after art. Certain authors – Lucien Goldmann (the author of the 
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work Towards a Sociology of the Novel, 1963), for example or the Polish 
phenomenologist and well-known aesthetician Roman Ingarden – not to 
mention anthropological Marxists (such as the Polish aesthetician Stefan 
Morawski) and the emergent structuralists – were praised for overcoming 
the division into, and competition between, content and form. Neverthe-
less, there existed an inherent and self-generating paradox encountered 
everywhere where Marxism was the official ideological and thereby the 
semi-official philosophical line: in all such cases Marxism remained the 
infinitely distant ideal, never to be reached and attained, and never to be 
subjected to theoretical scrutiny and empirical verification and evaluation. 
Since sixties and seventies which represented the apogee and then also 
the beginnings of the decline of the content/form divide, the classical mean-
ing of the syntagm “aesthetics and politics” lost its relevance, interest and 
importance. The same went for political ideology and for class adherence 
of art, culture, and aesthetics.
In United States and United Kingdom issues related to aesthetics or art 
and politics and ideology carried a different and a more academic mean-
ing. Usually they were unrelated to political struggles within individual 
countries or philosophical orientations. In such a context appeared in 1977 
a volume entitled Aesthetics and Politics and was edited by Fredric Jameson 
and containing polemical essays (mostly on Expressionism) involving 
Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Bertold Brecht and Georg Lukács.
With postmodernism issues such as art (or aesthetics, for that matter) 
and politics drifted into the background, such course of events being caused 
by the end of ideologies which seemed to include modernist ideas that gave 
semblance of simple myths. Also for this reason the idea about “the end of 
art” (as ran the title of a 1984 article by Arthur Danto) was not a suitable 
starting point for a discussion of art, aesthetics and politics.
In the new millenium the theme aesthetics and politics once more be-
came relevant , perhaps most visibly due to philosophy of Jacques Rancière. 
This former disciple of Louis Althusser developed a new interpretation 
of politics and aesthetics, wherein politics was essentially related to sub-
jectivization and aesthetics to the emergence of what Rancière called the 
“aesthetic regime of art” and which was to replace the previous dominant 
notions of modernism and postmodernism. Within Rancière’s theoretical 
framework art leads to emancipation – a vintage Marxist notion that we 
know well from the leftist philosophy of the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries. Aesthetics furthermore preconditions the emergence of art in 
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singular, making the two inseparable. The other reason for the growing 
import of art and aesthetics, was the emergence of new forms of capitalism 
that effectively sidelined all oppositional thought, even though this was 
not done by traditional weapons.
Yet another, although indirect theory involving art and via art also aes-
thetics and politics was that of Claude Lefort. Lefort developed (especially 
in his 1978 work Les formes de l’histoire) the idea of totalitarianism accord-
ing to which a democratic society was distinguished from a totalitarian by 
possessing different centers of power, with the totalitarian one possessing 
one such center only. Such situation turned art into a special social creation 
for within a totalitarian society it carried special social and political sig-
nificance. But let me return to Rancière and his interpretation of politics 
and aesthetics.
Contrary to the traditional usage of politics which is usually limited to 
the microphysics of power, Rancière ascribes to politics an emancipatory 
role. In such context speech acquires a special function. Let me illustrate 
this by a viewpoint, famously elaborated by Gayatri Spivak with her ques-
tion: “Can the subaltern speak?”4 Her response, arising from a discussion of 
Indian women, comes at the end of her essay: “The subaltern cannot speak.”5 
It is this speaking, the possession of a voice, that is not only a key issue of 
politics of representation, but also a key concept within the broader frame-
work of emancipation. This brings us to Rancière: “Man, said Aristotle, is 
political because he possesses speech, a capacity to place the just and the 
unjust in common, whereas all the animal has is a voice to signal pleasure 
and pain. But the whole question, then, is to know who possesses speech 
and who merely possesses voice.”6 If, then, the people, namely individuals 
and groups or communities are successful in making and having their voice 
heard – this voice stretching from the socio-political to the artistic and 
cultural realms – then they have taken a political stance and have effected 
action toward others, themselves, and their place in the world as subjects. 
“Politics begins when those who were destined to remain in the domestic 
and invisible territory of work and reproduction, and prevented from 
doing ‘anything else,’ take the time that they ‘have not’ in order to affirm 
that they belong to a common world.”7 In this concrete case Rancière’s 
claim concerns French workers from the nineteenth century, but it can be 
equally applied to the post-colony and to the postsocialist countries. While 
other issues of post-colonialism for example (such as orientalism, nation, 
identity, hybridity) find limited resonance when applied to non-colonial 
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countries, the issue of the “voice” overdetermines other issues that have 
been just mentioned. 
***
In the preface to The Order of Things, Michel Foucault raises an issue on 
which that work is based: “between the already ‘encoded’ eye and reflexive 
knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself. . . . This 
middle region, then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of 
order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all.”8 What Foucault is 
attempting to bring to light in the epistemological field are the conditions 
of possibility of history as a discourse and a form of knowledge. 
These thoughts of Foucault may aid us in understanding the position of 
Rancière, who himself states, “If the reader is fond of analogy, aesthetics can 
be understood in a Kantian sense – re-examined perhaps by Foucault – as 
the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense ex-
perience.”9 In Rancière’s endeavor aesthetics is what historically causes the 
constitution of the general notion of art, an event that in his opinion occurs 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. It is such aesthetic practices that 
make visible and “disclose artistic practices, the place they occupy, what 
they ‘do’ or ‘make’ from the standpoint of what is common to the commu-
nity.”10 Or as Rancière phrases this thought elsewhere, “Aesthetics is not the 
fateful capture of art by philosophy. It is not the catastrophic overflow of 
art into politics. It is the originary knot that ties a sense of art to an idea of 
thought and an idea of the community.”11 In this way Rancière establishes 
aesthetics as a discourse that not only creates the transcendental conditions 
for the emergence of a unified and general notion of art, which in his view 
stretches into our contemporaneity and beyond, but also connects art with 
community and reciprocally with politics. The latter is proximate to the 
notion of “the political,” for it relates to democracy and to making visible 
those who were previously disregarded and mute.12
****
The conclusion of this very brief sketch of the more recent relations among 
art, aesthetics and politics would be that today these notions retain their 
previous import which is – this time around – dependent upon the emer-
gent political transformations effected by the advent of neo-liberal capital-
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ism, on the one hand, and by developments in theory on the other. Some 
kinds of contemporary art are of course also involved in this relation, only 
that today, contrary to art of modernism, they focus on micro issues and 
not on the global, totalizng and revolutionary ones.
An important contribution made by Rancière was that he interpreted 
aesthetics and the aesthetic beyond the narrow confines of the terms in 
which we today usually employ them – namely, not only within the confines 
of art but within the framework of the sensible. In this way art too escapes 
the traditional unproductive division into art vs. politics. In such a way 
aesthetics can be productively applied not only to art of the last century and 
a half but too much of “contemporary” art – a notion that would require 
an analysis of its own.
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Tyrus Miller
On Albrecht Wellmer: Music and Modernism 
After Habermas
The work of Jürgen Habermas had a decisive effect on the current of Frank-
furt School thought, leading to a critique and even abandonment of a num-
ber of defining elements of its first-generation programme and to an on-
going reconstruction of other elements in light of Habermas’s “theory 
of communicative action.” Here I will touch exclusively on one subset 
of the work of a key post-Habermasian thinker,1 Albrecht Wellmer, who 
has published an important set of essays on aesthetics, particularly pertain-
ing to the aesthetics of modern music.2 Having taken as his starting-point 
Adorno’s strong association, in his Aesthetic Theory, of art’s validity with 
both conceptual truth and social emancipation, and having attempted to 
reconstruct these claims within a post-metaphysical philosophy influenced 
by Habermas, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wellmer of-
fers a useful perspective for focusing a set of specific claims about art and 
aesthetics in a “critical” vein: critical in the philosophical sense of both 
establishing the range of ways in which modernist aesthetics may have 
ethical, political, conceptual, and existential efficacy and the limits within 
which it exerts its possible effects. 
To address Wellmer’s approach to modernist art works, I will begin with 
the more general frameworks of aesthetic reception that he formulates. 
Notably, he orients his arguments towards reception in an explicit critique 
of Peter Bürger (among others), who, Wellmer argues, establishes a novel 
constellation of reality, art, and living praxis, but does so by abolishing 
the notion of “aesthetic semblance” and privileges “the significance of 
this constellation of reality for artistic production over its significance 
for reception” (PoM 17). In other words, for Bürger the decisive issue is 
how artists relate their production to the institutions of art – reflexively 
78  Tyrus Miller
embodying autonomy in modernist form or breaking with autonomy in the 
activist modes of avant-garde art – whereas Wellmer suggests that a focus 
on reception may mitigate some of the either-or dilemmas Bürger poses. 
Accordingly (and though he does not cite the essay, Wellmer here echoes 
Adorno’s important late essay “Culture and Administration”3), while Bürger 
formulates the avant-garde break as an abolition of a culture of artistic ex-
perts, Wellmer argues that transforming the institution of art would entail 
a democratization of the communicative interchange between experts and 
a broader constituency with a plurality of interest and engagements with 
art: “I argue on the assumption that a transformation of the ‘institution of 
art’ cannot mean the abolition of the ‘culture of experts,’ but that it would 
amount rather to the establishment of a tighter network of connections 
between the culture of experts and the life-world on the one hand, and 
the culture of experts and popular art on the other” (PoM 31). In turn, he 
argues, art can play a role in a broader process of democratic emancipation: 
“we can defend the idea of an altered relationship between art and the life-
world in which a democratic praxis would be able to draw productively on 
the innovative and communicative potential of art” (PoM 31).
In developing this view, Wellmer sets out from the everyday communica-
tive competencies of both makers and receivers of artworks. Both artists 
and audience members are, in this view, socialized individuals who have 
histories of participating in everyday practices of communication, both 
oral and written (and increasingly, televisual and digital). Their everyday 
competencies include a range of functions, from pragmatic, instrumen-
tal uses to aesthetically, emotionally, and existentially expressive uses of 
language, images, performative acts, and other signs. Their multifaceted 
participation in everyday communication will have shaped, to a greater or 
lesser degree, their abilities to use discourse consciously and make delibera-
tive judgments about the discourse of others. In the course of performing 
everyday communication, in particular, they will have become competent 
in making and evaluating discursive claims to “truth” in a number of dif-
ferent dimensions. These truth-dimensions include: the factual dimension 
of how a statement representing a state of affairs measures up against our 
experience of the state of affairs itself; the expressive dimension of a state-
ment’s “truthfulness” or authenticity in relation to a speaker’s personal 
beliefs, feelings, and way of life; and the dimension of moral, practical, and 
emotional “rightness” of a statement with respect to a concrete situation of 
life, measured against a background of culturally shared or even universally 
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human values and norms. Moreover, not only do they gain communicative 
competences in performing and evaluating claims to truth in these differ-
ent dimensions; even in the relatively loose contexts of everyday life, they 
may also have become aware of the potential for dissonance between these 
different dimensions of truth employed in discourse: what we know to be 
true factually may nevertheless, for example, be morally repugnant to us or 
inadequate to our personal, existential sense of who we are. Lastly, as part 
of their own personal and professional biographies, individuals may have 
succeeded in composing and integrating these different truth-dimensions 
into larger, more coherent wholes that are characteristic of their characters 
and lives. Everyday discourse, however, tends to shift sequentially between 
these dimensions and connect them at most in only loosely coordinated 
ways. It tolerates wide latitude for dissonance, bad faith, lack of awareness, 
and outright contradiction in the relations between these discursively 
embodied domains of truth.
In taking up the question of how art relates to these different dimensions 
of truth, Wellmer makes two specifications. First, he suggests, art does not 
so much literally represent truth as mobilize a potential for truth: “The 
truth content of works of art would then be the epitome of the potential 
effects of works of art that are relevant to the truth, or of their potential for 
disclosing truth” (PoM 24). This potential for truth in artworks is, however, 
related to a second specification: the claims to truth that artworks carry are 
related to their claims of aesthetic validity. To put it otherwise, only insofar 
as a work is aesthetically “right” does it realize its potential relevance to 
other sorts of truth; the aesthetically valid work allows us to focus on and 
evaluate some potential truth that previously was imperceptible, before be-
ing represented to us in a concentrated, specially framed experience of art. 
Wellmer goes on to suggest that insofar as art mediates its relation to truth 
through aesthetic validity, through its complex “rightness” as composition, 
it is particularly suited to reveal the interactions and interferences of the 
different sorts of truth comprised in everyday communication: factual, 
moral, and expressive dimensions. As Wellmer writes:
It transpires… that art is involved in questions of truth in a peculiar and 
complex way: not only does art open up the experience of reality, and correct 
and expand it; it is also the case that aesthetic “validity” (i.e. the “rightness” 
of a work of art) touches on questions of truth, truthfulness, and moral and 
practical correctness in an intricate fashion without being attributable to 
any one of the three dimensions of truth, or even to all three together. We 
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might therefore suppose that the ‘truth of art’ can only be defended, if at 
all, as a phenomenon of interference between the various dimensions of 
truth. (PoM 22–23)
Aesthetic reception attends to the intimate connection between the formal 
dimension of art works (or works, events, and performances that, by virtue of 
compositional qualities have been assimilated to art) and this reflexive work 
on a pluri-dimensional truth. To put this another way, aesthetic reception 
seeks to reveal how aesthetic validity (the “rightness” of artistic choices and 
structures) shapes a particular complex vision of truth – the possible interfer-
ences of factual, subjective, and moral truths in concrete human situations, 
and the ways in which, over time, these interferences may be negotiated. 
Focused in this way, this conception of the aesthetic helps us to interpret in 
a more rigorous light certain loosely shared aspects and background mo-
tivations of the critical, reflexive tendencies of modernist art and literature. 
Modernism represents an intentional practice of composing artworks that 
aim to reorient the communicative life of their receivers, offering them new 
ways of making sense not only within the microcosm of the artistic encounter, 
but also within the broader parameters of their everyday communication.
Wellmer’s aesthetic writings are most directly related to the Aesthetic 
Theory of Adorno, as an immanent critique and reconstruction of Ador-
no’s thought on reception-related and “communicative action”-oriented 
grounds. Adorno developed his aesthetic theory teleologically around 
its contemporary endpoint, to establish and justify the fragile possibility 
of a critical modernism in an age tending towards the abolition of art. 
Critical modernism, as Adorno discerned it in a few singular, communi-
catively resistant works by Schönberg, Picasso, Kafka, and Beckett, gave 
testimony to the trace of “something else” in the hour of its disappear-
ance into the night of indifference. In his focus on the experience of art 
as potentially disrupting the ease with which we ascribe cognitive, moral, 
and personal-existential “truth” not only to the aesthetic event, but also 
to everyday and perhaps even specialized statements and acts, Wellmer 
retains Adorno’s sense of art’s special relation to truth. Moreover, it is easy 
to see that Adorno’s justification of difficult, complex modernist art can 
be well-encompassed by Wellmer’s revisionary perspective. When, for 
example, we puzzle over whether Beckett’s “Molloy” and “Moran” in the 
novel Molloy are versions of the same character rather than two different 
ones, our inability to resolve the question may unsettle the self-understood 
existential truth that whatever else we might know or not know, we know 
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who we are; Beckett’s disruptions of character-identification might lead 
us to believe that holding onto a sense of self might not be so easy in the 
world we live in. Similarly, listening to a piece of atonal music, which 
has been emancipated from harmony as an organizing principle, we may 
perceive with new vividness various forms of local order that alternate 
throughout the longer piece: such musical means as repetition and varia-
tion of rhythmic figures, sharp alternations between high and low pitches, 
surprising dissemination of motifs among instruments of contrasting 
timbres, and the ways that dissonances are heightened or mitigated by each 
of these. Obviously, within the aesthetic experience of music, these various 
interacting forms of post-harmonic patterning call for different modes 
of attention and evaluation on the part of listeners. But new perceptual, 
affective, and cognitive intuitions originating in the experience of music 
need not remain encapsulated within the purely musical, but can extend 
by analogy to other dimensions of moral, existential, affective, and cogni-
tive life. Indeed, Adorno himself is an extreme example of the contrary, 
insofar as he carried his musical training into a whole new way of writing 
philosophy and conceiving the nature of philosophical reflection. Martin 
Jay captured this translation of modernist music into philosophy well in 
his characterization of Adorno’s negative dialectics as “atonal philosophy.”4
Despite this proximity to Adorno – rendered even closer by Wellmer’s 
intimate knowledge of modern and contemporary music, unique among 
the major followers of Habermas – Wellmer also diverges from Adorno 
on a number of key points in his interpretation of modernist art. First, 
since his focus is on how artworks impact listeners, viewers, and readers 
as agents within a plurality of communicative practices (a Habermasian 
perspective), rather than on the production of artworks as complex con-
stellations of subjective and objective elements mediated by artistic form 
(Adorno’s perspective), Wellmer abandons a key element of Adorno’s 
theory: his prescriptive focus on “progress” in the disposition of “artistic 
material,” which in turn leads him to dichotomous formulations such as 
the Schönberg/Stravinsky opposition elaborated in Philosophy of the New 
Music. Individual receivers of artworks are also social agents who live, act, 
think, work, and speak within a differentiated, plural set of social institu-
tions, rules, and discourses. The question of what sort of artwork might 
play a critical or even emancipatory role cannot be unilaterally determined 
by formal-materials features, rooted in artistic production. The “progres-
sive” effects of artworks depend on situational aspects of reception as well, 
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which can positively motivate a far wider range of artistic forms, registers 
(“high” culture to “popular” and “counter” culture), and modes (“classical,” 
jazz, pop, etc.) than Adorno was willing to contemplate.
This artistic pluralism – comparable to that advocated by Bürger – is 
most striking precisely where Wellmer moves upon Adorno’s signature 
artistic territory, in the field of modern classical and post-serialist “new” 
music. Wellmer’s recent collection of musicological writings, Essay on 
Music and Language,5 offers a wide-ranging treatment of different musical 
examples, including a sympathetic examination of two major composers 
who represent opposing, influential directions in post-war “new music”: 
John Cage, as the anarchist advocate of non-intentionality, indeterminacy, 
and chance in musical composition, as well as the expansion of musical 
materials to the whole range of natural and human sounds; and Helmut 
Lachenmann, as a rigorous, militantly politicized inventor of musical meth-
odologies that extend serial techniques to new dimensions of instrumental 
and vocal sound, timbre, rhythm, and text. Rather than setting up an 
Adorno-like dichotomy of Cage’s anarchic informality and Lachenmann’s 
political and formal rigor, Wellmer offers a measured assessment of their 
artistic projects as complementary, if antipodal paradigms of new music. 
In the final chapter on Essay on Music and Language, entitled “Transgres-
sive Figures in the Field of New Music,” affirms a concept of “postmodernism” 
that is “equivalent neither to turning away from the modern nor with the 
return of an emphatic claim for art, but rather much more with a plural-
istic modernism.”6 Wellmer not only argues for this modernist pluralism 
philosophically, but goes on to survey an open field of musical possibili-
ties represented by particular composers and their works. Not accidentally, 
given Adorno’s exclusive opposition of Schönberg and Stravinsky, Wellmer 
follows the lead of Pierre Boulez in presenting them as complementary 
figures through whom the structural apparatus of tonality was disrupted 
and dismantled, with one focusing on the destruction of tonal hierarchy 
through serial formalization and the other on “informal” rhythmic and in-
strumental violence to tonal organization.7 He goes on, however, to suggest 
other ways in which the emancipation of the musical field has proceeded – 
exemplifying not a dialectical logic of opposites (Schönberg / Stravinsky, 
progress / regression, formalization / dissolution of form), as in Adorno, 
but a progressive differentiation of musical experience through the enrich-
ment of compositional technique. Thus, for example, he enumerates: the 
expansion of the field of sound through electronic and aleatory musics; the 
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exploration of microtonal elements through tremolo, glissandi, new vocal 
articulations, and use of non-Western and historical musical materials that 
reveal the contingency of classical and twelve-tone music’s chromatic scale; 
the recourse to parts of the overtone series and other features of physical 
sound suppressed by tempered harmonics; the focus on gestural and tactile 
aspects of instrumental sound, as well as the dramatic aspects of their per-
formance; the highlighting of spatial features of musical sound; the structur-
ing of musical pieces as a direct intervention into the listener’s perceptual 
faculties and bodily sensations; and the hybridization of new music with 
cross-overs into jazz, hiphop, gypsy music, rock and roll, and other forms 
of popular music. Accordingly, he incorporates into his open, non-exclusive 
canon of pluralistic modernism in music such highly divergent composers 
as John Cage, Giacinto Scelsi, Pierre Boulez, Pierre Schaeffer, Karlheinz 
Stockhausen, Helmut Lachenmann, György Ligeti, Hans-Werner Henze, 
Luigi Nono, György Kurtág, Luciano Berio, Heinz Hollinger, Mauricio Kagel, 
Iannis Xenakis, Cornelius Cardew, Alvin Lucier, Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, 
Erhard Grosskopf, Georg Friedrich Haas, Hans Zenders, Hilda Paredes, 
Clemens Gadenstätter, Gene Coleman, Bernard Lang, Klaus Huber, and 
Isabel Mundry: a very diverse, multi-generational catalogue of post-war 
composers that could undoubtedly be extended greatly beyond Wellmer’s 
largely German and Central European “new music” focus. The modernist 
pluralism represented by this list, moreover, allows Wellmer to reach back 
into Adorno’s modernism and open up the historical past that Adorno’s 
philosophy of music mediated to future generations of critical theorists and 
musicologists: not only Gustav Mahler, Arnold Schönberg, Alban Berg, and 
Anton Webern represent “authentic” instances of musical modernism, as for 
Adorno, but also Claude Debussy, Igor Stravinsky, Oliver Messiaen, Edgar 
Varèse, Henry Cowell, Charles Ives, Béla Bartók, Ivan Wyschnegradsky, and 
Alois Haba. “Postmodern,” Wellmer writes, “would be. . . the consciousness 
of an infinite plurality of musical materials, including that of extra-European 
traditions, as well as the various procedures at the disposition [of composers] 
since the second half of the 20th century.” 8Wellmer’s “postmodern,” however, 
does not come after modernism, but is rather the pluralization of modernism 
itself, which branches forward in a field of ever-greater differentiation as it 
extend into and past the later 20th century.
Moreover, in a passage in which he discusses the use of highly complex 
rhythmic structures and speeds and their effects on the senses and bod-
ies of listeners, we catch a glimpse of the utopian, futuristic possibilities 
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that works of the historical avant-garde, from Marinetti and Khlebnikov 
to Schwitters and Breton, adumbrated, a total reinvention of the human 
sensorium. Describing the unaccustomed relations to the human body that 
the soundscapes of recent music establish, Wellmer evokes the utopian 
suggestion of a transfigured body that would be adopted to the textures 
and speeds of a virtual world:
Many of these rhythms race more swiftly ahead and oscillate more rapidly than 
would ever be possible for the body; many have a strongly gestural character, 
yet correspond to no known bodily or linguistic movement. While the early 
postwar composers presented the structures and skeletons for new, strange 
worlds, contemporary composers now create the flesh, muscle, and nervous 
systems not of traditional bodies, rather of completely new creatures that 
accordingly advance along an unfamiliar border of a “virtual movement.”9 
Wellmer’s evocation of creatures with radically different bodily and sen-
sory characteristics harkens back to an earlier moment of critical theory, 
Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the expressionist writer Paul Scheerbart’s 
Lesabéndio and his fascination with the utopian atmospheres of Scheerbart’s 
fictional planet. Scheerbart describes the sonorous space of the double 
funnel-shaped asteroid-planet, Pallas, which is designed by the author as 
a kind of total musical environment in which the inhabitants, with their 
extraterrestrial alien bodies, are continuously immersed. The planet itself 
is a kind of natural wind instrument, which has been adapted by the Pal-
lasians into an enveloping musical and sound-space:
Refined music resounded out of the depths of the funnel, including strange 
tones that were held and sustained for long periods of time. This music ema-
nated from the Central Hole connecting the north and south funnels. Here 
in the Center, where the funnel walls were steep and sometimes separated 
from each other by no more than half a mile, here in the very heart of the 
star, winds caused by the speedy descent of the cobweb-cloud at nightfall 
made the hole emit wonderful sounds. Because of the interior music of 
Pallas, which, naturally, could be heard best from the star’s southern fun-
nel, the Pallasians had set up many large, thin pieces of skin to strengthen 
the sounds and to link them into a melodious sonic flow. These hides were 
stretched and mounted in such a way as to cause the tones brought forth by 
the steep cliff walls to vary in a marvelous fashion. The pieces of skin were 
set up so that they would be easy to move to different spots in the larger 
system The moveable skins created fantastical harmonies naturally amplified 
by the acoustics of the funnels. Certain capacious metal instruments could 
even make the noises seem orchestral.10 
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One could imagine that this is just the sort of music that creatures whose 
bodies are nothing but a “rubbery tube leg with a suction-cup foot at one 
end,” an umbrella-shaped flexible head, and telescoping eyes would enjoy 
hearing. Yet turning around the perspective in light of Wellmer’s discussion 
of contemporary music, we might also say that such a sound environment 
as Scheerbart describes, not unlike that of a contemporary composition 
exploring the resonant properties of materials and spaces and immersing 
the listener in slowly pulsating rhythms, also evokes bodies more like those 
of the Pallasians than the bodies with which the listeners walked into the 
concert hall with. Their harmony with such an environment implies that 
human bodies, such as we possess, would find it very, well, alien. Yet in 
Lesabéndio, as in the musical worlds created by contemporary composers, 
we are also asked to imagine and empathize with creaturely forms radically 
other than our own: to become them for a time. For the duration of the 
musical experience, as for the duration of our reading of Scheerbart, our 
bodies are aesthetically stretched and compressed, broken and reassembled, 
in ways that give us a sensuous intuition of new bodies, a shimmering 
succession of virtual bodies evoked by the dissonances and tensions be-
tween our natural bodies and the techno-compositional environments to 
which we have submitted ourselves. Wellmer concludes that this temporary 
plunge into strangeness, into apparent senselessness or nonsense that is 
characteristic of avant-garde art, is the occasion for the production of new 
thought and feeling. “Upon such new thought and feeling produced by new 
music,” he quotes Karlheinz Stockhausen, “we can successively construct 
experiences, learning processes” (Stockhausen, quoted in Versuch11). The 
extension, by Stockhausen and subsequently Wellmer, of the key Haber-
masian concept of “learning processes” to aesthetic experience—to the 
non-discursive sonorous intensities of new music—at once demonstrates 
their indebtedness to Habermas’s thought, and underscores the bold step 
beyond Habermas’s discourse-based, rationalistic theory they must make 
when challenged by a complex aesthetic phenomenon.
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Miško Šuvaković
The Return of the Political in Contemporary 
Aesthetics, Philosophy, and Art
The crisis of philosophy and aesthetics certainly began during the philosophi-
cal century. It started when Marx highlighted the “misery of philosophy” in 
a world of real human misery, in the industrial society of exploitation.1 It also 
began with Friedrich Nietzsche’s “grandiose” and immanently philosophical 
failure to derive yet another great totalising philosophical system of thinking 
about everything and for all. It was then, for the first time, that the idea of 
a failed philosophical project became a basis for reorganising philosophy. 
Finally, it also began when Dr Sigmund Freud set up the universal discourse 
of the subject and subjectivity in human life, a humanistic discourse that 
passed over the empirical and pseudo-empirical fields of biomedical and 
socio-cultural hypotheses beyond the professional security of philosophical 
paradigms/styles. Then, in the first half of the 20th century, the philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger was an attempt to find the essential potentiality of yet 
another important step for philosophy, there and then, in what was for him 
an unacceptable modernity.2 That one step for philosophy was assumed in the 
conservative direction of invoking and responding to “originary” philosophi-
cal voices amidst a nightmare of the great Western tradition of thinking in 
metaphors, i.e. metaphysical figures of being, truth, and the subject. But “that 
one step for philosophy” was also marked with the concretely political failure 
of the traditionally and conservative-oriented modern philosopher with al-
most nihilistic misgivings regarding progress. Facing the powers and events 
of an all-human catastrophe, the devastating totalising state of emergency 
that Nazism produced with its anti-liberal programmes in the Third Reich,3 
this philosopher reconstituted his anti-modern “right to universal truth”.
Quite asymmetrically, in relation to Martin Heidegger, stood the anti-
philosophical endeavour of Ludwig Wittgenstein –anti-philosophical in 
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terms of preserving and cherishing the tradition of autonomous Western 
philosophy, with Wittgenstein trying to pose, in his individually manifested 
everyday human drama, some basic commonsensical questions – almost 
“dilettantish” – in the face of the security of philosophical jargon and its 
abstracting of the individual’s lived activity. Wittgenstein’s critical and 
analytical philosophy of philosophy is ‘dilettantish’ inasmuch as he com-
monsensically, from platforms of everyday speech, asks questions about 
philosophy’s internal affairs, which learned philosophers, who mature in 
philosophical discourses and jargons, as Theodor W. Adorno, for instance, 
put it, do not ask.4 Here, a “dilettante” in philosophy implies not a “self-
taught” or “committed amateur philosopher”, but one who deliberately, 
self-reflexively, and demonstratively violates the professional ethics of 
philosophising by straying from the normative/canonical jargon of West-
ern philosophy. Such a philosopher asks “impolite questions” concerning 
the basic meanings of words and their impact on the lived activity of 
philosophers and philosophy as a social practice. He diverts from the 
doxa of philosophers who do not pose those basic questions as important 
questions of philosophy, and instead constructs narratives or models for 
presenting thought within already established philosophical networks 
and methods. Those philosophies are quite close to the discourse of the 
philosophical hierarchy of power. This concerns the canonical acceptability 
of jargon and the conceptual atmosphere of stable thinking in defined 
social frameworks. These frameworks disable writing or thinking about 
something or anything related to philosophy outside of jargon topics or 
objects of debate. Wittgenstein’s reductionist transgressive solution was 
to translate philosophical terms from the discourse of philosophy into 
the language of the everyday use of words in speech, a task he saw as 
showing the fly out of the fly-bottle.5 Finding a way out of conceptual and 
linguistic traps was the main task of Wittgenstein’s philosophising. In that 
sense, another great “anti-philosopher” was the French doctor, founder 
of theoretical psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan, who, unlike Wittgenstein’s 
analytical reductionism, resorted to a “baroque” passage through all the 
spaces and times of philosophy, metaphorically speaking, like “an elephant 
in a China shop.”6 This metaphor bespeaks an author who sees discomfort 
in the order of meaning precisely as his key intervention in the materiality 
of speech, which is under the impact of the order of signification, that is, the 
unconscious. Lacan’s luxurious “dilettantism” differs from Wittgenstein’s 
puritan analytical work on the “absurdities” of philosophy, but the point 
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is the same: to achieve something with philosophy in a way disallowed by 
its traditional discourses, that is, jargon frameworks. For Lacan, this meant 
moving the reality of the unconscious in any discourse, including philo-
sophical. In Lacan’s mind, philosophical discourse must face its supporting 
web of signification that modifies webs of signified, i.e. conceptual ideas. 
That means having to face the structural principle of determination that 
eludes the philosopher’s conscious intent and will to express “this and that, 
there and then”; that is, a psychoanalytic theorist faces the material order 
of speech, including philosophical speech, which shows, in its complexity, 
what it omits, represses, covers, or negates.
Finally, French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s intervention showed that 
the “central world of philosophy” as much as “the margins of philosophy” 
constitute the problem of philosophy.7 He was entirely committed to phi-
losophy, although his early concept of deconstructing European philosophi-
cal logo-centrism – the centrism of thinking as opposed to speaking and 
writing – offered some potential directions for thinking and presenting 
inter-textually the limits of the philosophy of transcendence. Those who 
have invoked Derrida and radicalised his offers and promises have either 
moved out of philosophy and into the domain of the material practice of 
writing, of which philosophy is only an instance, or, like others, who were 
never in philosophy in the first place, have embraced the possibility of 
performing the event of theorising and thereby pointed to the resistance of 
the materiality of theory to the illusory esoteric quality of philosophy. After 
Derrida, there occurred quite diverse inter-textual and multidirectional 
rearrangements of the relationship between philosophy and theory, from 
literary critic Paul De Man, artist and theorist of culture Victor Burgin,8 to 
novelist and essayist Kathy Acker.9 The extent of the crisis of philosophy 
was also enhanced by the feminist, feminine, gender, and queer theorisa-
tions of philosophy, more precisely, by asking that really singular question 
extending from Simone de Beauvoir via Hélène Cixous to Judith Butler 
and Joan Copjec: “Does philosophy have a gender?”10 Then another, even 
more complex and philosophical question may be posed: “How was gender 
in philosophy, i.e. history of philosophy, and thereby the singularity of 
the identity of philosophy itself as a social practice reduced to a universal 
philosopher?” But that question, as well as similar questions, despite their 
attractive and seductive philosophicality, were closer to the singularity of 
the practice of theorisation within social, humanistic, or hybrid platforms 
of interpretation and textual productions about and against philosophy.
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In the late 1960s, notions of theory and theorisation gain a special mean-
ing and thus certainly an exclusive role with regard to knowledge (discourse, 
thinking, writing, behaviour), culture, and society.11 Theory and theorisa-
tion denote the hybrid genres or poly-genres that developed in parallel in 
artistic, activist, and academic circles (France, Great Britain, USA, Eastern 
Europe) by means of critiquing autonomous canonical models and institu-
tions of scientific and philosophical labour in society, culture, and art. The 
theoretical was posited as the textual and theoretical labour as a more literal 
or less literal textual production of a critical discourse. Writings by French 
structuralists from the 1960s and international post-structuralists from the 
early 1970s advanced the critical position that philosophy should be essen-
tially redefined. That meant transforming philosophy as general thinking 
about sciences into a critical theory based on reflecting the material practice 
of signification whereby philosophic texts are produced. The practice of 
philosophy was thus interpreted as material production of specific social 
texts. In his Consequences of Pragmatism, Richard Rorty pointed out that 
modernity witnessed an unprecedented “blending” of the borders of certain 
autonomous scientific and theoretical disciplines.12 The result was a new kind 
of writing, which was neither about evaluating aspects of literary, artistic, 
scientific, or cultural products, nor intellectual history, nor a philosophy 
of good and practical acting in culture and art, nor the interpretation of 
society, but all of that combined in the open and variable poly-genre of writ-
ing. Theoretical writing exceeds the boundaries between individual social 
and humanist sciences, pointing to forms of production, presentation, and 
expression in contemporary plural and global mass and media culture. As 
a poly-generic practice, theory asks questions regarding the self-reflexive 
character of writing about the nature, conditions, paths, and concepts of gen-
erating theoretical texts and their effects.13 Then, questions were also posed 
regarding the epistemological character of the mediation of knowledge and 
therefore also of institutions that establish and govern meanings, sense, and 
values within a culture or interrelations between different cultures. Likewise 
important are questions regarding the critical character of the conditions and 
circumstances whereby a theory emerges, is exchanged, governs a certain 
or uncertain scene of writing or scene of presenting, and then experiences 
a crisis, disappears, or transforms. Also important are questions regarding 
deconstructing, dislocating, or decentring the inscription of theory or its ef-
fects into a certain mass, elite, or professional public opinion, as well as traces 
of theory in its modifications, their erasure or accumulation on the jetties14 
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of meaning, sense, values, and identities of culture. But there also emerge 
psychoanalytical questions about how the desire for knowledge emerges, how 
pleasure occurs in a theoretical text or in a process with texts (inter-textuality) 
in media culture.15 For something – a thought, speech, writing, or media 
representation – to be theory, it must contain aspects that enable or realise 
an identification, description, explication, and interpretation, that is, debate. 
This is the open and indeterminate conception of theory. It is open enough to 
encompass quite varied procedures: identifications, descriptions, explications 
(readings), interpretations, and debates. What distinguishes theory from all 
other cultural activities, disciplines, and institutions is the demand that any 
kind of speaking or writing aspiring to be theoretical must meet, and that 
is to ask what theory is, how it functions and identifies, describes, explains, 
and interprets itself as theory or theorisation within quite specific cultural 
and social practices. Therefore, theory is not the opposite of practices, but 
the performance of an invariably specific material social practice that is 
posited in such a way that it problematizes – reflects, explains, interprets, 
produces – concepts, discourses, and representations of theory as a practice, 
from specific conditions and circumstances.
The crisis of postmodern liberal pluralism after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, that is, following the end of the Cold War and establishment 
of “global politics” and domination of a single superpower, that is, more 
importantly, of a single economic and biotechnological political order, 
provoked once more possibilities for examining “politics” and “the political” 
as a significant response to the apparent weakness or absence of any kind 
of the political in the apparently apolitical or extra-political neoliberal 
technological practices of organising public and private everyday life in 
post-modernity.16 In postmodern and then globalised neoliberal society, 
politics has acquired the character of a techno-managerial cultural practice, 
moving from fundamental social, global questions to individual cultural 
as well as artistic activities in the domain of identity and representation in 
the everyday. A cynic might conclude that in globalised times, everything – 
meaning culture and art – is politicised, except politics itself, which is 
depoliticised.17 Therefore, in the 1990s and 2000s, it became important to 
invoke and reconstruct “politics” and “the political” in relation to politics 
as a form of sociality, as well as a form of organisation, governance, con-
trol, and implementation. At that moment, “politics as a practice within 
or across general sociality” manifested a need or, even, desire for meta-
theory as the organisation of the singular as opposed to the particular in 
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relation to universal political knowledge and action, and traditionally, the 
meta-theory of “politics” is philosophy.18 As the meta-theory of big politics, 
philosophical universalism was “used” as an intervening sign for a critique 
of the anti-essentialism and social constructivism of “small politics” and 
“micro-ecologies” in culture and, certainly, art. Philosophical universalism 
thereby enabled asking questions about acting responsibly for every social 
intervention and risk of intervention. This kind of demand for another 
large-scale politicisation on the level of philosophy and intervention in 
global social processes after the Cold War occurred in very different ways, 
above all in philosophers, sometimes mutually impossible to compare and 
often confronted: Jacques Derrida and his new reading of Marx,19 Chantal 
Mouffe and her discussion of the return of the political,20 Ernesto Laclau 
and his theory of emancipation in the epoch of post-modernity and then 
globalism,21 Alain Badiou and his Platonist-oriented metapolitics,22 Terry 
Eagleton and his leftist critique of hybrid theories,23 Jacques Rancière and 
the preservation of the traditional European Aristotelian philosophical 
“political”,24 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt and their critique of the 
current global empire,25 Giorgio Agamben and his reconstruction of great 
philosophy by means of bio-politics,26 Paolo Virno and his theorisation 
of labour in global or post-Fordist capitalism,27 Brian Massumi and his 
analysis of the new media on the horizon of critical sociality, etc.28
Philosophy’s invoking of “the political”, its “return to the political” 
emerged not out of a structuring of reality undertaken by a party or state, 
but out of performing a philosophical desire for post-theoretical speculative 
philosophical constructions of the “crisis” character, functions, and plural 
(which also means arbitrary), effects of current socialities in capitalism, 
dominant but crisis-ridden. For example, the separation of politics and 
power, which characterises the neoliberal rise and, certainly, the global 
crisis of neo-liberalism, has had the effect of depoliticising “politics” and 
transferring the complex of the political and politics into the field of culture 
and art. Almost all of early-21st-century vital art29 is politicised, from a “po-
litical fictionalisation of the real” (the Irwin group with their NSK global 
state project) to various political activisms (the Critical Art Ensemble, Slavs 
and Tatars, Alfredo Jaar, Tadej Pogačar, Zoran Todorović, Artur Żmijewski). 
For instance, the conflict, a sort of revival of the Cold War in 2007 in 
2008, between the United States and Russia is not a conflict between the 
liberal and the communist, that is, between capitalist and social property, 
but between two capitalist imperial models. It is a conflict between the 
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American neoliberal model of capitalism and the Russian autocratic na-
tionalist capitalism. Therefore, the philosophical derivation of meta- and 
macro-politicisation marked a critical (and that means analytical) reactiva-
tion of the contradictory relations of local – minority – bodies of knowl-
edge as opposed to global – dominant, majority – bodies of knowledge in 
establishing and performing “universal” historical and geographical power. 
Moreover, this is not about opting between the local and the global, i.e. 
the particular and the universal; opting like that has cost dearly, with the 
defeats of modern projects in totalitarian regimes (the USSR, the Third 
Reich, fascist Italy, the Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea, the Cultural 
Revolution in China), as well as the defeats of postmodern conceptions, 
i.e. in the preservation of “weak” or “soft” power and its concomitant 
comprehensive plurality in ethnic wars and genocides, from the former 
Yugoslavia to Africa in the 1990s. This concerns deriving a philosophical 
understanding of how global as universal power is realised in relating – 
naturalising the universal with the particular and, to be sure, conversely, the 
particular with the universal. If one pays attention to questions regarding 
the character of today’s society, then one must ask about relations between 
global and local modes of material production and their fundamental 
refractions in individual and, certainly, global projections. Then one may 
ask, in philosophic-metaphysical terms, “who” or “what”, “when” or “where” 
constitutes the production of universal knowledge and thereby of global as 
a universal power. The relationship between the global and the universal 
is posited as a problematic and intriguing trap. In other words, the impor-
tant philosophical question is how singularity produces universality and 
what it is that enables surveying and regulating that production not only 
behaviourally, but also epistemologically and existentially? The critical 
question is this: can singularity produce universality?
Interpreting the complex process of integrating hybrid and anti-es-
sentialist theorisations into the neoliberal global system of power, some 
philosophers have suggested as an alternative, the potentiality of resisting 
global market capitalism by means of a universalistically posited philosophy. 
This would be a philosophical intervention stemming from:
 – the collapse or disorientation of the traditional Left and its theory and
 – the global domination of “right wing”, “neoliberal”, and “populist” 
discourses, as well as the integration of “soft” or “weak”, that is, “post-
philosophic” hybrid theories into the neoliberal system of a flexible 
technocratic regulation of power.
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In theoretical terms, such an intervention would mean a philosophic 
and theoretical turn from the 20th-century linguistic turn to the philosophy 
of the event of the early-21st-century.
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Gabriela Świtek
Architecture as Politics
“In 1950s Warsaw everybody had an idea of architecture, like in bygone 
days in Alaska everybody had an idea of gold-digging” – claims Leopold 
Tyrmand.1 In the legendary Polish detective story Zły [Evil] he sketches 
a superb social and architectural panorama of Warsaw in the first years 
after the Second World War. The novelist’s irony over what it meant “to 
have an idea of architecture” – should be read in the political and histori-
cal context of the 1950s Poland, the time of Stalinism. For it was not just 
the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party who merited the 
epithet of the ‘First Architect of Socialist Realism’, but rather “the whole 
nation was building our capital”– as proclaimed a series of Polish posters 
designed in the 1950s. The idea of architecture was also spread through 
a great number of architectural exhibitions – some thirty-three shows 
organized in all the regions of Poland in the period 1950–1953. 
Let us discuss just one example – the 1st Exhibition of Architecture of 
the People’s Poland organized in 1953 in the Central Bureau for Artistic 
Exhibitions (nowadays Zachęta – National Gallery of Art in Warsaw). The 
exhibition was opened on 8th March; thus, Stalin had died three days earlier. 
It was visited by 50.000 people, including more than a hundred organ-
ized groups,2 and opening hours were adjusted to the everyday working 
routines of prospective viewers, with the exhibition open until 9 p.m. The 
so-called high culture of the art gallery was to be experienced for free in 
workers’ leisure time; however, in the case of the 1953 Warsaw exhibition, 
there were no clear borders between high and mass culture. As Jacques 
Rancière argues, “an aesthetic community is not a community of aesthetes. 
It is a community of sense, or a sensus communis.”3 The aim of the 1st 
Exhibition of Architecture of the People’s Poland was the popularization of 
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the achievements of Polish socialist architecture “against the background 
of past epochs.”4 The exhibition presented buildings already constructed 
or designed between January 1945 and December 1952, juxtaposed with 
historical objects. In line with this strategy, the exhibition catalogue opened 
with photographs of the Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow and of Romanesque 
columns in the church of Strzelno.5
The show in the Warsaw Central Bureau consisted of six sections pre-
senting the achievements of six Polish regions: Warsaw (Mazovia), Kato-
wice (between 7th March 1953 and 1956, Stalinogród6), Wrocław (Upper 
and Lower Silesia), Gdańsk, Szczecin (Pomerania), Białystok (Podlasie), 
Łódź, Cracow with Nowa Huta (Lesser Poland), Poznań (Greater Poland).7 
(Fig. 1) The seventh section, the Hall of Honour was also named “the hall 
of Polish-Soviet friendship” with its dominant feature being a large pho-
tograph of the model of the Palace of Culture and Science (completed in 
1955) and other Warsaw projects “representative of ideological cooperation 
between Poland and Soviet Union.”8 (Fig. 2) The concept of socrealism 
required architecture which would be socialist in content and national in 
form.9 Therefore, Gdańsk and Pomerania region were considered an ap-
propriate source of northern Renaissance forms, while Warsaw was seen 
as a city of neoclassicism. Having received the regional forms as examples 
to be followed, architects were expected “to reject the whole era of eclecti-
cism and cosmopolitism of the 19th century and the interwar period.”10 
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the idea of socrealism in Polish 
architecture; this problem has been well researched in European political 
history. In recent years, there has been a marked revival of interest in the 
history of architectural exhibitions; the 1953 Warsaw show serves here 
as an example of this research field. An exhibition of architecture is, in 
a sense, a mixed media representation of something that has already been 
built and of something that does not yet exist as an architectural and urban 
environment. This kind of multimediality gives us an idea of architecture 
in the context of an art gallery space. In the Warsaw exhibition catalogue, 
Roman Piotrowski (a Polish architect active in the interwar period and the 
Minister of Building of Cities and Housing Estates in the 1950s) emphasizes 
the social function of architecture exhibitions at the time of the extensive 
rebuilding of Poland. As he notes: 
Architecture works in the most intensive way as a complete building real-
ized in its proper environment. However, its location sometimes limits the 
scope of its social influence; in order to admire a building a viewer needs 
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to visit the place where it is located. […] The exhibition is therefore one of 
the best ways to present architecture to the people.11
It might seem a paradox that in order to render “realism and the social 
function” of architecture, the exhibition presented twenty-five sculpture-
like mock-ups, and more than thousand architectural drawings and pho-
tographs.12 (Fig. 3)
In modern systems of the arts (crystallized in the aesthetics of such 
thinkers as, Charles Batteux, Immanuel Kant or James Fergusson) archi-
tecture has always oscillated between the status of mechanical and fine 
art or, to put it another way, it has always had to struggle for the right to 
a dignified position among the fine arts.13 Nowadays we accept with ease 
the definition of architecture as the most social and the most political of 
all the arts. In other words, architecture’s artistic and aesthetic aspects 
seem less important than its potential to build a community. “My house 
is not architecture; it is my home” – symptomatically argues Polish artist 
Artur Żmijewski in his introduction to the Polish translation of Jacques 
Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics.14 The opposition of the arts is one of 
the main points in Rancière’s reflection: “In the [representational] order, 
what was relevant was the opposition between fine arts – or liberal arts – 
and mechanical arts, which meant an opposition between arts designed for 
pleasure and glorification of gentle people and arts designed to respond to 
the necessities of practical life.”15 In the context of exhibitions, the practical 
aspects of architecture seem to be limited by the modalities of representa-
tion through the medium of images and models. But, this is not to say that 
automatically architecture becomes a ‘fine’ art designed only for pleasure.
Most commentators of Rancière’s writings draw our attention to the 
importance of his aesthetics for its emphasis on the relational or participa-
tory aspects of contemporary art. Architecture as a separate practice does 
not seem to be the main concern of Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics; 
only occasionally does he discuss, for example, the political implications 
of the British Art & Crafts movement and its derivatives, such as Art Deco, 
Werkbund, Bauhaus and Russian Constructivism.16 And yet, there are at 
least two lessons – as Slavoj Žižek recommends in his afterword17 – that 
can be taken from Rancière for our reflection on architecture. 
Undoubtedly, the first lesson that comes from Rancière is his critique 
of the modern dichotomy between art for art’s sake and social reality, or 
of the aforementioned opposition between the fine and mechanical arts.18 
Rancière questions this dichotomy, for example, in his essay on design 
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(Surface of Design), where he draws a daring comparison between the 
symbolist poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé and the work of architect and 
engineer Peter Behrens. There’s no such a thing as an autonomous or het-
eronomous art – Ranciére concludes.19 The “modern aesthetic revolution” 
abolished the hierarchy in art which used to reflect the prevailing social 
hierarchy. “Forms of poems” and forms of industrial (or architectural) 
objects are forms of life.20 Crucial for our understanding of modernity 
is also Rancière’s emphasis on the simple fact that art in the singular has 
only existed for two centuries.21 In line with this thought, one should re-
turn to the pre-modern situation in order to see architecture outside the 
field of the oppositions of “mechanical” versus “liberal”, but in the realm 
of mimēsis. As Rancière notes: “mimēsis is not the law that brings the arts 
under the yoke of resemblance. It is first of all a fold in the distribution 
of ways of doing and making as well as in social occupations, a fold that 
renders the arts visible. It is not an artistic process but a regime of vis-
ibility regarding the arts.”22 Similarly, some contemporary philosophers 
and historians of architecture argue that Aristotle’s celebrated definition 
of tragedy as mimēsis (representation) of praxis (action) outlines also the 
main function of architecture.23 In this light, there is no point to discuss 
whether architecture belongs to mechanical or liberal arts. Architecture 
is the ‘representation of action’. 
The second lesson which might be taken from Rancière (especially in the 
context of the 1953 Warsaw exhibition) is his reflection on the revival of 
the Gesamtkunstwerk in contemporary art.24 Rancière uses this notion, for 
example, with reference to a general confusion of the genres. As he argues: 
There is the revival of the Gesamtkunstwerk, which is supposed to be the 
apotheosis of art as a form of life but which proves instead to be the apothe-
osis of strong artistic egos or a kind of hyperactive consumerism […]. There 
is the idea of ‘hybridization’ of the means of art, which complements the 
view of our age as one of mass individualism expressed through the relent-
less exchange between roles and identities, reality and virtuality, life and 
mechanical prostheses, and so on. […]. The third way – the best in my 
view – […] invalidates the opposition between activity and passivity as 
well as the scheme of ‘equal transmission’ and the communitarian idea of 
the theater that in fact makes it an allegory of inequality.25
Following this argument, contemporary multimediality is not Ge-
samtkunstwerk in its 19th-century version, with its aesthetic program as 
a program of metapolitics: “multimediality only means that you combine 
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several media.”26 Rancière only occasionally mentions the notion of Ge-
samtkunstwerk, but often returns to the German Romantic roots of this 
concept. Central to his reflection is an analysis of Schiller’s Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) and The Oldest Systematic Program of 
German Idealism (by Schelling, Hegel and Hölderlin) in which the “highest 
act of reason” is identified with an aesthetic act.27 The aesthetic program 
of German Idealism, that is “art as the transformation of thought into the 
sensory experience of the community”, is, according to Rancière, basic 
for the writings of the young Karl Marx.28 Not accidentally, Rancière also 
discusses aspects of Adolphe Appia’s views on total theatre – a theatre that 
might get out of itself and become a form of existence for society itself.29 
Rancière also traces the project of an ‘art which becomes a form of life’ in 
the programs of the Arts and Crafts, Werkbund and Bauhaus with its ideal 
expressed in the 1919 manifesto: “The ultimate aim of all visual arts is the 
complete building! Architects, painters and sculptors must learn to grasp 
the composite character of a building. Only then will their work be imbued 
with the architectonic spirit which it has lost as «salon art».”30
In the 1953 Warsaw exhibition catalogue we find excerpts from the 
resolution of the Polish Council of Architects (1949), which provided the 
foundations for socialist realism. As we read: “Polish architecture should 
be reborn as a great social art. […] New social architecture, through the 
organic cooperation with painting and sculpture, through the synthesis 
of the arts will create a rich new plastic art which will oppose the barren-
ness of constructivism.”31 What is evident in this quotation – represented 
in the 1953 exhibition in the form of decorative plaque (Fig. 4) – is an 
appropriation of the idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk in the time of Stalinism 
(a problem already discussed in Boris Groys’ The Total Art of Stalinism).32
I use the word ‘appropriation’ following Žižek’s argument about the les-
son of Rancière – that “one should be careful not to succumb to the liberal 
temptation of condemning all collective artistic performances as inherently 
«totalitarian».”33 Žižek, for example, talks about stealing the ideas of collective 
performances (parades, mass performances in stadiums): “it was Nazism 
that stole them and appropriated them from the worker’s movement.”34 The 
lesson of Rancière in relation to architecture would be therefore to identify 
the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk (the apotheosis of art/architecture as a form 
of life) as different “framings of a specific sensorium.”35
The history of the Gesamtkunstwerk is a history of appropriations, or – as 
I call it, borrowing a notion from music – of ‘transcriptions’ of the concept, 
102  Gabriela Świtek
as when a general idea (melody) is orchestrated using different instruments at 
each performance, while still preserving a recognizable identity.36 The most 
problematic (sometimes superficially labelled ‘pre-Fascist’ or ‘totalitarian’) 
modern transcription of the Gesamtkunstwerk can be found in Richard 
Wagner’s concept of drama which was crystallized just after the Revolution of 
1848 (at that time Wagner was in Dresden and befriended Mikhail Bakunin). 
As Carl E. Schorske aptly puts it: “Like Schiller and Hegel, Hölderlin and 
Marx, Wagner saw the Greek polis as a historical archetype of community, 
a lost paradise to be regained. […] The Greek polis and the Greek drama 
rose and fell together. When the polis fell, the drama fragmented into the 
many arts which had composed it.”37 It was the failure of the 1848 Revolu-
tion that brought Wagner to the idea of aesthetic community, “the perfect 
reconcilement of art and life”, and “free artistic fellowship.”38 Wagner’s own 
failure was that his romantic dream of aesthetic community, as expressed 
in his essays Die Kunst und die Revolution and Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft, 
turned into the community of aesthetes in Bayreuth. The line of further tran-
scriptions (for example, from the theory of musical drama to the practice of 
architecture) is too long to be discussed here in detail. Let us only mention 
William Morris and the Arts & Crafts movement, or Adolphe Appia’s essay 
Living Art-Work, published in 1919, the same year as the aforementioned 
Walter Gropius’s Program of the Staatliches Bauhaus in Weimar.
The concluding question is, however – where in this line of Gesamtkunst-
werk transcriptions – can we place the idea expressed in the 1953 Warsaw 
exhibition, the idea of “architecture that should be reborn as a great social 
art.” Searching for social aspects in the architectural politics of the time 
of Stalinism does not mean that I am an advocate, either of architectural 
utopias or of political terror. But, in a similar way, Rancière explains his 
reflection on the aesthetic regime of art: 
My inquiry […] has often been suspected of proposing a return to the fairy 
times and fairy tales of aesthetic utopias and aesthetic community, which 
either have brought about the big disasters of the 20th century or, at least, are 
out of step with the artistic practices and political issues of the 21st century. 
I tried to suggest that, on the contrary, this inquiry points to the tensions 
and contradictions which at once sustain the dynamic of artistic creation 
and aesthetic efficiency and prevent it from ever fusing in one and the same 
community of sense. The archaeology of the aesthetic regime of art is not 
a matter of romantic nostalgia.39
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Taking a lesson from Rancière we may also try to avoid the contemporary 
temptation for condemning all the collective efforts of socialist architecture 
as ‘totalitarian’ or ‘Stalinist’. Thinking of architecture in terms of providing 
everybody with an affordable home or with public transportation is today 
often overshadowed by the principles of the neoliberal market which pro-
motes corporate skyscrapers and luxury apartments. Let us take a lesson 
from Rancière and think about the social consequences of the distribution 
of the sensible in the realm of architecture.
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Fig. 1. 1st Exhibition of Architecture of the People’s Poland, 1953 (plan with six 
regional sections and the Hall of Honour). Photo: Zachęta – National Gallery of 
Art, Warsaw
Fig. 2. 1st Exhibition of Architecture of the People’s Poland, 1953 (Hall of Honour). 
Photo: Zachęta – National Gallery of Art, Warsaw
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Fig. 3. 1st Exhibition of Architecture of the People’s Poland, 1953. Photo: Zachęta – 
National Gallery of Art, Warsaw
Fig. 4. 1st Exhibition of Architecture of the People’s Poland, 1953. Photo: 
Zachęta – National Gallery of Art, Warsaw

Somaesthetics 
(Richard Shusterman)

Richard Shusterman
Introducing Somaesthetics: 
Aims and Challenges
I
I am deeply happy and honored to introduce this somaesthetics plenary 
panel to you today. It is especially appropriate that I am doing this in Po-
land, which is where (on a short visit during my Fulbright year in Berlin) 
I first conceived the notion and name of the discipline called somaesthetics. 
Interested in the aesthetics of embodiment, I realized that the terms “body 
aesthetics” or “aesthetics of the body” were too narrow and misleading (too 
much associated with commercialized stereotypes of beauty) to convey the 
field I envisaged, a field devoted to the manifold ways the body is essential 
not only to our external appearance but also to our perception, thought, and 
action. A new term was needed, and I decided to try out “somaesthetics” to 
see if it could do the job.1 When the idea of somaesthetics first came to me 
about eighteen years ago, I hardly imagined it would develop into an interna-
tional force that would merit a plenary panel at the prestigious International 
Congress of Aesthetics. The passage of time can bring wonderful fruits such 
as the enriching growth of this idea, but time can also bring degeneration, 
decay and death to the bodies with which somaesthetics is concerned, mine 
included. Will our bodies all be sufficiently fit for intercontinental travel and 
international lecturing eighteen years from now? I certainly hope so, but 
such fitness requires good fortune as well as the disciplines of somatic care.
We intellectuals in aesthetics have often neglected the body because of 
our passionate interest in the life of the mind and the creative arts. But 
the body the basic instrument of all human performance, our tool of tools, 
a necessity for all our perception, action, and even thought. Just as skilled 
builders need expert knowledge of their tools, so we need better somatic 
knowledge to improve our understanding and performance in the arts, 
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and to advance our mastery in the highest art of all – that of perfecting our 
humanity and living better lives. The interdisciplinary field of somaesthetics 
is devoted to that project, a project of meliorative self-culture whose aim 
is also to improve the lived culture of the communities in which we live 
and likewise improve the physical and social environments that shape and 
nourish our existence.
Roughly defined, somaesthetics concerns the critical study and culti-
vation of the experience and use of the living body (or soma) as site of 
sensory appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-stylization. As a disci-
pline of both theory and practice, it aims to enrich not only our abstract, 
discursive knowledge of the body, but also our lived somatic experience 
and performance. It seeks to enhance the meaning, efficacy, and grace 
of our movements but also the quality of the environments to which our 
movements contribute and from which they draw their energies and sig-
nificance. Because the word “body” in our Western tradition is too narrowly 
associated with mere spiritless physicality, devoid of perceptive subjectivity. 
I prefer to use the word “soma” for somaesthetics, recalling that the term 
“aesthetics” originally denoted the broader field of perception rather than 
being confined narrowly to objects of art and beauty.
II
The philosophical neglect of somatic cultivation is paradoxical first because 
such cultivation was central to the origins of philosophy and also because the 
body remains emblematic for expressing the essential ambiguity of human be-
ing. Though Plato tends to give Socrates an idealistic interpretation, we know 
from other sources (such as his student Xenophon) that Socrates in fact insisted 
on somatic cultivation as an essential dimension of his defining philosophical 
goal of care for the self (epimeleia heautou). Xenophon notes how Socrates 
chided Epigenes for not engaging in physical training, arguing that “the body 
is valuable for all human activities, and in all its uses it is very important that it 
should be as fit as possible….even in the act of thinking. Besides, it is a shame 
to let yourself grow old through neglect before seeing how you can develop 
the maximum beauty and strength of body.” Xenophon further describes how, 
even as an old man, Socrates continued to train himself at dance.2 
In China’s great philosophical tradition cultivation of the body (xiu shen 
修身) is an essential dimension of self-cultivation not only in Confucianism 
but also in Daoism, where it is typically interpreted in terms of protecting 
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the body (shou shen 守身) through training in health techniques such 
as special breathing and callisthenics. Ancient Indian thought similarly 
recognizes the soma’s central role in life (including the life of the mind) by 
insisting on the value of yoga for both health and enlightenment.
But leaving such historical origins aside, we should realize that cultivat-
ing our humanity implies somatic cultivation because our bodies express 
the fundamental ambiguity of human existence. First, it expresses our 
double status as object and subject, as something in the world, and as a sen-
sibility that perceives and acts in that world of objects. I both am a body and 
have a body. When I consult the mirror, as I must daily do when shaving, 
the perceiving eyes of my subject soma sees the object of my face; and they 
are sadly shocked by how old and tired that face appears, including those 
very eyes that keenly perceive my aging. The Apollo-inspired Socratic in-
junction to “Know thyself ” so you can improve yourself includes somatic 
self-knowledge and critique. Ageing poses challenges for a philosopher 
of somaesthetics who advocates philosophy as an art of living. But good 
philosophy is never easy, and ageing like dying is something we all must 
face in the very process of living. Somaesthetic mastery, I hope, can help 
us face these challenges with more skill, grace, calm, and courage.
The body expresses the ambiguity of human existence as both shared 
species being and individual difference. Philosophers emphasize rational-
ity or language as the distinguishing essence of human kind. But human 
embodiment seems equally essential. Try to imagine a human being, and 
you cannot help but call up the image of our bodily form. Yet, if our bod-
ies unite us as humans, they also divide us into different genders, races, 
ethnicities, classes, and further into the peculiarly individuals that we are. 
The commonality and difference of our bodies are deeply laden with 
social meaning. We appeal to our shared somatic form, experience, needs, 
and suffering when charitably reaching out to people of very different 
ethnicities and cultures. But the body (through its skin, hair, facial fea-
tures and gestural behavior) is conversely the prime site for emphasizing 
our differences and for uncharitable racism, sexism, and ethnic prejudice. 
Here in Krakow, we are not far from Auschwitz, where many of my people 
were ruthlessly exterminated because they belonged to the Jewish people. My 
father was born not far from here, near Lviv. He was genetically lucky not to 
look Jewish, and so he survived a number of pogroms before arriving safely to 
New York’s Ellis Island long before the Nazis came to power. If I was similarly 
fortunate in my looks to be able to pass for non-Jewish, I nonetheless experi-
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enced some painful racial prejudice in our more enlightened contemporary 
Europe. When I came to Berlin as a Fulbright professor in the mid-nineties, 
my American born Japanese girlfriend left her job in the New York fashion 
world to be with me. A former model, her beauty and striking racial differ-
ence aroused far more attention (expressed in aggressive staring) than she 
wanted from ordinary passersby in Berlin, whose East Asian population at 
that time was very small and limited largely to the Vietnamese underclass 
and underworld. After four uncomfortable months she decided to return 
to New York, where her beauty was also noticed but was not stared at with 
suspicion because of racial difference from the local Berlin ethnic norm. 
A normal body is not always normal in all places. Somaesthetics explores 
how our bodies and our bodily perceptions are also socially shaped.
The soma exemplifies many other crucial ambiguities of our human 
condition, our wavering, middle state between power and frailty, worthi-
ness and shame, dignity and brutishness, knowledge and ignorance. We 
invoke the notion of humaneness to show our moral character that elevates 
us from mere animals, but we also use the predicate “human” to describe 
and excuse our flaws, failures, and lapses into base or even bestial behavior: 
they are human weaknesses, limits linked to the frailties of the flesh we 
share with common beasts. Bodily abilities also set the limits of what we 
can expect from ourselves and others, thus determining the range of our 
ethical obligations and aspirations. If paralyzed, we have no duty to leap 
to the rescue of a drowning child. 
Besides grounding our social norms and moral values, the body is the 
essential medium or tool through which they are transmitted, inscribed, 
and preserved in society. Ethical codes are mere abstractions until they 
are given life through incorporation into bodily dispositions and action. 
Any properly realized ethical virtue depends not only on some bodily 
act (speech acts included) but also on having the right somatic and fa-
cial expression, indicative of having the right feelings. A stiffly grudging, 
angry-faced offering cannot be a true act of charity or respect, which is 
why Confucius insisted on the proper demeanor as essential to virtue. 
Ethics implies freedom to choose and act on that choice. We cannot act 
without bodily means, even if these means are reduced (through the wonders 
of technology) to pressing a button or blinking an eye to implement our 
choice of action. Our most primal sense of freedom to act is the freedom to 
move our bodies, whether in locomotion or in simply opening the eyes to 
see, the mouth to breathe. But true to its essential ambiguity, the body also 
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clearly symbolizes our unfreedom: the bodily constraints on our action, the 
corporeal bulk, the physical needs and failures that weigh us down and limit 
our performance, the relentless degeneration of aging and death. 
If we turn from ethics and action to epistemology, the body remains 
emblematic of human ambiguity. As both an indispensable source of per-
ception and an insurmountable limit to it, the body epitomizes the human 
condition of knowledge and ignorance. Because, as a body, I am a thing 
among things in the world, that world of things is also present and com-
prehensible to me. Moreover, to see the world requires seeing it from some 
point of view that determines the meaning of left and right, up and down, 
forward and backward, inside and outside. The soma supplies that primor-
dial point of view through its location both in the spatiotemporal field and 
the field of social interaction. But every viewpoint has limitations, and so 
does the body’s, whose senses all have limits of sensory range and focus. 
These limits become increasingly restrictive and frustrating as we age. 
Hearing typically goes before sight. If I often complained that my father 
was always too busy to listen to me when I was young, then I now can la-
ment how it is even more painful today that he cannot even hear me well 
enough to have a proper phone conversation, despite the use of hearing 
aids. Soon he may not be able to hear or see me at all. But what should I 
expect from a centenarian? I rejoice that he can still function as well as he 
does, and I hope I can perform just as well for just as long. 
The ever encroaching, inexorable limits of our somatic powers (that 
culminate with our somatic end in death) have made it very tempting 
for philosophers to reject the body and instead focus on the idea of an 
immortal soul or disembodied mind. The soma is not eternal and ideal. 
It is full of imperfections and blemishes, including inevitable elements of 
ugliness, awkwardness, and pain in experience, appearance, and action. 
But, realistically, we cannot live or think, create beauty or perform virtuous 
deeds without the soma; and so a pragmatist concludes that we should do 
the best we can to cultivate it in order to enhance our powers for creating 
beauty, increasing knowledge, and practicing virtue.
III
Somaesthetics emerged from American pragmatist philosophy, but it has 
grown into an international and transdisciplinary field of research. This panel 
presents only a few of the many interesting directions that somaesthetics is 
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taking. Professor Otabe, from Tokyo, helps situate somaesthetics historically 
and culturally by relating it not only to older Western philosophical theories of 
embodied sensory perception from Aristotle through various eighteenth and 
nineteenth century French and German thinkers but also to contemporary 
Japanese theories that highlight the soma’s complexity and its multiple roles in 
aesthetic perception and creative action. Turning from philosophical theory to 
artistic practice, Professor Bukdahl of Copenhagen explores the application of 
somaesthetics to contemporary art by examining the work of some of today’s 
influential artists in Europe and Asia. Finally, Professor Wilkoszewska, our host 
from Krakow, takes somaesthetics beyond its connections with philosophical 
history and contemporary art practice, but also beyond its traditional human-
ist focus. In a wide-ranging paper she highlights the transdisciplinarity of 
somaesthetics by focusing on its connection with natural science and technol-
ogy3. She relates somaesthetics not only to the new technologies of remaking 
the body that inspire theories of posthumanism but also to the evolutionary 
sciences through which we can explore possible traces or features of prehu-
man or nonhuman bodies (such as those of plants and nonhuman animals) 
still present in the human soma, and she suggests how understanding such 
affinities with nonhuman life can improve our existence in this world, a world 
which we share with nonhuman creatures, including the many microbes in 
our bodies that make our somatic life possible.
Endnotes
1. For more on the origins of somaesthetics, see: Richard Shusterman, Thinking through 
the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. The 
field has developed in such an interdisciplinary way that a “Journal of Somaesthetics” 
is being launched to serve as a forum for such multidisciplinary research. The journal 
can be found at http://journals.aau.dk/index.php/JOS/, accessed on January15, 2013.
2. Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robert Waterfield, 
London, Penguin, 1990, pp. 171–172, 231–234.
3. Somaesthetics is increasingly being applied in the field of Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI). In recent research in this field practical somaesthetic workshops in 
raising body consciousness have also been used for generating ideas. See for example: 
Wonjun Lee, Youn-kyung Lim, and Richard Shusterman, Practicing Somaesthetics: 
Exploring its Impact on Interactive Product Design Ideation in Proceedings of DIS 
(Designing Interactive Systems)’14, New York: ACM Press, 2014, pp. 1055–1064.
Tanehisa Otabe
On an Aisthetic Consciousness of our Being: 
Toward a Contextualization of Shusterman’s 
Somaesthetics
Richard Shusterman once insisted that “new names can be helpful both 
in stimulating new thinking and in reorganizing and reanimating older 
insights.”1 The aim of my presentation is to contextualize by means of 
the history of ideas Shusterman’s somaesthetics within Western as well 
as Japanese discourses on sôma and aisthêsis in order to reorganize and 
reanimate older, often forgotten insights. My presentation will be divided 
into three sections. The first will give a general overview of the classical 
theory on sôma and aisthêsis by focusing on Aristotle. In the second section 
I will address how this classical theory was taken up and transformed in 
the 18th and 19th century Europe, thereby dealing with Johann Gottfried 
Herder, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Konrad Fiedler. In the third section 
I will turn to Japanese discourses on soma and aisthesis in the 20th and 21st 
century, corresponding to Shusterman’s interests in the “transcultural dia-
logue between Western and Asian approaches to aesthetic embodiment.”2
1. Aristotle is among those who most decisively influenced the Western 
conceptions of soma and aisthesis.
He once argued that each sense (aisthêsis) has its own medium and that 
“the flesh (sarx) and the tongue are related to the real organs of touch and 
taste, as are air and water to those of sight, hearing and smell,”3 i.e., in the 
case of touch (haphê), “flesh” or “body (sôma)” is its medium.4 This view 
would make it possible to treat an instrument or a tool as a prolongation 
of our body.5 He even went so far to insist that “in respect of touch we far 
excel all other species in exactness of discrimination” and “those whose 
flesh is soft (malakosarkoi)” are “well-endowed by nature.”6 Somatic deli-
cacy or softness is a precondition of our intellectual capacity. Generally 
speaking, the sense of touch is certainly regarded as “brutish”7) and the 
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sense of seeing is ranked at the top in his philosophy, as we read at the 
beginning of Metaphysics: “We prefer seeing to everything else, because 
this, most of all the senses, makes us know and bring to light differences 
between things.”8 At the same time, however, Aristotle insisted on the 
important role the sense of touch plays for a human being. Among all the 
senses, that of touch is not only primary, but also fundamental, in that 
somatic fineness is a disposition to a high intelligence.
What characterizes his theory of aisthêsis is that, under the name of 
“sensus communis (koinê aisthêsis),” he addressed the so-called perception 
of perception, or a sort of higher-order perception. According to Aristotle, 
thanks to the sensus communis that “subsists in association chiefly with 
the faculty of touch,” “one perceives (aisthanesthai) that one sees and hears” 
and “one discerns,” for example, “white from sweet,”9 i.e. one can cross 
over from one sense to the other.10 He argued further that we perceive 
not only that we perceive, but also that we think and concluded that “to 
perceive that we perceive or think” is “to perceive that we are” or “that we 
live.”11 What is at issue in the sensus communis is, therefore, our aisthetic 
consciousness of our own being. Put in a modern terminology, the sensus 
communis guarantees the “feeling of realness” of ourselves and, therefore, 
also the world in which we live.12
2. The topic of the sensus communis was taken up by a variety of think-
ers in the 18th century, including Rousseau and Herder.
Herder (1744–1803), for example, argued that the human being is a “think-
ing sensorium commune,”13 by which he meant that the sense of touch (Gefühl) 
is a fundamental sense from which all other senses were derived.14 He was 
against the idea to situate the “site or seat of the soul” in a certain place in 
the brain called “sensorium commune.” For Herder, the human being is 
a thinking sensorium commune. This is why Merleau-Ponty (1908–61) who 
advocated the integration of the various senses into “one knowing organism” 
quoted with sympathy Herder’s formula cited above.15 Herder elaborated on 
how the five senses have been integrated and underlined the fact – that is most 
usually ignored by the sight itself which fancies itself to be self-sufficient – that 
the sense of touch has guided the sense of sight: “We have actually learned 
how to see through force of habit and using other senses, above all by using 
our sense of touch (das tastende Gefühl).”16 Based on contemporary insights 
into physiology, especially those of Albrecht Haller, Herder acknowledged 
the importance of the embodiment, by stating a motto: “I feel myself! I am!”17 
which mediates between the Aristotelian tradition and 20th century philo-
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sophical anthropology with which Shusterman’s somaesthetics shares the 
emphasis on the intimate union between body and mind.18
In Emile, or On Education (1762), Rousseau (1712–78) argued that the 
“common sense” “results from the well-regulated use of the other senses,”19 thus 
emphasizing reciprocal refinement of the senses as follows: “Children, who are 
great imitators, all try to draw. I would want my child to cultivate this art, not 
precisely for the art itself but for making his eye exact and his hand flexible,” 
in other words, in order that “his sense [may] acquire the perspicacity and 
his body the good habits one gains by this exercise.”20 The idea of common 
sense thus leads to “using the active organ (i.e. hand) and the passive organ 
(i.e. eye) to exercise one another reciprocally”21 and thereby to cultivating “the 
body’s good constitution which makes the mind’s operations easy and sure.”22
In the 19th century aesthetics, Fiedler (1841–95) explored in an original 
manner the idea of reciprocal cultivation of the senses. In his essay on The 
Origin of Artistic Activity (1887), he critically investigated the traditional 
art theory that strictly distinguishes a spiritual invention from a somatic 
execution. This distinction involves that “the artist who externally executes 
expresses only for others in a visible and lasting way what has already 
gained a form in his cognitive faculty that does not depend on external 
action, or even that the artist who is about to act artistically is compelled to 
do so, for no external means is able to render his spiritual forms in its pure 
perfection.”23 By spiritual form, Fiedler meant the so-called inner Form, 
criticizing the position that idealizes Raphael without hands. Contrary 
to this traditional view, Fiedler argued that it is in the somatic activity of 
painting that the cognitive faculty of seeing can be elaborated: “The artist’s 
hand develops further (Weiterentwickelung) what the eye does – precisely 
on the point where the eye has reached the end of its action.”24 The artist’s 
hand does not simply duplicate what the eye has seen; rather the hand 
continues the process of the seeing.
The reason why the hand should share in continuing the process of the 
seeing is that the inner activity of seeing is not determined clearly enough 
until the process is depicted on external materials by the somatic act of 
painting. The artist, therefore, does not have to complain, as the painter 
Conti in Lessing’s drama Emilia Galotti (1772) did: “How much is lost on 
the long path from the eye, through the arm, into the brush!”25 Fiedler 
said: “The artistic process proves to be a progress from the indeterminate-
ness of the inner process to the determinateness of external expression.”26 
Certainly Fiedler considered the collaboration of the senses only possible 
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between eye and hand, but if we generalize his idea, we will find clues to 
the theory of the intertwinement of the senses.
3. In modern Japan, inspired by Western philosophy and reinterpreting 
Eastern traditions, several prominent scholars have developed their original 
ideas concerning soma and aisthesis.
One of the characteristics of modern Japanese thinking is that Fiedler has 
exerted a decisive influence, which can be especially seen in Kitarô Nishida’s 
concept “intuition as action (kôi teki chokkan).” In the following, I focus on 
the theory of body of Motomori Kimura (1895–1946), a favorite student of 
Nishida.27 Kimura paid attention on the polysemy of the Japanese term mi, 
as follows: “The term mi does have the meaning of body as a natural object, 
but it also has the meaning of self as is expressed in the phrase ‘mi wo omou’ 
(taking care of oneself), and even that of heart as seen in the phrase ‘mi wo 
tsukusu’ (devoting one’s energies). Thus, the human body is dialectic existence 
as subject-object. As a subject making inroads into nature, it is an apical end 
of the expressive will of a subject; alternatively, as nature making inroads 
into subject, it is a limitation of a subject by nature.”28 The peculiarity of the 
human body is found in its mediating between the inner and the outer, as 
is shown in the Japanese term te-gokoro (literally: hand-heart). Te-gokoro 
means the “heart that dwells in hands and works through hands.”29
Kimura defined the actions of a heart residing in a body as art, i.e., technique. 
Art is a kind of somatic intellect that indwells in hands, an intuitive knowledge 
that delicately works in accordance with objects. Kimura notes that there are 
many “expressions related to body, in particular, to hands (te)” that describe 
the “forms of art”: For example, concerning working ways of technique te-ren 
(wiles), te-kuda (trick), te-giwa (dexterity), te-sabaki (manipulation), regarding 
technical properties of an object as material te-goro (handy), te-gowai (stiff) 
and with reference to the work of art as a synthesis of working and material 
te-no-konda (elaborate), te-garu-na (easygoing), and te-wo-nuita (negligent). 
All these examples indicate that human beings are not only an inner existence, 
but also a somatic existence.30 Referring to Ravaisson’s theory in his Of Habit 
(1838), Kimura explained the process in which technique is gained as follows: 
“It is the will that first makes the hands move. This process being repeated 
over and over, the hands gradually become purposively habituated. Then we 
gain the heart residing in the hands.”31 Technique as the “naturalized will that 
dwells in the body”32 is realized by habitual practice. And such a body is then 
able to call creative acts from the subject, or rather to stimulate the subject to 
invent what it could not think of by its autonomous will,33 which testifies the 
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creativity of somatic exercise for human beings. In this sense, Kimura could 
be regarded as a forerunner of somaesthetics.
In the 1970s, Hiroshi Ichikawa (1931–2002) also took notice of the poly-
semy of the Japanese word mi, that has not only the meaning of physical 
body, self and heart, as Kimura had once pointed out, although Ichikawa 
never mentioned Kimura, but also that of social position, as is expressed in 
the phrase mi-no-hodo (literally: the extent or grade of body, as an idiom: 
one’s place or status),34 and defined mi as an implex (a term adopted from 
Paul Valéry) that consists of three layers, namely a tropic (i.e. unconscious), 
an intentional and a mediated integration. As for modality, he further 
distinguished an actual integration from a virtual and a possible integra-
tion.35 Ichikawa argued that, being void of practical implications, art can 
foreground a virtual and a possible integration of mi that would be “imme-
diately suppressed” in our actual life36 and thereby “enlarge our aisthesis.”37
Bin Kimura (1931– ), a psychiatrist, paid attention to another aspect of 
mi, as is seen in the expression mi-zu-kara that means “for oneself ” (liter-
ally: the body itself). He argued that it is by means of mi (i.e. body) that the 
natural spontaneity of life in general which is characterized as ono-zu-kara 
(i.e. naturally, of itself) and in which the self and others are inseparable is 
individualized as a self of mi-zu-kara and that the incompetence of indi-
vidualization brings about schizophrenia.38 By the way, the fact that the 
Japanese have applied the same Chinese character “zì” (in Japanese: “ji”) 
to the both words, mi-zu-kara (for oneself) and ono-zu-kara (naturally), 
implies, according to Kimura, that the Japanese regarded self and nature 
as correlated with each other.39 The loss of such a correlation between self 
and nature is one of the symptoms of depersonalization, which Kimura 
described as a disorder of sensus communis in Aristotelian sense, reinter-
preting thereby the sensus communis as “a sensation of practical relation-
ship to, or rather practical participation in, the world.”40
Yujiro Nakamura (1925– ) took up the idea of sensus communis and 
devoted an entire book to this subject in 1979. Calling into question the 
primacy of the sense of seeing confirmed by experimental psychology, 
Nakamura argued that a centripetal, clearly conscious integration of the 
senses by the sight that is most usually deemed to be self-sufficient is 
based (and should be based) on a centrifugal, unconscious integration of 
the senses by somesthesia or coenesthesia that is represented by the sense 
of touch.41 He thus rehabilitated the sense of touch, clarifying thereby its 
status within our body. By the say, it is not to be forgotten that Megumi 
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Sakabe (1936–2009) pleaded a “philosophy of touching (fureru)” as a basis 
for understanding cultural dynamism.42
Toshio Kuwako (1951– ) who specialized in Aristotle and Zhu Xi, a neo-
Confucian, recently advocated a philosophy of aisthesis, thereby defining aisthesis 
as a “faculty of a somatic self to perceive its spatial placement and temporal hys-
teresis.”43 I personally am trying to trace Baumgarten’s concept of aisthesis to its 
origin in Leibniz, namely the idea of “small perceptions,” i.e. those perceptions 
of which we are not conscious, focusing on how we can make use of those traces 
that have been sedimented in ourselves in order to reorganize or regenerate 
our habitual selves and to correspond in a more fruitful manner to the world.44
On these attempts in modern Japan might be shed a new, systematic 
light if seen from a somaesthetic viewpoint.
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Else Marie Bukdahl
The Relation between Richard Shusterman’s 
Someaesthetics and Selected Artworks by 
Carsten Höller, Rirkrit Tiravanija, Pan Gongkai 
and SUPERFLEX
For over two decades, Richard Shusterman’s wide-ranging and innovative 
somaesthetics has been applied to significant aspects of philosophy, politics, 
literature, visual art and many other fields in both culture and science. 
Somaesthetics is not only a specific field of study, it is also a methodic 
physical exercise.
That somaesthetics has proven to be such a fruitful discipline is due 
in part to the close relationship between theory and practice and be-
cause – says Shusterman – it “offers a way of integrating the discursive 
and nondiscursive, the reflective and the immediate, thought and feel-
ing, in the quest of providing greater range, harmony, and clarity to the 
soma – the body-mind whose union is an ontological given but whose 
most satisfying unities of performance are both a personal and cultural 
achievement.”1 
Embodied creation and perception are keywords in somaesthetics and 
in his aesthetics and philosophy as such. Art interpreted as experience 
has a very central role in his aesthetics. This concept of art has expanded 
”the realm of art by challenging the rigid division between art and action 
that is supported by definitions that define art as mimesis, poiesis, or the 
narrow practice defined by the institutional art world.”2 Shusterman has 
a vital focus on lived experience and he stresses that aesthetic experience 
is never passive. Thus, an artwork cannot be complete until the viewer has 
experienced and interpreted its particular qualities.3 
Shusterman has always worked with what he calls “new challenges and 
engaging transdisciplinary projects.”4 
In recent years, the visual arts have achieved increasing importance 
in his somaesthetic optic and this has been one of the new challenges he 
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has accepted. More and more prominent artists have been inspired by his 
aesthetics and this has resulted in more requests from artists for written 
contributions to their exhibition catalogues or to them contacting him in 
other contexts.
The prominent German installation artist Carsten Höller was one of the 
first artists to approach Shusterman after reading Pragmatist Aesthetics, 
which echoed his own artistic perception of the importance of corporeality 
in all aspects of human life. While studying the work, he discovered that 
there were also parallels to his own understanding of the unification of art, 
science and life and the embodied participation of the public in artworks. 
Höller creates cross-disciplinary installations, often allowing exhibi-
tion visitors to experiment on themselves, and inviting viewers to be ac-
tive participants. In 1996, Carsten Höller asked Shusterman to write the 
catalogue text for the provocative and interactive installation House for 
Pigs and People (1997), which he was creating with Rosemarie Trockel for 
Documenta X (1997) (fig. 1). 
1. Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel. House for Pigs and People. Insal-
lation created for Documenta X 1997, Kassel.
The famous French philosopher Jean Baudrillard described this impressive 
installation as follows:
Reaching up on tiptoe to see over a fence, spectators look down on a pigsty, 
while a large mirror opposite allows them to see themselves observing pigs. 
Then they walk round the shelter and park themselves behind the mirror, 
which turns out to be a two-way mirror through which they can once again 
see the pigs, but at the same time also see the spectators opposite looking 
at the pigs – spectators unaware, or at least pretending to be unaware, that 
they are being observed.5 
In his catalogue essay on this work Shusterman analyzed it both in 
the somaesthetic perspective as well as characterizing some of the basic 
ideas in the aesthetic that relate to art in particular. This applies first and 
foremost to the destruction of ”the crusty old dogma that firmly divides 
art from real life and praxis”, but it is also a criticism of the closed world 
of the gallery, the so-called ”white cube”. It is, says Shusterman, impor-
tant to emphasize that ”art’s highest aim is not to make a few admirable 
objects in a world filled with misery, but to create a better world through 
the work such objects can generate.” These views are also visualized in an 
individualized manner in Höller’s and Trockel’s works. This takes place 
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in such a way that ”a concretely embodied reality” is created, which – as 
Shusterman formulates it – demonstrates that ”art can play a powerful 
role in changing other realities by changing our perception, attitudes and 
consequent actions”. House for Pigs and People cast a critical light on the 
sacred concept of autonomy and the often closed world of galleries and 
museums, in which – as Shusterman expresses it – ”the artist is boxed out 
from the power to enlighten and move the multitudes toward the creation 
of a better world.”6 On the one hand, Höller and Trockel are ”evoking art’s 
potential for real world improvement”, on the other, they reveal ”art’s actual 
limits and impotence.”7 Visitors view the pigs behind the glass in much 
the same way as we often settle for simply viewing rather than involving 
ourselves with groups of people who exist on the periphery of society. ”They 
are seen through the one-way glass of sociocultural privilege.”8 
Höller has used many of his later sculptures or installations as platforms 
for interactions with participants and visual dialogues with the surround-
ings. They challenge our somatic habits and contribute to the art of living 
by enhancing our bodily awareness, thereby approaching one of the impor-
tant artistic aims of Shusterman’s somaesthetics. One example is Test Site, 
which was installed in the Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern in 2006 (fig. 2) 
2. Carsten Höller. Test Site. Installed in the Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern 
in 2006. 
and “comprised five spiralling tubular slides that ran from the upper floors 
of the gallery to ground level. Sliding down, especially from the higher 
levels, was an experience that was both physically and psychically intense.” 
Using peoples’ experience as what Höller calls ”raw material” he created 
a work of art that was ”centred around, and dependent upon, visitor’s 
participation.”9 
In Test Site, the glass plate separating the artwork and the viewer has 
disappeared. The viewer actually acts as a co-creator. Mark Windsor sum-
marises the impact of the interactive Test Site on both viewers, the environ-
ment and our perception of urban planning:
”Test Site poses a threat to urban spatial practices because it prompts an 
awareness of the pacific control exerted by structured spaces by offering an 
alternative; one that activates the individual’s imaginative capacity against 
the institutions that suppress it.”10 
Höller shatters what Shusterman calls the ”false barrier between art and 
action, that trivializes art and robs its power for positive praxis.”11 
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In 2012 Shusterman added curating to his practice because “the prag-
matism I practice advocates experimentation as a key dimension of its phi-
losophy of transactional experience.”12 This became a reality when Richard 
Conte and Sandra Laugier from Université 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne decided 
that part of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the simultaneous 
publication in English and French of Pragmatist Aesthetics should be an 
art exhibition to be shown in the Sorbonne’s Michael Journiac Gallery in 
Paris. Shusterman curated the exhibition himself and was provided with 
an opportunity to present works by seven artists that he says “enriched my 
life experience as well as my thought.”13 All the artists at the exhibition 
in Paris presented “interactive works” or “relational installation”. The art-
ists were the aforementioned Carsten Höller, media artist and researcher 
Thecla Schiporst, Orlan, who practices Carnal Art, the Chinese painter 
and art theorist Pan Gongkai and the Italian French installation artist 
Tatiana Trouvé. The Italian artist Luca Del Baldo also participated, as did 
the experimental French photographer Yann Toma.
He characterizes the essence of the exhibited works as follows:
Their works illustrate this ultimate pragmatist bridging of somaesthetics 
theory and artistic practice where my own philosophical soma (with its 
expressive energies and cultural shaping) becomes the substance for artistic 
rendering.14 
The Chinese artist Pan Gongkai, who also took part in Shusterman’s 
exhibition in Paris, has already made a significant impact on the inter-
national art world. He has been very successful in the fields of painting, 
installation and video art as well as in education and administration. He 
is currently the president of the Central Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing 
and vice-president of the Chinese Artists Association. He contributed to 
the Venice Biennale in 2011 with four other Chinese artists. Shusterman 
commented on these contributions in an interview with the Chinese cura-
tor Peng Feng.15 Somaesthetics has had great significance for Peng Feng’s 
curatorial work:
“Somaesthetics has begun to have an impact not only on the analysis of 
visual art, but also on its practice. One prominent example is its use as 
a generative theoretical background for Peng Feng’s curatorial project 
for the Chinese Pavilion of the 2011 Venice Biennale entitled Pervasion.” 
This show of five installation pieces included “clouds with tea fragrance; 
pipes dripping with Chinese schnapps; fragrant porcelain pots of herb 
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medicine; fog of incense; and lotus-scented virtual snow.” These “instal-
lations sought to emphasize that our appreciation of even visual art is 
always much more than visual.” Shusterman stresses that they “highlight 
the soma’s role as transmodal perceiving subjectivity by also engaging the 
pleasures of other bodily senses.”16 
Like Shusterman, Gongkai is convinced that all art is created and per-
ceived through the body. He knows that body consciousness plays an im-
portant role in contemporary Chinese painting. This is also the case with 
the impressive video installation Snow Melting into Lotus from the Venice 
Biennale 2011 (fig. 3). It is a long, moving passage, which transports you
3. Pan Gongkai. Snow Melting into Lotus. Exhibited in the Venice Bien-
nale 2011. 
into a magical space. Both sides of a temporary corridor are covered with 
Chinese ink lotuses, onto which an animation of falling snow is projected. 
Three air conditioners help keep the temperature of the corridor much 
cooler than the rest of the building. The temperature never rises above 
10º C. In this work, Pan Gongkai juxtaposes the traditional subject of the 
lotus and the traditional technique of ink painting with the use of modern 
computer technology to create elements of falling text in video, falling like 
snowflakes. On the ground beneath it are actual cut out white letters which 
appear to have fallen out of the work. The text is his English translation of 
his essay on modern Western art and art theory. Gongkai has described 
this project as follows:
It is an attempt to create a poetic and vacant space that fits in with traditional 
Chinese culture.
Shusterman showed a video of this project in the exhibition he curated 
in Paris at the Sorbonne’s Michel Journiac Gallery in connection with the 
celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the French translation of his 
book Pragmatist Aesthetics in 2012.17 
Gongkai’s ink paintings have a contemplative intensity and invite a sur-
render of self. They are characterized by bold renewal and reinterpretation 
of the ancient Chinese art form. From the simple elements of water and ink 
emerge artworks of intimate subtlety and overwhelming emotional power 
(fig. 4). Gongkai also uses the language of art to express
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4. Pan Gongkai. Ink Painting.
human values and to open up new dialogues between the local and the 
global. In these works, viewers encounter a visual dialogue between tra-
dition and innovation, the local and the global. The artist has expressed 
himself with all his power and so personally that his work achieves general 
significance. 
Shusterman emphasises that Gongkai is “equally accomplished as an 
erudite theorist and we have spent many hours in Beijing in philosophi-
cal dialogues about art, some of which have been published in Chinese 
art journals.” 
Shusterman developed his view from a western perspective in Pragmatist 
Aesthetics. It was only when he met the Chinese philosophers and artists – 
Gongkai in particular - that he was introduced to the ”rich sources in the 
classical Confucian notion of an ethics of harmony in which ethical educa-
tion rests on the twin aesthetic pillars of art and ritual.” Gongkai is a special-
ist in Confucianism. Another key focus of Shusterman’s discussions with 
Gongkai concerned ”the relationship between art and life, including the 
pragmatist idea of the ethical art of living.”18 Gongkai developed this theme 
in an article that was published in the catalogue for the exhibition Zaoxing, 
which was shown in September 2010 at the Central Academy of Fine Art 
in Beijing, with Gongkai at its head. In this essay, Gongkai ties aesthetics 
closely with life and practice and to improving the quality of our life and 
society. These attempts are the heartbeat of Shusterman’s somaesthetics and 
are probably directly inspired by them.”19 Gongkai hopes that these goals 
will start to characterise the Chinese teaching system in the Academies 
and culturally and societally to a greater degree.20 
Shusterman is convinced that in Gongkai’s projects ”West and East coex-
ist in active harmony and moving beauty, without an isolating separation, 
but also without coercive fusion.”21 The same goes for the interplay between 
traditional techniques and contemporary technology.
In an interview by Aude Launay on Biological Aesthetics, Shusterman 
tells us that he admires some European artists of “relational orientation” 
such as the prominent Thai artist Rirkrit Tiravanija. He met him at an Art 
and Experience event in Venice (2004), organized by the Italian art critic 
Maurizio Bartolotti.22 
Tiravanija works in the same interactive manner as Carsten Höller and 
the other artists that Shusterman presented in his exhibition in Paris.
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Rirkrit Tiravanija has presented outstanding and very impressive instal-
lations in Thailand, Europe and particularly in his country of residence, 
the U.S.A. 
He is renowned particularly for creating projects that are designed to 
be used, are socially grounded and in which the viewer is always a very 
active participant. 
His installations often take the form of stages or rooms for sharing meals, 
cooking, reading and playing music. The architecture or other structures 
he uses always form the framework for a variety of social events. 
An example of this was his installation Fear Eats the Soul at Gavin Brown’s 
Enterprise in which his assistant served bowls of soup every Thursday, 
Friday, and Saturday throughout April 2011 (fig. 5). 
5. Rirkrit Tiravanija. Fear Eat the Soul at Gavin Brown’s Enterprise. April 
2011.
He describes his interactive artistic intentions as follows: 
”The situation is not about looking at art. It is about being in the space, 
participating in an activity. The nature of the visit has shifted to emphasize 
the gallery as a space for social interaction. The transfer of such activities 
as cooking, eating or sleeping into the realm of the exhibition space puts 
visitors into very intimate if unexpected contact; the displacement creates 
an acute awareness of the notion of public and private, the installations 
function like scientific experiments: the displacement becomes a tool and 
exposes the way scientific thought processes are constructed. The visitor 
becomes a participant in that experiment.”23 
Tiravanija’s work is fundamentally about bringing people together to 
create a better world. His exhibitions are often developed through surpris-
ing interactions and exchanges amongst participants. He has emphasised 
repeatedly that “it is not what you see that is important but what takes place 
between people.”24 In his installations he successfully attempts to bridge 
the mind-body gap that often exists in Western art. This is precisely what 
Shusterman has been doing with his somaesthetic theory and practice. 
Through his installations, Tiravanija always creates new relationships 
between people and breaks down barriers between societal groups and 
conventional ways of thinking. It is precisely this liberating process that 
is one of the main themes in Shusterman’s somaesthetics and which Tir-
vanija interprets in many surprising and artistic ways in his installations. 
Another general theme in Shusterman’s somaesthetics is interdisciplinarity. 
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This interaction and integration of the diverse forms of somatic knowledge 
and artistic fields was visualized in a very impressive way in Tiravanija’s 
staging at New York’s Park Avenue Armory of Oktophonie in March 2013. 
It was a performance of electronic music by the singular German composer 
Stockhausen (fig. 6). This surprising music is only a 70-minute excerpt of 
the late 
6. Rirkrit Tiravanija’s staging at New York’s Park Avenue Armory of Ok-
tophonie in March 2013.
composer’s 29-hour opera Licht. It was intended for performance in a spe-
cially designed chamber with octophonic (8-channel) sound. 
 “Tiravanija conceived of a circular stage with a lunar surface to include 
both the audience and the performers, all-white smocks to be worn by all 
attendees, and a light show that approximates an eclipse.”25 The embodied 
experience that Tiravanija made possible was featured in the following 
review in the “New Yorker”
“A vivid presence on the international art circuit…[who] not only welcomes 
but depends on[a] collaborative embrace between artist and spectator.”26 
At the end of the nineties, Tiravanija was one of the artists that Nicolas 
Bourriaud had in mind when he created the new term “relational aesthetics”. 
This was based on works such as Tiravanija’s legendary exhibition at 303 
Gallery in New York in 1992, in which he made Thai food for the guests 
of the exhibition for a whole month. 
But Shusterman emphasizes, to a greater degree than Bourriaud, the 
importance of corporeality for all aspects of human existence. And Bour-
riaud has not, like Shusterman, connected this aim with the concept of 
artworks being capable of improving the quality of our life and the soci-
ety as such. This is the reason why Shusterman’s somaesthetics is able to 
clarify these aspects in Tiravanija’s artworks and to place them in a new 
and promising context. 
John Perreault suggests a parallel between Duchamp and Tiravanija and 
alludes to Tiravanija’s ability to engage the public in the art space: 
Why was he so late in coming to Marcel Duchamp’s famous lecture called 
The Creative Act: “The creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the 
spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by decipher-
ing and interpreting its inner qualification and thus adds his contribution 
to the creative act.”27 
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The three Danish artists Bjørnstjerne Christiansen, Jakob Fenger and 
Rasmus Nielsen formed a project group in 1993 that they called SUPER-
FLEX. Their projects use social processes and networking as their working 
material and are represented in e.g. MoMA. All three artists were educated 
at the Royal Danish Academy of Art. They describe their most important 
aim with their often site-specific projects as follows: 
We are interested in using our position as artists to explore the contribution 
that the field of art can make to social, political and economic change. (..) It 
is our suggestion that some possible new ways of thinking and acting can 
be found through the activity of art and artist.
There are some clear parallels between the aims of SUPERFLEX and 
one of the keywords in Shusterman’s development of pragmatism. This 
deals with what he calls “community” which he characterizes as “an in-
dispensable medium for the pursuit of better beliefs, knowledge, and even 
for the realization of meaning through language and the arts. Pragmatists 
have offered cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic arguments for democracy.”28 
SUPERFLEX describe their projects as “tools” that invite people to take 
part in the creation of their experimental models which are aimed at chang-
ing the economic and cultural conditions in various societies, both in the 
East as well as the West. Shusterman also emphasizes the interactive and 
creative elements in the experience of art. In their projects, SUPERFLEX 
support the requirement for “free space” and make it possible for informa-
tion to be free, i.e. that “citizen users should be able to retrieve and share the 
visual information that he or she finds most relevant for decision-making.”29 
SUPERFLEX realised this aim in a project that established an internet-
based dialogue in the public space in Sharjah in The United Arab Emirates. 
This was called Sharjah Moon Channel (fig. 7) and was broadcast during 
the fifth International Biennale in Sharjah from 
7. SUPERFLEX. Moon Channel , Sharjah, April 2001.
17–27 April 2001. SUPERFLEX calls this kind of channel a superchannel, 
which they describe as “a local studio used by people and communities as 
a discussion forum, presentation medium and a physical gathering place. 
It is a tool enabling the production of Internet TV directly (…). During 
live productions the viewer can communicate directly through a chat with 
the producer and with all other viewers. All productions are archived, so 
viewers can continue to watch and discuss them.”30 
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The Superchannel project at the Sharjah Biennale was curated by the 
painter Dorte Dahlin (www.superflex.net/tools/superchannel/users/moon.
shtml, accessed on June 13, 2014). It was part of a wider collaborative 
project between Dorte Dahlin, colleagues from the Sharjah Department 
of Culture and Else Marie Bukdahl, who was at the time the rector of the 
Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts in Copenhagen.31 
The projects by Carsten Höller, Pan Gongkai, Rirkrit Tiravanija and 
SUPERFLEX, which are interactive and relational, are based on different 
types of technology. They visualise – as we have seen – some basic elements 
in Shusterman’s somaesthetics. Carsten Höller and Pan Gongkai have been 
directly influenced by it. It has broadened their artistic perspective. Rirkrit 
Tiravanija’s and SUPERFLEX’s project contain clear visualisations of the 
aims that are parallel to the aims occupying a central place in Shusterman’s 
somaesthetics. Common to all the artists mentioned here is their focus 
on embodied creation and perception, the full-bodied experience, the 
establishment of a bridge between art, real life and praxis and the interac-
tive dialogue with the viewer and the surroundings. Their projects also 
demonstrate that they – like Shusterman – aim at the creation of a better 
world. But Shusterman’s somaesthetics has also been a valuable resource 
for interpreting the works of the artists discussed here and revealed some 
aspects which have not been clearly analyzed up till now. Particularly with 
regard to the role of body consciousness, the viewers active involvement 
in the projects and the meliorist goals. It is also these essential elements 
in Shusterman’s conception of art that will be capable of providing a great 
deal of inspiration for the artists of our time.
Shusterman’s somaesthetics appeals not only to an artistic elite but also 
to very different artists, including those who are just starting their artistic 
development and are encountering problems. Somaesthetics also provides 
great inspiration and generates new ideas for the entire spectrum of our 
cultural and social life. 
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Insallation created for Documenta X 1997, Kassel.
Fig. 2. Carsten Höller. Test Site. Installed in the Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern 
in 2006
138  Else Marie Bukdahl
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Fig. 7. SUPERFLEX. Moon Channel, Sharjah, April 2001
Krystyna Wilkoszewska
Transdisciplinarity of Somaesthetics 
According to Richard Shusterman somaesthetics is the core integrating di-
verse – philosophical, scientific, artistic and everyday – discourses concerning 
the body. In this sense, somaesthetics is of interdisciplinary or even transdis-
ciplinary character. The prefix >trans< introduces a subtle difference, namely 
that each problem, to be better understood, is considered not in cooperation 
of several disciplines (since this would be interdisciplinarity), but rather it is 
perceived in all its complexity since the very beginning, not being subjected 
to one domain of knowledge. In other words, nowadays the problematic 
configurations transgress the traditional divisions into disciplines. 
The author of somaesthetics emphasizes its role in the transformation 
of the humanities that appears necessary today. Their German name 
Geisteswissenschaften reflects the fact that the humanities in Europe, while 
dealing with the man, treated the object of their studies as res cogitans, 
neglecting or excluding the issues of human body. In turn, in the existing 
division of sciences, Naturwissenschaften considered the body exclusively 
in its physical and biological aspects. The role of somaesthetics consists in 
including the body in the humanities as well as re-formulating the form 
of corporality in the natural sciences. 1
This task seems to be extremely difficult: the need for transformation 
of the humanities in the aspect of soma cannot consist in introduction of the 
body – in the way this concept functions in the natural sciences – into the 
disciplines dealing with the spirit. It is so, first of all because the awareness 
of the body is now changing fundamentally in the natural sciences, mainly 
due to the new technologies, in particular biotechnology, transforming 
the received dichotomous relation between the natural sciences and those 
dealing with mind.
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As in the first decades of the 20th century the achievements of physics 
transformed significantly our world outlook, so do life sciences seem to 
be doing now, and among them the most effective discipline is modern 
biology equipped with new research possibilities provided by electronic 
media. Mentioning biology I have in mind its modern transmutations like 
biotechnology, evolutionary biology in its newest shape as well as genetic 
and tissue engineering. 
At our congress we have relatively many papers as well as two session 
panels concerning biotechnology and this clearly shows how important 
these problems are also within the domains of the humanities, philosophy 
and aesthetics.
If we accept Shusterman’s thesis that “the body is always being constructed 
in some way” and that the dominating discourses contextualize the body, 
the factors that undoubtedly influence the construction of our concept of 
the body today are, to a large extent, the discourses developed of the basis 
of the achievements of life sciences. They compete with, or sometimes are 
complementary to the vision of human body offered by the electronic me-
dia. Art is fully involved in those processes of transformation of the image 
of human body, and the division into the moist media and dry media that 
occurs within it, diversifies new discourses concerning soma significantly.
Somaesthetics, with its conceptions of „body consciousness” and “think-
ing through the body” brought about an important change in the under-
standing of the self. “…lessons of somatic self-conscious eventually point 
toward the vision of an essentially situated, relational and symbiotic self 
rather than traditional concept of an autonomous self grounded in an in-
dividual, monadic, indestructible, and unchanging soul.”2 In particular the 
theory of aesthetic experience, into which a corporeal and multi-sensual 
subject was introduced, was transformed dramatically in comparison to 
the modern tradition based on the concepts of distance, isolation and 
disinterestedness and on mere two senses, namely, sight and hearing. Nu-
merous detailed analyses conducted by Shusterman showed in what way 
the body - remaining in unity with the mind - “thinks”, acts and responds.
Nevertheless, while searching for the forerunners of his conceptions in 
the antique thought of the West and the East and criticizing the European 
mainstream philosophy neglecting the problems of the body, the author 
of somaesthetics mostly restrict his considerations to the anthropocentric 
perspective treating the body of a human being in reference to culture and 
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philosophy. He admits, however, that the disciplinary relations of somaes-
thetics go beyond the humanities into biological, cognitive sciences and 
those connected with health…
The present day research conducted both by the scientists and artists 
who have turned their studios into laboratories, studies in the area of bio-
technology (DNA, genetic and tissue engineering) as well as of the theory 
of evolution incline us to consider anew the question “Who are we?”, that 
is the question of identity of the human being. 
Eduardo Kac, a leading representative of bio-art claims that questions 
posed by biotechnology dissolve barriers between species and play a direct 
role in evolution. They create new forms of life, they modify notions of per-
sonal identity; our understanding of the phenomena that were dualistically 
divided between nature and culture is no longer sustainable because this 
kind of dichotomy seems to be too reductive.3 
What does it mean that questions put by biotechnology dissolve barriers 
between species?
Richard Shusterman based his somaesthetics on the concept of soma – 
the conscious body, the thinking body. In this context – of the conscious 
body – we can pose the question about its memory, the question that is 
important in striving to define the identity of the human being. What has 
been preserved in the memory of our bodies from the many centuries long 
course of the process of evolution? 
Here I would like to make a remark: in the current of the so-called post-
humanism a provocative question is asked about how much human there 
is in a human (Donna Haraway), and it turns out that there is not much 
of it.4 Posthumanism tends to blur the boundaries between species and it 
seems to aim at melting the human species in the non-personal sphere of 
life, in zoe. This trend in thinking about humans seems to me too radical. 
I would like to pose the question concerning the past of human body on 
a more moderate plane. Nevertheless, it requires making a step ahead in 
relation to the so-called ecological sensitivity thanks to which we have 
started treating animals as our “lesser brothers”.
I would like to turn, as it were, to the past of our bodies or, in other 
words, towards the predecessors of human body. It is not the perspective 
of the “post-human” but rather the “pre-human”. My goal is to go beyond 
the sphere of this which is human in order to better understand what is 
human . And the “non-human” sphere does not signify the divine sphere, 
just the opposite – it is directed at biology and the theory of evolution. 
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According to the metaphysics of life that is built today on the achieve-
ments of molecular biology, a man due to his body appears related to all 
live creatures. Lynn Margulis in Symbolic Planet asks: “When does a man 
begin? A man began – like all life on the earth – about 3.5 billion years ago. 
The chain of our ancestors begins with primitive bacteria, with microbes.”
What has our body memory preserved from those centuries of evolu-
tion? To what degree is a man – a vegetable, animal or human? (Aristotle: 
vegetative, sensitive, rational soul). Is the ‘non-human’ in a man humanized 
or does it rather remain alien? 
As regards flora, negative metaphors recognizing vegetation or ‘being 
a cabbage’ as the least valuable forms of existence have been functioning 
in the language for centuries. Inability to move and standing still in 
one place are emphasized as imperfection. In Plato’s Phaedrus Socrates 
says “trees have nothing to teach me”5, and in a similar spirit, centuries 
later, Baudelaire claims that he is “unable to get inspired by vegeta-
tion”. Contemporary artists working with plants frequently emphasize 
how much can be learnt from them if we are patient enough trying to 
understand them.
For example, George Gessert, a French artist has been working with 
plants for three decades. He writes: „I cannot say that I am happier with 
plants than with men, but I am in a better accord with plants and, in general, 
I feel more relaxed among them”. (…) „Plants are literally unimaginable. 
Nobody could dream up a wild iris.”6
Commenting Gessert’s words, Monika Bakke writes, that plants are 
everywhere around us, they affect us and influence our ways of thinking 
and feeling. They do it in larger extent than we influence them. Usually we 
perceive them in the context of our physiological needs (breathing, eating), 
sometimes they become the objects of our aesthetic contemplation, most 
rarely we think about plants in the context of our common genealogy that 
they are our ancestors. They have the complex relations with other forms 
of life. And yet we do not want to learn from them. In our philosophical 
thought plants have been degraded.7 
Nevertheless, plants are our ancestors and, due to this common gene-
alogy, we still retain something plant-like in ourselves. An insight into 
this long-forgotten sphere would probably help us to understand some 
processes going on in a human body better.
As regards fauna, which – in Aristotelian taxonomy – is closer to people than 
the plant life, we must state that this closeness or ‘bestiality’ in a human has 
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become a shameful and undesirable element. Therefore, since people started 
to conceive themselves as the only rational beings, they have done much to 
distance themselves from animals, thus justifying their right to dominate them.
Polish artist Grzegorz Kowalski realized a project: People/Animals. He 
asked people: would you like to embody (incorporate) yourself in an animal 
(in front of a camera)? The reactions of people were very varied: refusal, 
discomfort, disgust; shame, curiosity, trying to face a challenge; careful 
acceptance connected with the new kind of feelings, etc.
Our culture is understood as opposed to nature, human dignity is based 
on the separation of a man from nature. Denaturalization of our culture 
and a man is connected with contempt for human body as well as for 
animals. What was identified with animals, was suppressed or negated. 
Our philosophy emphasized the differences between human beings and 
animals (Cartesius, Kant). According to the evolutionary biology, the 
similarities between men and the other organisms are bigger and more 
significant than differences.
Instead of asking what we profited from this separation from nature, let 
us ask: what did we lose?
At this moment I would like to recall John Dewey. His book Art and Expe-
rience devoted to “philosophy of aesthetics” starts with two chapters dealing 
with a relation between a “live creature” (an organism) and its environment.
„The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life. 
While man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic vital functions with 
them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue the 
process of living. Having the same vital needs, man derives the means by 
which he breathes, moves, looks and listens, the very brain with which he 
coordinates his senses and his movements, from his animal forbears. The 
organs with which he maintains himself in being are not of himself alone, 
but by the grace of struggles and achievements of a long line of animal 
ancestry.”8 
It is important that Dewey indicated the results that the opposition of mind 
and body, matter and spirit, imposes on the experience, bringing about its 
reduction, shrinking, withdrawal and blunting. It is so because participation 
in interaction is realized with the use of sense organs and the motor system 
connected with them, and ignoring them or denial of their role causes that 
our experiences are impoverished. Senses do not unite in cooperation, „we 
see without feeling”, „we touch, but the contact remains tangential because it 
does not fuse with qualities of senses that go below the surface.” In this situ-
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ation many sense perceptions get weaker or simply disappear. However, it is 
the body and the senses that „are the organs through which the live creature 
participates directly in the ongoings of the world about him.”9 
Referring in merely one aspect to the question what we lost isolating 
ourselves from the nature, from our vegetal and animal past, I have quot-
ed Dewey’s words because they open broader prospects to the chance 
of combining the humanities with the nature sciences and introduction 
of biological and evolutionary perspective to the domain of aesthetic stud-
ies, but also because it is in his philosophy of experience that Shusterman’s 
pragmatic aesthetics and somaesthetics are rooted. 
As the pragmatist, Richard Shusterman puts experience in the centre of 
philosophy and emphasizes the role of living, sentient body in organizing 
the course of experience. For this reason and also because of the pragmatist 
meliorist approach the somatic consciousness acquires its importance. 
Shusterman asks: “Are the special principles or methods of somatic 
introspection for improving body consciousness and then using such en-
hanced awareness for better cognition and sensorimotor performance?”10
It seems that the penetration of the long-forgotten spheres in human 
being which are of vegetal or animal nature can be helpful in the enhanc-
ing body awareness. Dewey’ philosophy of experience with its idea of the 
evolutionary continuity encourages to such introspection.
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Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics 
(Wolfgang Welsch)

Wolfgang Welsch
Aesthetics beyond Aesthetics
In 1995, at the end of the XIIIth International Congress of Aesthetics in 
Lahti, I delivered a lecture entitled “aesthetics beyond aesthetics”. It seems 
to have been influential because the concept of the XIXth International 
Congress of Aesthetics in Cracow (July, 21–27, 2013) reflects some of the 
ideas I developed then. This is why Krystyna Wilkoszewska, the organ-
izer, suggested to reexamine the topic of “aesthetics beyond aesthetics” in 
a plenary panel. This is what we are going to do in the following.
Let me first briefly explain what the idea was then, in 1995. Afterwards 
I will consider how we might reformulate it today.
What I had in mind in 1995 was that the discipline of aesthetics should 
transcend the narrow frame of art and also include considerations on 
aesthetic phenomena outside of art: in science, politics, economy, design, 
ecology, the lifeworld, etc. Aesthetics should explore and cover the complete 
range of aesthetic phenomena, give a full account of aesthetics.
I was widely dissatisfied with the habitual narrowing of aesthetics’ frame 
at that time. Originally, with its founding father Baumgarten, aesthetics 
had been designed to cover the full range of aesthetic phenomena (even 
including, for example, predictions from the flight of birds). Soon after, 
however – with Kant, Hegel and others – a restriction of aesthetics to the 
beautiful and to art occurred. This restriction prevailed up to the present day.
What, in my view, was striking and completely disturbing, was, how-
ever, that in the meantime – paradigmatically with the avant gardes of the 
twentieth century – the arts themselves had moved in the opposite direc-
tion. They had transcended the golden cage of an autonomous art closed 
on itself and had taken up and pursued relations to the reality outside of 
art – to politics, ethics, industrialization, the lifeworld, etc.
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Therefore it seemed absurd and self-contradictory that the discipline of 
aesthetics which purportedly wanted to be faithful to art still focused on art 
alone, as if art were still closed on itself. The champions of this traditional 
type of aesthetics had obviously missed out on art’s shift to an art beyond 
the golden cage, to an art open to phenomena outside of art.
There were, to be sure, other arguments too for an opening up of aes-
thetics to aesthetic phenomena beyond art: recent epistemological insights 
into the role of aesthetic elements in the constitution and shaping of reality, 
or the increasing relevance of aesthetic styling in the lifeworld – all the 
phenomena labelled under the heading “aestheticization”. This alone would 
have justified or even imposed an opening up of aesthetics to phenomena 
beyond the limited sphere of the arts.
But the one and decisive argument that even traditional aestheticians 
would have to accept, I thought, was the alteration of art itself. Art had 
become art beyond art (i.e. art beyond autonomist art), therefore a shift 
of aesthetics to aesthetics beyond aesthetics was obligatory. Otherwise one 
would only pretend to speak about art while in fact ignoring it and speak-
ing just about oneself ’s outdated concept of art.
What is the situation like today, almost twenty years later? The arts and 
artists themselves, it seems to me, have moved even more in the direction 
of an art beyond art. They are very sceptical about the traditional (western) 
concept of ‘art’ which is bound to the idea of autonomy and the produc-
tion of self-sufficient works. Artists rather try to intervene in non-artistic 
contexts, or to sharpen our aesthetic sensibility, or to develop new aesthetic 
practices and strategies.
I want to point out just two possibilities. 1) Artists less create works 
in the traditional sense but tend to intervene in processes. For this, art-
ists can either initiate new processes (as Joseph Beuys did, for example, 
with his 7000 oaks action during Documenta VII in 1982), or they can 
intervene in already existing social processes (micro-invasive strategies). 
In such cases, art surrenders itself to processes which finally will take 
their own route. After a while one will no longer know or be able to rec-
ognize that art had at some moment a finger in the pie. Contemporary 
artists often just transform what is at hand, or produce contingent and 
ephemeral things that ultimately realize themselves by disappearing or 
becoming invisible. The felicitours phrase coined by Lucius Burckhardt 
with respect to design that “good design is invisible” is equally valid for 
such intervenionist types of art.
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The broader context of this shift to processes is a general transition – in 
epistemology, philosophy and many other strands of cultural orientation – 
from trying to understand the world in terms of substances to perceiving 
it as a bundle of processes. In everyday thinking substances still are to 
the fore, but in scientific and philosophical thinking, and also in our cul-
tural self-understanding processes are gaining priority. We are performing 
a transition from substance to process ontology – a transition to a kind 
of Whiteheadian worldview. I consider this a very important change – in 
many, epistemic as well as practical and political regards (which I can-
not explain in detail here) – I just wanted to point out this larger context 
of artists’ turning to processes.
2) Another widespread tendency today consists in drawing inspirations 
from advanced science, especially from digital technologies and from the 
life sciences. This is again to be seen in a broader context. We are today 
undergoing a deep transformation of our self-understanding and our 
conception of how we humans relate to the non-human entities surround-
ing us. We are shifting from an oppositional to a more holistic worldview.
For centuries – since the Early Modern Age and fully fledged in moder-
nity – a dualism between man and world had set the agenda. The world 
was seen as consisting just of matter (res extensa) – as being just a spatial, 
temporal, mechanic, and, above all, spiritless entity. (In this, the modern 
worldview differed considerably from earlier views to be found in Greek 
antiquity or in Christianity according to which, spirit was an inherent 
principle of the world.) While the world was now taken to be just spiritless 
matter, the human, on the contrary, was still considered to be essentially 
a spiritual (rational) being (res cogitans). From this resulted a fundamental 
difference between world and man. They were on principle heterogeneous, 
incongruent and incompatible.
That rationality is not something mundane, was in addition supported 
by the belief that rationality is an exclusive characteristic of man – that 
no other animal, not even the ones closest to us, possess rationality. This 
seemed to bear witness that rationality is not of mundane origin, for oth-
erwise it would be completely unintelligible why rationality should not 
have developed in other beings around us as well.
From this constellation resulted the man-world-dualism so typical 
of modernity. There was no conceivable way leading from the world (pure 
spiritless matter) to spirit – and likewise no way leading from spirit to 
the world. Hence man, as a spiritual being, was thought to be unable to 
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recognize the world as it is but only to construct a world according to his 
epistemological equipment (the doctrine of Kant, Nietzsche, Sapir and 
others up to the present constructivism in the humanities).
During the last decades, however, we have recognized that the two pillars 
on which this modern position rests are untenable. 
First: Man’s rationality is not a supra-natural gift but has evolved quite 
naturally – it arose continuously from animal rationality. There exist many 
and impressive instances of rationality in the animal kingdom, reaching 
from pigeons’ capacity of abstraction to chimpanzees ability to understand 
the intentionality of conspecifics, to recognize themselves in mirrors, and 
even to do problem-solving through mere deliberation. So there is continu-
ity between the non-human and the human.
Second: Nature in general is not contrary to spirit. From very early 
stages on (already in cosmic evolution) nature is characterized by self-
referentiality. This one is the great driver for the formation of galaxies or the 
constitution of organisms and finally also for the emergence of conscious-
ness and thinking.1 So spirit is not something alien and incongruent to the 
world. Rather it is inherently affine to the world. It is a product of the world’s 
development and a manifestation of its innermost organizing principle.
This means that nature is not opposed to spirit but open to it, with spirit 
being an emergent of nature. Correspondingly, the human is not something 
supra-natural but a natural product of evolution. Even our turn to cultural 
evolution was a result of natural evolution, and cultural evolution still 
rests on and profits from the achievements of natural evolution. So there 
is convergence (instead of opposition) from both sides.
Hence the new agenda in thinking is to explore the fundamental com-
monality and continuity between the human and the non-human, and 
spelling out its – conceptual as well as practical – consequences. The hu-
man cannot be understood – as modernity would have it – exclusively in 
human terms. Rather one has to take our evolutionary provenance and 
animal heritage into account.
The same holds in aesthetics: Artists no longer take human exclusivity 
and alterity as guiding-line. They no longer follow the perspective of the 
human standing as a special entity in opposition to world and nature. 
Accordingly, they no longer try to create an autonomous world through 
artworks – with artworks standing opposed to the real world. They rather 
try to bring to view the deep commonality of humans with other things – 
living and non-living. This commonality is the big agenda today. And it 
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obviously is not just romantic fantasy but a completely realistic perspective. 
Every cell phone user knows that matter bears intellectual potentials. He 
makes quite naturally use of the similarity between silicon-based and hu-
man-based intelligence. He has long-since left behind old-modern dualism.
Let us now take a closer look at the various forms how contemporary 
artists proceed within this framework of thematizing the human-nonhu-
man-relationship.
Some, like Pierre Huyghe for example, create bio-culture-topes where 
it is hard to distinguish any more between human and nonhuman ele-
ments (Untilled, 2011–12; Documenta XIII, Kassel 2012). Others pursue 
projects of Artificial Life where determinants of natural evolution (like 
mutation, selection, variation, chance, population etc.) are transferred into 
algorithms that regulate the evolution of images. Natural processes serve 
here as models for artistic processes.
A third possibility is Bio Art. It goes beyond a mere parallelism of natural 
and artistic evolution (as is characteristic of Artificial Life). It rather creates – 
through artistic as well as scientific procedures – new real objects, i.e. not 
just art objects, but living things that sometimes are even able of replication 
and reproduction. Here we clearly have a case of an art practicing aesthetics 
beyond aesthetics – an aesthetics open to science, nature, life-world, tech-
nology. And I am very happy that we have one of its main representatives 
on this panel: Eduardo Kac. I will present him to you in a minute.
Besides artist Eduardo Kac from Chicago, I invited aesthetician Peng Feng 
from Beijing. Many of you know Peng Feng from previous congresses and 
from his writings. He is an aesthetician not of the old-fashioned type, but 
is very ínnovative and above all: he is open to the arts. He was the Chinese 
curator for the Venice Biennial in 2011. He has also worked as an artist, 
writing, for example, a musical. He deserves all kinds of interest and respect.
Inviting a contemporary artist and an aesthetician affiliated with art is, 
of course, a kind of programmatic gesture. I consider it important and 
necessary for aestheticians to have closer and more manifold contact with 
the practitioners of aesthetics, the artists. And I am very happy to see that 
this idea coincides with the view of the organizers of this congress. We 
have here in Cracow more artists invited and more artistic presentations 
during and around the congress than ever before.
Finally I want to present Eduardo Kac. I restrict myself to explaining why 
I consider him a perfect match for a panel on aesthetics beyond aesthetics. 
Let me mention just one work. It is entitled Edunia and was created from 
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2003 to 2009 (illustration 1). Edunia is a hybrid flowering plant which 
originated through the combination of the normal genome of Petunia with 
some specific genes of Eduardo Kac. Eduardo introduced genes which in 
himself are responsible for the redness of his blood into the genome of 
Petunia so that this gene now produces red veins in Edunia. And Eduardo 
obviously likes his relative in the plant world (illustration 2).
This is a typical example of “transgenic art” – a term Eduardo coined in 
1998 (as he introduced the term “bio art” since 1997). Edunia thematizes 
the commonality and continuity between human and nonhuman I spoke 
of before. And it certainly represents a type of artwork that has moved 
beyond aesthetics and art in the traditional sense: it has linked up with 
science, anthropology, engineering, and it is not only an artwork but a new 
living being as well. Here, it seems to me, aesthetics beyond aesthetics is 
fully put into practice.
Endnotes
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Peng Feng
Aesthetics and Contemporary Art: 
An Experiment in Venice
The incompatibility of aesthetics and contemporary art seems to become 
a consensus of both art world and aesthetic society. Can aesthetics and 
contemporary art meet each other when they go beyond their boundaries? 
When I, as an aesthetician, curated the China pavilion at Venice Biennale 
2011, one of my intentions is to make it an arena for aesthetics and contem-
porary art joining hands. The aesthetics embodied in the China pavilion 
is beyond the aesthetics based on disinterested contemplation, and the art 
presented in the China pavilion is beyond the art based on representation. 
The works of China pavilion are for the five senses, especially the nose. 
Visitors can experience the fragrances of herb medicine, green tea, baijiu, 
lotus, and incense, which remind us the mystery concept of Five Elements 
in Chinese philosophy. Aesthetics and contemporary art can live in peace 
with each other when they undo their limits and prejudices.
1. The incompatibility of aesthetics and contemporary 
art [INCOMPATIBILITY]
The subversive strategies in contemporary art encourage it to violate any 
definitions of art from aesthetics. As Cashell says, “What contemporary 
transgressive art – more aggressively than any previous cultural practice – 
has actively sought to do is invalidate the principles of institutional aes-
thetics. To this end, the principal target of transgressive antagonism will 
be discovered to be the paradigmatic concept of philosophical aesthetics, 
namely, the so-called ‘disinterested’ mode of aesthetic contemplation.”1 
Cashell continues, “Disinterestedness, long considered the fundamental 
motif of traditional art discourse, has its foundations in the philosophical 
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tradition of the eighteenth century and its associated prioritisation of the 
category of beauty for aesthetics.”2
2. Modern Aesthetics and contemporary art cannot 
match each other [ANACHRONISM]
However, the aesthetics and art in Cashell’s case cannot match each other. There 
is an anachronism in Cashell’s compare of aesthetics with art. The aesthetics 
in Cashell’s mind is not contemporary but modern aesthetics, while the art 
is not modern art but contemporary one. Unfortunately, this anachronism is 
common in the discourse of contemporary art theory and criticism. It is gener-
ally known that only modern aesthetics is preoccupied with disinterestedness 
and beauty. As Stolnitz said, “We cannot understand modern aesthetic theory 
unless we understand the concept of ‘disinterestedness.’ If anyone belief is the 
common property of modern thought, it is that a certain mode of attention is 
indispensable to and distinctive of the perception of beautiful things.”3
Because of the obvious anachronism in the compare of modern aes-
thetics with contemporary art, the incompatibility of aesthetics and con-
temporary art should not have been a surprise. The relevant thing is not 
the incompatibility but the real relationship of art and aesthetics in their 
contemporary situations.
3. Contemporary aesthetics
Contemporary aesthetics is different from modern aesthetics in many as-
pects. Briefly speaking, modern aesthetics based on disinterested attitude 
and beauty is a detachment mode of aesthetics, while contemporary aes-
thetics is an engagement mode of aesthetics. Firstly, as engagement mode 
of aesthetics, contemporary aesthetics is no longer preoccupied with fine 
arts, but open itself to cover the everyday life. Secondly, contemporary 
aesthetics does not presuppose the internal sense, but accepts all five ex-
ternal senses as aesthetic sense. The first aspect is mainly embodied in the 
aestheticization of everyday life, which Wolfgang Welsch gave a compre-
hensive analysis in his Undoing Aesthetics. We can see the second aspect 
in somaesthetics that Richard Shusterman has been advocating since later 
1990s. Contemporary aesthetics is already very different from modern 
aesthetics. As Wolfgang Welsch says, 
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Aesthetics has lost its character as a special discipline relating solely to art and 
become a broader and more general medium for the understanding of reality. 
This has resulted in a general significance for aesthetic thinking today and 
in a need for change in the structure of the discipline of aesthetics, so that it 
becomes an aesthetics beyond traditional aesthetics comprising the whole 
range of aesthesis in everyday life, science, politics, arts, ethics, and so on.4
4. Somaesthetics as contemporary aesthetics
Somaesthetics is a contemporary aesthetics due to its rebellion against 
Kantian aesthetics. Kantian aesthetics is based on the imagination of mind, 
and is considered to be the paradigm of the detachment mode of aesthetics. 
Instead, body consciousness is highly valued by somaesthetics. The term 
“soma,” Shusterman says, 
indicates a living, feeling, sentient body rather than a mere physical body 
that could be devoid of life and sensation, while the “aesthetic” in somaes-
thetics has the dual role of emphasizing the soma’s perceptual role (whose 
embodied intentionality contradicts the body/mind dichotomy) and its 
aesthetic uses both in stylizing one’s self and in appreciating the aesthetic 
qualities of other selves and things.5
Even if soma is not same with body. But it is clear that soma is closer to 
body than mind. As both subject and object, body cannot be disinterested, 
detached, and distanced psychologically. Body is inescapably engaged in its 
surrounding. In this sense, somaethetics as engagement mode of aesthetics 
belongs to contemporary aesthetics.
5. Body as object
We can easily find consequences or reactions responding to somaesthet-
ics in contemporary art. Actually, contemporary art is indulged in body 
too much. Not only innumerable body images and sounds can be found, 
but also real body can be encountered. For example, Italian artist Vanessa 
Beecroft’s performances involve live naked women. Richard Shusterman 
himself also ventures into contemporary art project. He cooperates with 
French artist Yann Toma to show his soma – the body with aura – by 
photography. 
However, body as art subject in contemporary art normally be treated 
as object. Can body be treated as subject in contemporary art? 
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6. Body as subject
In both the cases of Beecroft’s performance and Tomma’s photography, what 
we see are only physical bodies. The so-called soma, which means a living, 
feeling, sentient body, seems impossible to be the object of visual art. Soma 
is both subject and object. Only through self-consciousness can soma be 
object of perception. Therefore what we can do is to create an art for soma 
by awaking our body consciousness. For the purpose of awaking body 
consciousness, art for nose seems superior to art for eyes. Although all five 
senses are the part of bodily perception, nose, tongue and skin are clearly 
more dependent on or close to body than seeing and hearing. When I was 
appointed to curate the China pavilion at Venice biennale 2011, I decided 
to make it an arena for aesthetics and contemporary art joining hands.
Based on the concept of Five Elements and Five Flavors, I invited five 
artists to create five installations that had to make use of the chosen materi-
als or subjects such as Baijiu, herb medicine, lotus, incense, and green tea. 
The works should be able not only to smell but also to taste. On the lawn, 
artists Cai Zhisong and Yuan Gong installed the huge sculpture of clouds 
and the installation of fog. Both emitted the fragrance of green tea. The 
clouds and fogs made the virgin garden into an Arcadia. 
Inside the tank farm, Liang Yuanwei, the only female participant, in-
stalled her work I Plea: Rain. This installation successfully manifested the 
flavor, color, fluidity, and mystery of Baijiu. “The Baijiu as rain,” Liang says, 
“can wash the soul.” 
When visitors reach the main aisle of the pavilion, they can see the 
installation Snow Melting into the Lotus created by Pan Gongkai. Pan is 
both ink-water painter and conceptual artist. He has been experiencing the 
contradictions between the traditional and the contemporary, the Chinese 
and the western. According to Pan’s interpretation, actually they can both 
co-exist and be “harmonious in difference.” When visitors go through the 
installation, they can experience the pleasantly cool smell of lotus. 
On the ground of the tank farm, visitors can see thousands of medicine 
pots. They belong to Yang Maoyuan’s installation All Matters Are Visible. 
Nothing will be contained in the pots except the smells of herb medicine. 
What pervaded in the space is Yuan Gong’s installation Empty Incense. 
24 machines produced heavy fog with smell of incense.
The works exhibited in the Chinese pavilion as a whole, I hope, can make 
a fantastic sensuous world. The works are not only for eyes and ears, but 
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also for nose, tongue and skin. All five senses can be excited and affected 
and so a special feeling, emotion and mood can be stirred up in the visi-
tors. The works cannot be transmitted by any techniques. The only way for 
perceiving and experiencing the works is present oneself in the pavilion. 
What I did is extending the bound of art and making art for whole body. 
Unlike Beecroft and Toma, we didn’t appropriate body as object of art, 
instead we created art for our alive bodies.
7. Aesthetic Turn in contemporary art?
Contemporary artworld has been dominated by conceptual art and neo-
conceptual art since 1970s. The most important aspect of conceptual art-
work is not skill or aesthetic property but idea or concept. The consequence 
of this conceptual turn or linguistic turn in contemporary art world is, as 
Arthur Danto and others observe, the end of art. 
Contemporary conceptual art is getting into difficulties. Maybe it’s time for 
art returning to the aesthetic. Dave Hickey predicted in 1993 that beauty would 
be the dominant issue of the next decade.6 By the same token, Donald Kuspit 
asked that artists should return art to the studio and aesthetic transcendence. 
It does not simply return to the old master. The new art “is neither traditional 
nor avant-garde, but a combination of the two. It brings together the spiritu-
ality and humanism of the Old masters and the innovation and criticality of 
the Modern masters. It is a New Old Master.”7 Denis Dutton bluntly criticized 
contemporary conceptual art as “coming up with concepts that capture the at-
tention of the art market.” “The appreciation of contemporary conceptual art, …
depends not on immediately recognizable skill, but on how the work is situated 
in today’s intellectual Zeitgeist… Future generations, no longer engaged by our 
art ‘concepts’ and unable to divine any special skill or emotional expression 
in the work, may lose interest in it as a medium for financial speculation and 
relegate it to the realm of historical curiosity.”8
If we can distinguish art from philosophy which is dominated by con-
cepts, in other words, if we would like to save art from reaching its end 
in philosophy, we should keep art in the area of aesthetic. Art with “the 
sensuous in all its glory,” borrowed the wording from Mikel Dufrenne,9 is 
becoming more important in this cyberage. 
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Eduardo Kac
Bio Art: In Vivo Aesthetics
In 1997 I introduced the concept and the phrase “bio art”, originally in 
relation to my artwork Time Capsule (1997).1 This work approached the 
problem of wet interfaces and human hosting of digital memory through 
the implantation of a microchip. The work consisted of a microchip im-
plant, seven sepia-toned photographs, a live television broadcast, a webcast, 
interactive telerobotic webscanning of the implant, a remote database 
intervention, and additional display elements, including an X-ray of the 
implant. While “bio art” is applicable to a large gamut of in-vivo works 
that employ biological media, made by myself and others, in 1998, I started 
to employ the more focused term “transgenic art”2 to describe a new art 
form based on the use of genetic engineering to create unique living be-
ings. Art that manipulates or creates life must be pursued with great care, 
with acknowledgment of the complex issues it raises and, above all, with 
a commitment to respect, nurture, and love the life created. I have been 
creating and exhibiting a series of transgenic artworks since 1999. I have 
also been creating bio art that is not transgenic. The implications of this 
ongoing body of work have particular aesthetic and social ramifications, 
crossing several disciplines and providing material for further reflection 
and dialogue. What follows is an overview of theses works, the issues they 
evoke, and the debates they have elicited.
*
For almost two decades my work has explored the boundaries between 
humans, animals, and robots.3 Thus, transgenic art can be seen as a natural 
development of my previous work. In my telepresence art, developed since 
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1986, humans coexist with other humans and non-human animals through 
telerobotic bodies. In my biotelematic art, developed since 1994, biology 
and networking are no longer co-present but coupled so as to produce a hy-
brid of the living and the telematic. With transgenic art, developed since 
1998, the animate and the technological can no longer be distinguished. 
The implications of this ongoing work have particular social ramifications, 
crossing several disciplines and providing material for further reflection 
and dialogue.
The presence of biotechnology will increasingly change from agricultural 
and pharmaceutical practices to a larger role in popular culture, just as the 
perception of the computer changed historically from an industrial device 
and military weapon to a communication, entertainment, and education 
tool. Terms formerly perceived as “technical”, such as megabytes and ram, 
for example, have entered the vernacular. Likewise, jargon that today may 
seem out of place in ordinary discourse, such as marker and plasmid, for 
example, will simply be incorporated into the larger verbal landscape of 
everyday language. This is made clear by the fact that high school students 
in the United States already create transgenic bacteria routinely in school 
labs through affordable kits. The popularization of aspects of technical 
discourse inevitably brings with it the risk of dissemination of a reductive 
and instrumental ideological view of the world. Without ever relinquish-
ing its right to formal experimentation and subjective inventiveness, art 
can, art should contribute to the development of alternative views of the 
world that resist dominant ideologies. In my work I subvert contemporary 
technologies — not to make detached comments on social change, but to 
enact critical views, to make present in the physical world invented new 
entities (artworks that include transgenic organisms) which seek to open 
a new space for both emotional and intellectual aesthetic experience.
I have been employing the phrase “bio art” since 1997, in reference to 
my own works that involved biological agency (as opposed to biological 
objecthood), such as Time Capsule4 and A-positive5, both presented in 
1997. The difference between biological agency and biological objecthood 
is that the first involves an active principle while the second implies mate-
rial self-containment. In 1998 I introduced the phrase “transgenic art” in 
a paper-manifesto with the same title and proposed the creation (and social 
integration) of a dog expressing green fluorescent protein. This protein is 
commonly used as a biomarker in genetic research; however, my goal was 
to use it primarily for its visual properties as a symbolic gesture, a social 
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marker. The initial public response to the paper was curiosity laced with 
incredulity. The proposal is perfectly viable, but it seemed that few believed 
that the project could or would be realized. While I struggled to find venues 
that could assist me in creating the aforementioned project, entitled GFP 
K-9, I too realized that canine reproductive technology was not developed 
enough at the time to enable me to create a dog expressing green fluorescent 
protein. In the meantime, I started to develop a new transgenic art work, 
entitled “Genesis”, which premiered at Ars Electronica ‘99.6
Genesis
Genesis is a transgenic artwork that explores the intricate relationship 
between biology, belief systems, information technology, dialogical inter-
action, ethics, and the Internet. The key element of the work is an “artist’s 
gene”, a synthetic gene that was created by translating a sentence from 
the biblical book of Genesis into Morse Code, and converting the Morse 
Code into DNA base pairs according to a conversion principle I specially 
developed for this work. The sentence reads: “Let man have dominion 
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living 
thing that moves upon the earth.” It was chosen for what it implies about 
the dubious notion–divinely sanctioned–of humanity’s supremacy over 
nature. Morse code was chosen because, as the first example of the use 
of radiotelegraphy, it represents the dawn of the information age – the 
genesis of global communication. The Genesis gene was incorporated into 
bacteria, which were shown in the gallery. Participants on the Web could 
turn on an ultraviolet light in the gallery, causing real, biological mutations 
in the bacteria. This changed the biblical sentence in the bacteria. After 
the show, the DNA of the bacteria was translated back into Morse code, 
and then back into English. The mutation that took place in the DNA had 
changed the original sentence from the Bible. The mutated sentence was 
posted on the Genesis web site. In the context of the work, the ability to 
change the sentence is a symbolic gesture: it means that we do not accept 
its meaning in the form we inherited it, and that new meanings emerge 
as we seek to change it.
While presenting Genesis, I also gave a public lecture in the context of 
the symposium “Life Science”, presented by Ars Electronica ‘99. My lec-
ture focused on the GFP K-9 proposal. To contextualize my presentation, 
I reviewed the long history of human-dog domestication and partnership, 
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and pointed out the direct and strong human influence on the evolution 
of the dog up to the present day. Emphasizing that there are no packs of 
Poodles and Chihuahuas running in the wild, and that the creation of 
the dog out of the wolf was a technology – a fact that we seemed to have 
lost conscience of – I proceeded to point out the complex relationship 
between dogs and humans throughout their long history together, going 
back at least fourteen thousand years according to archeological records. 
While some showed support and appreciation for the work, others reacted 
against the project and voiced their position. The stage was set for a very 
productive dialogue, which was one of my original intentions. As I see it, 
the debate must go beyond official policy-making and academic research 
to encompass the general public, including artists. GFP K-9 was discussed 
in art magazines and books and science journals. Daily papers and general 
magazines also discussed the work in progress. While specialized publica-
tions showed greater appreciation for GFP K-9, the response in the general 
media covered the whole gamut, from forthright rejection to consideration 
of multiple implications to unmistakable support. The shock generated by 
the proposal curiously caused one critic to declare “the end of art”.7 As I see 
it, there’s no reason to see the beginning of a new art as the end of anything.
GFP Bunny
This pattern of response repeated itself, at a truly global scale, when I an-
nounced in 2000 the realization of my second transgenic work. Entitled 
GFP Bunny, the work comprises the creation of a green fluorescent rabbit 
(Alba), the public dialogue generated by the project, and the social integra-
tion of the rabbit. This work was realized with the assistance of Louis Bec 
and Louis-Marie Houdebine. Louis Bec worked as the producer, coordinat-
ing the activities in France. Bec and I met at Ars Electronica (September 
1999) and soon afterwards he contacted Houdebine on my behalf, for the 
first time, to propose the project. Months later, in 2000, Alba was born, 
a gentle and healthy rabbit. As I stated in my paper entitled GFP Bunny8, 
“transgenic art is a new art form based on the use of genetic engineering 
to create unique living beings. This must be done with great care, with 
acknowledgment of the complex issues thus raised and, above all, with 
a commitment to respect, nurture, and love the life thus created.”
GFP Bunny attracted local media in the south of France in June 2000 
when the former director of the French institute where Alba was born used 
his authority to overrule the scientists who worked on the project and re-
fused to let Alba go to Avignon and then come to my family in Chicago. The 
arbitrary decision was made privately by one individual (the former director 
of the French institute where Alba was born). He never explained his reason 
for the refusal, so it remains unknown to this day. Bec and I denounced 
this censorship through the Internet and through interviews to the press.9 
If the objective was to silence the media, the result backfired. GFP Bunny 
became a global media scandal after a front-page article appeared in the 
Boston Globe10, sharing headlines with articles about the 2000 Olympics 
and US presidential debates. Articles about Alba were published in all 
major countries, with wire services further spreading the news worldwide.11 
Alba was also on the cover of “Le Monde”, “San Francisco Chronicle” and 
“L’Espresso”, among others. “Der Spiegel” and “Chicago Tribune” dedicated 
full pages to GFP Bunny. She also appeared on the front page of the Arts 
section of the New York Times. Broadcasts by ABC TV, BBC Radio, and 
Radio France also took the Alba story to the whole planet. The relentless 
response to “GFP Bunny” has been equally intense and fascinating, with 
fruitful debate and both strong opposition and support. From October 15, 
2000 to December 02, 2004, the Alba Guestbook collected general opinions 
about the work and expressions of support to bring Alba home.12 Through 
lectures and symposia, Internet postings and email correspondence, the 
debate intensified and became richer, more subtle and nuanced, as I had 
hoped. The response to GFP Bunny constitutes extremely rich material, 
which I hope to revisit in the near future.
As part of my intercontinental custody battle to obtain Alba’s release, 
between December 3 and December 13, 2000, I staged a public campaign 
in Paris, which included lectures, broadcasts, public and private meetings, 
and the public placement of a series of seven posters. I placed individual 
posters in several neighborhoods, including: Le Marais, Quartier Latin, 
Saint Germain, Champs de Mars, Bastille, Montparnasse, and Montmartre. 
The posters reflect some of the readings afforded by GFP Bunny. They show 
the same image of Alba and I together, each topped by a different French 
word: Art, Médias, Science, Éthique, Religion, Nature, Famille. Between 
December 3 and December 13, 2000, parallel to radio (Radio France and 
Radio France Internationale), print (“Le Monde”, “Libération”, “Trans-
fert”, “Ça M’intéresse”, “Nova”), and television (Canal+, Paris Première) 
interviews and debates, I posted these images on the streets in an effort to 
intervene in the context of French public opinion and gather support for 
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my cause to bring Alba home. I also engaged the public directly through 
a series of lectures (Sorbonne, École Normale Superior, École Superior des 
Beaux Arts, Forum des Images) and through face-to-face conversations on 
the street sparked by the public’s interest. In total, I reached approximately 
1.5 million people (about half of the population of Paris). This was an 
important step, as it allowed me to address the Parisian public directly. In 
2001 I created The Alba Flag, a white flag with the green rabbit silhouette, 
and started to fly it in front of my Chicago-area house. The flag not only 
signals publicly the home of the green bunny, but most importantly stands 
as a social marker, a beacon of her absence.
Continuing my efforts to raise awareness about Alba’s plight and to ob-
tain her freedom, in 2002 I presented a solo exhibition entitled Free Alba!13 
at Julia Friedman Gallery, in Chicago (May 3–June 15, 2002). Free Alba! 
included a large body of new work comprised of large-scale color photo-
graphs, drawings, prints, Alba flags, and Alba t-shirts. Seen together for 
the first time were the posters from my public interventions in Paris (2000), 
an Alba flag flying outside the Gallery (2001), photographs that reclaim 
green bunny narratives circulated by global media (2001–02), drawings 
that reflect on our closeness to the “animal other” (2001–2002) and Alba 
t-shirts that extend Alba’s cause beyond gallery’s walls (2002). Through 
the leitmotif of the green bunny, this exhibition explored the poetics of 
life and evolution. The story of GFP Bunny was adapted and customized 
by news organizations worldwide, often generating new narratives that, 
both intentionally and unintentionally, reinstated or overlooked the facts. 
My Free Alba! exhibition featured photographs in which I reappropriated 
and recontextualized this vast coverage, exhibiting the productive ten-
sion that is generated when contemporary art enters the realm of daily 
news. The photographs in this series dramatize the fact that the reception 
of GFP Bunny was complex, taking place across cultures and in diverse 
locations. With her passing, I will continue to create new works through 
which I celebrate her life. 
The Eighth Day, a Transgenic Artwork
While in GFP Bunny I created a new mammal, in the transgenic work that 
followed, entitled The Eighth Day, I investigated the new ecology of fluo-
rescent creatures that is evolving worldwide. It was shown from October 
25 to November 2, 2001 at the Institute for Studies in the Arts, Arizona 
State University, Tempe.14 While fluorescent creatures are being developed 
in isolation in laboratories, seen collectively in this work for the first time 
they form the nucleus of a new and emerging synthetic bioluminescent 
ecosystem. The piece brings together living transgenic life forms and a bio-
logical robot (biobot) in an environment enclosed under a clear Plexiglas 
dome, thus making visible what it would be like if these creatures would 
in fact coexist in the world at large.
As the viewer walks into the gallery, she first sees a blue-glowing semi-
sphere against a dark background. This semisphere is the 4-foot dome, 
aglow with its internal blue light. She also hears the recurring sounds of 
water washing ashore. This evokes the image of the Earth as seen from space. 
The water sounds both function as a metaphor for life on Earth (reinforced 
by the spherical blue image) and resonate with the video of moving water 
projected on the floor. In order to see The Eighth Day the viewer is invited 
to “walk on water”.
In the gallery, visitors are able to see the terrarium with transgenic 
creatures both from inside and outside the dome. As they stand outside 
the dome looking in, someone online sees the space from the perspective 
of the biobot looking out, perceiving the transgenic environment as well 
as faces or bodies of local viewers. An online computer in the gallery also 
gives local visitors an exact sense of what the experience is like remotely 
on the Internet. 
Local viewers may temporarily believe that their gaze is the only human 
gaze contemplating the organisms in the dome. However, once they navi-
gate the Web interface they realize that remote viewers can also experience 
the environment from a bird’s eye point of view, looking down through 
a camera mounted above the dome. They can pan, tilt, and zoom, seeing 
humans, mice, plants, fish and the biobot up close. Thus, from the point 
of view of the online participant, local viewers become part of the ecol-
ogy of living creatures featured in the work, as if enclosed in a websphere. 
The Eighth Day presents an expansion of biodiversity beyond wildtype life 
forms. As a self-contained artificial ecology it resonates with the words in the 
title, which add one day to the period of creation of the world as narrated in 
the Judeo-Christian scriptures. All of the transgenic creatures in The Eighth 
Day are created with the same gene I used previously in GFP Bunny to create 
Alba, a gene that allows all creatures to glow green under harmless blue light.15 
The transgenic creatures in The Eighth Day are GFP plants, GFP amoeba, GFP 
fish, and GFP mice. Selective breeding and mutation are two key evolutionary 
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forces. The Eighth Day literally raises the question of transgenic evolution, 
since all organisms in the piece are mutations of their respective wildtype 
species and all were selected and bred for their GFP mutations.
The Eighth Day also includes a biological robot. A biobot is a robot with 
an active biological element within its body that is responsible for aspects 
of its behavior. The biobot created for The Eighth Day has a colony of GFP 
amoeba called Dyctiostelium discoideum as its “brain cells”. These “brain 
cells” form a network within a bioreactor that constitutes the “brain struc-
ture” of the biobot. When amoebas divide, the biobot exhibits dynamic 
behavior inside the enclosed environment. Changes in the amoebal colony 
(the “brain cells”) of the biobot are monitored by it, and cause it to move 
about, throughout the exhibition. The biobot also functions as the avatar 
of Web participants inside the environment. Independent of the ascent and 
descent of the biobot, Web participants are able to control its audiovisual 
system with a pan-tilt actuator. The autonomous motion, which often 
causes the biobot to lean forward in different directions, provides Web 
participants with new perspectives of the environment.
The biobot’s “amoebal brain” is visible through the transparent bioreactor 
body. In the gallery, visitors are able to see the terrarium with transgenic 
creatures from outside and inside the dome, as a computer in the gallery 
gives local visitors an exact sense of what the experience is like on the 
Internet. By enabling participants to experience the environment inside 
the dome from the point of view of the biobot, The Eighth Day creates 
a context in which participants can reflect on the meaning of a transgenic 
ecology from a first-person perspective.
Move 36
In The Eighth Day, the biobot embodies a biological component to ma-
terialize a hybrid of the living and the nonliving. Another way in which 
society has experienced the future abilities of machines was through Deep 
Blue, a computer that beat Chess world champion Gary Kasparov in 1997.16 
My transgenic artwork Move 36 makes reference to Deep Blue’s dramatic 
winning move. The competition between Kasparov and Deep Blue can be 
characterized as a match between the greatest chess player who ever lived 
against the greatest chess player who never lived. The work – presented for 
the first time at the Exploratorium, in San Francisco, from February 26 to 
May 31, 2004 – sheds light on the limits of the human mind and the in-
creasing capabilities developed by computers and robots, inanimate beings 
whose actions often acquire a force comparable to subjective human agency.
According to Kasparov, Deep Blue’s quintessential moment in Game 
Two came at Move 36. Rather than making a move that was expected by 
viewers and commentators alike – a sound move that would have afforded 
immediate gratification – it made a move that was subtle and conceptual 
and, in the long run, better. Kasparov could not believe that a machine had 
made such a keen move. The game, in his mind, was lost.
The work presents a Chessboard made of earth (dark squares) and white 
sand (light squares) in the middle of the room. There are no chess pieces on 
the board. Positioned exactly where Deep Blue made its Move 36 is a plant 
whose genome incorporates a new gene that I created specifically for this work. 
The gene uses ASCII (the universal computer code for representing binary 
numbers as Roman characters, on- and off-line) to translate to the four bases 
of genetics Descartes’ statement: “Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am).
Through genetic modification, the leaves of the plants grow multiple 
plantlets. In the wild these leaves would be smooth. The Cartesian gene 
was coupled with a gene for the expression of the plantlets, so that the 
public can easily see with the naked eye that the Cartesian gene is expressed 
precisely where the plantlets grow.
The Cartesian gene was produced according to a new code I created es-
pecially for the work. In 8-bit ASCII, the letter C, for example, is: 01000011. 
Thus, the gene is created by the following association between genetic bases 
and binary digits:
A = 00
C = 01
G = 10
T = 11
The result is the following gene with 52 bases:
AATCATTCACTCAGCCCCACATTCACCCCAGCACTCATTCCATCCCCCATC
The creation of this gene is a critical and ironic gesture, since Descartes 
considered the human mind a “ghost in the machine” (for him the body 
was a “machine”). His rationalist philosophy gave new impetus both to the 
mind-body split (Cartesian Dualism) and to the mathematical foundations 
of current computer technology.
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The presence of this Cartesian gene in the plant, rooted precisely where 
the human lost to the machine, reveals the tenuous border between hu-
manity, inanimate objects endowed with life-like qualities, and living or-
ganisms that encode digital information. A single focused light shines in 
a delicate luminous cone over the plant. Silent square video projections on 
two opposing walls contextualize the work, evoking two chess opponents 
in absentia. Each video projection is composed of a grid of small squares, 
resembling a chessboard. Each square shows short animated loops cycling 
at different intervals, thus creating a complex and carefully choreographed 
thread of movements. The viewer’s cognitive engagement with the multiple 
visual possibilities presented on both projected boards subtly emulates the 
mapping of multiple paths in a chess match.
This work explores the poetics of real life and evolution; it is a game for 
phantasmic players, a philosophical statement uttered by a plant. Move 36 
gives continuity to my ongoing interventions at the boundaries between 
the living (human, non-human animals) and the non-living (machines, 
networks). Checkmating traditional notions, nature is revealed as an arena 
for the production of ideological conflict, and the physical sciences as 
a locus for the creation of science fictions.
Specimen of Secrecy About Marvelous Discoveries
Expanding on ecological and evolutionary issues I previously explored 
in transgenic works such as The Eighth Day, my Specimen of Secrecy 
about Marvelous Discoveries is a series of works comprised of what I call 
“biotopes”, that is, living pieces that change during the exhibition in re-
sponse to internal metabolism and environmental conditions, including 
temperature, relative humidity, airflow, and light levels in the exhibition 
space.17 Each of my biotopes is literally a self-sustaining ecology com-
prised of thousands of very small living beings in a medium of earth, 
water, and other materials. I orchestrate the metabolism of this diverse 
microbial life in order to produce the constantly evolving living works. In 
embracing the mutability of unpredictable circumstances and evolving 
in response to human care and environmental conditions, the biotopes 
further develop dialogical principles that have been central to my work 
for over two decades.
The biotopes are a discrete ecology because within their world the mi-
croorganisms interact with and support each other (that is, the activities 
of one organism enable another to grow, and vice-versa). However, they 
are not entirely secluded from the outside world: the aerobic organisms 
within the biotope absorb oxygen from outside (while the anaerobic ones 
comfortably migrate to regions where air cannot reach). 
A complex set of relationships emerge as the work unfolds, bringing 
together the internal dialogical interactions among the microorganisms 
in the biotope and the interaction of the biotope as a discrete unit with 
the external world. 
The biotope is what I call a “nomadic ecology”, that is, an ecological 
system that interacts with its surroundings as it travels around the world. 
Every time a biotope migrates from one location to another, the very act of 
transporting it causes an unpredictable redistribution of the microorgan-
isms inside it (due to the constant physical agitation inherent in the course 
of a trip). Once in place, the biotope self-regulates with internal migrations, 
metabolic exchanges, and material settling. Extended presence in a single 
location might yield a different behavior, possibly resulting in regions of 
settlement and color concentration.
The biotope is affected by several factors, including the very presence 
of viewers, which can increase the temperature in the room (warm bod-
ies) and release other microorganisms into the air (breathing, sneezing).
I consider the exhibition opening as the birth of a given biotope. Once an 
exhibition begins, I allow the microorganisms in suspended animation to 
become active again. From that point on I no longer intervene. The work be-
comes progressively different, changing every day, every week, every month. 
When the viewer looks at a biotope, she sees what could be described 
as an “image”. However, since this “image” is always evolving into its next 
transformative state, the perceived “stillness” is more a consequence of 
the conditions of observation (limits of the human perception, ephemeral 
presence of the viewer in the gallery) than an internal material property 
of the biotope. Viewers looking at the biotope another day will see a dif-
ferent “image”. Given the cyclical nature of this “image”, each “image” 
seen at a given time is but a moment in the evolution of the work, an 
ephemeral snapshot of the biotope metabolic state, a scopic interface for 
human intimacy. 
Each of my “biotopes” explores what I call “biological time”, which is 
time manifested throughout the life cycle of a being itself, in vivo (contrary 
to, say, the frozen time of painting or photography, the montaged time of 
film or video, or the real time of a telecommunications event).
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This open process continuously transforms the image and may, depend-
ing on factors such as lighting conditions and exhibition length, result in 
its effacement – until the cycle begins again.
The biotope’s cycle begins when I produce the self-contained body by 
integrating microorganisms and nutrient-rich media. In the next step, 
I control the amount of energy the microorganisms receive in order to 
keep some of them active and others in suspended animation. This results 
in what the viewer may momentarily perceive as a still image. However, 
even if the image seems “still”, the work is constantly evolving and is 
never physically the same. Only time-lapse video can reveal the trans-
formation undergone by a given biotope in the course of its slow change 
and evolution.
To only think of a biotope in terms of microscopic living beings is ex-
tremely limiting. While it is also possible to describe a human being in 
terms of cells, a person is much more than an agglomerate of cells. A per-
son is a whole, not the sum of parts. We shall not confuse our ability to 
describe a living entity in a given manner (e.g., as an object composed 
of discrete parts) with the phenomenological consideration of what it is 
like to be that entity, for that entity. The biotope is a whole. Its presence 
and overall behavior is that of a new entity that is at once an artwork and 
a new living being. It is with this bioambiguity that it manifests itself. It 
is as a whole that the biotope behaves and seeks to satisfy its needs. The 
biotope asks for light and, occasionally, water. In this sense, it is an artwork 
that asks for the participation of the viewer in the form of personal care. 
Like a pet, it will keep company and will produce more colors in response 
to the care it receives. Like a plant, it will respond to light. Like a machine, 
it is programmed to function according to a specific feedback principle 
(e.g., expose it to more heat and it will grow more). Like an object, it can 
be boxed and transported. Like an animal with an exoskeleton, it is mul-
ticellular, has fixed bodily structure and is singular. What is the biotope? 
It is its plural ontological condition that makes it unique.
Natural History of The Enigma
The intimacy and personal interaction that characterize our relationship 
with the biotopes are also present, but take a different turn in Natural His-
tory of the Enigma. This series is centered on what I call a plantimal, a new 
life form I created and named Edunia, a genetically-engineered flower 
that is a hybrid of myself and a petunia. The Edunia expresses my DNA 
exclusively in its red veins.
Developed between 2003 and 2008, and first exhibited from April 17 to 
June 21, 2009 at the Weisman Art Museum18, in Minneapolis, Natural His-
tory of the Enigma also encompasses a large-scale public sculpture, a print 
suite, photographs, and other works. 
The new flower is a Petunia strain that I invented and produced through 
molecular biology. It is not found in nature. The Edunia has red veins on 
light pink petals and a gene of mine is expressed on every cell of its red 
veins,19 i.e., my gene produces a protein in the veins only.20 The gene was 
isolated and sequenced from my blood. The petal pink background, against 
which the red veins stand out, is evocative of my own pinkish white skin 
tone that is due precisely to the blood that flows beneath it. The result of 
this molecular manipulation is a bloom that creates the living image of 
human blood rushing through the veins of a flower.
The gene I selected is responsible for the identification of foreign bodies. 
In this work, it is precisely that which identifies and rejects the other that 
I integrate into the other, thus creating a new kind of self that is partially 
flower and partially human. 
Natural History of the Enigma uses the redness of blood and the redness 
of the plant’s veins as a marker of our shared heritage in the wider spectrum 
of life. By combining human and plant DNA in a new flower, in a visually 
dramatic way (red expression of human DNA in the flower veins), I bring 
forth the realization of the contiguity of life between different species.
This work seeks to instill in the public a sense of wonder about this 
most amazing of phenomena we call “life”. The general public may have 
no difficulty in considering how close we truly are to apes and other non-
human animals, particularly those with which it is possible to communicate 
directly, such as cats and dogs. However, the thought that we are also close 
to other life forms, including flora, will strike most as surprising.
While in the history of art one finds imaginative associations between 
anthropomorphic and botanical forms (as in the work of Archimboldo, for 
example), this parallel (between humans and plants) also belongs to the 
history of philosophy and to contemporary science. Advancing notions 
first articulated by Descartes, Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751) al-
ready proposed in his book L’Homme Plante [Man a Plant] (1748) that “the 
singular analogy between the plant and animal kingdoms has led me to 
the discovery that the principal parts of men and plants are the same.” The 
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preliminary sequencing of the human genome and that of a plant from the 
mustard family (Arabidopsis thaliana, in the journal “Nature”, December 
14, 2000) have extended the artist’s and the philosopher’s analogies beyond 
their wildest dreams, into the deepest recesses of the human and plant cells. 
Both have revealed homologies between human and plant genetic sequences.
Thus, the key gesture of Natural History of the Enigma takes place at the 
molecular level. It is at once a physical realization (i.e., a new life created 
by an artist, tout court) and a symbolic gesture (i.e., ideas and emotions are 
evoked by the very existence of the flower).
I had a sample of my blood drawn and subsequently isolated a genetic se-
quence that is part of my immune system – the system that distinguishes self 
from non-self, i.e., protects against foreign molecules, disease, invaders – any-
thing that is not me. To be more precise, I isolated a protein-coding sequence 
of my DNA from my Immunoglobulin (IgG) light chain (variable region).21
1. To create a Petunia with red veins in which my blood gene is expressed, 
I made a chimeric gene composed of my own DNA and a promoter to 
guide the red expression only in the flower’s vascular system, not in 
the petals or the rest of the flower. In order to make my blood-derived 
DNA express only in the red veins of the Petunia, I used Professor 
Neil Olszewski’s CoYMV (Commelina Yellow Mottle Virus) Promoter, 
which drives gene expression exclusively in plant veins. Professor 
Olszewski is in the Department of Plant Biology at the University of 
Minnesota, St. Paul, MN.22
My IgG DNA is integrated into the chromosome of the Edunia. This 
means that every time that the Edunia is propagated through seeds my 
gene is present in the new flowers.
The sculpture that is part of Natural History of the Enigma is a three-
dimensional fiberglass and metal form measuring 14’4” (height) x 20’4” 
(length) x 8’ 5” (width.) It contrasts the minute scale of the molecular 
procedure with the larger-than-life structure. Likewise, the work pairs 
the ephemeral quality of the living organism with the permanence of the 
large sculpture. The sculpture is directly connected to the flower because its 
form is an enlargement of unique forms found inside this invented flower. 
In other words, the sculpture is derived from the molecular procedure 
employed to create the flower.23 In its hybridity, the sculpture reveals the 
proximity of our next of kin in the kingdom Plantae.
I used 3D imaging and rapid-prototyping to visualize this fusion pro-
tein as a tangible form. I created the visual choreography of the sculpture 
based on the flower’s molecular uniqueness. The sculpture was created 
with a vocabulary of organic twists and turns, helices, sheets and other 
three-dimensional features common to all life. The sculpture is blood red, 
in connection to the starting point of the work (my blood) and the venial 
coloration of the Edunia.
In anticipation of a future in which Edunias can be distributed socially and 
planted everywhere, I created a set of six lithographs entitled Edunia Seed 
Packs. Visually resonant as they are with the flower and the work’s theme, 
these images are meant to be used in the actual seed packs to be produced 
in the future. In my exhibition at the Weisman Art Museum, I exhibited 
a limited edition of Edunia seed packs containing actual Edunia seeds.
Cypher 
Similar to all of the preceding works discussed here (with the exception of 
the biotopes), Cypher is transgenic. It merges sculpture, artist’s book and 
a DIY transgenic kit. The work measures approximately 13 x 17” and is 
contained in a stainless steel slipcase. When removed from the case, the 
kit — itself also made of stainless steel — opens up in two halves, like 
a book. Inside, the viewer/user finds a portable minilab. The kit contains 
Petri dishes, agar, nutrients, streaking loops, pipettes, test tubes, synthetic 
DNA (encoding in its genetic sequence a poem I wrote specifically for this 
artwork), and a booklet containing the transformation protocol—each in 
its respective compartment.
The work literally comes to life when the viewer/reader/user follows 
the protocol in the booklet and integrates the synthetic DNA into the 
bacteria (the “transformation”). The bacteria (normally pale) will then 
glow red, showing through this transgenic visual marker that the artwork 
is now alive. In bacterial division, two identical clone cells are always pro-
duced. After the transformation, the poem will be fully integrated into the 
bacteria’s cellular machinery and therefore will be present in each newly 
reproduced bacterium. 
Cypher visually hybridizes sculpture and artist’s book : a three-dimen-
sional metal object (with a velvety internal coating, finished by hand using 
industrial techniques and complemented with glass objects) is initially 
handled like a book, only to reveal itself as a nomadic laboratory. The key 
poetic gesture in Cypher is to place in the hands of the viewer the decision 
and the power to literally give life to the artwork.
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The synthetic DNA in Cypher encodes in its genetic sequence a poem 
I wrote specifically for this artwork. The code replaces alphabetic letters 
included in the poem with short DNA sequences of two or three bases. The 
poem Cypher is composed with a high statistical incidence of the four let-
ters that represent the four genetic bases Adenine, Cytosine, Guanine, and 
Thymine (i.e., A, C, G and T). The set of remaining letters is formed by four 
consonants and two vowels: these additional six letters were carefully selected 
to form a “code within the code” that serves as semantic counterpoint to 
the apparently enigmatic meaning of the poem. The result of this process is 
that poem and code complement each other in such a way that the code is 
absolutely integral to the poem. Both are included in the booklet present in 
the kit, thus enabling the viewer to discover this relationship while following 
the protocol to give life to the poem. The title manifests an anagrammatic 
relationship between sign and referent that is, itself, also part of the work.
Cypher is an artwork that presents itself as an invitation; it is a call to en-
gage with a set of procedures that merge art and poetry, biological life and 
technology, reading/viewing and kinesthetic participation. This sculptural 
object’s relationship to the book is enhanced by the fact that the title of the 
work is engraved on the spine of the slipcase and on the “cover” (the front 
of the kit). The work can go on a bookshelf and be clearly identified. When 
opened, the viewer discovers a complete transgenic kit. The participant reads 
the poem by transforming E. coli with the provided synthetic DNA. The act 
of reading is procedural. In following the outlined procedure, the participant 
creates a new kind of life – one that is at once literal and poetic.
Conclusion
The tangible and symbolic coexistence of the human and the transgenic, 
which I have developed in several of my works discussed above, shows 
that humans and other species are evolving in new ways. It dramatizes 
the need to develop new models with which to understand this change, 
and calls for the interrogation of difference, taking into account clones, 
transgenics and chimeras. 
Although not all of the works discussed in this essay are transgenic, all 
of my bio art, from Genesis to Cypher, explores our perceptions of what 
is “natural” and what is “monstrous”. The common belief that transgenics 
are unnatural is incorrect; it is important to understand that the process 
of moving genes from one species to another is a part of wild life beyond 
human intervention. A common example of this is “agrobacterium”24, 
which has the ability to transfer DNA into plant cells through the roots 
and integrate that DNA into the plant chromosome. Even humans have 
sequences in their genome that came from viruses and bacteria acquired 
through a long evolutionary history; we have DNA in our bodies from 
nonhuman organisms, thus, we are ourselves transgenic.25 Before deciding 
that all transgenics are monstrous, humans must look within and come 
to terms with their own transgenic condition, their own “monstrosity”. 
But bio art, rather than commenting on what it means to create life, 
actually creates life. These works embody the absolute freedom of crea-
tion of poetry while simultaneously emerging from the sustained inquiry 
upon the world brought about through philosophical rigor. They make 
us question not only who we are as humans, but also what that physical 
identity means in the context of a wide universe of living beings. Bio art 
suggests that idealized notions of what is “natural” must be challenged and 
the human role in the evolutionary history of other species (and vice versa) 
acknowledged, while at the same time respectfully and humbly marveling 
at this amazing phenomenon we call “life”.
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Being (in) Mediations
The topic of the death of art is such a constant in writings on contemporary 
aesthetics that is worth considering it because the relationship between art and 
time and history is at stake there, and/or because from that horizon I would 
like to pose the question about the mediation among art and biomedia.
Pointing at a moment such as the “death of art” would imply that art is 
researched after its history, i.e. it would implicitly be acknowledged that it 
has not always been what it is today and therefore it would be necessary 
to think about it regarding its differences. Yet this statement isn’t followed 
necessarily nor is it as obvious as it might seem, since acknowledging the 
evident historical transformation of arts at empirical level – as today there 
are not the same artistic manifestations as the ones from the nineteenth cen-
tury – does not mean that art’s mode of being is under discussion. What is 
at stake then is whether art or its modes of being are essentially transformed 
after history or whether it remains the same with differences that occur 
at another level, different than the one implicated with its mode of being.
In my view, there are at least three positions that can be considered after 
what was previously said. First, the so-called analytic aesthetics which 
while speaking about the death of art, as in the well-known case of Ar-
thur Danto, it discusses transformations related to art’s contents and (re)
presentation modes rather than its modes of being; in consequence, they 
still talk about things like “definition of art” (either closed or open, in any 
case they imply a historical continuity even if they consider variations and 
even if they hold “historic” or narrativistic positions1). Second, Martin 
Heidegger’s paradigmatic case, who – when thinking the artwork’s mode 
of being, conceived from the conflict between world and earth and the 
occurrence of truth, and in frank discussion with aesthetic Kantianism 
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and Hegelianism – does not seem to fundamentally include history, since 
the ontological would describe modes of being that happen “always” or 
that belong to a transcendental field.2
Third, the recovery and incorporation of the Hegelian system of aes-
thetics in some contemporary French authors, such as Jacques Rancière3 
and Jean Luc Nancy4, who expect to address the everlasting question of 
current aesthetics –‘what is art?’– by saying what art has been through or 
in its historical transformations, which are essential and do not describe 
trends, content or ways to (re)present. In that sense, these transformations 
do not occur necessarily according to a chronological order, but different 
times can coexist simultaneously, since in any case we are not talking about 
the dating of different schools, trends, authors or works in art history, but 
rather about periods or occasions of art; ways of being of the being of art.
Both Heidegger’s perspective and the latter’s – that of the French – are 
not aesthetic in the sense of dealing with a “philosophy of art”. Therefore, 
they can think art in its mode of being and according to modes in which 
the being happens. However, Hegel, Rancière and Nancy agree in some 
things when reflecting upon art from time and from history: there are three 
moments and then what comes next. There is a way to understand art’s 
mode of being in which history and time are critical, that is, the question 
‘what is art?’ must be faced from epochality –and the question “what is” is 
said with the full strength of a Platonic ti esti (Greek).
But what art can be, if in its very mode of being temporality goes in 
such an essential way? What can be that which is only to the extent that 
it ceases to be what it is and becomes another? The contradiction in these 
questions is obvious: it is what it is because it no longer is. This is a Hegelian 
contradiction, in the sense of the dialectic. 
Widely known, discussed and criticized is Hegel’s definition of art as 
“sensible expression of the idea (das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee)”. It is 
precisely this way of considering art’s mode of being after the mode of be-
ing of what it is which allows making that necessary connection between 
art and time, art and reality.
What I want to emphasize with this is that the core would be in the 
relationship established between that thing called “art” and let’s say the 
“real” (just to give it a concept).
The real does not occur without mediations, it does not occur outside 
categories and these assertions are convincing in the Hegelian system 
and constitute one of the great disappearance moments of what Nietzsche 
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called “the true world (die wahre Welt)”. There is no arché (Greek), there 
is no origin, and there is no in-itself to which nothing can refer. 5
The world of masks is in front of us (no immediacy, everything is medi-
ated, everything is “determined by other”). I bring these considerations to 
note that art is mediation without reference (hence the disquisitions on 
art’s representational nature are out of place.
Mediation should be thought according to epochalities. This means that 
differences, which are differences of differences, happen on this mode of 
being of the real, its mediated being – there is nothing beyond and besides 
mediation. How many mediations, in how many modes, through how many 
devices? Time must get into these thoughts. What mediates has not always 
been the same. But art, whatever we call such, has been a great mediator, 
and in that sense, a founder of mediations that happen in a particular way.
From there, I would say that this aesthetic ontology is not about thinking 
neither the means, the media nor the representation, since the core issue 
is not discussing that, but the modes of being of mediations.
Much of twentieth-century aesthetics has been wandering about whether 
art’s representational nature has ended (the end of art). By representation 
they understand either figuration (Danto6), presenting what was previously 
presented (Derrida7) or that the work is different from what it represents 
(by its medium, its materials, the way in which it executes the mimesis, 
as in Tratnik8). There is indeed a strong imprint to deprive art from its 
representational nature and say that it is not the representation but rather 
is, for example, performative, executive, that brings about something that 
was not and thus is from then on. It is not what comes next, in ontological 
and epistemic terms, but what presents and performs.
Within this discussion, art working with bio-media has a special place since 
for many it is not representational at all, there is nothing to represent even 
in material terms (there where mimesis is understood also from the media 
through which art represents), because the thing itself is there: it is not painting 
of the tree, but the tree “itself”. Has the representational nature of art given way 
to the event’s performative presentation that executes a possibility of being?
Here we can indeed tell stories about art… when and how it represented 
and with what, when it stopped being the imitation of nature or figurative 
or illustrative of the great moments in history or literature, which have 
been the media…
But it should be noted as well that the insistence that art working with 
bio-media is not representational depends on a tactic that can become 
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rather sensationalist, as Suzanne Anker has previously stated.9 Some say, 
on the contrary, that it is about operating with living organisms or tissues, 
but not with configurations: it is about making art in vivo. Yet I drag here 
considerations by Ingeborg Reichle10 on this regard, who lucidly shows 
that the subject of art in the age of science and technology not only goes 
through the manipulation of living organisms, but also through the appro-
priation and reinterpretation we do of new sciences and technologies with 
and through images. Therefore, it would be naive to think that the effect 
on the world occurs mainly and almost exclusively in material terms – e.g., 
making rabbits –, leaving aside the powerful effect of images, which shape 
reality in a strong ontological sense.
Thus said, the transformation of our world due to technoscience also 
involves – substantially – images and figurations, which are evidently built 
on both the sciences and the arts. It would be naive, very naive, to think 
that science images – say the DNA sequence strips or brain scans – are the 
clear manifestation of reality and then later appear the artistic figurations 
(artistic depictions). In any case, we would have to argue that the image 
is subject of a hermeneutics, here specifically of bio-hermeneutics, rather 
than bio-semiotics (the hermeneutic dimension of biofacts has been already 
pointed out by Nicole Karafyllis11).
With that I get to the second point. Discussion of art’s media linked to 
representation. Much has been said as well about art and “new media” in 
relation with art’s death or end. They talk about technology, about analog 
media and digital placing the current art elsewhere, about immediacy 
being sought after the use of technology and its realistic interfaces, about 
photography displacing painting in its spatial representation of reality, 
about the mathematical perspective of computers, etc.
The media of mediations have modified considering to different tech-
niques and objectives. We face not only the so-called “new media” in the 
digital and cybernetic age, but also the typical means of representation, 
the ones thought and rethought by philosophy since ever – namely, the 
senses (particularly sight and hearing) – are today technically modified, 
prosthetically increased.
If we said that the natural senses are one thing and their technological 
extension artificiality, we would be in a rather confusing way of thinking.
What lies ahead is mediations of mediations and from there we have 
configured today the map of our world in a very radical way. The senses 
are mediations, we would say, with what there is – though we already 
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know that it is not without mediations and is not either different than the 
mediations–. Therefore, it has been so important for philosophy to clarify 
about its fidelity when it was thought that there was something unmedi-
ated, something immediate. Plato and Descartes are good examples of this.
But what happens when this mediation combines with another one 
and this produces knowledge –the kind they say is true – and produces 
machines with which we operate technically on the world? The power of 
display devices – from magnifying glasses to microscopes to telescopes to 
the screens of our daily existence– is impressive in its capability to configure 
and extend our experience.
We can think from some examples that allow us to see these mediations. 
The naked eye cannot see bacteria. Eye mediation is not enough, neverthe-
less they are absolutely real in our lives and through prosthetically increased 
eyes we do so many things in relation to the existence of bacteria – from 
washing our hands to public health policies–; that double mediation, i.e. 
the microscope’s, is more effective in this than simple mediation, i.e. the 
naked eye. But the bacteria are also mediation, outcome and determination 
of many processes in which one becomes the other.
The next example is the genome. Saying that there is a fundamental 
change after the description of the DNA helical structure (1953, Watson 
and Crick) and that from there different possibilities have been operated 
for the living has nothing to do with the fact that today it is genetically 
manipulated and intervened. Some point out that this has always been 
done, for example, in agriculture and stockbreeding (no one would state 
that corn or dogs are “natural”, but rather bio-facts). The breaking point is 
not there, but in the display devices that allow “seeing” or pretending to see 
the DNA structure, i.e. they make clear and visible what is – which is also 
a mediation, a process, an outcome. In that moment we have mediation 
of mediation of mediation and our world’s map changes very significantly.
It is about seeing with naked eye or walking around with the prosthetics 
of eyes. It has to do with combining – and conjuring – experiences that do 
not juxtapose but coexist in simultaneity of planes. The image represented 
in my mind is not more real than the photograph’s than the microscope’s 
than the DNA sequence image. The genome map is not more unreal than 
synthetic organs than my own death’s anticipation. The reality parameter 
does not depend on the mediation degree.
And then art makes all this explode by showing the mediation of biotechnol-
ogy and display devices as mediation. I mention only for clarity’s sake Suzanne 
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Anker’s work, which clearly emphasizes the power of images and their trans-
formations, for example, in Zoosemiotics; and Paul Vanouse’s, who has insisted 
on display devices and how they create our space-time, e.g. in Fingerprints.
We should at the same time see knowledge and its various models as 
mediation, whether they are empirical, scientific, humanistic… What kind 
of science, with what model, with what paradigm, positive or complex, 
mechanic or quantum…? Knowledge is a mediation.
We should also consider art as mediation. It is not about saying whether 
or not art is representational, or on what terms or if it is performative or 
what… This long discussion dismisses art’s mode of being as a matter of 
thought. It is not about elucidating the transformations of artistic mani-
festations after the media’s change… That also avoids art’s mode of being 
as a matter of thought. It’s about focusing on mediation and its mode of 
being, as a mode of being of what is.
Therefore, the statement: Mediations of mediations. There is no in itself. 
No origin. No units (either discrete or continuous), mainly because there is 
no immediacy. The question about being also interrogates about mediation. 
And from this perspective we can think about the fourth moment of art. In 
Hegel it is art’s destruction. For those who follow is of course this we have 
today. It is the moment when art knows it is mediation and acts as media-
tion. To clarify the argument, the moments should be mentioned. There 
is the antiquity where art is not art because there is no division between 
what is represented and what is: the bison in the cave is pure event. There 
is the classical period where there is consciousness of representation and 
a system for mimesis is created. There is modernity where art is born as 
such and as such also dies, art as what is separate, as what is aesthetic, as 
an entity with certain specificity and difference – or so is intended when 
founded as “aesthetic” (and then it realizes its artifice and rejoices playing 
with it and makes art for art’s sake and manifestos and complexities in its 
structure, in its manifestation, in its concept requiring much knowledge 
and much thought, the same in the literature than on visual arts; art has 
such self-awareness and of its artifice that it is entangled and bites its tail). 
In the separation it becomes market art, in the execution it wants to stop 
being separated and “aesthetic” (one should recall Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
critique of aesthetic consciousness12), wants to go back to where it ever was.
But knowing about the artifice is not the same as knowing about and rec-
ognizing itself as mediation. Acknowledging the mediation is recognizing 
oneself along with other mediations and operating with and from them. It is 
Being (in) Mediations 191
not a fight for disciplinary difference, about art, or philosophy, or science. It 
is about crosses between mediations, between models, metaphors, devices, 
senses, configurations and how many other modes of being of mediation.
Therefore, the interesting thing is not discussing what is the definition of 
art, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions making “x” an artwork, 
or deciding whether they are performances or representations, or whether 
new media and bio-media locate (dislocate) art to the point of needing 
new aesthetics and theories for so many innovations.
If art becomes aware or rather whether if it operates as mediation from 
mediation, then the disquisitions about its specificity and its being sepa-
rated are, as I said, out of place: there is no separation, but operations-
executions-effectuations of different modes of being of mediation.
It is not the same claiming to act on matter as such – operating the world 
technically – than claiming to act on the model which is neither one or 
the other, that is, it is not the same acting or operating at the mask’s or 
interpretandum-interpretans level, language’s level (mediation has received 
all these names in the past century)… and this is no rough nominalist 
repetition of speculative idealism. Rather it is hoisting this question: how 
do we cleave the sensible when it is no longer the other of the intelligible?
With no transcendent shape, without Platonic eidos (Greek) out of this 
world, there is no copy, no reference, and no last and final parameter of 
mediation. All mediation is operable, alterable, by other mediation. Hence, 
the debate about nature and artificiality appears today so eagerly. Biotech-
nology and the production of genetically modified organisms, plus the 
technical intervention of virtually the entire planet, seem to bring to the 
fore the debate about whether there is “nature” and how to think about 
life (now that there is synthetic biology producing “living things” and 
cybernetics making “artificial intelligence”).
If art has come to intervene in this sphere and so vehemently, again it is 
not due to representation and bio-media, but with it’s taking over media-
tion as mediation that produces other units and effectuations. Due to this 
the living appears prosthetically modified, genetically manipulated. There 
are no natural or absolute units. Mediation is constantly generating what 
is there. And this is no apology for biotechnology, which – in any case – is 
not questioned from its engineering capabilities, but from how art makes 
it conscious as mediation.
Thus, when art works with life as matter, even though it might seem to 
replicate the sense of the laboratory, of the scientific experiment, the aesthetics 
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of DNA synthesizers and sequences, though it might look like it is built as 
a replica or that it pretends to be a small science world, or that it is nothing 
more than the greater speaker, with an non-specialized audience, of the 
scope – and disasters – of science; even when all of this seems to be, we must 
look through the eyes of mediation: life appears as being mediated, inter-
related and inserted in a panorama of complexity. It cannot be understood 
as a primary and isolated unit. It cannot be understood as a determination 
of a gene-centric paradigm, even when the firsts works of bio art, stuck in to 
a certain extent uncritical fascination with biotechnology, repeated the gene-
centric paradigm and played with the imaginary dream that the formation 
of the organism depended on and was determined by genes to a very high 
degree. Even so, life turned up to be in the middle. Bio art inserts matter in 
the networks of mediations, in the relations, in the complexities. There noth-
ing remains as it is. Rather, it clarifies the limit whence something becomes 
what it is. We mean limit as mediation, as an opening in which something 
is configured. Art as a limit and mediation transforms matter, in this case, 
the living, and shows it in scales and distinctions, in so many and so specific 
differentiations, that allows us to see that which we would (always) be missing.
To instantiate this possibility of life appearing in the middle and be-
ing transformed from the multiple mediations in which it is taken, I will 
mention the case of transgenic maize in Mexico and the way in which art 
working with biomedia has entered the debate. In my perspective, a biofact 
as maize, which is the outcome of thousands of years of domestication and 
selection, and crucial to the determination of a culture, makes transparent 
the very idea of mediation, since it incarnates so many process of media-
tions, from biological, to cultural, to agricultural ones among others. Point-
ing out that maize is not a “natural” entity, and assuming its characteristics 
as something produced and constructed, does not mean in any case that 
the degrees of mediation can be annulled to simply state that all maize is 
a biofact and that the transgenic one is just a slight transformation of that 
entity already altered and manipulated.
Art has the potency to put forward the different layers of mediation 
through devices that clarify, as I said before, the limit, that is, the opening 
in which something is configured. 
The issue of maize had been previously dealt with in Mexico with a very 
strong political mark by visual and plastic artists that repudiate transgenic 
maize and that have mobilized all over our Republic to denounce the 
practices of transnational corporations and political parties.
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For us, as the first art collective in Mexico producing transgenic and 
biotechnological art,13 the problem required a “revisit” of the different dis-
courses implied in the debate. The first resolution we took was to reproduce 
this debate. For the exhibition “Sin origen/Sin semilla” (Without origin/
Seedless)14 at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) we 
set a video installation of switching interviews called Cross-Pollination, in 
which the opinions of the parties included in the debate were to be heard. 
The title of the videos and the constant changing of images in the moni-
tors allude the promiscuous mode in which maize reproduces, and also 
facilitates the contamination among varieties (including the transgenic 
ones). The idea was to continue this process of informative (discursive and 
genetic) contamination and to include the spectators and their opinions 
about GMOs. 
This video installation accompanies the piece They will be ashes, but will 
make sense (Slightly toxic) which settles in the museum an easy protocol 
to prove whether maize samples had presence of transgenic genes resist-
ant to glyphosate (RoundUP herbicide of Monsanto) or not. This toxic 
substance was spread in maize’s plantlets coming from several zones of 
Mexico: the samples with presence of transgenes would survive, and the 
native or improved (mutant) ones not. The contamination was finally 
proved by ELISA tests.15
We had a performance every week at the MUAC museum, sprinkling 
the seeds with glyphosate. The installation was design with furniture con-
taining the plant pots, striving towards an aesthetic that was not exactly 
laboratory-like, but also not completely like a garden or a greenhouse. One 
could actually go plowing about through the piece as if it were a “milpa”,16 
and in order to go through the entrance one had to cross a sign on the floor 
where one could read “slightly toxic”, the letters of which were drawn with 
the ashes of the burnt plants.
They will be ashes deliberates about GMO crops, and the primary inten-
tion was to post a question about the artificiality grads in maize (which has 
no wild variety unlike other grains), and to underline that the technifica-
tion process means also the parallel production of artificial (toxic) media, 
meaning agrochemicals.
The third piece Polymer “milpa” was a 3D printer mounted on a tractor 
that printed seeds out of a biopolymer PLA moving in a radial space. In 
a slow, seemingly fragile movement the injectors pushed PLA out in seed 
shapes that fell onto the earth. The biopolymer cartridge was spinning and 
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through the four giant speakers one could hear audio from Monsanto’s 
stock exchange that had been recorded for three months. The seeds became 
plastic monuments to recall the acting power of biotechnology.
The three installations decentered the debate about GMOs and theirs 
risks by including the question about the discourses that produce truth, the 
possibilities of thinking about technology from the point of view of social, 
political and epistemic conditions, and also by situating the reflection on 
technologies in non-neutral spaces: for producing new bioartifacts technics 
should intervene several layers of mediation, history, epistemic horizons, 
previous technics, economical conflicts and even repurpose the material 
conditions of the media of growth.
Through these installations the idea of art is revisited, it is not a question 
whether artworks are representational or not, whether they are aesthetic 
or not, or if they already belong to the era of the end of art. The way in 
which they cross among disciplines and produce a discourse, an effect, an 
atmosphere to thresh corn in its many manifestations, show that when 
art is conscious of its mode of being as mediation it can throw light to the 
form in which reality is constructed as mediation of mediation of media-
tion. This, in turn, allows us to have a position in the debate that goes 
much farther than the simplified extremes of natural and artificial. Maize 
through these installations becomes a network, a complexity, and a mode 
in which life appears in the middle. 
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Miško Šuvaković
Spectacularisation. The Philosophy 
of Contemporary Transitional Art 
and Form of Life
This text is about understanding philosophically and theoretically the 
conditions of thinking and acting in different registers of art, science, tech-
nology, and politics in contemporary transitional cultures. In the context 
of abstract knowledge, the central problem of the following discussion will 
be to articulate the understanding and presenting of thinking and acting 
immanent to multiplicity of life.1 I will show that contemporary technol-
ogy, science, every day life and politics are spectacularised and brought 
to bodily-individual and collective-social visibility by means of art. It is 
about art endowed with the specific functions of cultural spectacularisa-
tion. In the case of these productions, spectacularisation denotes those 
art practices by which the biotechnological, bioscientific, and biopolitical 
practices of contemporary culture become visible in relation to forms of 
life. The visibility of their mutual relations suggests three different regimes 
that should be examined and interpreted:
 – the regime of sensory recognition, i.e. the regime of preparing ‘forms 
of life’ for sensory perception, followed by cognitive processing,
 – the regime of presenting and representing the visibility of forms of 
life by means of media and post-media in the information channels 
of culture and art, and
 – the regime of impacting the spectator’s individual or collective body, 
whereby the impact of the visible emerges as an event that results in 
that body’s attraction and affectation.
BioArt and, more wider, BioPolitical Art denotes those contemporary 
art practices that interventionally present the potentialities and actualities 
of real or fictionally conceived life, by means of their choice of subjects 
or media. BioPolitical Art emerges from the re-articulations of science, 
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technology, behaviour, politics, and art in contemporary culture. Those re-
articulations are associated with presenting, representing, and performing 
most diverse forms of life, i.e. conditions of living matter in social contexts.2
Form of Life
Form of life is a basic concept in biology, biopolitical philosophy, as well 
as contemporary BioArt and Radical Body Art and Critical Performances.
The usage of the concepts of “life” and “form of life” is indebted to 
analyses and discussions of the differences and contradictions between 
the undisplayable-silent presence in nature, the undisplayable-silent life 
of nature, and the displayable-sayable life of society, i.e. culture and art.
In its broadest sense, biopolitical thinking begins as a critique of poststruc-
turalism’s ‘textocentrism’, by pointing to those existences and phenomena 
that are beyond the field of intentionality and symbolisation. It shows that 
there is something beyond text as a referent, as a rupture, as that which falls 
out or that which emerges as a becoming, that is, as that which is an object, 
situation, or an event. There is something that is wild, potent, and immanent, 
and at the same time fragile, vulnerable, and extremely short-lived – all of 
this might certainly apply to the life of a bacterium, a cell, a plane tree, a grain, 
a butterfly, an elephant, or a human. Here is how Gilles Deleuze defined life:
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is 
not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. 
A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete 
power, complete bliss.3
On the other hand, according to Giorgio Agamben, the Ancient Greeks 
had no generic term for what we mean by the word life.4 They used two 
semantically and morphologically different terms: zoé, which signified the 
very fact of the living together of all living things (animals, people, and 
gods) and bios, which signified the form or specific way of life of a particular 
individual or group. Over the centuries, this distinction gradually disap-
peared from the vocabulary of modern languages; in those places where 
it still survives, as in biology or zoology, it no longer denotes a significant 
difference whatsoever. One single term – “life” – is used in such a way 
that its ambiguity grows in proportion to the sacralisation of its referent. 
“Alive” signifies a mere common assumption that is almost always possible 
to isolate in any one of numerous distinct forms of life.
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Form of life, however, refers to life that can never be separated from 
its form, life in which it is impossible to isolate such a thing as mere 
or bare life. This is where a fundamental difference emerges between 
cultural-studies theorisations of ‘life’ and the philosophical interpreta-
tions of life that biopolitical philosophy has provoked. Cultural stud-
ies have advanced the post-poststructuralist assertion that there is no 
such thing as bare life, but that, rather, life invariably exists through 
its presentations and representations by textual agents within closed 
systems of culture. Cultural studies posit life as a text, or ‘non-bare life’. 
On the other hand, the philosophy of biopolitics posits the claim of an 
analytic-critical separation of “natural” from “human”, which means 
intellectual from political life.5 Life appears as an event that triggers 
variable consequences in the world.
Viewed from yet another angle, that of the philosophy of biology, form 
of life is not only the event of life itself, but also an event and discourse 
that have their own history, which is projected onto the event of life in 
constructing and deriving concrete and abstract knowledge of life. In that 
sense, for the science that goes under the name of biology, life is a hetero-
geneous set that includes both the linguistic and the non-linguistic, that 
is, non-intentional events and discourses of living matter. The concept 
of life is determined by life as such, i.e. life as the external reference of 
that discourse. But the concept of life includes the abstract knowledge of 
life as well. Also, the concept of life includes institutional classifications 
and divisions of the knowledge of life, as well as surveillance/control of 
life. Life is a philosophical proposition as well as a legal category. On the 
other hand, form of life is invariably endowed with its concrete strategic 
function, which situates it in a human relation, with all the contradictions 
and conflicts that human relations as such bring. Biology is therefore 
determined by intersections between relations of power and knowledge 
in the complex process of human alienation, which means that amid all 
these contradictions humans must become machines in order to be able to 
produce the human in themselves. Only humans produced as such, who 
appear to have abandoned their “zoé” (biological existence), are those who 
construct the concept of life as abstract knowledge in relation to the wild, 
potent, and immanent, and yet fragile, vulnerable, and extremely short-
lived duration of organisms. That moving between zoé and bios, that is, 
from bios, which makes zoé possible as knowledge in the field of power, 
is an essential marker of every “form of life”.
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Spectacularisation
Contemporary relations between art, politics, technology, behaviour and 
science may be identified as a field of obsessions and phantasms about 
representing the “truth of the world/life”, or, alternatively, as a field of ob-
sessions and phantasms about performing the “regulation of world/life.”6 
The concepts of this representing and performing should be understood 
as practices of exemplifying generically the conditions of the truth and 
potentiality of forms of life. By means of this representing and performing, 
the invisible and abstract world of the “knowledge of life”, which politics, 
science and technology posit before events and situations of life, becomes 
visible. It is not that art thereby becomes politics, science or technology, 
but rather that through art, science and technology become visible with 
all of their effects and consequences in the real, living world. The function 
of art is to spectacularise the complex field of relations between science, 
politics, and technology with regards to forms of life.
“Spectacularisation” stems from “spectacle”. Guy Debord claimed that 
spectacle was capital accumulated to the point when it became an image.7 
If one accepts his assertion as the formula of the spectacle, then one may 
say that the spectacle is an X accumulated to the point when it becomes 
an image. In other words, one might say that through art, different forms 
of life are accumulated to the point when they become images. Spectacu-
larisation is identified as a recreating8 of the conditions of sensory/bodily 
experience in relation to forms of life:
Spectacle is not primarily concerned with a  looking at images but rather 
with the construction of conditions that individuate, immobilize, and sepa-
rate subjects, even within a world in which mobility and circulation are 
ubiquitous.9
Spectacularisation may thus be understood as performing subjectifica-
tion by means of the visible in relation to forms of life. With regards to 
forms of life and living matter, subjectification is the regime of relations 
between that which is seen and that which may be said, between knowledge 
and action, activity and passivity. Subjectification is determined not only 
by nature, but also by history – for example, Walter Benjamin offered an 
explanation of that essentially socio-historical character of subjection and 
spectacularisation:
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During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception 
changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which 
human sense perception is organized, the medium in which it is accom-
plished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances 
as well.10
Regarding the above, one might construct a scheme of forms of life 
brought to visibility by means of art, thereby establishing references to 
politics, science, and technology. Such a scheme might look like this:
The spectacularisation of relations between politics, science, and tech-
nology through art appears in the historical endurance of differences, 
from tradition, to modernity and postmodernity, through transition and 
globalism. These are the differences between bodily skill (the ancient tradi-
tion), the working of the machine as an extension of, and replacement for, 
the human body (the modern tradition), transformations of the human 
body’s functions by means of machines (the condition of postmodernity), 
and, finally, transformations of machines into complex productive, post-
productive, and tactical networks of the electronic, techno-biological, and 
electronic-biological conditions/processes of material exchange (the age 
of transition and globalisation). These are entirely different ontologies of 
human labour and its history.
Politics
Science
Technology
FORMS OF LIFE Art
Visible
Spectacularisation
Subjectivisation
Ideology
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Traditional ontology refers to objectification based on a bodily act that 
posits an object (a chair, a house, a ship, a sword, a statue, a spoon) into 
the world of humans. The key notion of traditional ontology is the bodily 
positing (Ge-Stell) of a made object into the world of humans.11 An object 
is made by hands and posited into the world of objects among people. This 
is about longing for an object endowed with a rational structure, which 
reveals ‘rational’ planning on the part of its creator. The creator is a master 
craftsman. The work is an authentic piece that bears its creator’s bodily 
imprint. Therefore is technology so much more than a mere tool: 
Technology is a way of revealing. […] It is the realm of revealing, i.e., 
of truth.12 
By means of exposure, technology is linked to science. But that link 
may only be seen through the mediation of politics and art, by means of 
spectacularisation as an event.
Modern ontology, that of the early Industrial Age, speaks of the machine 
as an extension of the human body qua its introduction into the world. By 
means of machines, humans penetrate the world in order to transform it. 
Then, modern ontology, that of the advanced Industrial Age, speaks of 
the machine and machines that replace the human body in production. 
The extended body and then also the displaced body are two features of 
modernity. The extended body is that which intervenes in the world/life 
by transforming and thereby appropriating it. Appropriating the world/
life indicates a situation where the natural world/life ceases to be the only 
coherent world. The world/life of humans is no longer an event of nature 
only, but also a modification of nature and life. An added value and po-
tentiality emerge that were not identified in nature before and that are 
not identified as nature now. Technology achieves the mass production of 
pieces. The produced piece emerges through a mechanical reproduction 
of an exemplary model. The modern machine evolves from a mechanical 
extension of the human body to an ‘abstract machine’ (a cognitive machine, 
a digital device, or a cybernetic system) that is meant to replace the human 
body/bodies in freeing humans and multiplying their work potential. The 
machine is a tool, a means, and, at the end of modernity, an artificial part-
ner in the production and distribution of goods and information. Modern 
technology is viewed as applied science, whereby the truth established 
by science is introduced into the pragmatics achieved by technology. Art 
spectacularises the relation between the true and the pragmatic regarding 
the modification of forms of life.
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The postmodern machine seeks to take over the human body’s functions – 
from manual through cognitive labour. Cognitive labour becomes dominant 
over manual and mechanical labour. This constitutes a de-articulation of 
the anthropology of human productive labour. No longer is labour an an-
thropological category – the death of the subject and author was announced 
a long time ago. The road led form Barthes’s idea of the death of the author 
and an active role for the reader to the domination of the consumer.13 The 
direct labour of humans is transformed into work effect, which emerges from 
the dynamic relations of programmed machines that create ‘copies without 
originals’. The anthropology of human labour becomes a techno-theory of 
machine labour and then later also of cognitive labour. The product is no 
longer a mass-produced piece by itself, but the plurality of mass-produced 
pieces in the informational field of communication (production, exchange, 
and consumption), which in virtual and physical spaces realises an autono-
mous world in relation to nature and human experience based on a direct, 
“innocent” experience. The production of an autonomous informational 
world as opposed to the world of experience shows that the postmodern 
product has the status of a produced fiction. Fiction becomes constituent 
of postmodern social relations. Postmodern technology is established as 
a plural field, which generates consumers’ response to fictional and cognitive 
products. First and foremost, art spectacularises that field of consumption, 
as well as modes of fictionalising the “human condition”.
Globalisation spectacularises politics, science, technology, and art as 
post-media or tactical media. Life is posited as “complexity” and “com-
plicity”, which takes the human condition into transition, whereby local 
situations are brought into global regimes of visible knowledge. Globali-
sation is viewed as the most advanced form, i.e. the ultimate structure of 
the singularisation, standardisation, and homogenisation of cultures for 
the sake of a fully developed, totalising market capitalism, i.e. politics and 
ideology of neoliberalism. This global optimistic project’s basic features are 
based on reordering and re-substituting the “liberal” concept of society into 
the concept of plurality and non-confrontation among “global” or “world” 
societies and their cultures. The concept of “reordering” is posited as an 
essential and profound change of power relations on a global level, which 
views human relations in “humanity” not through the lens of “political 
criteria” or their ideological realisations, but as the global market’s self-
regulating relations derived through the executive formats of economic 
and cultural policy. The global financial crisis has questioned the liberal 
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ideal of a global economic self-regulation. The global crisis has brought 
economic self-regulation back into the field of social contradictions and 
conflicts at the end of the opening decade of the twenty-first century.
When one crosses from the field of the “politics of seeing”, i.e. spectacu-
larisation into the field of discussing specific formations in the history of 
art, one may establish the following descriptive model:
 – in the avant-gardes (ranging from futurism to surrealism through 
constructivism), spectacularisation was projected by means of uto-
pian ideas about realising the revolutionary-new in the industrial 
society – it concerned progress, speed, and turning from individual 
to mass consumption,
 – in the neo-avant-gardes (neo-constructivism, kinetic art, eco-art, ro-
botics in art), spectacularisation was realised by deriving a concrete 
utopia of a synthesis between science and art, by means of laboratory 
research conducted by artists and groups of artists modelled after 
scientific research teams,
 – the spectacularisation of postmodern culture, the one between high 
and popular culture, was performed by means of a totalising and 
eclectic mass consumer culture (nomadic pop, mimesis of mimesis, 
neo-expressionism, neo-conceptualism) in relation to the ideological 
suggestions of depoliticising politics with regard to the postmodern 
meta-languages of power – science, technology, politics, and art are 
shown as cultural categories of consumption, and
 – the spectacularisation of transition and globalism is based on an 
economically motivated expansion of the scientific and technological 
infrastructures into the field of ‘abstract knowledge’ as a source of 
the production of affective situations in the field of art and culture 
(BioArt, internet art, cyber-art, digital art).
Translation: Žarko Cvejić
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Polona Tratnik
The Quest for Survival: Art with Biotechnology
In the biotech century we have been facing a tremendous development of 
the field since the middle of the twentieth century. Biotechnology as the 
knowledge-power has been perceived as revolutionary field, promising 
that the man is soon to become the “master of the evolution”. Since the 
computer paradigm signifying the swing of genomics art has found its 
mission in reflecting and discussing this segment of reality. Humankind 
has been aiming to gain the ultimate power with biotechnology. The art 
projects reveal this striving and link it to another, rather modest yet utmost 
ambitious goal: the quest for survival.
Generally, these projects are structurally very complex, transdisciplinary 
and logistically demanding. Conceptually they are often not meant to be 
naïve, non-reflexive playing with life. The artists have developed rich con-
ceptual challenges and technological platforms in order to discuss complex 
but very relevant actual issues, such as those of biopower, anthropocentrism, 
survival of the species, biological adaptation to extreme environmental 
conditions, genetically modified food products and possible cannibalism 
as means of survival tactics, etc. These aspects present extreme aesthetic 
and political confrontation of public with the levers of the need to foster 
the development of biotechnology.
1. Biotechnology and Biopower
Michel Foucault was analysing the enthronement of biopower during the 
18th century, which was supporting the affirmative politics of life and over 
life: “Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom 
the ultimate domination was death, but with living being, and the mastery 
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it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level 
of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, 
that gave power its access even to the body.”1 The political technologies that 
ensued, investing the body, health, modes of subsistence and habitation, 
living conditions, the whole space of existence only proliferated since then.
Foucault was aware that medicine is significant for bio-power, since 
bio-power “is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live.”2 The 
“power is decreasingly the power to take life, and increasingly the right to 
intervene to make live”.3 He recognized medicine as a biopolitical strategy: 
“for capitalist society it is the biopolitical that is important before everything 
else; the biological, the somatic, the corporeal. The body is a biopolitical 
reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy”.4
Today biotechnology has become a significant supporting technology of 
medicine. Biotechnology has got growing importance for power over life 
and body; it is a a political technology investing in the body, improving 
its qualities, prolonging youth, taking care of health and reproduction. In 
such sense it preserves or protects life by helping to improve health, en-
riching the quality of life and enabling active aging. There is power over 
life and body in contemporaneity that is far exceeding the extensions and 
the technological possibilities of power from the biological modernity.
2. The paradigm of auto-regenerative body
Regenerative medicine manipulates with body’s own cells for composition 
or regeneration of tissues or other bodily parts, with special, increasingly 
stronger interest for stem cells. Primarily, tissue engineering emerged as 
a response to transplantation problems, mainly in association with the re-
sponse of the immune system, which meant the rejection of allogenic tissue. 
Tissue engineering is a technology of in vitro tissue manipulation, which 
nowadays mainly uses stem cells in artificially created support systems that 
are set up for the execution of specific biological functions, particularly 
for the repair or replacement of parts of the tissue (like skin, cartilage, 
bone). Engineering and cell cultivation in the laboratory for the purpose 
of transplantation is called regenerative medicine. Today, the expression 
“advanced therapy” is well-established in the EU medical legislation which 
divides advanced therapies into gene therapy, somatic cell therapy and 
tissue engineering. Advanced therapy uses principles of self-regeneration 
in tissue injury as well as in treatment of cancer. 
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Eugene Thacker, one of the first humanists to discuss tissue engineering, 
points to the new comprehension of the body introduced with it: “Tissue 
engineering is able to produce a vision of the regenerative body, a body 
always potentially in excess of itself.”5 According to Thacker, because of the 
idea of regeneration the economy of body parts (transplantations, xeno-
transplantations) has been replaced by the economy of auto-regeneration 
(regeneration of tissues from one’s own cells), which is cyclic and prolifera-
tive (productive of a great number of cells with their division).6
Thacker is introducing the concept of regenerative body with reference to 
the function of proliferation. This is the immanent function of many types 
of cells, such as skin, cartilage, bone and muscle cells. Tissue engineering as 
a branch of biotechnology has relied exactly on these functions, which are 
already present in the body, but of which one can make good use of with 
in vitro manipulation and then application back to the body. That is how 
regenerative medicine gained the regenerative effect. In the next phase tissue 
engineering additionally relied on the even nobler functions brought about 
with stem cells. With its potentiality to become a particular cell, whereat the 
decision about differentiation depends on the need, stem cell shifts the no-
tion of regeneration to another, higher level. It is particularly stem cell which 
executes auto-regeneration of a tissue that is taking place in the body. The 
function of auto-regeneration has not only been acknowledged, but has been 
intensified with support of technology, in such a manner suggesting great 
medical achievements, resulting in optimization and prolongation of life.
Ultimately the idea of regeneration of the body is generating a utopian 
vision of immortal active life and body enabled with a reinforced con-
stant process of vitalization victoriously defeating the natural process of 
mortification.
In my artistic practice, particularly with the projects Hair and Initiation, 
I am enlightening the prospects of auto-regenerative body, as well as the 
biopolitical aspects related to the interventions of regenerative medicine.
3. Maja Smrekar – radical survival strategy: 
self-exploitation
Questions upon the politics of life and the body are being addressed by 
Maja Smrekar. Her thinking is put into the context of a likely scenario in 
which humanity is facing a global food deficit. This survival plan utilizes 
man’s potential to produce molecules for nutritional purposes. The author 
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has created the genetically modified micro-organism MaSm Saccharomyces 
cervisiae by adding her own enzyme to yeast. By performing its original 
survival function – the fermentation process – the generated metabolic 
system of lactose (milk sugar) produces lactic acid. In this way the project 
provides the production of one of the most widely used additives in the 
modern food industry – lactic acid. In the context of utilitarian society, 
Maja Smrekar does not merely propose the exploitation of human mate-
rial – moreover, the artist makes it obvious. After all, we are witnesses to 
the exploitation of our own body every time we give a medical sample of 
biological material, which will be used for research purposes after the nec-
essary health screening has been conducted (except where the individual 
expressly opposes this, if he even has the option to do so). In a society where 
everything is subject to privatization and commercialization, the question 
of ownership and integrated exploitation of one’s own body presents itself 
as a novelty. This leads us to questions of power over life. 
Maja Smrekar discusses the contemporary power over life and the ob-
jective of the human species to “survive” as a species, to help itself in the 
course of life processes, where nutrition play the key role. The type of 
survival Maja Smrekar addresses is actually an “auto-survival” strategy, an 
autonomous survival. Human species is helping itself, feeding itself with 
itself, in a literal sense.
We live in an era when the issue of survival, particularly in our anthro-
pocentric world, is getting an increased importance. We are impatient 
about the research of space which we expect to soon deliver good news 
that we are finally enabled to migrate to another planet and colonize it, in 
such a manner saving ourselves and our species before the risks of greater 
environmental changes or dangers from the space which we are not able 
to survive in the design we currently have. We want to get out of here also 
because the world has become small – it has been explored, cultivated, 
utilized, crowded and restricted. 
The fostering of life and the planning of survival, which are being re-
flected in Maja Smrekar’s work, do not only lead to the expansion of the 
notion of the human being, but also to the humanization of other living 
species. Maja Smrekar humanizes the “other” (as the other to the human) 
living world in order to manage the survival of the human species. She 
demonstrates that the world we live in is completely subjected to the hu-
man power over life.
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4. Robertina Šebjanič and Špela Petrič – human survival 
plan = transspecies
In the context of the fear of the environmental changes, taking place on 
our planet or the different conditions we would meet if we would migrate 
to another planet, human species is looking for solutions to improve its 
form of existence in order to be able to survive as a species. 
Robertina Šebjanič and Špela Petrič, an artist and a biologist by basic 
education, are suggesting precisely this – a subversive creation of a trans-
species of the human and algae, humalgae, which would provide humans 
with better conditions of survival on Earth in circumstances that may be 
difficult to predict. However, despite the proposed genetic hybridization, 
man would still retain the human form, phenotype. The project proposes 
to ‘improve’ the human being, which means a plan for an extreme sur-
vival strategy. In the scenario that the human species is most afraid of, 
single-celled organisms or multicellular organisms without significant 
differentiation of cells, like bacteria and archaea, will have greater sur-
vival ability and adapt more easily to major environmental changes. For 
his proper survival plan, the partner species of man should therefore be 
able to quickly adapt and possibly exist in a dormant state that can be 
reactivated, for instance in endospore or cyst form, which will be capable 
of withstanding extreme environmental conditions. The authors propose 
a reproductive cycle in which a diploid body of algae uses mitosis to 
produce a homospore, intended to become a fully formed human being. 
Through meiosis, which takes place in the human genitals, haploid gam-
etes are produced. After fertilization, the zygote becomes a cyst. This will 
preserve the semi-dormant state which can be reactivated in a complex 
life cycle, from which it can develop into algae under desired conditions. 
As the authors note, the biggest challenge is to ensure the biological en-
vironment that would support human development. For this purpose it 
would be possible to make a uterus from the parental algae, which would 
share nutrients with humans. 
Robertina Šebjanič and Špela Petrič understand that this concept rep-
resents a stepping away from ethical principles, which makes their project 
radical. Nevertheless, with the current programme of genetic engineering 
and synthetic biology – both deal with genetic programming – we are 
homing in on the concept of modifying the human genome. Here the 
management policy of this programme is focused precisely on improving 
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the qualities that will lead to greater resistance to disease and other death 
threats, which ultimately means the prolongation of the life of the indi-
vidual, thereby also the prolongation of the active period of the population, 
and not least, the improvement of survival abilities in an environment that 
endangers the species. The project thus touches upon the necessities of the 
human species to survive as a species. At this point the humalga plan meets 
the plan to send man into space, which actually represents the coloniza-
tion of new environments. With the expansion of humans into space, the 
question of the qualities of this migratory species re-pose themselves. The 
human being is a unique species within the bios dimension, which means 
the management of life. Bios, the politics of life, here encounters technē – 
cunningness of the mind to cheat nature and make it subordinate to itself 
for its own benefit. How should we then in contemporary times understand 
what it means to be human? It is precisely with technē that man interferes 
in his own ‘nature’, and not with his knowledge – technology, which has 
been called biotechnology. The aspiration to improve the qualities of the 
human species is present precisely in the essence of what we consider 
as our identity, as the human identity: it is part of our culture. The term 
biotechnology expresses exactly that – technē bios – the controlling and 
designing of life, ultimate engineering.
The Renaissance started its programme to gain understanding of man, 
which has not seen its end up till today, yet ever new dimensions of this 
same research continue to open up. But something has become apparent 
in all this: man strives for knowledge, by mapping and organizing it, so 
that we can use it to manipulate, function actively, exercise our dominion 
over the world. Subjugation, invasiveness, exploitation and optimization 
of the conquered are inherent to the tendency itself to discover, explore, 
gain knowledge, to understand. Knowledge exists for technē. But in all 
the vanity of the human species about its extraordinariness, all its unsur-
passable skills and intellectual prowess, even divinity, as confirmed by the 
Greek – and later the Renaissance, followed by the modern – tradition of 
thought, it nevertheless seems at the end that we are merely one of the 
species striving for its own survival, in which we do not stand as much 
chance as many other species.
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Jos de Mul
The (Bio)Technological Sublime
If the concept of the sublime had previously been used 
to articulate the inadequacy that the human subject felt 
upon trying to represent Nature, the postmodern con-
dition – in which Nature itself has been effaced – has 
produced a sense of the sublime in which humans find 
themselves up against their own creations.
Dale Chapman
Introduction
Since its emergence as a specific discipline within philosophy in the middle 
of the eighteenth century,1 the history of aesthetics shows two remarkable 
tendencies, reflecting specific developments within (post)modern art and 
culture as a whole. On the one hand, the development of aesthetics is char-
acterized by an impressive differentiation and multiplication of aesthetic 
categories. Whereas early aesthetics was predominantly focused on the 
category of beauty, since the beginning of the nineteenth century until 
now a wide range of new aesthetic concepts have emerged, such as the 
sublime, the ironic, the comic, the absurd, and the banal. Without doubt 
this development reflects developments in modern art itself, which has 
restlessly expanded the domain of aesthetic experience and expression. 
The fine arts became the no-longer-fine-arts.
The second tendency has also to do with another type of expansion 
which characterizes modern aesthetics. At least since the Romantic Move-
ment there is a tendency to comprehend aesthetic experience as a, and 
sometimes even the fundamental type of human experience. Here again, 
the history of modern art has played a crucial role in this development. 
Following the revolutionary spirit of the early-romantic movements, the 
artistic avant-gardes of the twentieth century aimed at a fundamental 
“aesthetization” of the world and at a transformation of human life into 
a work of art2. In this way the no-longer-fine-arts ultimately became no-
longer-artistic-arts. This implies for aesthetics that everything becomes 
an object for aesthetic interpretation. The domain of aesthetics is no 
longer restricted to the aesthetic dimension of nature (“natural beauty”) 
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and specific cultural artifacts (“artistic beauty”), but covers the world 
and human life as a whole.
In this contribution I want to investigate a phenomenon that is located at 
the crossroad of these two tendencies: the technological sublime. Although 
the category of the sublime has a long history, it became a dominant concept 
in nineteenth and twentieth-century aesthetics. In (post)modern culture 
however, we witness a fundamental transformation of the experience of 
the sublime. Although originally the concept of the sublime predominantly 
referred to a specific rhetoric effect, in the nineteenth century the sublime 
became strongly connected with the artistic representation of overwhelm-
ing phenomena in nature. I will argue that in the course of the 20th cen-
tury, the sublime increasingly becomes entangled with the experience of 
technology. At first, we seem to witness here a return of the sublime from 
nature to technology, even though the point of departure was an alpha-
technology (rhetoric), whereas the return concerns the domain of beta-
technologies, such as nuclear physics and information technology. In the 
age of biotechnologies (such as genetic modification and synthetic biology), 
however, the sublime seems to regain a natural dimension. Mediated by 
biotechnologies nature becomes a “second” or “next nature”: “With our 
attempts to cultivate nature, humankind causes the rising of a next nature, 
which is wild and unpredictable as ever. Wild systems, genetic surprises, 
autonomous machinery and splendidly beautiful black flowers. Nature 
changes along with us.”3 As such, next nature provides a specific, so far 
unknown experience of the sublime: the technological sublime. 
Before investigating the technological sublime in more detail, I will 
give a concise overview of the history of the concept of the sublime This 
will enable us to demarcate both the continuity and discontinuity of the 
technological sublime.
The classical sublime
When we call a landscape or a piece of art “sublime,” we express the fact 
that it evokes particular beauty or excellence. Note that the “sublime” is not 
only an aesthetic characterization; a moral action of high standing or an 
unparalleled goal in a soccer game may also be called “sublime.” Roughly 
speaking, the sublime is something that exceeds the ordinary. This aspect 
of its meaning is expressed aptly in the German word for the sublime: 
das Erhabene (the “exalted”). In the latter term we also hear echoes of the 
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religious connotation of the concept. The sublime confronts us with that 
which exceeds our very understanding.
As already noticed, the notion of the sublime goes back a long way. The 
word ‘sublime’ first appears in Middle English in the 14th century. It was 
probably derived from the Middle French “sublimer”, which has its root in 
the Medieval Latin sublimare (to refine) and, further back in time, in the 
Latin sublimis (high up in the air). Used more figuratively as an adjective, 
it means “lofty” or “grand.”4 One of the oldest essays on the sublime dates 
back to the beginning of our calendar. It is a manuscript in Greek entitled 
Περ ψους (On the Sublime), long ascribed to Longinus, though probably 
incorrectly so. In this treatise, the author does not provide a definition for 
‘the sublime,’ and some classicists even doubt whether ‘the sublime’ is even 
the correct translation of the Greek word used – ψους.5 Using a number 
of quotes from classical literature, the author discusses fortunate and less 
fortunate examples of the artistic evocation of the sublime. For one, the 
sublime must address grand and important subjects and be associated 
with powerful emotions. For (pseudo)Longinus, the sublime landscape 
even touches upon the divine. Nature “has implanted in our souls an 
unconquerable passion for all that is great and for all that is more divine 
than ourselves.”6 
The early-modern sublime 
Longinus’ essay was hardly noticed by his contemporaries and, in the 
centuries that followed, we rarely find references to this text. The essay was 
printed for the first time as late as 1554 in Basel. But only after the French 
translation by Boileau (1674) and the English translation by Smith (1739) 
did the text begin its victory march through European cultural history. 
From the Baroque period onward, which culminated in Romanticism, the 
sublime grew to become the central aesthetic concept, at which time it was 
often associated with the experience of nature. In the eighteenth century, 
for example, we find it predominantly in the descriptions of nature of 
a number of British authors, portrayals of their impressions collected on 
Grand Tours through Europe and the Alps (a common practice in those 
days among young people from prosperous families). These authors use 
the term to render the often fear-inducing immensity of the mountain 
landscape in words. The landscape gives them, as John Dennis already puts 
it in his 1639 Miscellanies, “a pleasure mingled with Horrours.”7 
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Basically, in early modernity the sublime refers to the wild, unbounded 
grandeur of nature, which is thus contrasted starkly with the more harmo-
nious experience of beauty. In A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1756), Edmund Burke defines the 
sublime as a “delightful terror.”8 That the forces of nature may nevertheless 
leave the viewer in a state of ecstasy is connected with the fact that the 
viewer observes these forces from a safe distance.
The romantic sublime
In German Romanticism, however, the sublime loses its innocent character. 
The work of Immanuel Kant has been of particular critical importance in 
this respect. In his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment, 1790), 
Kant, following Burke, makes an explicit distinction between the beautiful 
(das Schöne) and the sublime (das Erhabene). Beautiful are those things 
that give us a pleasant feeling. They fill us with desire because they seem 
to confirm our hope that we are living in a harmonious and purposeful 
world. A beautiful sunrise, for instance, gives us the impression that life 
is not that bad, really. The sublime, on the other hand, is connected with 
experiences that upset our hopes for harmony. It is evoked by things that 
surpass our understanding and our imagination due to their unbounded, 
excessive, or chaotic character.9 Moreover, the sublime cannot be expressed 
in a (necessarily limited) sensuous form:
For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any 
sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, although no 
adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into 
the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous pres-
entation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called sublime. 
Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one’s mind in advance with 
a rich stock of ideas, if such an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feel-
ing which is itself sublime-sublime because the mind has been incited to 
abandon sensibility and employ itself upon ideas involving higher finality.10 
Kant makes a further distinction between the mathematical sublime 
and the dynamic sublime. The first, the mathematical sublime, is evoked 
by that which is immeasurable and colossal, and pertains to the idea of 
infinitude. When we view the immensity of a mountain landscape or look 
up at the vast night sky, we are overcome by a realization of our insig-
nificance and finitude. Kant associates the second, the dynamic sublime, 
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with the superior forces of nature. The examples he uses include volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes and turbulent oceans. Again, these phenomena 
are not sublime as such, but they might evoke the sublime in us. Just as in 
the case of the mathematical sublime, we experience our insignificance 
and finitude, but in these cases this understanding is supplemented by the 
realization that we could be destroyed by the devastating power of these 
forces of nature. Kant calls the dynamic sublime “ungeheuer”, which we 
could translate as “enormous” or “monstruous”: it evokes both awe and 
fear. It induces a “negative lust”11 in which attraction and repulsion melt 
into one ambiguous experience. 
Since the sublime, in spite of its moral connotations, remains primarily 
an aesthetic category in Kant’s work, he maintains the idea that “safe dis-
tance” characterizes the experience of the sublime. When viewing a paint-
ing of a turbulent storm at sea, one can contemplate the superior force of 
nature while remaining comfortably assured that one is safely in a museum 
and not at the stormy sea depicted! Friedrich Schiller, in contrast, takes 
things one step further and “liberates” the sublime from the safe cocoon 
of aesthetic experience. The political terror under Jacobin rule following 
the French Revolution had deeply impressed him and shaped his view of 
the sublime, as elaborated in a series of essays.
In order to accomplish this liberation, Schiller rephrases Kant’s dis-
tinction between the mathematical sublime and the dynamic sublime. In 
a 1793 text called Vom Erhabenen (Of the Sublime), Schiller argues that 
the mathematical sublime ought to be labeled the theoretical sublime. The 
immeasurable magnitude of the high mountains and the night sky evoke 
in us a purely reflexive observation of infinitude. When nature shows 
itself to be a destructive force, on the other hand, we experience a practi-
cal sublime, which affects us directly in our instinct for self-preservation. 
Still, in Schiller’s view, we need to make yet another distinction. When 
we view life-threatening forces from a safe distance – for instance, by 
observing a storm at sea from a safe place on land – we might experience 
the grandeur of the storm, but not its sublime character. An experience 
can only be truly sublime when our lives are actually endangered by the 
superior forces of nature.
And yet, for Schiller, even that is not enough. Human beings have an 
understandable urge to shield themselves both physically and morally 
from the superior forces of nature. Dutchmen who protect their country 
by building dykes attempts to gain “physical certainty” over the violence 
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of a westerly gale; those who believe their soul will live on in heaven after 
death protect themselves by means of “moral certainty.” Whoever truly 
manages to conquer his fear of the sea, or of death, shows his grandness, 
but loses the experience of the sublime. According to Schiller, truly sub-
lime is he who collapses in a glorious battle against the superior powers of 
nature or military violence: “One can show oneself to be great in times of 
good fortune, but one only can be sublime in times of bad fortune” (“Groß 
kann man sich im Glück, erhaben nur im Unglück zeigen.”12) Schiller’s 
work transforms the sublime from an ambiguous aesthetic category into 
a no less ambiguous category of life.
The technological sublime
History doesn’t stop, however. Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the main site for the ambiguous experience of the sublime has gradually 
shifted from nature to technology. Our current period is viewed as the age 
of secularization. God is retreating from nature and nature is gradually 
becoming “disenchanted” (entzaubert ) in the process. Nature no longer 
implants in us, as was the case in Longinus’s time, “an unconquerable 
passion for all that is great and for all that is more divine than ourselves,” 
but invites technical action and control. Divine rule has become the work 
of man. The power of divine nature has been transferred to the power of 
human technology. In a sense, the sublime now returns to what it was in 
Longinus’s work: a form of human technè. However, these days it no longer 
falls into the category of the alpha-technologies, such as rhetoric, but rather, 
we find ourselves on the brink of the age of sublime beta-technologies. 
Modern man is less and less willing to be overpowered by nature; instead, 
he vigorously takes technological command of nature.
Today the human impact on our planet can hardly be underestimated. Cli-
mate change, population explosion, genetic manipulation, digital networks, 
plastics islands floating in the oceans. Untouched old nature is almost 
nowhere to be found. “We were here”, is written all over. We are living in 
a time of rainbow tulips, palm-shaped islands, hurricane control and engi-
neered microbes. An age in which the “made” and the “born” are fusing.13 
As David Nye has documented in great detail in his book, American 
Technological Sublime (1994), modern Americans initially embraced the 
technological sublime with as much enthusiasm as they had embraced 
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the natural sublime. The admiration of the natural sublime, as it might 
be experienced in the Grand Canyon, was replaced by the sublime of the 
factory, the sublime of the skyscraper and the metropolis, the sublime of 
aviation and auto-mobility, and the sublime of war machinery. Talking 
about the electrical sublime he claims that 
the electrified landscape’s meaning lays precisely in the fact that it seemed to 
go beyond any known codification, becoming unutterable and ungraspable 
in its extent and complexity. […] The city as a whole seemed a jumble of 
layers, angles, and impossible proportions; it had become a vibrating, inde-
terminate text that tantalized the eyes and yielded to no definitive reading.14 
Of all the technologies the computer in particular discloses a whole new 
range of sublime experiences. In order to understand the nature of the 
sublimity of information and communication technologies, we should first 
of all realize that the crucial element of every computer program is some 
sort of database. In a basic sense, the word “database” may refer to any 
collection of items that is ordered in one way or another, be it a bookshelf 
with a collection of alphabetically ordered books or a card index box with 
a series of cards with names, addresses and telephone numbers. In com-
puting, too, a database is a structured collection of data records. However, 
in this case the records are stored in computer memory, so that a software 
program can consult it to answer queries. With the help of the four basic 
operations of the database – the ABCD of computing: Add, Browse, Change, 
and Destroy – in principle all possible combinations of data can be created. 
Database ontology is dynamic because the growing number of elements is 
constantly combined, decombined, and recombined.15 
Database applications virtually span the entire range of computer soft-
ware, ranging from mainframe databases for administrative purposes 
and multimedia encyclopedias on the internet, to search engines, wikis 
and other Web 2.0 applications. In a world in which the computer has 
become the dominant technology, everything – genes, books, organiza-
tions – becomes a relational database. Databases transform everything 
into a collection of (re)combinatory elements. In this sense databases 
have become the dominant “cultural form” of our age.16 Computers are 
“ontological machines” that shape both our world and our worldview. As 
such, the database also transforms the sublime, as well as our experience 
of the sublime (cf. 2007). 
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Theoretical and practical sublimity in the computer age
Keeping Kant’s distinction between the mathematical and the dynami-
cal sublime in mind, we might also distinguish between mathematical 
and dynamical sublimity in computer technologies. The mathematical 
sublime in computing manifests itself as a combinatorial explosion. As 
Borges has shown in The Library of Babel (1941), the number of possible 
combinations of a finite number of elements – in his story, the twenty-five 
orthographic symbols of the alphabet – is mind-boggling.17 The ”protago-
nist” in Borges’ story is a Library, consisting of a huge collection of books, 
each book contains four hundred ten pages; each page, forty lines, each 
line, eighty black letters. This means that each book contains 1,312,000 
symbols. The narrator tells us that the Library is “total” (perfect, complete 
and whole), because the bookshelves contain all possible combinations of 
the twenty-five available symbols. This makes the number of books in the 
library hyper-astronomical, as it contains no less than 251,312,000 books. The 
number of atoms in the universe (estimated by physicists to be roughly 1080) 
is negligible compared to the unimaginable number of possible (re)combi-
nations in Borges ”Database of Babel.” Already the collection consisting of 
one single book, together with all of the copies of this book showing one 
to twelve misprints, is bigger than the number of atoms in the universe.18 
Not only the number of books mathematical sublime, but also the con-
tents of the books, as they contain “all that is able to be expressed, in every 
language”. The narrator gives us a fascinating insight in the contents of 
those books:
All-the detailed history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, 
the faithful catalog of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogs, 
the proof of the falsity of those catalogs, a proof of the falsity of the true 
catalog, the gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon the gospel, 
the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your 
death, the translation of every book into every language, the interpolations 
of every book into all the books, the treatise Bede could have written (but 
did not) on the mythology of the Saxon people, the lost books of Tacitus.19 
In the case of Borges’ Library of Babel, we can still comfort ourselves 
with the idea that this story is part of his Collected Fictions. After all, the 
Library of Babel is only a product of artistic imagination. However, in 
the domain of biotechnologies we confront databases that are even more 
astonishing, both in magnitude and in scope. If we take into account that 
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the human genome alone consists of roughly three billion nucleotides, 
written in a four-letter language; we realize that the number of possible 
(re)combinations (43,000,000,000) of the human genome is even more sublime 
than the number of books in Borges’ Library. 
Besides the magnitude of combinations, the database containing the 
human gene pool differs from many other databases in yet another respect. 
Although dazzling because of the unimaginable numbers of combinations, 
the information age version of the mathematical sublime is, to use Schil-
ler’s distinction, still only theoretical. However, the impact of databases 
is not restricted to the world of computing. Databases often function as 
material metaphors. This happens when they evoke acts in the material 
world.20 Examples of this are databases implemented in industrial robots, 
enabling mass customization (e.g. “build to order” cars). But this is also 
true for biotechnological databases used for genetic engineering. Here we 
enter the domain of the practical dimension of the technological sublime. 
By actively recombining the elements of the database in the real world, 
by genetic manipulation or synthetic biology – building organisms from 
scratch using “biobricks”, for example – we unleash awesome powers and, 
in so doing, transform the dynamic sublime in a fundamental way.21 
In our (post)modern world it is no longer the superior forces of nature 
that calls forth the experience of the sublime, but rather, the superior forces 
of technology. With the transfer of power from divine nature to human tech-
nology, the ambiguous experience of the sublime also nests in the latter. In 
the era of converging technologies – information technology, biotechnology, 
nanotechnology and the neurosciences – it is technology itself that gains an 
ungeheuer character in its battle with nature. Without doubt these technolo-
gies have increased our power over nature enourmously. However, this does 
not mean that we have become gods in the sense that we have gained control 
over our own destiny. Rather, our relation with nature is changing:
Where technology and nature are traditionally seen as opposed to each 
other, they now appear to merge or even trade places. While old nature, in 
the sense of trees, plants, animals, atoms, or climate, is increasingly con-
trolled and governed by man – it is turned into a cultural category –, our 
technological environment becomes so complex and uncontrollable, that 
we start to relate to it as a nature of its own.22 
While technology is an expression of the grandeur of the human intellect, 
we also increasingly experience it as a force that controls and threatens us. 
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Technologies such as atomic power station and genetic modification, to 
mention just two paradigmatic examples, are Janus-faced: they reflect, at 
once, our hope for the benefits they may bring as well as our fear of their 
uncontrollable, destructive potentials.
At first sight it seems that in these cases technology completely controls 
and conquers nature.23 However, in the fast growing domain of the bio-
technologies (which will probably become as important in the twenty-first 
century as the physical sciences were in the twentieth century), we witness 
a remarkable revenge of nature within technology. After all, technologies 
like genetic modification and synthetic biology create entities that are no 
longer passive, manipulatable innate elements, but have, and will increas-
ingly have, their “own agenda”. 
Next nature
In fact, in this domain of ‘next nature’ we witness the vanishing of the very 
opposition of nature and technology. A striking example of this develop-
ment is GFP Bunny, created by the Brazilian artist Eduard Kac in 2000 
(see illustration 1 and 2). Kac commissioned the ‘transgenic’ bunny from 
a French lab, where scientists injected green fluorescent protein (GFP) 
of a Pacific jellyfish into the egg of an Albino rabbit. This is how the artist 
describes his experiment:
My transgenic artwork GFP Bunny comprises the creation of a green fluo-
rescent rabbit, the public dialogue generated by the project, and the social 
integration of the rabbit. […] GFP Bunny was realized in 2000 and first 
presented publicly in Avignon, France. Transgenic art, I proposed elsewhere, 
is a new art form based on the use of genetic engineering to transfer natural 
or synthetic genes to an organism, to create unique living beings. This must 
be done with great care, with acknowledgment of the complex issues thus 
raised and, above all, with a commitment to respect, nurture, and love the 
life thus created.24 
In spite of Kac’s emphasis on ”great care”, his experiment has lead to 
heated debates about the tolerability of such works of art. However, besides 
ethical objections Kac’s GFP Bunny raises the question whether this “work” 
can be called a work of art at all. Perhaps it rather belongs to the domain 
of nature or to the domain of technology. But probably it belongs to all 
three domains at once: art, nature, and technology. With regard to “next 
nature” we can no longer distinguish sharply between these three domains. 
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Although in a different manner than envisioned by the historical avant-
gardes, Kac’s Alba fluo rabbit seems to realize their dream to transform 
life itself into a work of art. 
Conclusion
According to David Nye, this explains why enthusiasm for the technological 
sublime has transformed into fear in the course of the twentieth century. 
This is also why it is often said, in relation to aforementioned sublime 
technologies, that we “shouldn’t play God.” At the same time, twenty-first 
century man has been denied the choice to not be technological. The bio-
tope in which we used to live has been transformed, in this (post)modern 
age, into a technotope. We have created technological environments and 
structures beyond which we cannot survive. The idea that we could return 
to nature and natural religion is an unworldly illusion. In fact, because of 
its Janus-faced powers, “living technology” itself has become the sublime 
god of our (post)modern age. Assessments regarding the fundamental 
transformation from the natural to the technological sublime may vary; 
however, no one can deny that technology is a no less inexhaustible god.
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Melentie Pandilovski
Toxicity at the Equidistance of Biotechnology 
and Biopolitics
The idea of Toxicity, in its theoretical and practical results, entrenches itself 
into the standard phenomenological understanding of the co-constitution 
of society and technology. The cultural deciphering of the toxic social ter-
rain resonates with current socio-economic global transformations. The 
topic of toxicity reconstructs not only the current environmental situation, 
but also sociopolitical contexts by looking into modes of contemporary 
cultural and technological production, the extraction of minerals, toxic 
waste, local and international policies, community-based responses and 
processes of production, consumption and disposal.
We are continually subjected to processes whose full impact is hard to 
comprehend; the phenomenological approach allows us to reveal these 
processes. For the phenomenologist, technology is a condition of society. 
For Heidegger, technology is not just an artifact but already emerges from 
a prior technological attitude towards the world. He claimed that, “[w]hen 
we are seeking the essence of ‘tree,’ we have to become aware that that which 
pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered 
among all other trees. … Likewise, the essence of technology is by no 
means anything technological.”1Another important point made by Hei-
degger is the distinction between Object (Gegenstand) and Thing (Dinge). 
This is not merely word play but a paradigm shift in which the integrity of 
Aristotelian substance is broken down, as das Dinge has encoded in it the 
possibility of gathering together the contents of the universe. This position 
results in a profound change, as basically Aristotle’s belief that relations 
among objects leaves the essences of those objects unchanged can no longer 
be applied. The relations between Things becomes crucial; Things have 
different features according to where they are situated and the context in 
226  Melentie Pandilovski
which they are placed. Heidegger identifies Plato’s articulation of technē as 
the foundation upon which contemporary technology builds. According 
to Heidegger, technology is the extreme danger that “threatens man with 
the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original 
revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth”. Yet, on 
the other hand, technology also holds within it a saving power in order 
to recapture the essence of science; according to Heidegger, the essential 
unfolding of technology “harbours in itself what we least suspect, the pos-
sible arising of the saving power”. This creates for us the paradoxical situa-
tion where technē represents the beginning and the end, an overwhelming 
threat to human existence as well as its salvation.2
In some respects, Heidegger’s position on art resembles McLuhan’s as 
they both believe in art’s saving power. Heidegger called for the “second 
beginning of thinking” and the meeting of the world in historical time-
space; this space can only be built by art. McLuhan claimed that it is the 
artist, rather than the scientist, who has the insight to perceive these rela-
tionships and foresee trends, as it is “inherent in the artist’s creative inspi-
ration… [to be] subliminally sniffing environmental change” (McLuhan 
[c] 237). After all, he claimed that “art at its most significant is a Distant 
Early warning System that can always be relied on to tell the old culture 
what is beginning to happen to it.” “The artist,” according to McLuhan, “has 
had the power – and courage – of the seer to read the language of the outer 
world and relate it to the inner world. … It’s always been the artist who 
perceives the alterations in man caused by a new medium, who recognizes 
that the future is present, and uses the work to prepare the ground for it” 
([c] 237). To summarize: “[t]he artist is the person who invents the means 
to bridge between biological inheritance and the environments created by 
technological innovation” (McLuhan [b] 98).
The Heideggerian Dinge (Thing) contains within itself the possibility of 
gathering together the contents of the universe, toxins included. Relations 
between Things become crucial, acquiring different features depending on 
the contexts of where and how they are situated. The discourses of biotech-
nology are evolving, showing us that their latest theoretical and practical 
developments have a potential to cause a tectonic shift in our society and 
culture, wherein we experience the world at the intersection of the engi-
neered and the biological. Toxicity appears precisely at this intersection, and 
its biopolitical modes must be understood. Marshall McLuhan noted that 
the creation of the technological world has created a neural exoskeleton3. 
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I maintain that this skeleton has become tainted by Toxicity in numerous 
ways, from the bioenvironmental to the info-financial. 
The extended role of biopolitics today focuses on the crucial question 
of how biotechnology shapes life and comes to assume a central role in 
society. Biotechnology, through its complexity, radically reconstructs the 
relations between politics and nature, allowing for a reassessment of how 
we look at life today. Under biotechnological pressures, the regulation of 
life cannot continue under the premises of what had been previously taken 
for granted. The dualities of power and right, sovereignty and law, do not 
leave biopolitics for a minute. Additionally, biotechnology generates its 
own internal conflicts (e.g. Monstanto vs. Dupont in regard to GMO seed 
patenting.) We become witnesses of a process in which the state control of 
the biological is increasingly being ceded to biotech companies. In Michel 
Foucault’s words: “For capitalist society it is the biological that is important 
before everything else; the biological, the somatic, the corporeal. The body 
is a biopolitical reality, medicine is a biopolitical strategy.”4
Life, politics and economics intersect at such speeds in the globally con-
nected society that a novel biopolitical model is emerging, which alter this 
society’s operational functions. I refer here to the social and political functions 
of the Biotech Revolution. The technological and psychosomatic constitute 
the two poles in this emerging biopolitical discourse. At the centre of this 
discourse is the notion that life can now be molded as we see fit, enabled by 
biotechnology. Biopolitics is therefore able to control life by taking it out of the 
natural domain, reshuffling it at will and subsequently using it in a functional 
or structural form, thereby freeing life from nature. This intertwining of nature 
and technology makes the schematic of biopolitics increasingly complex. The 
question of articulating sovereignty no longer depends on the suppression of 
life; our understanding of life and death has altered. Biopower, embedded in 
biopolitics, now concerns itself with the mere reshuffling of biological units 
of data. We have moved a step closer to the fulfillment of Foucault’s prophesy 
about the extension of biopower: “the excess of biopower appears when it 
becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only to manage 
life but also to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, 
and ultimately to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally 
destructive. This formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was saying 
about atomic power, will put it beyond human sovereignty.”5 Thus, we have 
effectively banned experiments with plutonium, but we continue to be quite 
liberal with the experimentation, research and use of biotechnology.
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In order to contemplate fully the notions of life, flesh and the body, we 
must now surpass the Heideggerian dichotomy between existence and 
life. We are witnesses and participants in the creation of the Biopoliti-
cal Apparatus in all of its paraphernalia. And when we speak about this 
Apparatus, we should remind ourselves of Vilém Flusser’s6 remark that 
apparatuses are based on technical and political programs that are highly 
ideological and always biased. There is no value-free technology7. And 
indeed, we can see that biopolitical conflicts are accelerating in both the 
real and virtual worlds among governments, NGOs and corporations 
over genetic-technological practices, stem cell research, bioethics and 
bio-patenting. Public engagement in biotechnology can be seen in the 
increasing interest in DNA profiling, personal genomics, bio-data gath-
ering and, most recently, genetic social networking. One of the possible 
outcomes of this arrangement is the creation of a genetically based value 
system. Another outcome may be the development of appealing forms of 
neo-eugenics and the creation of new utopian communities. Biology has 
a long history of being politicized, but we must admit that the biotechno-
logical changes in the past two decades are indeed profound. Historically, 
all technological revolutions have resulted in an alteration of the political, 
social and economic spectrums of society. We find ourselves as a society 
facing radical changes in power relationships in the local and international 
domains. This biopolitical shift registers at the economic (bio-capitalism) 
and cultural (bio-culture, bio-art) levels. This shift, generated by the 
Biotech Revolution, configures the biological as political and economic. 
The biological as political includes notions of human rights, the changing 
and increasingly toxified environment and bioterrorism. The biological 
as economic sees bio-capitalism as the latest stage of capital’s develop-
ment, but also discloses a certain negation of profit-oriented values and 
the necessity of growth, thereby holding an ambivalent ethical position 
regarding capitalist production values. 
As contemporary biopolitical discourses intersect in the re-contextu-
alization of the relations between state apparatuses, scientific protocols 
and cultural systems, the consequences of the Biotech Revolution become 
apparent in the political and economic spectrum. These relations coalesce 
in the construction of a global Biopolitical Apparatus, encompassing new 
vectors of power with regard to social, political, economic and administra-
tive mechanisms, as well as knowledge structures which have the capacity 
to create, maintain or destroy contemporary society. Biotechnology thus 
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enables a certain neo-politicization by putting into motion control mecha-
nisms based on a coding system, altering the dynamics between state and 
individual and resulting in an increasingly programmable and disciplined 
society. This up and coming Biotech era has the potential of inaugurating 
a very different constellation of political visions and social visions just as 
the Industrial era did. The current debate over cloning human embryos 
and stem cell research marks the beginning of the new biopolitics.
Félix Guattari taxonomizes the apparatuses of subjectification in three 
ways: as pathways of power, pathways of knowledge and pathways of self-
transformation.8 The relations between these three pathways determines 
how society is established and whether the Biotech Revolution will create 
the conditions for new existential territories for humanity, rather than 
replicate and continue present alienation systems. I am of the opinion that 
in order for the pathways of self-transformation to influence the pathways 
of knowledge and power, we will have to embrace collectively the idea of 
biopolitical and biotechnological responsibility, which will assist us in further 
developing the governmentality of bio-society according to the theoretical 
and practical pathways of self-transformation.
The overall implications of technology are exemplified in the everyday 
relations that technology establishes. The disclosure of the world through 
technology also is a disguise of these relations, relations that can, however, 
be unconcealed. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger noted 
that the essential unfolding of technology harbours within itself what is 
least expected, the possible rise of a saving power. Where does this saving 
power of technology reside? Will salvation be found in art and activism, 
that is, strategies of resistance?9 Perhaps the Biotech Age will allow us to 
witness what Heidegger called “the second beginning of thinking,” the 
meeting of the world in historical time-space, and perhaps this space can 
be built only by art.
At the same time, artistic and cultural research into biotechnology has 
questioned established philosophical systems, ethical beliefs and cultural 
practices by proposing new ways of looking at life and society, as artists, 
critics and theorists navigate the maze of the global Biopolitical Apparatus. 
How art and technology interrelate, how this interrelation changes in the 
cultural, sociopolitical and ecological landscape and how biotechnology 
infiltrates into everyday life are important research areas. Artistic respons-
es have included examining biopolitical conflicts in the real and virtual 
worlds; pollution; corporeality and somatic biopolitics; energy control, 
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fuel material and alternative energy sources; the inheritance and program-
mability of life; the causes and consequences of environmental changes; 
environmental sustainability; micro and macro-ecologies; life, empathy 
and questions of ownership; GM products; death and appearance; and 
the ethical implications of working with biological media in an art context.
Practical strategies of resistance such as these need to address structures 
of knowledge in order to achieve broader ethical and philosophical con-
cerns concerning biotechnology; they must also look into what Heidegger 
would have called the Biotechnological Gestell (Enframing) of everyday 
life and address the changes that Toxicity causes in the cultural, sociopo-
litical and ecological landscape. Of course, those concerned with Toxicity 
must be aware that this Enframing has infiltrated deeply into the system, 
aided by lobby groups mediating between the biotech cartels and various 
governments. Any potential resistance must engage in a robust imposition 
into mass media channels and make periodic feedback analysis to assess 
its progress. Phenomenology’s meta-social function is necessary for this. 
In particular, an analysis of the natural attitude must be implemented. The 
phenomenological investigation of the biotechnological must look into the 
elements of reflexive interplay between the biotech programmers’ standards 
(content development) and the lifeworlds of actual people – the interplay in 
which new identities are forged. After all, Heidegger tells us that Enframing 
is destining from which the essence of all history is determined. Enframing 
is the essence of modern technology because, for Heidegger, technology is 
rooted in tēchne: it is a means for sourcing true forms and ideas that exist 
prior to their phenomenal appearance. Heidegger’s concept of Enframing 
can be deciphered today by using Eugene Thacker’s triumvirate of encoding, 
recoding and decoding, as today the dissemination of biological data through 
information networks either on demand or out of necessity creates a new 
situation in which the biological is seen as a digitally packaged commodity.10
In conclusion, in order to track the changes brought about by the Biotech 
Revolution, we must utilize both phenomenology and biopolitics. Phenom-
enologically speaking, the social order and reality of interactions between 
institutions and individuals are constructions. Society is a fragile construc-
tion. It is consciousness that determines the actions of all entities. There is no 
alternative but creativity in this process, and therefore human beings must 
act as creative agents in the construction of their social worlds. It is neces-
sary to assert meaning in a process, which would otherwise seem chaotic.
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As far as biopolitics is concerned, the biotechnological changes that our 
civilization is witnessing are profound, and as all technological revolutions 
throughout history have resulted in significant changes in the political, so-
cial and economic levels of society, so we find ourselves collectively facing 
radical alterations in local and international power relations. Thus, we are 
in a different situation than the one predicted by Foucault, as biopolitics 
today begins to realize that biotechnology potentially allows for a further 
emancipation of the human being in terms of its self-understanding, its 
own genetic make-up, all of its flaws and virtues. The constant advances 
in biotechnology, and we can note the Human Genome Project as a sign 
of this advancement, signify a shift in the balance of power in favour of 
a society that can select and design desirable life-forms in advance. 
Thacker reminds us that biotechnology takes place on a global level, be 
it in terms of exchanging biological information, controlling epidemics, 
deterring biological attacks or standardizing intellectual property laws. 
Importantly, the Biopolitical Apparatus suggests novel blueprints of power 
allocation in the domain of the governance over life. Thus, any interpre-
tation of biopolitics, in light of these new developments, must take into 
account how biopolitical discourses have changed in terms of the biological 
as political and the biological as economic. This necessitates the articulation 
of Biotechnological Responsibility and the development of Modes of Gov-
ernmentality for Bio-Society. This future bio-society could take upon itself 
a variety of roles including the role of hegemon, and might develop new 
modes for governance, economic domination and the repositioning of our 
relationship towards nature. However, alongside the potentially negative 
consequences of the Biopolitical Apparatus, we must also consider a more 
humane role, indicated by Giorgio Agamben in his What is an Apparatus?,11 
wherein we learn that at the heart of friendship, philosophy and politics 
lies the same experience: the shared sensation of being.
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The Aesthetics of Electronic Worlds
The idea of immateriality was critical to defining cyber-
space as an imaginary place. Because it has been consid-
ered immaterial, it would be free from the constraints 
of the physical world. Therefore, it would be possible to 
create new places and new identities. It would be feasi-
ble to lose one’s material body and still travel around the 
world as a body of information.
Adriana de Souza e Silva, The Invisible Imaginary: 
Museum 
Spaces, Hybrid Reality and Nanotechnology
1. Value as ontological difference: the physical 
vs. the electronic world
My aim is to draw attention to the values, principally aesthetic, which arise 
from the ontological difference between the physical and the electronic. 
This ontological difference can, in itself, be said to have value since it lays 
the foundation for creating different or even new values, especially in the 
electronic sphere. First of all, therefore, a brief explanation of this ontologi-
cal difference and how it affects value is necessary.
A distinction should be made between phenomena occurring in the 
physical world, usually referred to as ‘real’, and those occurring in the 
electronic sphere, which I refer to as electronic reality, and which can also 
be regarded as real. Any conscious and real human activity (as opposed 
to simulation, for example) in the form of an intentional act performed in 
electronic reality – in this case, the creation of a person or an electronic 
world – carries with it the same obligations as activity in the physical world. 
This real human engagement can, for example, comprise uploading spe-
cific content to create one’s own image or space. This must be understood 
in terms of the ontology of the Web since such phenomena involve the 
person to an ever greater degree; they expand to a multiplicity of forms, 
which become increasingly attractive and meaningful, acquiring an aes-
thetic dimension. One can understand electronic reality in terms of the 
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aesthetic values connected with beauty, fantasy, imagination, strangeness, 
and, frequently, ‘otherness’ in relation to forms found in the physical world.
I therefore posit that online phenomena should be seen not as unreal, 
but as electronic forms of existence, real states of being created in the 
electronic world, as a human world transformed, and, finally, as the person 
him/herself.
2. The creative process in electronic reality
What I mean by the aesthetics of electronic reality principally refers to 
electronic worlds created using 3D graphics together with two processes 
occurring within them: the creation of a self and the creation of a world. In 
addition, a number of other components of electronic reality unconnected 
with electronic worlds created using 3D graphics, such as the aesthetic di-
mension of social media sites and the visual features of a personal websites, 
will also be analyzed to some extent. 
The basis for these two processes is not only philosophical but also psy-
chological and cultural. The psychological aspect derives from the need to 
create one’s own image and a place on the Web which can be shared with 
others, but also an environment that provides private, personal space. The 
cultural basis is connected with the fact that today an electronic presence 
is a necessity, which is expressed in the colloquial maxim: If you’re not 
on Google, you don’t exist. The whole point of creation and self-creation 
is to show oneself as a different, more interesting person in a way that 
would normally be impossible in the physical world. The potential of the 
electronic environment is released by the individual’s desire for creative 
engagement, a desire to change or expand oneself and to create a small 
part of the electronic world. 
The ability of developing technologies to satisfy human needs makes it 
a reasonable supposition that we are in the early stages of a process that 
will lead to the creation of electronic space as an alternative sphere of 
existence suffused with human presence. Whether by choice or necessity, 
people are increasingly communicating with each other by means of an 
avatar in a graphic 3D environment or a user profile on a social media site. 
The origins of electronic reality are intimately bound up with technology, 
and it is also technology that offers the individual new opportunities in 
electronic reality: the possibility of assuming different forms and modes 
of existence. 
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For the past three decades, I have been fascinated with the construction 
of identity and how it affects culture: the symbiotic relationship between 
the real and the virtual, and how identity reacts and shifts when processed 
through manipulated time.1
I wish to focus on such phenomena as the experience of the new, which 
allows one to observe changes both in one’s own identity and in the elec-
tronic environment around oneself. It can be seen as a sort of game that 
one plays, principally with oneself, in which one draws out and presents 
to others certain meaningful content which lies within oneself but remains 
concealed in the physical world. An example of this is Facebook, where 
personal stories occasionally appear presenting a picture somewhat at vari-
ance with what is known about an individual in the physical world. Some 
profiles on Facebook reflect how a person would like to see themselves and 
their relationships with others, and how they would like to be perceived, 
both in terms of physical appearance and personal qualities. Despite the 
plethora of websites where such phenomena arise, it is my view that the 
most appropriate environment for creation and self-creation is an electronic 
3D world such as Second Life, where I have been active since 2007. 
3. The person as avatar: who would you like to be here?
Those entering an electronic 3D world normally do so in the form of an ava-
tar, capable of constant transformation. The creation of an avatar involves 
self-creation, which in turn might prompt the asking of certain questions 
as one observes this new representation of oneself and the relationships 
formed by means of it. This is a new kind of experience, a place in which 
you can choose your own identity. 
Self-creation can release the desire for physicalization: the creation of an 
avatar as the fulfillment of how one would ideally wish to look according 
to one’s own aesthetic canon. This might involve gender-switching, which, 
while fundamentally a question of physical appearance, may also reveal 
a need for embodiment in a different gender as part of the communicative 
process. Another possibility offered by self-creation is to take on a fantasy 
form, either as a communicative statement or simply for fun. Below are just 
a few examples of forms used by acquaintances and students at Academia 
Electronica-Institute of Philosophy UJ, in Second Life.
Aspects such as appearance, an interest in alternative forms of commu-
nication, and the desire for various kinds of participation may result in 
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fairly deep engagement in the electronic world because they contain values 
which can become so important that one makes the choice to function in 
an electronic community and an electronic world. If this form of being 
brings satisfaction, we will want to choose it and be continually involved 
in it, and it will constantly occupy our thoughts.
One might also compare oneself in both realities and transfer experi-
ences from the electronic to the physical world: for example, outward ap-
pearance in the electronic world can have a positive effect on a person in 
the physical world. This is an aesthetic-social approach to oneself; changing 
one’s appearance in the form of an avatar can change the attitude of others. 
The transformation of a person’s appearance in the electronic world is a very 
particular phenomenon in that once a person undergoes this experience, 
they can expect an immediate evaluation from the online community, 
which may lead to further modifications. This process of change may lead 
to constant experimentation with one’s appearance based on the evaluation 
of others as well as one’s own feelings. The electronic world makes it pos-
sible for changes to be instant, momentary or experimental, but they can 
also initiate other processes which, where possible, extend to the physical 
world. In several cases, I have observed how the kind of transformation 
a person undergoes as a result of their involvement in Second Life can also 
cause a transformation of their “biological avatar” – usually for the better.
There you discover the trendy inhabitants (actors, singers, models, produc-
ers) who look like some new race, a result of successful mutation: unbeliev-
ably beautiful skin and faces; fixed smiles; and bodies whose perfect shapes 
surely can’t be the result of human evolution.2
Now would be an opportune moment to explain what we mean by 
a  person’s aesthetic dimension: how they manage their appearance 
through the often profound creation of an avatar. Even if their self-
creation in the electronic world initially amounts to little more than 
a game, it is quite possible that a person will begin to derive pleasure 
from showing others their electronic form, joining a community of other 
electronic figures, being perceived in this way over a period of time, and 
forming relationships. They could also become so bonded to and identi-
fied with their avatar that losing it could impair their perception of reality 
as generally understood. 
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The spectral body in the virtual realm is kinesthetically linked as well to 
the felt body. That is why a virtual persona can be violated and why there 
is a relation between cyberdeath and psychic annihilation.3
Another aspect is the flow of time. One can form a certain attachment 
to the electronic world because of the possibilities it offers to manipulate 
one’s appearance, for example, to look younger than one’s years. The usual 
practice in the electronic world is not to discuss such matters as who you 
are or where you come from in the physical world: life in electronic reality 
is lived without reference to the physical world. I am reminded of the case 
of a Californian man of advanced years who in Second Life was a young 
man in his early twenties. There he owned a house, sold objects he made 
himself, and had a girlfriend. In our conversations he often remarked that 
thanks to his electronic manifestation and the ideal space he had created for 
himself, life had become so much better. His experiences took place among 
friends in an atmosphere of love; life there was good, at times even better 
than in the physical world. Age had ceased to have any meaning since the 
convention in Second Life is that you are your avatar. For this man, time 
in the electronic world had, in effect, stopped, or even been reversed; in 
the physical world, however, biological processes were taking their course. 
One day, he appeared to have logged into Second Life, but it turned out to 
be his sister. He had passed away the previous night, having given her his 
password so that she could inform us in the event of his death. The time 
he had spent as an avatar in his ideal world had made him very happy in 
his final years – and isn’t that what matters?
4. The immaterial world – where would you like to 
spend your time?
The ontological difference between the electronic and physical world men-
tioned earlier means that one can experience pleasure spending time in 
one’s favorite place in the electronic world. What makes graphic 3D creation 
different from, say, creating a personal website or a profile on a social media 
site is the possibility of creating (within technological limits) a complete 
environment, a world to live in. 
In this sense, a WWW website is two-dimensional. Even if it allows 
some scope for creativity through interactivity, one could not create an 
environment but merely something like a motif: a photograph, a clip of 
music, some graphics or a piece of text. This type of expression generally 
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results from the user’s interest in certain content, making it a kind of passive 
exposure, but not a place, somewhere where one can be constantly logged in. 
Moreover, this kind of information does not require the participation of the 
person themselves; it is, rather, an objectified representation of the person. 
A social media site is more appropriate for daily, extended participation 
(sometimes lasting several hours), enabling the user to upload their own 
content, but it is still not a place, merely an interactive profile; not an all-
encompassing environment, but intriguing nonetheless for its variability 
and potential for acquiring a massive contact base. One might wish to 
follow other users, view pages or be continuously active oneself, reporting 
one’s experiences in the physical world or imaginatively describing how 
life could be. Although social media sites can be very enticing with a high 
degree of immersion, they are mainly about communication, regardless of 
the content. I call this kind of participation active exposure, in which one 
is enveloped by a plethora of information in various forms. 
The situation changes entirely with an avatar, which, through its appear-
ance, behavior and speech, represents a person in their interactions with 
others and with the electronic world. Here one operates in a complete 
world, encounters personal places and communicates with one’s intimates. 
Having entered it, one moves and immerses oneself in the created world 
of electronic space. This is engaged participation, which is no longer about 
uploading content, but being a person; it is about total online involvement 
with one’s own created persona and the environment in which it exists. 
Engaged participation is not about receiving information on the surface 
of the screen, but spending time in electronic space, to which the screen 
is the gateway.
Finally, by “user-created,” we mean that everything within Second Life is 
given form and substance by its Residents. And this is where the SL avatar 
is unique, for in most online worlds, reality is part and parcel a conception 
of the company that created it.4
The most important element in a 3D electronic world is the avatar/person. 
The space here is predominantly personal space, which, in the absence of 
its owner (the avatar) is empty. Here the focus is on the person themselves, 
not just information about the person or merely being in a personal or 
shared place, often with no specific end.
 It should be added that the creative process in a 3D environment can 
give rise to new values that do not exist in the physical world, something I 
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have witnessed several times in different places when wandering through 
Second Life. This is particularly true of places set up as works of art, which 
one can stroll through. I have in mind a place in Second Life called Im-
mersiva, created by Bryn Oh.5 It is an island in Second Life, a place created 
as one enormous work of electronic art. This exquisitely created space, in 
which one can be teleported to different surroundings in different climates, 
makes it possible to experience this work of electronic art in all its variety, 
in terms of structure, traditional concepts of art appreciation (for example, 
atmospheric or romantic visual effect), or the use of graphic animation 
and color. It is also of significance that the forms emerging from electronic 
matter could not exist in the physical world.
It should also be noted that these items created in the electronic world 
are generally of considerable value, particularly to their creators; I am not 
referring to financial value, but the value derived from creating something 
oneself and the feeling of satisfaction and pride this engenders. Anyone 
possessing property such as a garden, building or animal (bot) will want 
to show it to others. I was once involved in a situation in Second Life 
concerning the removal of an area of land which contained items created 
by a number of people. These items were of such value to them that they 
petitioned the Second Life administrators to temporarily reinstate the land 
to allow them to recover their creations, which the administrators agreed to. 
5. The interface as the gateway to another world – 
do you like your computer?
It always amazes me that people transfer so much of their activity to the 
Internet, even in matters important to their professional and personal 
lives. Why do we spend so many hours clicking a mouse? My view is that 
regardless of the possibilities that the Internet offers, there is a need for new 
experiences and some relief from the monotony of life, and the Internet 
offers solutions not previously available. In the physical world, the effort 
most people put into their everyday activities is disproportionately large 
compared with time spent on relaxation, entertainment and their emotional 
lives. Occupation and culture inform the logistics of life to such an extent 
that the default premise is to regard any activity outside work or in some 
way beyond the norm as being difficult to comprehend or make part of our 
lives; life becomes predictable, at times automatic, and difficult to change, 
perhaps because we do not know what or how to change. At this point, the 
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Internet becomes a part of our lives, and with it an interest in other people 
and places. Searching and self-expression become pleasurable, not least 
for their sheer novelty; add to this the ease of access to places created in 
electronic reality and the fact that no special effort is required, merely the 
straightforward use of a computer. Moreover, what happens on the Web 
usually fulfills a genuine need, and emotions expressed and encountered 
there can be very real.
Returning to the ontological difference between electronic and physical 
reality, I would argue that it releases powers of creation and self-creation 
in the individual. Mediation into the electronic world is not like taking 
one’s seat in an auditorium to watch a performance or a film, but, rather, 
having the opportunity to exist in electronic space, and, if one so desires, 
in a way different from in the physical world. I have frequently observed 
expressive avatars in Second Life, looked at profiles on Facebook or taken 
part in forums for PC gamers. I have no doubt that in most cases the 
content involved was different from what these people experienced in the 
physical world; in this way, they were creating part of their everyday life. 
Similarly, the user of a virtual world tries to click on whatever is in front 
of him; if the objects do not respond, he is disappointed. In the virtual 
universe, Descartes’ maxim can be rewritten as follows: “I can be clicked 
on, therefore I exist”.6
Never before have people been able to enrich their lives in the way mod-
ern technology allows. It could even be said that the possibilities of creation 
and self-creation available today are a kind of therapy to counteract the 
flow of time, enabling changes which can bring new opportunities. What 
matters is not that in creating a self and a place in the electronic world 
we function on the same principles as in the physical world, but that we 
see the experience as real and having value. It is a way of comparing and 
creating values and making changes and re-evaluations through which we 
understand the otherness and multifarious forms of the electronic world. 
If new technologies continue to offer increased scope for creation and 
self-creation in the electronic world, our online activity may become more 
significant to us than what we do in the physical world; for some, perhaps, 
it already has.
Translated by Jerzy Freundlich
The Aesthetics of Electronic Worlds 243
Endnotes
1. Lynn Hershman-Leeson, The Raw Data Diet, All-Consuming Bodies, and the Shape 
of Things to Come in Database Aesthetics: Art in the Age of Information Overflow, ed. 
Victoria Vesner, Electronic Mediations, Vol. 20, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007, p. 249.
2. Lev Manovich, The Aesthetics of Virtual Worlds: Report from Los Angeles [1], West 
Hollywood, Los Angeles, 1995, http://manovich.net/TEXT/virt-space.html, accessed 
June 14, 2014.
3. Margaret Morse, Virtualities: Television, Media Art, and Cyberculture, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998, p. 211. 
4. Wagner James Au, The Making of Second Life: Notes from the New World, New York: 
Harper Collins e-books, 2008, p. viii.
5. Bryn Oh’s blog: 
http://brynoh.blogspot.com/2012/01/first-of-all-i-would-like-to-thank.html, 
accessed on June14, 2014. 
Videos on Immersiva: 
Breve visita a  Immersiva, by Bryn Oh: https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=GF9kW7f2ROE, accessed on June 14, 2014.
Immersiva – Bryn Oh: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BanupMBcpRw, accessed 
on June 14, 2014.
Immersiva by Bryn Oh: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4B5DJZVthqY, accessed 
on June 14, 2104. 
6. Lev Manovich, The Aesthetics of Virtual Worlds… 
244  Sidey Myoo
Alice in Wonderland Robot
Dragon
The Aesthetics of Electronic Worlds 245
Architecture in Second Life (Academia Electronica-
Institute of Philosophy UJ)
Piotr Zawojski
The Question Concerning Cyberaesthetics. 
One World – Hybrid Reality*
Referring to Sidey Myoo’s motto – “There is one human and there are two 
worlds”1 – I would like to suggest a different perception of hybrid reality 
in which our doubled or multiplied “self ” in a natural way experiences 
“multiple realities”. 
Cyberaesthetics is not only an aesthetic phenomenon with the prefix: 
“cyber”. Separating a phenomenon of cyberculture sphere from phenomena 
of new media sphere is a mistake. Therefore I try to think about cybercul-
ture and cyberaesthetics in terms of their mutual relations with the world 
of new media. This is integrative and not oppositional thinking. Cyber-
aesthetics is an attempt at describing the way in which new media shape 
and co-create cyberculture. And the latter is expressed in new media art 
(cyberart). Cyberart still needs to be defined. Or, perhaps, if not defined, 
it needs to be constantly re-defined – and this should set the route to 
prolegomena which are the foundation for cyberaesthetics. Only dialogue 
may enable this process. This is why we participate in the dialogue – or pre-
cisely – polylogue panel. Taking into account references to the “philosophy 
of dialogue” is crucial. Dialogue on the web is the basis for the philosophy 
of dialogue, of “interfaceology”, which is an interpretation of “interfacing”.
Web aesthetics (and cyberaesthetics) must be an aesthetics of a multi-
plied dialogue in cyberspace. Of course, the web should be understood 
in the whole complex dimension in which this notion can be understood. 
From the technological, through the human (anthropological) perspective, 
to the cultural and philosophical aspect of networking. Web aesthetics and 
* Text in another version was published under the title Cyberaesthetics – Some Basic Theses 
in “CyberEphaty. Visuall and Media Studies Academic Journal” 2014, no 8.
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aesthetics on the web, the web as a metaphor, but also as a real structure, 
the web as a challenge and as a space to be managed – these are the issues 
which require attention. 
Being netizens – who extensively colonize (and are colonized by) the 
hybrid, yet, at the same time, integral doubled (or rather multidimensional) 
reality – we are responsible for developing a formal language to describe art 
in the era of bio-techno-logical systems. So, let’s create a “web aesthetics” as 
a contemporary version of aesthetics being the first domain of knowledge 
providing insight into our ontological and epistemological entanglements 
in the world of web practices. 
Art in cyberspace
What is the place of art in cyberspace and cyberculture? Writing about “the 
work of art in the age of digital reproduction”2 Charles Alexander Moffat 
states that works of art will not be experienced in galleries because instead 
spectators will admire artists’ performance – both: the ancient and the 
contemporary ones – in cybergalleries. There is no convincing reason for 
such thinking, yet, on the other hand, there is no doubt that cyberspace 
has become a place where a huge number of images (or rather their digital 
reproductions) is collected, and for many spectators it is the only possible 
way to experience classical paintings, sculptures, photographs and also 
video films, documentations of installations, performances or concerts.
Placing Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper on the web by the HAL9000 
company3 might assume the proportions of a symbol. The photograph 
of the fresco located in the church of Santa Maria della Grazie in Milano 
was taken with the resolution of 16 billion pixels and with the help of 
contemporary most advanced photographic equipment by Nikon and the 
cutting edge optics relying on the technique of panoramic photography. In 
order to achieve an excellent quality of the digital image, 1677 photographs 
were taken and subsequently turned into one digitalized image. Specta-
tors may enlarge the image on their computer screens by using the zoom 
feature – which means that they are able to see even the tiniest elements 
of the fresco, something they would have never been able to see standing 
in front of the work in the della Grazie church. 
It would be absurd to claim that watching da Vinci’s masterpiece in 
cyberspace is the same thing as watching the original. However, the digital 
replica of The Last Supper may be an ideal addendum and extension of the 
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physical existence of the work of art. This slightly anecdotic event can be 
a perfect introduction to the reflexions upon the very complex stories of 
traditional art facing new situations resulting from digital breakthrough 
in culture, but it can also encourage various (re)interpretations of the state 
of the art in the age of digital media. 
As a result of cultural transformations a number of new forms of elec-
tronic art and cyberart have been created, simultaneously, digital tools 
have enabled the earlier unknown, because technologically impossible, 
methods of representation, promotion, distribution and they have given 
the opportunity to develop completely new research methods, for example, 
for the analysis of the structure of images. The digital copy of The Last Sup-
per will not substitute the original, although it presents researchers and 
common spectators with totally new possibilities of monitor perception. 
Thus, new perspectives of viewing the history of the traditional (let’s say, 
pre-digital) art with the use of “digital glasses” have emerged and they are 
different from the ones we have known so far.
(New) Media art in cyberculture
Media art seems to be one of the key issues of cyberculture – both in terms 
of new technocultural tendencies being manifested in society defined by 
using new computer technologies (not only, though) and in terms of playing 
a special role in the process of (self)defining of a new cultural paradigm. 
Cyberculture finds art to be a perfect medium in which fundamental 
characteristics of culture of the age of information and communication 
are revealed. 
It has been brought to our attention by Ryszard W. Kluszczyński:
If information society find their expression in cyberculture, then multi-
media art is its most perfect articulation. Digital – interactive, web, global, 
immersed in the space of socio-cultural practices – art ideally represents, 
expresses and also analyses the nature of cyberculture, being both – con-
structive and critical towards it. It serves as a laboratory where research 
experiments are carried out not only on new technologies but also – and 
perhaps most of all – on new social relations created or supported by the 
technologies.4
Before we begin to discuss digital aesthetics, we should probably move 
back to the most basic questions: what digital art is and how it differs from 
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analogue art, because if we acknowledge that the digital does exist, then, 
obviously, the analogue paradigm should be, in a dialectical way, placed 
at the opposite pole. 
It is worth remembering that the very “digital art enables analogue 
processes occurring in nature being represented digitally.”5 The words 
come from Peter Weibel’s manifesto published as a supplement to the 
catalogue of Ars Electronica Festival in 1984 – as the author himself claims 
the term “digital art”6 was used in the text for the first time. The very 
term is highly ambiguous, all the more that it has undergone a specific 
form of evolution: from the commonly used at the turn of the 60s and 
70s term computer art, through multimedia, hypermedia art, to digital 
art and cyberart. 
At the same time, the term new media art has been quite commonly used 
and the term digital media art – less frequently. Christiane Paul, taking into 
account those terminological ambiguities, writes: “The notion of “digital art” 
is used to such diverse objects and artistic practices that it is impossible to de-
fine it by a homogenous set of aesthetic terms.”7 A little further Paul explains 
the reasons for such definitional problems: “Defining and categorizations 
might be helpful in identifying basic attributes of a given medium. Yet, at 
the same time, they pose a threat of constructing pre-definitional limitations 
in explaining and understanding of works of art, especially when they are 
constantly developed as it is in the case of digital art.”8 
Digitalisation
One more aspect emerging from the discussions on digital media art 
should be added to the above doubts – a fundamental issue of the basic 
distinction between the art which uses digital technology as a specific tool 
for creating traditional (analogue) artistic objects such as photography, 
sculpture or music, and the art which uses digital technology as an im-
manent feature of a medium, that is the art which is created, stored and 
presented in a digital format. And, moreover, which uses possibilities of 
interaction, co-participation and co-creation.
I ask myself the next question: about the role of an aesthetician in defin-
ing and recognizing digital art – ergo, while giving consideration to the 
object of my reflections which is still in statu nascendi. I try, simultaneously, 
to take into account the specificity of the aesthetic reflection whose subjects 
are the activities and objects realized by means of digital technologies. The 
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state of being formed has a double meaning here: firstly - an “object” of 
digital art is in the state of permanent formation, it never really undergoes 
“coagulation”, and secondly – broadly defined digital art is in the process of 
being born, constituted, in the process of searching its own territory – as 
it would be a simplification to locate it solely in cyberspace. 
Contrary to appearances, the subject of digital aesthetics within the 
cybercultural discourse is not so obvious. I use the phrase “contrary to ap-
pearances” because one may say that the situation is very clear in this case: 
everything that has a binary digital record as its ontological basis that was 
positively verified by an aesthetician or a theoretician – as including artistic 
and aesthetic values – is digital art. However, it seems that the obvious-
ness of such a statement is an undue and highly unjustified simplification.
Digital media art is an art which makes an interface a basic category 
not only in the sense of a “medium” enabling contact between the user 
and (most often) the virtual work of art, yet also one of the fundamental 
categories of a new, media oriented aesthetics. The case of database which 
has become one of the most important issues of media aesthetics is similar. 
An ideal proof of the significant role of a database as a research problem 
can be found in a joint publication (edited by Victoria Vesna) which, in 
a sense, proclaims a new scientific discipline – “database aesthetics.”9 
Besides, it has its continuation on the web where one may find additional 
publications and, most of all, various artistic (although not only) projects 
using databases as a fundamental constitutive element and, at the same 
time, exploring the issues of the need to constantly develop methods of 
selection and material organization in the age of information flood of data.10 
Clearly, it is the Internet which is a special sphere and medium predestined 
to use database strategies. As Victoria Vesna, an artist and theoretician, 
and an editor of the above mentioned publication, writes: “Artists using 
Internet as a medium are particularly interested in creating new kind of 
aesthetics which encompasses not only aspects of visual representation, 
but also invisible aspects of organization, searching for information and 
navigating them.”11 
Aesthetic computing
An important subdiscipline of aesthetic studies has emerged recently. It 
is treated as a kind of centre of various trends and explorations within 
digital media aesthetics. It is “aesthetic computing”. Although it may 
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seem that “aesthetic computing” is a phenomenon strictly connected 
with the digital breakthrough and with the emergence of the world wide 
web which redefined the whole range of phenomena resulting from the 
expansion of technoculture based on the domination of a metamedium – 
the computer – one has to be aware of the fact that those processes 
began in the late 60s. 
Since 2002 workshops devoted to the aesthetic computing problemat-
ics initiated by Paul Fishwick, Christa Sommerer and Roger Malina have 
been organized in German Dagstuhl (near Wadern in Germany). Dag-
stuhl is an academic institution where Leibniz Center for Informatics is 
located. Early computer art, while studying the possibilities of hardware, 
software and cybernetics, brought about the transgression of boundaries 
between cognitive and material aesthetics. The participants of the above 
mentioned meeting and later research and publishing defined aesthetic 
computing in a brief manifesto. They referred to artistic practice and 
theoretical concepts deriving from the area of new media art research. 
Generally speaking, they emphasized the question of “applying theory 
and artistic practice to aesthetic computing.”12
Writing the preface to the joint publication on the issues, which was the 
outcome of the above described initiative, Paul Fishwick tries to outline 
a program for the future in the form of three fundamental questions faced 
by aesthetics attempting to apply traditional categories and new aesthetic 
notions to digital art. 
1. Firstly, a question of expanding traditional definitions of aesthetics 
to include the context of issues connected with digitality.
2. Secondly, the question of the role of values, subjectivity and emotions 
in mathematics and computer science as the elements which enable 
sustaining the balance between the form and function – needs to 
be addressed. 
3. Thirdly, we need to answer the question on how effective social 
structures – where artists, designers, mathematicians and com-
puter scientists could co-work directly or by means of web – can 
be created.13
Paul Fishwick has been working on methodological and theoretical 
basis of an aesthetically oriented research on phenomena included in 
the sphere of art as the result of using computer technologies, but also 
of activities transgressing art which, however, can be analysed from the 
perspective of “broadened aesthetics”. 
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Programming is the example of such an activity. Using various pro-
gramming languages programmers apply their own “handwriting” while 
creating algorithmic structures which have aesthetic potential themselves. 
Simultaneously, the aesthetic dimension of programming is revealed at the 
level of the effects of specific procedures application and it can be easily 
observed, for example, when we watch two- or three-dimensional data 
visualizations. Moreover, instead of programming art we should frequently 
refer to art of programs whose visual architecture may enchant us with 
their beauty. And I am not talking only about fractals, although evoking 
them in such a context should be obvious.
Thus aesthetic computing seems to be the area of inter- and transdisci-
plinary confluence of different research procedures, disciplines, particular 
issues and attempts at a global perception of cyberart functioning in cyber-
culture. To be more specific, to globally perceive a certain type of cyberart 
which is based, in the creative process, on algorithmic patterns; Cyberart 
uses the achievements of programming languages applies mathematical 
and computer procedures as systems of tools facilitating creation, or con-
ditioning it. Also as tools which constitute basic equipment of artists who 
cooperate in different areas with representatives of numerous scientific, 
computer and cognitive disciplines.
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Antoni Porczak
Art between Cockpit and the Passenger. 
Breaking of the Gutenberg Era Customs
The experience of art (mainly owing to new technologies) undergoes 
transformation from pro-scenic contemplation of untouchable works 
for recipients and created by artists to interactive artefacts, transformed 
ad hoc by the perceiving entity during the operational perception. The 
media interactivity is not an invention of artists, but it has become the 
experience of the everyday life of the human being in the media terms. 
I intend to show the technical aspect of the changing perception owing 
to the use of gadgets and technical devices in day-to-day life and social 
consequences of the use of interactive environment on the basis of the 
experience of art. The cave type interactive installation, which is charac-
teristic of the arts, and the cockpit of the commonly used technical device, 
which is a modern car, will be mainly compared in this context. What 
changes in the perception owing to the operations of the entity who uses 
technical devices and communication systems as: GPS, radio, telephone in 
the hybrid (real and media) space, understood and practiced as common 
environment? The driver and the passenger (the inter-actor and the viewer) 
are not the only two ways of travelling, but also participation in culture. 
The passenger of culture consumes ready artefacts created by others as 
products in the construction of which he/she does not participate, but 
the inter-actor (the driver) acts just the opposite way, he/she transforms 
other works into his/her own ones, and navigates, enters into a dialogue 
with technical devices, sometimes he/she creates new sets of stimuli. The 
difference between the conceptual and the contemplative perception and 
the operational perception, existing in the arts, is also the difference in 
the ways of participation in culture, and creating different models of un-
derstanding of the human. For centuries, mankind has deemed imitation 
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and admiration for other products or gestures as necessary features of 
the development of the species.
In the beginning there was not the Word, in the beginning of the way 
of the development of the Homo sapiens there was the action, at first the 
individual one, and then the collective one, which was directed at the 
common objective, as it required interpersonal collaboration. Only then, 
the communication acceleration, leading to the emergence of the sound 
language in small groups, and then the tribal one, and with the course of 
time to forms of writing, at first the pictorial writing, and then the one 
based on letters, did occur. The record / registration of reality/ of the 
picture is a very late invention which has not been properly mastered by 
societies, and which is, to a great extent, inhibited by Gutenberg’s inven-
tion of printing, which builds the conviction that verbal and/or writing 
communication is the exclusive and the most important and scientifically 
approved. The written language, which is taught as early as in the kinder-
garten, dominates the brain areas, responsible for other media and ways 
of communication, but which is less efficient in describing modern real-
ity than the element which can transfer the image and the sound within 
a second in the complex time and space conditions, while the written 
language needs dozens of pages of the text. Its linearity complicates the 
actual order of events, which take place in a specific time and space, and 
reading of which with comprehension exceeds the possibility of focusing 
attention and coordinating the described components. You can see this by 
comparing a manual of a technical device, accessible only in the written 
language, and an audio-visual presentation. The lack of competence to 
understand technical images by modern people, who are accustomed to 
the mono-culture of the text, induces stress in the writing-reading users, 
who speak about the flood of images, /which they are unable to read, as 
this skill is not taught at school, not to mention the transformation skills/, 
but they cannot see the flood of words, the oceans of verbosity, the waste 
paper in libraries and meanings detached from signs. In science only the 
text matters, as universities teach writing, and not imaging, doing research, 
inventing. So, what you cannot describe verbally, does not matter in sci-
ence, only printing sheets, publications, quotations are important. All that 
is based on the thinking in accordance with the Gutenberg culture. 
The reality has been reduced to words, but images and sounds which 
have not been verbally described in science are not recognised, although 
they play at least the same role in our civilisation. The multimedia com-
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munication is understood as a subordinate appendix to the dominating 
word, though the word itself is deficient in describing the reality, slow and 
incomprehensible at the times of multi-media and contextually placed 
communication meanings. You may be consoled by the communication 
revolution arising from the bottom-up, as everyday and common technical 
devices accumulate the experience to use the multi-media tools. Modern 
communication technologies may break the Gutenberg era customs, which 
may be seen in new generations of people communicating in another way. 
There is a difference between the verbal description and imaging which 
is in parallel to the concepts of to know and can do something. Most re-
searchers have extensive knowledge, but cannot use the image and sound 
media. So, there is not only university based aesthetics, dealing only with 
words, quotations and mixes of historical texts, and separated from cur-
rent artistic practice and often from empirical studies, but also the users’ 
aesthetics, characteristic of new multimedia technologies, affecting the 
recipient’s all senses, and changing his/her perception in general, not only 
the perception of artworks. The content and the cognitive structures of 
both of those experiences are much more different than the technological 
art whose artworks are intangible and are created and made present by the 
mediation of machines affecting seeing and/or hearing. Technical devices 
which are used in day-to-day practice seem to have greater influence on 
human perception than philosophical arguments. In a sense, it was always 
the same. Research activity /in particular in humanities/ is a reflection of 
the ability of the human mind to extremely complicate the descriptions 
of its relations with its external environment. 
The artwork (artefact) needs social recognition which is necessary for 
changing it in the work of art in the process of perception. Today, we 
mainly value it according to the competencies of the perceiving entity, his/
her experience and imagination, which are just formed by the means of 
technical mediation. The range of widespread operating experiences which 
are acquired by people using technical mobile devices, their interfaces and 
applications, is immense. Also, you cannot omit their consequences in 
artistic practice and the perception of art. A good example of this multi-
sensory technological environment may be the cockpit of the modern car 
which is a place of forming and developing basic skills and competencies 
of the operating perception of the users. Those experiences which are trans-
ferred into the area of the arts /in terms of both creation and perception of 
artefacts/ change them in accordance with the new paradigm of the media 
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age. Both direct experience and its mediation are not so important for the 
human brain, because they are new links and new resources /in computer 
technology terms/. The artificial natural environment of the human has be-
come a widely practised way of his/her existence in the world. It also seems 
to teach automatically to coordinate the body action and technical devices. 
The hybrid /i.e. real and media/ world is experienced as more comfortable 
environment than its natural equivalent. Being and action have become 
more and more mediated, tactile and telematic. From this point of view, 
previous art is recognised as an art form of high culture which is pro-scenic 
in its dispositives, and it is most frequently manifested as the antithesis of 
the life environment in the technical area. Contemplation and the festive 
nature as the old perceptual context of art and specific topography of its 
appearance undergo atrophy and they become the phenomena of the past 
under the pressure of new technical means of expression, communication 
and perception. 
Interactive Installation and Cockpit
In art perception the interactive installation is not only an aesthetic experi-
ence of the appearance of the artefact, but mainly a cognitive action which 
is analogous to the role of the cockpit of the modern car in everyday life. 
The interactive installation is the non-proscenic artefact, in which mainly 
operating actions of the interactor matter, so, it is a close analogy to the 
cockpit of the day-to-day life. The driver and the passenger in the front seat 
of the car occupy seemingly equivalent places, but they are technically 
armed in a different way and adopted functionally to the different behav-
iours of their users. The driver of a car (whose counterpart in the arts is the 
interactor) while driving receives a variety of stimuli (coming from various 
sources), he/she reacts to them using many devices in order to ensure safe, 
sensible and attractive journey. He/she uses GPS, radio, telephone, and he/
she keeps track of indicators of the devices of the car. He/she operates the 
devices, changes the direction and speed of driving, and operates in the 
hybrid (real and media) space, understood and practiced as one environ-
ment. The passenger sitting next to him/her may freely contemplate the 
attractions of the landscape during the journey, as it is not the passenger 
who drives the vehicle, so he/she does not need to coordinate the data from 
the real and media worlds in order to move in the environment, because 
he/she relies on somebody else. 
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A person participating in culture is in a similar situation. He/she may be 
an active operating entity (a driver) or a passenger. The passenger of previous 
culture consumes other works as ready made products, in the constructing 
of which he/she does not participate, playing only the role of the observer, 
recipient, consumer. The interactor does just the opposite. He/she transforms 
other works into his/her own ones, navigates, enters into a dialogue with 
technical devices, and even creates new sets of stimuli and makes them ac-
cessible to others so that they can deal with them in a similar way. 
The difference between the conceptual and contemplative perception and 
the operating perception in the arts is equivalent to the difference in the 
ways of participation in culture, which results in forming different types 
of the human being. Although the same entity may ”change” from the 
passenger’s seat to the driver’s one, he/she has to master the techniques of 
real and multi-media “driving” and methods of coordination of all factors 
of the heterogeneous environment beforehand. He/she has to familiarise 
with the techniques which are necessary for the operating perception, in 
which contemplation is not a usual perceptive behaviour, but it occurs 
rather post-perceptively as a reflection on the actions previously made. 
So, how does the perception of art change owing to the use of gadgets and 
technical devices in everyday life? What could be the social consequences 
of the use of interactive environments as a result of such an experience? 
Contemplation and action are various activities in the perceptual process of 
the entity. During the contemplation the body and the reason are seemingly 
separated, the reason is fed by the body which plays the role of the energy 
and stimuli provider and which assures calmness (stillness) for better ef-
ficiency of thinking. During this stillness the accumulation of associations 
at the time of perception, provoked by the stimuli of the artefact finished 
by the artist, follows. The body and the reason are linked with the action, 
so, they are intertwined and create new contexts, which are interpreted for 
next actions. The operating action /understood as an operation on technical 
devices and interfaces, it also involves kinesthetics and the sense of touch 
besides seeing and hearing/ is the multi-sensory process of the body action 
coordinated by the brain. Both cerebral hemispheres are responsible for 
two different groups of skills and activities, e.g. verbal and image actions. 
Their work is coordinated, but one of them usually prevails.
The multi-media communication and multi-sensory perception are 
new civilization challenges of the post-verbal reality. However, linear /
functional in some texts/ discourses do not have to dominate the entire 
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communication process, as the verbal communication is neither exclusive, 
nor the universal communication medium. In the cockpit of the car non-
verbal information prevails, as it is the ineffective medium, so, it is less 
useful for quick operations which are made instantly. The word is slow 
and contemplative, and it requires accords /associations/ at first with the 
user’s database of the biological memory, invoking experience, imagination 
/transformation into the image/, and only then the reaction, resulting in the 
operation, does follow. Written words require decoding signs, sequencing 
in the linear order, and linking them with meaning created by the contexts, 
which last long. Audio-visual communication is quick, it contains more 
information, and its context is generally clear. The image and the sound 
are complete, in the meaning of its real predecessor /the analogue of the 
reality in which we have seen and heard the unmediated speaker at the 
same time/. The operations of processing of the image and sound should 
be a concrete and fundamental object of teaching, but the present culture 
in a way inhibits the development of the human, because of dividing his/
her abilities to communicate with the world into specific media, and at the 
same time ignoring multi-media competencies. Clearly, I do not recom-
mend to teach fine arts or music to the same extent as writing, but rather 
how to sensibly and effectively use various media in the multi-media and 
multi-sensory communication and operating perception. 
Aesthetics has maintained its old paradigm of the written language 
as it reflects on images, sounds, touch and kinaesthetics with the use of 
words. It does not make them present at the same perception time while 
a scientific text is transferred. Although it seems to me that there are 
no rational reasons for which other media than words could be deemed 
non-scientific and condemned to be an appendix to the verbal discourse, 
hundreds of researchers stammer their speeches in the English version 
of their mother tongues, referring to images and sounds. It happens so 
though the audiovisual text allows the recipient to understand more quickly 
and precisely which version of the aesthetic reality is invoked. If an event 
is a complex action occurring at the same time, what should its verbal 
description look like? What should be described at first, later, and in the 
end? How to coordinate described actions occurring in the course of time? 
Postmodern criticism of linear writing was nonetheless led in the linear 
media of the word and printing. So, I am forced to follow this pattern in 
this text, as other media are deemed irrational, and publishing instructions 
for contributors require only written texts. The aesthetic discourse does 
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not usually use other media than texts. It sometimes relies on images and 
sound, referring the reader to the sources, but generally, it uses other texts 
as if they referred not to the visual or sound works of art, but only to the 
authors of texts on a given topic. Texts swarm with quotations whose rela-
tion to the artwork is meaningless, and at most subordinated, as writing 
and reading matter more, because of the conviction that the verbal text 
guarantees rational standard. If multi-media publications were allowed 
in the rational discourse, aesthetics as the research activity could obtain 
the tools for the multi-sensory examination and publishing. They could 
be used to present, show and analyse /not excluding the verbal discourse/ 
in the same context of images and sounds. The conviction that the verbal 
discourse is the most efficient tool used in order to describe phenomena 
in their philosophical aspect has its historical roots. The accessibility of 
imaging techniques in the past was economically limited, because images 
and sounds required complex and specialized methods of production. 
The traditional printing house could be an example of the difference be-
tween the company reproducing pictures in large quantities with the use 
of expensive and specialized machines and individualized methods of 
computer-aided production, reproduction and networked transmission 
of images and sounds. 
The electronic interactive art could serve as an example of how far we 
departed from analogue technologies, and thinking in terms of tangibility, 
place, temporality and philosophical context of understanding communica-
tion and creativity. Even though sometime in the past a new style or trend 
in art or vanguard movement appeared, nonetheless the communication 
system, the existence basis of the work or perceptual dispositive remained 
the same. Nowadays, we see the changes of functions of all those elements 
without detailed considerations in the area of the psychology of reception 
or mediated experience. The development of aesthetics is not only the 
result of more and more complicated thinking about art, but principally 
because of the change of the perceptual paradigm from the pro-scenic 
to the non-proscenic /installation/, based on operating perception, also 
occurring in the process of transformation of the artefact. The use of the 
image and sound media, so natural for the young generation, and the 
possibility of transforming them individually /not only interpreting/ have 
aroused deeper interest /also in artists/ in the multimedia, multi-sensory 
and operating techniques. Thus, the museum ban do not touch allows to 
have a sense of more active participation in creative practices /not only 
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artistic ones/ in large numbers of users of the social communication media 
which are understood in this way. I think that future creative action shall 
not consist in more complicated staring at other works, but transforming 
other works into artists’ own ones. Clearly, we could encounter counter-
arguments against technological logic, invoking artistic mythology, the 
elitism of high culture, which are insignificant to the power of development 
of communication technologies influencing everyday life practices. The 
reader of this text could think that this point of view is a misunderstand-
ing or everyday life practices cannot play a decisive role, and that art and 
aesthetics are much more than simply users’ operations, but the Facebook 
user who transforms images and sounds, texts, and uses other works, could 
create his/her own media message and reality. If he/she stimulates other 
users to perform creative acts by his/her activities, he/she plays a similar 
artistic role to such an extent which is recognized by the community of 
his/her addresses. The operating perception as the action preceding the 
emergence of the object of perception is both the author’s act for the crea-
tor of the artefact and its user. The object of perception emerges as a result 
of the interactor’s action, and it is not possible for him/her to perceive it 
totally, the author of the interactive artefact is not familiar with it, as he/she 
only prepares the stimuli and procedures to use them. Previous author’s 
narration is replaced by interaction and navigation implemented by the 
user /interactor/ during the operating perception of the author’s artefact. 
The artefact of the interactive installation, though organised by the author 
/artist/, is implemented by users. It appears as one of many possible vari-
ations of using the resources for the addresses. 
If the painting is the organisation of sensations in a constant form, pos-
sible to be seen in totality at the same time, the interactive installation is 
the organization of sensations in the expanded form /inaccessible to the 
senses in totality/, requiring selecting and transforming the recourses into 
users’ own stimuli. The interactor travels around the installation as the 
technological environment /not the same, but analogous to the journey/ 
in the cockpit of the modern car. If the pro-scenic art was assigned for 
developing interpretative imagination of the recipient, the main issue for 
the artists of interactive media was the skill of the interactor to transform 
other artefacts into the object of his/her perception. Apparently, they are 
different artistic objectives, and communication competencies of the users 
which require different aesthetic tools.

Aesthetic Practice in the Life of East Asia 
(Takao Aoki)

Takao Aoki 
On the Concept of Geidoh in East Asian 
Aesthetic Tradition of Practice
Contemporary studies of East Asian aesthetics have tended to confine their 
analyses within the borders of modern nation states, and write of Japanese 
aesthetics, Chinese aesthetics, Korean aesthetics, etc. From a longer and 
larger point of view, however, we may see points of consistency throughout 
East Asia. Identifying these common features, while contrasting their local 
variations, can serve to elucidate the uses of various aesthetic concepts and 
its history and theory.1
In the present paper I would like to look at the concept of Geidoh, an 
idea with deep roots in Asian tradition of practice. I will give a brief 
outline of its history, its sources in medieval Japan and classical China, 
and then show some of its manifestations in early modern Japan. This 
will contrast the concept with the idea of fine arts, as it was imported 
from the West.
Chinese characters, chopsticks, a rice-based diet, ancestor worship, and 
other common elements characterize East Asian culture and help to form 
its civilization. They contribute to what we might call an East Asian life style. 
In addition, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism have played important 
roles in mixing Asia-wide elements with indigenous cultures. Culture and 
civilization have a deep relationship with language. In East Asia, a shared 
use of Chinese characters tends to influence our view of the world.2 The 
concepts behind these characters shape Asian understanding of the world, 
nature, society, and several arts.
For example, we can look at the Chinese characters pronounced geijutsu 
in Japanese, and usually translated as “art.” [藝術] The first Chinese character, 
藝, has a relationship with gardening and planting and, metaphorically, with 
the idea of cultivation in general. This reflects a cultural tendency or view 
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of plants which informs our understanding and interpretation of the world. 
Two representative family names in Japanese are Suzuki [鈴木] and Satoh 
[佐藤]. Both names include elements related to plants: Suzuki contains the 
character for tree [木], and Satoh contains the character for vines or wisteria 
[藤]. My name, Aoki [青木], also means blue or green tree. The Chinese and 
Korean name pronounced Lin is written with the character for forest [林], 
as is the Japanese name Hayashi [林]. The character for plum blossoms, 李, 
is the most popular name in East Asia, pronounced Lee in Korean and Li 
Chinese. The popularity of these and many similar names throughout East 
Asia demonstrates something of the inclination here for plants. 3
Nowadays, although the character 藝 has largely lost its association 
with gardens, some variant of the characters 藝術 is used in several Asian 
countries to refer to the fine arts. Though the characters originated in China, 
each country has altered or simplified how it is written. China writes the 
word for fine arts as艺术 or 蓺术. The same is written as 芸術 in Japan4 
and as 藝術 in Taiwan. Korea writes it [藝術]. Seventy years ago – that is, 
before the end of World War II – the changes had not yet been introduced. 
Most of East Asia still used the traditional characters 藝術, a combina-
tion which first appeared in the historical text The Book of the Later Han, 
後漢書, in China, c. 432 CE.
Although the combination of these two characters carried several senses 
for a long time, around the turn of the twentieth century Japanese intel-
lectuals began to use the term to refer to the fine arts in a modern sense – 
the general concept of arts ranging from literature, poetry, and drama to 
painting, sculpture, and music. This use of the term arose from its being 
called into service as the translation for a Western concept.
Traditional Geijutsu as Learning with Cultivation 
Throughout East Asia in recent years, the Chinese characters 藝術, pro-
nounced geijutsu in Japanese, have commonly been used to translate the 
European concept “fine art.” The word has evolved, however. It was used 
from the end of the eighteenth century to translate a variety of Western 
ideas. Among them, it is especially important to remark that in 1870 it was 
used to translate the Latin term artes liberales, which had been imported via 
Holland. Philosopher Nishi Amane (西 周; 1829–1897) who had studied 
in Holland, used the term in this way. Before him, Watanabe Kazan (渡辺
崋山; 1793–1841) used geijutsu before 1840 somewhat differently, to label 
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basic subjects for education. These uses illustrate that at the first stage of 
translation, geijutsu didn’t yet refer to works of art or cultural products, 
but the practice of cultura mentis and corpus, that is the cultivation of the 
mind and body through education and the mastery of skills.5
Before being applied in such a way, geijutsu referred primarily to an over-
lapping of six arts which the warrior class of the Edo Period (1603–1867) 
were expected to cultivate as part of a Chinese-style aristocratic education. 
We will return to this usage of the word in our discussion of scholar Haga 
Yaichi (芳賀矢一; 1867–1972). Here, I’d like to explain the cultural status 
of skill and technique in Confucian axiology. Confucianism places a very 
high value on the idea of the michi or doh or, usually known in the West 
by its Chinese pronunciation tao [道]. The Confucian view of the tao is 
different from that of Taoism, and includes several arts. One is education 
as above mentioned. Another is understood as practical skill or technique. 
Michi or tao [道] is the final aim and gei [藝] is instrumental in reaching 
the michi or tao.
During Japan’s Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government promoted 
a doctrine of “civilization and enlightenment” [bunmei-kaika, 文明開化], 
hurrying the adoption of European views. Presented with a new European 
model and standard of civilization after centuries of adapting Chinese 
values, Japan was faced with a cultural crisis.
There is a famous slogan of modernization proposed around 1853 by 
Sakuma Shozan (佐久間象山, 1811–1864): “Learn morals from the East; 
learn technology and arts from the West [東洋道徳西洋藝術]. In this phrase, 
the term geijutsu [藝術] refers to Western technologies and arts, whereas 
morals, written with the characters 道徳, means the cardinal virtues and 
morals of Confucianism [儒教] which supported life and society. Though 
Chinese culture and sciences had been given the leading role during the pre-
ceding Edo Period, and for centuries before, especially by Japanese followers 
of Confucianism, the Meiji Restoration saw the administration drastically 
change the model of civilization and start to imitate European sciences and 
institutions. Japan tried to “escape from Asia and become a member of the 
advanced Western community,” [datsua-nyuoh, 脱亜入歐]. “While keeping 
traditional Japanese spirit and morals, they should learn the technological 
treasures of Western civilization.” This is a basic stance called wakon-yohsai 
[和魂洋才], used to introduce Western cultures.6
During the late nineteenth century, the term geijutsu was used by some 
to translate the term Liberal Arts, but other people continued to use it with 
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its old meaning from the Edo Period, as the basic subjects for the samurai 
or warrior class. Later the focus of its meaning gradually transformed to 
that of the modern concept of fine arts or beautiful arts. At the beginning 
of the Meiji Restoration, in the 1860s, another term, bijutsu [美術], was 
introduced to refer to cultural practices which were thought to enhance 
the standard of the nation’s civilization. This term consists of the charac-
ters for beauty 美 and method or technique 術. In this case, “beauty” is 
not a character of works of art, but a cultural refinement which serves to 
make people more beautifully edified – that is, more civilized. Imperial-
istic dynamics of the time considered refinement or westernization to be 
necessary for Japan, to make herself similar to western states. In addition, 
bijutsu began to be used as a general concept whose boundaries ranged 
from literature, poetry, painting, sculpture, music, dance, theater and so 
on. Gradually, its focus narrowed to the fine arts. In this way, around the 
turn of twentieth century, there appeared the concept of the way of arts, 
that is geidoh, in contrast to such imported concepts or translated words as 
bijutsu (fine arts)7 and geijutsu (the general concept of fine arts). As both 
of those terms are derived from Europe, geidoh had to be seen as having 
traditional origins. In the process of modernization, Japan had to face the 
conflict of these two perspectives on the arts.8
A Hierarchy or Politics of Cultures 
At the beginning of the Showa era (1926–1989), German philosopher Karl 
Löwith (1897–1973),9 after teaching at a Japanese university, described 
his impressions of the sociological knowledge of the country. In Japan, he 
explained, professional scholars learned at university only to receive the 
opinions of Western Europe, causing an unconsidered flight from earlier 
traditions of Japanese everyday knowledge and life. He introduced the 
metaphor of the two-story house to describe how he saw Japanese scholars 
living in relation to Western ideas. Like the majority of Japanese people, 
the scholar enjoys living on the ground floor of a traditional Japanese 
residence. On the other hand, he studies hard to accept a knowledge of 
Western life and a few of the improvements it brought, but has little interest 
in the harmony of the two floors. Some intellectuals and artists, however, 
felt keenly the split and paradox of attempting to continue native traditions 
while Westernizing society. The need to live on both floors of the house, 
adopting Western views of the arts while also loving and having faith in 
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one’s native culture, led some (e.g. Soseki Natsume) to such distress that 
they felt at the point of suicide. The ideological conflict of choosing to 
maintain traditional Japan in the context of rapid Westernization is an 
example to keep in mind. The writer Akutagawa Ryūnosuke shows a rep-
resentative and typical case of this conflict and agony among elite with 
intellectual conscience.
The Case of Writer Akutagawa Ryūnosuke10
Akutagawa Ryūnosuke (芥川 龍之介; 1892–1927) is among the most 
famous writers of the Taishou Period [大正], which lasted from 1912 to 
1926. He is representative of those intellectuals who believed in cultural 
modernization, and argued for it in new artistic creation. To employ Lö-
with’s metaphor, we might say Akutagawa moved his artistic life to the 
second floor of the house, and turned away from his country’s native and 
aesthetic traditions. He explained his modernist views in his essay “Arts 
and Others”「藝術その他」published in 1919:
What artists strive for most is to make works of art which are perfect. Oth-
erwise, it would be meaningless for them to make a great endeavor to 
sacrifice themselves for the arts. Can it be compared to attending a sermon 
which brings us merely “sentimental appreciation”? Only by serving the 
end of the arts, which is their perfect expression, should the works of art 
to which we artists dedicate ourselves to complete, give birth to “a perfect 
artistic impression”.
All artists should practice and improve their skills and techniques, even 
if they have already developed these to high levels… As I am inclined to 
indulge in the charm of beauty, I am aware of being caught in the aesthetic 
trap. If I am satisfied with the aesthetic tradition of furyu 風流 ( fengliu 
in Chinese), then I might lose the narrow way of being a true artist. [藝
術その他, 1919]
We can see here Akutagawa’s commitment to perfection, uniqueness, 
progress, and innovation. The passage quoted from him below emphasizes 
the same points, and makes clear as well his dislike of the aesthetic tradi-
tion of furyu, or the artistic mannerism of the literati painters [文人], called 
wenren in Chinese or bunjin in Japanese. He does not hide his dissatisfaction 
with this tradition, associated with painting plum blossoms. For him, the 
adherence to the furyu and literati tradition blocks an artist from modernity 
with its indulgence in aesthetic pleasure, rather than aesthetic uniqueness.
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Plum flowers as depicted in The Tale of Ise [伊勢物語] or in ukiyo-e 
paintings by Harunobu [春信] are meant to evoke elegant feelings. How-
ever, the sight of plum trees in works of art never fails to remind me of 
the aesthetic tradition of the literati, and the ethos that came with them 
from China. Plums can arouse a series of such associated images, includ-
ing cranes, crescent moons, etc., that is the aesthetic taste of fenryu, often 
associated with Lin Bu [林逋] (967–1028). It is natural that modern artists 
turn away from such images, since plums have been represented with so 
many designs and ideas that they can find few ways to show originality 
or uniqueness in their depiction. However the true reason why modern 
artists look coldly upon plums is thus: the plum is the symbol of the old 
literati attitude of mannerism, and the self-satisfied attitude that comes 
from neglecting the importance and progressiveness of creativity. [Against 
Plum Blossoms「梅花に対する感情」1924]
Akutagawa despises this tradition symbolized by plum blossoms, which 
he knows so well. For him, the aesthetic attitude of the literati is that of 
mere hobbyists, who paint only for personal pleasure.
We can find here an opposition between modern artistic attitudes and 
the traditional aesthetic ethos of the literati artists. The tradition of literati 
may be included in the range of geidoh, but it is not the prototype, because 
the tradition of the literati suggests the erudition of a man with elite social 
status, especially in China. In Japan, this tacit aspect is not necessary.
Historico-cultural background of Invention of Geidoh
Generally speaking,11 the literati had passed through the Confucian civil 
service examinations [科挙] of old China. Once the literati who had at-
tempted to rise within the political system saw their hopes for their careers 
blocked, they gave up for a while the chance of political activity to turn to 
lives of pleasure in country homes, enjoying various arts, and communing 
with nature. They particularly passed the time with poetry, painting, and 
music, communicating only with like-minded friends surrounded by the 
beauties of nature. They can also be described as inja in Japanese [隠者], 
yinzhe in Chinese – a term meaning “hidden person” or “recluse.” Among 
well-known literati we may name Lin Bu, and the so-called “7 Sages in the 
Bamboo” Zhúlín Qī Xián [竹林七賢]. Such characters are personifications 
of a Taoistic ideal of a life of furyu [風流], living in harmony with nature, 
away from the capital. Their aesthetic lives focus on two points: solitary 
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pleasures [自娯]12 and a kind of pure lifestyle in communication only with 
friends and nature [清遊], standing aloof from the crowd.13 
Similar literature concerning the aesthetic lives of such hermits began 
appearing in Japan in the Middle Ages, after the appearance of The Pil-
low Book and The Tale of Genji. These included the well-known Ten Foot 
Square Hut and Essays in Idleness, but many lesser-known Buddhist monks 
followed a similar course. They showed great respect for the Chinese and 
Japanese classics, while disdaining politics. In Japan, literary hermits tended 
to describe their experiences through the values of Buddhism, as well as 
in the Taoism and Confucianism of their Chinese forebears. 
Buddhistic Sources in the Medieval Era 
When the term geidoh [藝道] was coined just before or during World 
War II, it referred to an ideal model of aesthetic practice from the Middle 
Ages, as exemplified by Shunzei [俊成] (1114 –1204), Zeami [世阿弥] 
(1363? –1443?), and Shinkei [心敬] (1406 –1475).
In all countries, the Middle Ages are an age of religion. In Japan’s me-
dieval period thought was dominated by Buddhism, and proper religious 
exercise was called the Buddha Way [仏道]. Medieval times are often 
referred to as “dark ages,” indicating that they are times of irrationalism 
and religion, in contrast to more enlightened times, in which the power of 
reason guides us. Seen from this perspective, our normal way of looking 
at the world is one of darkness. From our typical, secular views, we must 
walk step by step toward the supreme enlightenment of awakening. Monks 
can walk this road every day through Buddhist practices. Other Buddhists, 
not living as monks, may follow a similar path by doing their own work, 
as artists, for example, spiritualize their practice. 
A serious devotion to creating perfect aesthetic works came to be con-
sidered a kind of religious endeavor in the pursuit of supreme truth, that is 
enlightenment or religious Tao. In such a view, the way of art is interpreted 
as a semi-religious activity, modeled on Buddhism’s methods and artistic 
exercise was considered to be a way to aesthetic Nirvana. This is how, much 
later, geidoh came to be seen as a respectable path, serious in its aims.
To make a work of art or literature perfect or attractive, an artist must 
dedicate everything to gain a kind of divine protection. In other words, art-
ists try to form a poetic virtue from which they hope for a divine aesthetic 
visit from God. They try to form good artistic habits through long and hard 
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training, which may be the work of an entire lifetime. Cultivating virtue 
in an aesthetic sense in this way could be conflated with the idea of form-
ing moral virtue – a contrast with the ideas of those who, like Baudelaire, 
see aesthetic and moral virtue as unrelated. Though we can find examples 
of aestheticist or decadent ideas in Japan, it was more typical in the Edo 
Period to see virtue and aesthetics as going hand in hand. 
On the Transformation of Geidoh from medieval 
Buddhism to the Confucianism of the Edo Era 
In the Edo Period, the warrior class was expected to rule society with a re-
finement brought on by studying several arts or skills [geijutsu] which were 
compared to (or considered equivalent to) the six arts [六藝] of the ancient 
Chinese scholar-gentlemen, the class known as the shì dàfū [士大夫]. 
Once Confucianism was adopted as the state religion, however, geijutsu 
was viewed as a useful tool in developing edifying public values. Geijutsu 
became useful for public education that supports the state. The playful and 
unproductive hermits were less admired. As a result yugei [遊芸], private 
pleasures or “playful arts,” began to be recognized as a separate category 
during the Edo Period. Among yugei, the tea ceremony and Noh drama, 
with literature in general, could be placed in the category of uplifting 
geijutsu. If we look for similarities between the categories of playful yugei 
and more edifying geijutsu, we can see that practitioners in both schools 
laid their emphasis on the way of life they employed, and not just its mate-
rial products. The later concept of geidoh grew from this way of thinking. 
In addition, we must mention Basho who lived in the early Edo Era and 
maintained the old tradition of Buddhism geidoh. In his travel essay “Oi 
no Kobumi,” he names four artists as those he particularly admires: poet 
Saigyou, painter Sesshu, tea master Rikyu and poet Sogi. These four are 
chosen because they dedicated their lives to the road of aesthetic truth or 
fuga [風雅]. Basho sets himself at the end of this artistic genealogy of fuga, 
his ideal of artistic practice.
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A Historical Rough Sketch of Modern Geidoh: On the 
Way of the Arts as a Path to the End of Life; the Tao.
The Invention of geidoh as a counter to the imported modern 
concept of fine arts from Europe
The analysis advanced by Eric Hobsbawm in his book The Invention of 
Tradition has been used to criticize the political background of some dis-
tinguished traditions of culture.14 Invention, he claims, may be not only 
a forgery of history, but the attempt to produce community through the 
use of illusion. Even if a tradition is created in a particular nationalistic 
or socio-historic context, however, we may still evaluate it on its own 
merits. The Japanese concept of geidoh may be approached in this way. 
Geidoh does have aspects of invented tradition, of the kind that Hobs-
bawm criticized, but also shows a deep self-understanding of Japanese 
society and tradition. The invention of this particular tradition is not 
something to despise.
Geidoh was invigorated by nationalist movements at least twice. Dur-
ing World War II, many Japanese philosophers and historians, including 
Shinichi Hisamatsu, Shumei Ookawa, and Nobuyoshi Sida boasted of the 
superiority of the Japanese way of the arts. That is, they favorably compared 
traditional Japanese geidoh, especially in its medieval version, to modern 
concepts of the arts invented in the West. This exaltation of Japanese culture 
was of course inspired by the contemporary pressure of and confrontation 
with the West. In this socio-politico context, geidoh was employed to further 
the political goals of the age.
In this presentation, however, I will look at an earlier model of this con-
cept. After victories with China in 1894 and Russia in 1905, the Japanese 
people were awakened to a sense of nationalism. People in other countries, 
as well, began to show interest in the character of this small country. In 
this context, Tenshin Okakura’s The Awakening of Japan (1904) and Book 
of Tea (1906), and Inazo Nitobe’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan (1900) were 
read abroad, while in Japan arguments flourished concerning the true 
character of the Japanese. Among the authors who worked on this topic 
was Yaichi Haga (芳賀 矢一; 1867–1927), who held a literature post at 
Tokyo Imperial University. He wrote many books, but he approached the 
topic as an essayist rather than as a researcher. Despite little knowledge of 
Western aesthetics, he formulated a clear view of geidoh. He wrote:
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Determination and patience are necessary in studying [學] and learning 
[習]. Our ancestors considered this their ideal. We recognize the significance 
of this when we see that all forms of arts [藝術] used the word doh [道 – in 
English, “path” or “way”]. As in Shinto [神道], doh is what people follow. It 
has a moral nuance and is thus different from mere skill [技]. Skill in using 
swords [剣術], in archery [弓術], or in horsemanship [馬術], are only skills. 
If we hope to gain a higher principle from them, they must become kendoh 
[剣道], that is the way of swords, or the way of the Samurai [弓馬之道], that 
is the way of archery and horsemanship. In the past, people learning Japanese 
poems and poetics believed that if they mastered Japanese literature, they 
could go to paradise [極楽] at once. […] Similarly, calligraphy is called the 
way of writing [書道]; such minor arts as tea making or aroma are called 
Sado [茶道] (the way of tea) and Kōdō [香道] (the way of aromatic arts). 
Music was originally highly respected as a way, as were ikebana [活花], flower 
arrangement, kemari [蹴鞠] the game of kickball, and tousen [投扇], fan 
casting. Mastering these skills superficially can’t be regarded as gaining the 
true sense, though one may advance a certain extent. The true performer 
will be graced with the brightness of spirituality after serious endeavors of 
full attention and passion. Our ancestors believed that the ardent pursuit, 
with all energy and real mastery of these arts, will allow the mind, spirit, and 
body to merge in the Way of Skill that is Doh [道].15
We can hear the living echoes of several historical traditions in Haga’s text.
East Asian Aesthetics Emphasize Respect for Practice
Haga Yaichi listed various fields which could not be considered arts ac-
cording to the modernized view of the time. The skills and arts he men-
tions may be divided into two parts, with waka [和歌], a Japanese style of 
poetry, as their dividing line. One part consists of the knowledge and skills 
necessary for the warrior, and the other part constitutes the education and 
entertainment of a courtier in an older tradition. Haga integrates various 
artistic practices of the Edo Period into a new concept of traditional art, 
in response to westernization. The following are the characteristics of his 
artistic views: 
1. Traditional arts are open ways for many people to learn, not closed 
ways limited to professionals. 
2. They are active creative practices of enthusiasm and attention, rather 
than the appreciation of listed canonical works.
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3. Traditional artistic practice puts more emphasis on cultivating inner 
aspects of the self, rather than the production of objects.
Haga’s traditional artistic views were formulated in the late Meiji Period. 
At that time the European view of art and artists was becoming very popular 
in Japan, and the word bijutsu [美術] (literally: “beauty method”) limited 
its field to optical arts, that is painting, sculpture and so on. In contrast 
to bijutsu, geijutsu refered to fine arts in general. A small dictionary of 
new words16 published in 1913 defines geijutsu [藝術] as aato (arts) in 
English, to state that the word connotes the special arts and crafts which 
have beauty as their sole purpose, instead of skills which are put to practi-
cal use. That is, the term denotes music, poetry, and similar arts as well as 
sculpture and painting.
When the older term geijutsu took on a more modern sense of fine arts, 
students studying in Japan around 1910, especially those from China, 
heard the term in its updated meanings and replanted it into their own 
countries. In this way, changing uses of the term geijutsu, blended with 
modern, more Western concepts, spread through East Asia, including 
colonized Taiwan and Korea.
The Significance of Invention in the Traditional Arts
In Haga’s view, traditional Japanese art was comprised of the poetic arts of 
elegance [風雅之道],17 arts for aristocratic courtiers, arts directly related 
to Buddhism, arts for the warrior class, and common people’s entertain-
ment. We may well say that Haga “invented” the new concept of traditional 
arts, which transcends the categorical differences of Edo culture. When he 
united all arts in the face of modernization to produce the new category of 
Traditional Arts, he emphasized the importance of the morality and ethics 
acquired through learning these arts, and ignored cultural demarcations 
based on the criteria of Confucianism. 
Perhaps Haga’s efforts can be seen as the awakening of Japan’s artistic 
views. Seen in this way, Haga’s combination of incompatible parts of culture 
from before the Edo era is a renewal of traditional artistic views. I cannot 
simply deem this to be wholly imaginary. Of course, we must always take 
a careful attitude towards patriotic views among the Japanese. Still, we 
can esteem Haga for his ability to look at history from a new point of view, 
summarize certain of its major trends, and create a feasible view of the 
arts. The views he introduced still guide Japanese approaches to traditional 
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arts, later called geidoh or naraigoto (“learned things” including learning 
such high cultural practices as the tea ceremony, painting, and so on). As 
the comparison of skill and Tao, Haga’s view is rooted in ancient Chinese 
aesthetics, in spite of his opinion that this view of arts has original roots 
in the depth of Japanese culture.
We can hear not only the echo of Buddhism but also the contrast of East 
Asia’s basic concepts, skill and Tao, in an anecdote from Zhuangzi’s Chinese 
classic Fundamentals for Nourishing Life. This book tells of an exchange 
between Wen Hui and a cook, which illustrates the difference in the two 
approaches to learning. The anecdote emphasizes that the Chinese word 
Tao, the great way of the world, is the same as the Japanese word doh [道], 
or truth in a context of wisdom, and a path through the ordinary world.
“Ah! Very good!” Wen Hui said to the cook, “How did you achieve such 
perfection in your skill?” The cook put down his knife and replied, “What 
I love is the Tao, which is more advanced than skills.”
「文惠君曰：「善哉！技蓋至此乎？」庖丁釋刀對曰：「臣之所好
者，道也。進乎技矣。」(『荘子』内篇「養生論)
Here, in a Chinese classic, skill and Tao are connected and contrasted 
with each other directly. This is a part of the cultural and philosophical 
background of the invention of geidoh before Yaichi Haga’s time. 
Here I would like to make at least two points by comparing Western 
traditional thinking about art or praxis with different ideas from China 
and Japan.
Most of the skills mentioned here are not forms of “making arts,” but 
rather kinds of performing arts. Here I consider martial arts, cooking, or 
the tea ceremony to be performing arts.
Aesthetic Practice and the Cultivation of Geidoh
Any kind of act or deed may be seen to have a double aspect when viewed 
aesthetically. That is, an aesthetic act works on both a subject and an object. 
We can say that an artist can make his or her work with his or her own 
skill and heart. But what does he or she really experience in the act of 
making? The act of making performs at least two functions for the artist: 
a mimetic function and a self-cultivating one.
First, making something means “to give form to a thing.” Through mime-
sis, an artist can represent an image on a canvas imitating an object. Here 
is a mimetic relation between an image on the canvas and the real thing.
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Secondly, making something entails nurturing the artist’s mind. In this 
sense making implies some relationship between the artist and his or her 
faculty. When an artist makes something, this practice develops the nature 
of the agent through the practice of his or her aesthetic faculty and heart. 
Artistic practice, whether it is an ordinary exercise or a performance 
on the stage, necessarily cultivates human nature. It elevates aesthetic 
virtue and works to make the human being more complete. This is the 
self-cultivating aspect of art-making. From this point of view, any kind of 
artistic activity, whether it is making or performing, can have the function 
of cultivating the human nature of the agent through the accumulation 
of artistic skills. In sum, the process of making not only develops our artistic 
ability but also nurtures our personality.
Western tradition, for example as in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, may 
discriminate two basic contrasting deeds: theoria and praxis. And within 
praxis, we can discriminate both moral praxis and poiesis.
Aristotle examines episteme, phronesis, and techne. For us, it is important 
not only to discriminate moral practice from productive practice, but also 
to see two types of productive practice: object making, such as sculpture 
or architecture which create new and lasting things, and performance of 
a pre-existing work. A performer like a singer, musician (but not a com-
poser), or a dancer does not create a material work which will endure in 
time, as a bronze sculptor might. 
In short, poiesis can be either making or performing. Within these 
practical activities, we can find a cultivating dimension. For example, rep-
resenting something on a canvas cultivates our abilities to see and to depict. 
This cultivating principle spreads over all kinds of practice beyond the 
purely aesthetic. In Japan, the goal of self-cultivation is emphasized, so 
any kind of practice can be understood as a “way of skill,” or a path that 
guides us to the supreme way of the Tao. In fact, many people in Japan 
believe that their job, whatever it is, can lead to a Tao Way through the 
passionate exercise of a skill in everyday life. And the everyday practice or 
exercise is also called a michi or way. These everyday exercises have such 
names as shugyoh [修行], keiko [稽古], or shudo [修道, 習道], whose field 
ranges from religious deeds and moral behavior to eating, cleaning, and 
the everyday behavior that we read of described in Zen Buddhism. So we 
may speak of a Tao of golf, of confectionary, of merchants – even a Tao 
of ramen. And these are not usually categorized into aesthetic arts in the 
older sense. We can actually enumerate these limitlessly. In the Edo era, 
278  Takao Aoki 
there was a book entitled the Shikidoh-ohkagami (1678) which has been 
translated as The Great Mirror of the Arts of Love. In this book author Kizan 
Fujimoto (1626–1704) described what he called a way of living which he 
called shikidoh. The book is essentially a guide book or manual to the arts 
of eros, especially those practiced in the licensed gay quarters. And though 
the word shikidoh literally means “the way of color,” in fact its focus on the 
deep and wide range of loving and sexual relationships between couples of 
various types implies a significant philosophical meaning. From the gay 
quarters of the Edo era, there appeared the famous aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious idea of iki which Shuzou Kuki (1888–1941) later reinterpreted in 
his famous book The Structure of ‘Iki’ (1930). This concept does not focus 
on sexual techniques but on manners or ritualistic ways of communica-
tion. Through this training in love, people in those days could expect to 
cultivate the mind and enhance refined behavior that, among themselves, 
they considered the ideal. They introduced a system of gradual elevation 
through the practice of erotic arts which was much like the stages of Bud-
dhist training. So we may see that many aspects of life could be elevated 
from mere skills to paths of cultivation and refinement.
It’s due to a similar goal that the cook Pao Ding advances from a mere 
skill to a unification with the Tao attained through long hours of practice. 
Working as a butcher was hardly a position with high social status, but 
through the excellence of his performance even the Emperor learns a lesson 
in the Tao. This story discriminates between skill and the supreme Tao or 
Way and stresses the pleasure and freedom that result of attaining the latter.
In the Chinese way of discourse to describe the relationship between skill 
and Tao, hard training is little emphasized. Chinese stories often include 
legendary wizards who are capable of performing miracles with a single 
word. This is a different view from Japanese thinkers who see the artistic 
process as ‘ardent pursuit,’ as Haga did, to attain supreme performance. This 
model of training had several cultural sources: Buddhistic training, which 
we have explained, and Confucianist learning which we will turn to now.
The first stanza of the Analects of Confucius insists on the importance 
of this self-cultivation and the pleasure resulting from learning. Even the 
Chinese character for learning contains a similar message. The character 
習 is constructed of two parts. The top, 羽, is the character for wings, and 
白 means white, but in this case indicates youth or immaturity. Aca-
demically speaking, this is not a philological explanation, but an invented 
philosophical story – the flapping wings of the aspiring learner.
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If East Asian education in the arts and skills is, then, the desire of the 
young bird to acquire a Tao-like path of refinement, we may be justified 
in contrasting this to Western arts education, which tends to focus on 
the systematic knowledge of making, rather than the ability and virtue 
of their maker.18 
Mimetic-Learning [學] and Self-Cultivation [習] 
in the Analects of Confucius19
“To learn, and then, in its due season, put what you have 
learned into practice – isn’t that still a great pleasure?” 
Confucius (BC 551–479) 
「子曰學而時習之、不亦説乎」(『論語,「學而」) 18
In education, learning [學習] is of course important. Although gaku [學], 
which focuses on imitating a model, plays an important role in education, 
narai [習] plays a more important role in East Asian education, at least in 
Japan. By analyzing what is implied by the character 習 – narai in Japanese 
or shu in Chinese – we can understand one of the most important aspects 
of our traditional education. 
Let us illustrate one aspect of narai by citing a famous phrase from 
well-known haiku poet Basho (芭蕉; 1644– 94). For him, a pine tree and 
a bamboo are teachers whom disciple poets should imitate humbly. 
“Of what a pine tree is, learn from the pine; of what bamboo is, learn 
from bamboo.”
Translator Dennis Hirota has here rendered the verb form of narai 
as “learn.” Here, learning means that it is by entering into things and ex-
periencing the manifestations of their particularity that haiku are made. 
The mimetic aspects of narai [習] are profoundly described. When this 
ontological encounter between Basho and the pine tree happens, the pine 
tree is a master and Basho his servant and friend.
However, Confucius said, “By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice 
[習], they be wide apart.” [『論語,「陽貨;「子曰性相近也習相遠也」] 
Why do they become wide apart? The proverb goes “Practice makes perfect.” 
Here we can refer once again to the exercise of skill [術, 技] by the cook 
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Pao Ding. In that episode, through long exercise of skill, Pao Ding reached 
the perfect, in other words, came into contact with the Tao. So the skill or 
practice carries a man a great distance.
Although they employ the same term, 道, there is a great difference between 
ancient Taoism and Japanese geidoh. However, this mostly arises from dif-
ferences in the habitus among Taoism, Confucianism and Japanese thought. 
In the ancient Chinese classic Shujing, [『書経』「太甲上」] we have 
the phrase “Habit is a second nature” [習輿性成]. And in the Shoubou 
Genzou [『正法眼蔵』,「現成公案」] by thirteenth century Buddhist 
master Dogen (道元; 1200–53), we read that “To study [習] the Buddha-
way is to study the self, to study the self is to forget the self, to forget the 
self is to be actualized by myriad dharmas.” Practice leads to self-nurturing 
by which habitus becomes a key to reach the Tao. In sum, in addition to 
the mimetic function, narai [習] has self-nurturing functions [養] which 
through repetitive performance or practice [踐] not only promote an inner 
transformation [化] but also produce personal pleasure [自娯 or自楽].
Conclusion
Nowadays we should take into consideration these two elements when 
we rehabilitate the view of geidoh in a contemporary context. To conclude, 
we may draw some general distinctions between Western aesthetics and 
those of the East, and between Chinese practice of the Tao and Japanese 
artistic “ways.” 
In general we may say that arts in Europe aim at making a representation 
of an object (an inner idea or outer thing), while in East Asia they aim at 
the encounter with a michi or Tao by the enhanced artistic virtue formed 
through practice. The proof of quality in a Western artist will be the de-
velopment of his skill and the eternal beauty of his production. Japanese 
geidoh, in contrast, places less emphasis on works, and more on developing 
a way of life that puts the practitioner skillfully into nature or the Tao. No 
matter which “way” the Japanese practitioner devotes himself to, whether 
painting or flower arrangement or archery, the path converges on a similar 
goal, reached through ardent love and serious practice.
Chinese culture emphasizes the pleasures of the artistic life, and the joys 
it affords. It also gives more importance than Japanese culture to a mastery 
of life that is sometimes depicted as attaining the status of a supernatural 
Taoist immortal. The prototype of Japanese aesthetics, on the other hand, 
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focusses on the process of training, and the refinement this brings. Fol-
lowing the path is as important as reaching the goal.
Portions of this essay appeared in earlier my publications, mentioned 
in the footnotes.
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Joosik Min
Aesthetic Practice in the Life of East Asia: 
Fengliu or Elegant Life
Almost in East Asian countries, especially in Korea, we can easily encounter 
a scenic pavilion, named in “nujeong” (樓亭), looks like a picture, in any 
place where the beautiful scenery is unfolded. Many of them are located 
at the side of valley with clean water or at the top of precipitous cliff. This 
scenic pavilion in Korea is the place where cultivated men have discharged 
their intellectual activity and leisure entertainment. Gathering in the scenic 
pavilion, they have shared poetical sentiments, enjoyed entertainments, 
discoursed on administrative issues, pursued learning, and taught the 
youth of their native village. 
Many precede intellectuals have delighted in beautiful scenery, escap-
ing the vulgar reality of life. They have found spiritual pleasures in it and 
learned principles of nature from it. They have considered the scenic pa-
vilion as a part of nature, located apart from village and situated without 
fences. The elegance of life and the thinking of adapting to nature in Korean 
culture are derived from this way of life. The so-called literati culture and 
landscape culture are closely linked with this beautiful scenic pavilion. The 
scenic pavilion played various roles in reality of human life, such as appre-
ciation of nature, pursuit of study, human communication and relaxation. 
The scenic pavilion, as a space for “poongryu” (風流, fengliu in Chinese, 
furyu in Japanese) or elegant life, has an important humanistic meaning.
The scenic pavilion or nujeong is a good cultural heritage representing 
the Korean thoughts on art and life. Therefore, someone indicated that it is 
the essence of Korean traditional landscape architecture. The scenic pavilion 
assembles natural objects in a certain place so as to make beautiful scenery. 
It draws nature closer to its breast. It takes mountaintop and hillside on 
the back, and holds river and ravine in its arms. It is built in a scenic spot 
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where both the right and left sides and both the upper and lower sides are 
in harmony. Therefore, the scenic pavilion makes both the inner view and 
the outer view more abundant visually. The space of the scenic pavilion has 
played a role to cultivate individual personality and aesthetic sentiments. 
It has a humanistic significance for the hermit scholars, who are practicing 
self-education and life-long education, to realize the perfection of the self. 
1. East Asian Nujeong Culture
Everyone feels the allurement to go to see beautiful sceneries. When we are 
tired and stuffy of ordinary life, we want to take a view of natural landscape. 
On this account, our predecessors took pleasure in visiting a nujeong (樓亭) 
or scenic pavilion and appreciating the wonderful sceneries spread out 
around it. The scenic pavilion constitutes a beautiful landscape accompa-
nying the oneness with natural environment. The walls of scenic pavilion 
architecture are opened and simply composed of pillars. Thereupon, its 
inner space and outer space become one, and in this space we naturally 
become open-minded.
Nujeong is an artificial building within beautiful nature. It is a necessary 
space especially for literati’s elegant life and culture. Sitting in the scenic 
pavilion, literati has enjoyed the beautiful scenery around and associated 
with each other through writing poetry and prose. The prefecture with 
many scenic pavilions is properly famous for its natural beauty and poetic 
or literary culture. Jeong Inji (鄭麟趾, 1396–1478), a literati-governor in 
the early period of Joseon (朝鮮, 1392–1897) dynasty, said in his account 
of a journey to Gwanjeongnu (觀政樓) at Hampyeong (咸平) as following. 
“We can judge the right or wrong of the reign of a state and the growth and 
decline of a county as well by its nujeong.”1
If that is the case, we need to know who had played the leading role in 
nujeong culture. They are retired scholars or learned men. Nujeong is the 
place where cultivated men have discharged their intellectual activity and 
leisure entertainment. Gathering in nujeong, they have shared poetical 
sentiments, enjoyed entertainments, discoursed on administrative issues, 
pursued learning and taught the youth of their native village. 
To illuminate the formation and development or the circumstance of 
nujeong culture would be helpful for our understanding the history of 
Korean traditional culture. Even the naming of nujeong has a lot of impli-
cations of East Asian thoughts. 
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In case of Hamheojeong (涵虛亭), the Chinese character “ham” (涵) 
of means ‘get wet’ or “contain”, and “heo” (虛) has a similar concept of 
‘emptiness’ in Buddhism or ‘nothingness’ in Taoism. Once Chuang Tzu 
(莊子) said, “When our mind is empty, the ultimate way comes together 
of its own accord into our heart.”2 It means that if we get rid of earthly 
desires and thoughts from our mind, Tao(道) will fill up the vacant space.
2. Spatial Meaning of Nujeong
The term of “nujeong” (樓亭) indicates both “nu” (樓, lou in Chinese) and 
”jeon” (亭, ting in Chinese), at times called “jeongnu” (亭樓). It is not easy 
to differentiate “nu” and “jeong”. The one is usually a two-storied building 
with high and broad floor, which shows the dignity of high official culture. 
The other one is comparatively small in scale and simple in form, which 
shows the naivety of the culture of common intellectuals. Both of them 
are tile-roofed pavilions, mainly located outside house for the purpose of 
relaxation and excursion in broader sense. Generally, there are not any 
rooms and walls in nujeong. There are simply floors and several pillars so 
that one could take a view at a distance. 
We can conjecture that nujeong has been built since human being began 
to construct their dwelling houses. According to Chinese history Shiji 
(史記), the Emperor Huangdi (黃帝) had built “five castles and twelve 
pavilions” for the man-gods because that they want to live in the high 
scenic pavilion. In Korean history, we can find the first document on 
nujeong in the fifth century. 
Especially from the sixteenth century Confucian scholars erected a lot of 
nujeong with specific meaning. It was popular to build nujeong all around 
the country. The sphere of influence to make nujeong was established in 
this period. It was not any more the space simply for reciting poems and 
drinking liquor than the place to realize their lofty ideals and sincere aca-
demic inquiry. It was for them a place to contemplate nature and meditate 
on human affairs. The architectural style of nujeong was built up by the 
intellectual’s spiritual temperance and moderation of Confucian virtue.
There are two kinds of nujeong, namely the nueong in garden and the 
nujeong in nature.3[1] The one is located inside of the artificial garden of 
palace, governmental office and private house. It has played a role for leisure 
so often, as an attached building. The other one is located in a scenic spot 
outside, borrowing beautiful landscape of nature. This type of nujeong is 
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situated on the hills even alone where one can enjoy the natural sentiments, 
or on the riverside where vivid pine trees stand in line unchangeably dur-
ing four seasons. 
Further, we can divide four types of nujeong in accordance with the 
geographical location. Firstly, river or valley side type. We can take a view 
of landscape performed by valley water, white sandy riverside, and the 
moon reflected in water. Secondly, pond side type. It makes harmony with 
the surrounding nature, located in the middle or the side of pond or lake. 
Thirdly, the mountaintop type. It is located in the high place such as hills 
and ridge of mountain harmonizing with the surrounding forests. Fourthly, 
the inside house type. It mainly appeared in villa or cottage rather than in 
general dwelling house. It brings about a good outlook of abundant rural 
landscape.
Among these, the first type is most popular in Korea. In valley side region, 
trees are thick, and the rocks are clean. On this account the hermitlike 
intellectuals loves the place a lot. Korean literati considered the flowing 
water not simply as a kind of natural beauty but as a body containing the 
ultimate substance Tao. The valley was not simply topographical site but 
recognized as a spiritual world. They liked to build a nujeong alongside 
the valley and river, and speculated on the basic problems of human being 
and the principles of nature by contemplating the water there. 
If we go to the beautiful places, we can always encounter with nujeong. 
However, Korean nujeong doesn’t stand out barely or strikingly. It is lo-
cated gently and quietly in accordance with the surrounding environment. 
It becomes one with rocks, trees and water. There is a nujeong called as 
Shikyeong-jeong (息影亭) in Damyang (潭陽) povince. The name was 
originated “cheo-um- shik-yeong” (處陰息影) which means “If we are 
placed in the shade, our shadows disappear. If we come to a stop quietly, 
our footprint doesn’t remain.”4 This passage pronounces the valuable teach-
ing of human virtue. 
3. Cultural Role of Nujeong
The origins of nujeong’s name are different and various. We can divide 
the sources of name in several kinds. Firstly, there is a lot of name related 
with surrounding nature. For example, it borrows from the name of rock 
on which the nujeong is built. And it comes from the name of river, pond, 
lake, river and sea around it. Yeongwol-lu (迎月樓) means welcoming the 
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first moon in the night, and Yeolwoon-jeong (悦雲亭) means pleasing the 
dancing clouds. Further, it comes from the name of animals and plants, for 
example imaginary symbolic animals like phoenix and dragon and turtle, 
crane, common gull, and the Four Gentleman, which compares to Confu-
cianist “goonja” (君子, junziin Chinese) or “gentlemen”, namely the plum 
blossoms, the orchid, the chrysanthemum and the bamboo, and the pine 
tree and the lotus. Besides, there are names from the comprehensive taste 
for great nature, not for confined to specific individual things in nature, 
for example Chuigyeong-ru (聚景樓) or Assembling Sceneries Pavilion. 
Secondly, there are many names come from pen name of noted persons. 
Descendants named the nujeong after the pen name of their forefather. If circum-
stances require, the name of nujeong become the pen name of the erector such 
as Song-gang-jeong (松江亭) and Myeonang-jeong (俛仰亭). Thirdly, it comes 
from the Chinese phrases or ancient sayings. For example, Doksoo-jong (獨守
亭) from Li Bai’s (李白) poem reciting the lofty virtue of a hermit intellectual.
There are a lot of wooden tablets in nujeong. We can differentiate them 
in two kinds. The one outside is a signboard indicating its name in the 
upper front, and the other ones inside are documentary writing boards 
on its history and the boards of poetry which is reciting beautiful scener-
ies and human feelings. They were written in various styles by the famous 
calligraphers of those times. 
Nujeong has become a central facility for the landscape of garden and 
nature in Joseon dyasty. Although it was simple and naïve in form, it played 
an important role as the place to improve one’s leisure. According to Sejong 
Shillog Jiriji (世宗實錄地理志), there were slightly 60 nujeong in the year 
of 1454, but its number has increased greatly to 553 in Shinjyng Dongguk 
Yeojisyngram (新增東國輿地勝覽) which was written in the year of 
1530. This shows that it was very popular to make nujeong at that time. 
Regionally it was concentrated in southern province linked with summer-
ing, amusement, poetical circle and appreciation of landscape. Nujeong 
has various cultural functions for a long time. The most important one is 
the role of mediator to make the beholder united with true self through 
sensual interchange with surrounding nature. 
4. Nujeong and Poongryu or Elegant Life
Summarizing the various function of nujeong, its core meaning is the 
space for “poongryu” (風流) or “elegant life”. The major constituent ele-
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ments of the concept of poongryu are individuality, nature, arts and play. 
Nujeong plays a good vehicle encouraging these elements. Thus it is eas-
ily interlinked with composition of poem, song and music, and drinking. 
A scholar and poet of Goryeo dynasty Lee Gyubo (李奎報), a lover of 
nujeong, mentioned as following.
“High spot and opened space alone cannot fulfill the condition of scenic 
pavilion jeong (亭). The value of jeong is not confined to the architecture. 
It can be completed by accompanying with a lute-player, a singer, a poetic 
talent, a monk, and a chess player. The proper taste of jeong demands to 
match well these guests with the host together with.”5
In this sense, nujeong is called a valuable place that is central to poon-
gryu culture. 
Poongryu is a free and unrestrained spirit like a stream of wind. Its freedom 
can be displayed not only in the attitude on the politics and society, but also in 
the realm of the literature and the tastes. Furthermore it can be displayed in 
the relation with the opposite sex and in the way of life. In short, the free life 
of human being provided with the free surroundings and high dignity is no 
other than poongryu. Poongryu is the core concept of East Asian aesthetics.
The main contents of poongryu are enumerated as the discovery of 
beauty of the individuality, the returning to the pastoral nature in order 
to liberate one’s own inner nature, the respect for the artistic beauty which 
represents the artist’s individual spirits, and the play or enjoyment of the 
nobility. Poongryu has the intent to enhance the ordinary life to the aes-
thetic state or the world of art. Therefore the full content of poongryu is 
nothing but the aesthetic way of life.
We could make various gesture in nujeong, namely to eat and drink, re-
pose and play, teach and learn, talk with, sing a song and recite a poem etc. 
We usually strive to be free from the ordinary life in the space of nujeong. 
The men of poongryu had enjoyed a nap in nujeong, when a breeze passes 
through at high-noon and the surroundings become calm like underwater. 
They were steeped in the correspondence with the bright moonlight lean-
ing to its railings. Sometimes they talked with each other drinking liquor, 
and indulged in subtle and profound world of literature when the convivial 
mood proceeds to the poetical inspiration.
Nujeong is a good place for reading, escaped from vulgar customs. 
A great scholar of the late Joseon dynasty Song Siyeol (宋時烈, 1607–1689) 
once borrowed a vacant jeong from his friend and read books gently alone 
to be awakened spiritually. “When I was in crowded places, I have heard 
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everyday only the quarrel on right or wrong of political affairs and ascent 
and descent of the official position. In those circumstances, I could not 
read any book to pass away my life idly.”6 Nujeong was for him a place of 
seclusion and a hermitage. 
Intellectuals who knew poongryu were fond of drinking. Drinking is 
comparable to the behavior and livelihood of great poets like Tao Qian 
(陶潛), Du Fu (杜甫), and Li Bai (李白), and then the poetic inspira-
tion was correlated easily with the liquor that is a kind of companions of 
poongryu. Nujeong became a remarkable place for poongryu where many 
people enjoy and entertain altogether. 
Men of influence of the province sometimes held a party and a frater-
nity in nujeong with a certain justification for the provincial inhabitants. 
Through this convivial meeting, their mind becomes pleasant, and then 
the discretion and sympathy with others grow up. As above mentioned, 
nujeong was a refined meeting place sharing the beautiful nature, a her-
mit place to satisfy the reading and retired life, and a productive place to 
cultivate the artistic culture like poetry.
5. Aesthetic Significance of Nujeong Culture
Everyone feels the temptation to search for the beautiful nature which is 
showing the vivid change of four seasons. Moreover, when one is tired or 
stuffy in ordinary life, one intends to visit the opened natural environment. 
That is why our ancestors were estranged from vulgar society and visit 
to nujeong in order to appreciate natural landscape. Nujeong is a good 
cultural heritage representing the Korean thoughts on art and life. There-
fore, someone indicated that nujeong is the essence of Korean traditional 
landscape architecture. 
Nujeong makes beautiful scenery, not opposing to nature but becom-
ing oneness with nature. We recognize that in its space the inside and the 
outside become oneness, because the wall sides of nujeong are opened, 
composed of pillars alone, This kind of spatial structure is most exceedingly 
suitable for enjoying beautiful sceneries, for example, a cool breeze and 
a bright moon. In this place, we can easily have opened minds.
Nujeong assembles natural objects in a certain place so as to make 
beautiful scenery. It draws nature closer to its breast. It takes mountaintop 
and hillside on the back and holds river and ravine in its arms. Nujeong 
is built in a scenic spot where both the right and left sides and both the 
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upper and lower sides are in harmony. Therefore, nujeong makes both the 
inner view and the outer view more abundant visually.
However, it is more important than these formal elements that how much 
the nu or jeonghas poetry or poetical heritage. Admirable nujeong with 
a long history takes pride in its pillars permeated with prose and poetry. 
Accordingly, anyone who is ignorant of poery doesn’t know the elegance 
of nujeong. Without poetry, the color of nujeong justly fades. Nujeong is 
a specific place with poetical culture. Its dignity becomes greater by reciting 
poems. The pleasure in nujeong consist both in the landscape unfolded in 
front of us and in finding the poetic state originated from it.
Song Soon (宋純, 1493–1583), a lyric poet of Joseon dynasty, recited in 
his Myeonangjeong Ode (俛仰亭歌) as following. 
I have erected a scenic pavilion beside a broad and flat rock, 
plowing into the grove of pine trees and bamboos. 
Just like a blue crane stretching radiantly two wings, 
taking to the air far away.7 
The poet recites the beauty of nature and the pleasurable taste amusing it. 
We can read the state of mind of the poet who would like to attain spiritual 
enlightenment through appreciating the nature and projecting his idea into 
it. The main function of nujeong has been basically the appreciation of the 
beautiful landscape immersing with its pleasurable taste.
The space of nujeong has played a role to cultivate individual personality 
and aesthetic sentiments. It has a humanistic significance for the hermit 
scholars, who are practicing self-education and life-long education, to real-
ize perfection of self. They utilized the place for enlarging their knowledge 
and deepening their discernment, and debating the state of political affairs 
to search for vision of the future, in the quiet and beautiful environment 
after their retirement from official life. And they utilized the place for pu-
rification of mind and turning spare time to good account, such as reciting 
poems and practicing calligraphy. 
Now, we need a new paradigm of education grounded on the idea of 
recovery of humanity and harmonious life. An alternative plan could be 
self–cultivation and self-education which improve and build up oneself 
through introspection. Nujeong could be a good vehicle which can furnish 
such an environment and condition. 
Nujeong must be, still now for us, a valuable place where we can recover 
our sensibility and ensure a genuine “perspective of life,”8 [2] in the midst 
of looking up the sky and the cloud, facing the sunbeam and the shade, 
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feeling the wind and the water, and lifting one’s eyes to the moon and the 
stars. Nujeog is an ideal space for our physical and spiritual repose and 
leisure in our healthy livelihood. 
6. Poongryu as a Basic Concept of East Asian Aesthetics
Generally the name of aesthetics is considered as a branch of philosophy 
which has been shaped and developed in the European countries, and its 
main subjects have been beauty, fine arts and sensual cognition. However, 
there is no guarantee that the concepts of beauty and fine arts for Western 
people are necessary in accord with those for Eastern people. Moreover 
the concepts of beauty and fine arts in the West were not fixed, and they 
were changed continuously in history. 
Therefore when we East Asian people study our own traditional aes-
thetics today, it is more fruitful not so much to pay attention to the 
translated words of beauty or fine arts used in the Western language 
as to find out our own concepts equivalent to the Western concepts in 
the role. We cannot assert that the words such as beauty and fine arts 
are the main concepts in East Asian aesthetics. At least in Korean tradi-
tional thoughts the values and phenomena of beauty and fine arts were 
not dealt with in their own way, but regarded and treated of as relating 
strongly to other values and phenomena. Especially they were linked 
together morals or ethics, and still more sometimes subordinated to 
them according to circumstances.
In this viewpoint I would like to notice of poongryu as a methodologi-
cal concept of East Asian aesthetics which comprise three main aspects of 
aesthetic study such as beauty, fine arts and sensual cognition. In Eastern 
thoughts the concept of poongryu is able to integrate the various aspects 
of aesthetic problems. It has been to be conscious of in the historical de-
velopment in East Asian classical aesthetics incessantly. In this reason, 
poongryu is to be called the basic concept founding East Asian aesthetics.
Poongryu (or fengliuin Chinese and furyu in Japanese) means ‚the 
stream of wind’ in the literal sense of the word. It implies to give full play 
to one’s free-spirited and extravagant mind with full scope. Once when 
Confucius asked to his pupils about their hope in the future, Zi-lu replied 
to rescue the country from danger as a politician, Ran You to raise the 
wealth of the people as an economic person and Gong-Xi Hua to become 
a government official. Only Zeng Xi didn’t reply. Then the Master asked 
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again to him. Zeng Xi said, at the end of spring, when the making of the 
Spring Clothes has been completed, to go with five or six newly-capped 
youths and six or seven uncapped boys, perform the lustration in the 
river I, take the air at the Rain Dance altars, and then go home singing. 
The Master heaved a deep sigh and said, I am with Zeng Xi. Poongryu 
is such Zeng Xi’s mind as breaking off relations with the trivialities of 
ordinary life.
This free and extravagant spirit can be displayed not only in the attitude 
on politics and society but also in the realm of literature and taste. Further-
more it can be displayed in the relation with the opposite sex and in the 
way of life. In short, the life of a freeman sharing in the benefit of the unre-
strainedness of environment and the loftiness of personality is to be called 
poongryu. To enjoy a hermit’s life and to be excellent in “quintan” (淸談)
or the clean discourse are good examples of fengliu. The disposition of the 
clean discourse became “xuanxue” (玄學) or the profound philosophy by 
combining with the Buddhism, and then the profound philosophy devel-
oped to be the Zen-Buddhistic philosophy (禪) so that it made a tradition 
of poongryu in the side of mind. Poongryu has the tendency to enhance 
the ordinary life to the aesthetic state or the world of art. Therefore, the 
full content of poongryu is nothing but the aesthetic way of life.
7. Transition of the Concept of Poongryu
The implications of poongryu have been modified variously with the change 
of times. The original meaning in China implied simply a custom handed 
down from the preceding King. In Han period (BC. 206–AD. 220) the 
meaning was changed to be a laudable and beautiful custom in policy and 
education. And then it has been used to judge the merit of a person, to 
qualify the attitude of life and to designate the doctrine of artistic beauty. 
And next on the one hand it implied the beauty of natural scenery and 
human appearance, and on the other hand it signified the aesthetic life 
with taste. 
The concept of poongryu as a kind of expression of aesthetic conscious-
ness was widespread in the period of Wei Jin (AD. 3–4 C.). It is natural 
that poongryu should come into being from the influence of Taoism which 
was a foothold of that period. Many Taoists primarily have elucidated the 
aesthetic way of life. We can find an example in the famous chapter Let 
Fancy Roam in Chuang Tzu. Poongryu came to be nearer to the aesthetic 
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idea as an artistic and tasteful life, which was supported, formed and de-
veloped by the luxurious life of clan. In this way the concept of poongryu 
was breeding as an aesthetic idea in Jin period.
The purport of poongryu became almost same as that of the word ya (雅)
or elegance which is opposite to su (俗) or vulgarism. In the sixth century 
in China the meaning of fengliu changed again to be voluptuous beauty. 
We can find many examples in the poems of Yu Tai Xin Yong Ji which was 
one of the best anthologies compiled in those days. 
The meaning of the word fengliu has changed variously. In the Chinese 
dictionary Pei Wen Yun Fu (佩文韻府) the most of the usages of fengliu 
appeared in Chinese classical writings are enumerated. The usages are rear-
ranged in seven kinds in a modern dictionary Ci Yuan (辭源). They are as 
follows: First, the remnants of beautiful custom. Second, the physical appear-
ance or the attitude of a man. Third, grace or dignity. Fourth, the brilliance 
of beautiful scenery. Fifth, go against etiquette, to make one’s own style and 
to express something different from ordinary people. Sixth, the unusual 
spiritual ability. Seventh, to call at the place where prostitute girls live in. 
If we reexamine above contents, we can find that the first usage denotes 
the flowing of the beautiful customs made by preceding King. It means the 
tradition of morals and customs which aim at the realization of moral and 
political culture based on ‘the Way of King’. In short we interpret it as good 
customs among the people or as the beautiful customs of the world. The 
second and third usages signify the individually preeminent character or 
dignity, and further signify the visible appearance in which the character and 
the dignity were manifested externally. Consequently it means the attitude of 
life which shows human merits in a broad sense. In some cases we can regard 
it as grace of work of art in general because it designates the style or norm 
of music. The fourth usage signifies the existence of the aesthetic qualities 
which can be discovered in the attributes of natural things. For example the 
aesthetic quality of elegance in the long drooping branches of a willow tree 
is the case. The fifth and the sixth usage mean the spiritual state which is 
super-mundane, extraordinary, lofty and graceful. It is the aspect of cultured 
elegance free from the trammels of ordinary life. It signifies the greatness of 
not only moral mentality but also artistic and literary cultivation. In short it 
is a refined and graceful literati taste. The seventh is a transferred meaning 
in particular which imply the amorousness.
The general usages of poongryu are mentioned above. The basic meaning 
supporting those usages, in brief, signifies the existence of spiritual value. 
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The content was mainly political and educational at first, gradually spread 
to the sphere of moral and aesthetic value, and eventually to the site of 
customs, individuals, natural things and works of art all over the world. 
8. Conclusion
Recently a Japanese writer Fujiwara Shigekazu wrote a book on poongryu 
or furyu. He tried to suggest poongryu as a model of ecological life while 
he was inquiring into the structure of poongryu.9 According to him, the 
factors supporting the structure of poongryu are as follows: unrestrained 
posture, play, surplus, open mind and body, and detachment. And in 
the bottom of these factors nature is permeated deeply. Consequently 
poongryu is come-and-go to boundaries at one’s pleasure unrestrained 
by both the subject and the object. It is a borderless reconciliation not 
being involved in the distinction between the subject and the object. It is 
a correspondence with all things in nature through the mind of playful-
ness. It is a way of living i.e. a free detachment which always is used to 
contact with the things and leave its direction to wind, opening the mind 
and body to all things. 
It is just the time that we have to make a new life model or life manners 
grounded on the ethics covering the whole ecosystem which consists of all 
living creatures. At this time I hope that the manners of poongryu, which 
might be called the poetics of correspondence with all things in ecosystem, 
will be resuscitated quietly. I think the ecological implication of poongryu 
is very important in present time. I expect the idea of poongryu will play 
an important role as a model of ecological life and still more as a model of 
way of life which is able to cultivate our personality grounded on the true 
subjectivity of human existence.
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Chen-Chu Chen
Examining the Art Practices and Self-cultivation 
in Traditional East Asia: Zhu Xi and Ogyū Sorai 
on the Confucian Rites and Music
1. Introduction
In pre-modern East Asia, the word of “art” did not have the same mean-
ing as that of today; art in the present day refers to visual and performing 
arts, while art in ancient time even included skills such as archery and 
fortune-telling. In fact, when people practiced arts, such as music or po-
etry, they recognized their actions from different perspectives and give 
them different significances from ours. The Confucian rites and music 
(禮樂, Li-Yue) was adopted widely in China, Korean, Japan, Vietnam 
and so on. Often considered together with poetry (詩, shi) and history 
(書, shu), they were used to describe the ideas and practices of art. Rites, 
music, poetry and history seem so heterogeneous that it may be difficult 
to see them as inherently and closely related to one another. But in Con-
fucianism they are indeed closely linked with each other. Analyzing the 
relations between these topics is a productive way to examine the view 
of art in pre-modern East Asia. But so far only a handful of researchers 
focus on this issue.1
This essay compares the philosophy of rites and music of Zhu Xi(朱熹, 
1130–1200) and Ogyū Sorai(荻生徂徠, 1666–1728). As two of the most 
influential philosophers in China and Japan, their views were of fundamen-
tal importance to the idea of art in pre-modern East Asia. Comparing their 
theories about rites and music helps us grasp some common characteristics 
of how people recognized arts and artistic activities in the past. In the fol-
lowing, I first describe the basic features of the Confucian rites and music.
in the context of major East Asian philosophical traditions. Then I offer 
a comprehensive overview of Zhu Xi’s and Ogyū Sorai’s philosophies. With 
these larger contexts established, I discuss the differences and similarities 
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between the two philosophers’ views on the arts to illustrate a distinct 
conception of art and its significance in traditional East Asia.
2. The Basic Characteristics of the Rites and Music
What are the characteristics of the rites and music? They can be illustrated 
by some comparisons.
The question of what the contents and forms of arts are and ought to 
be depends on how people think of the essence of arts. While Western 
European art emphasizes making a point and sees autonomy as one of its 
core beliefs, most (traditional) East Asian arts, in contrast, focus on self-
cultivation. The latter’s audience pay more attention to the practitioners 
than their artworks. What really matters is the process of self-cultivation 
itself as well as the methods adopted by the practitioner in the process.
Most of the ideas of East Asian arts were influenced by Buddhism, Tao-
ism and Confucianism.
Buddhism values the achievement of the discovery and the elimination of 
all suffering.2 Daily walking, standing, sitting, and lying down are all parts 
of an important process for this achievement. Some practices of arts, such 
as poetry writing, tea ceremony, music making (like shakuhachi 尺八, 
a Japanese bamboo flute) are also considered as ways of attaining this 
achievement. The practice of arts is a part of everyday life. People believe 
it would help attain the enlightenment.3
In Taoism (Daojia , the philosophy based on the texts of the Daode-
jing (道德經) and the Zhuangzi (莊子) ), the core is Tao (道), which means 
“the Way.” Wing-tsit Chan explains that:
Whereas in other schools Tao means a system or moral truth, in this it is the 
One, which is natural, eternal, spontaneous, nameless, and indescribable. 
It is at once the beginning of all things and the way in which all things pursue 
their course. When this Tao is possessed by individual things, it becomes its 
character or virtue [de]. As the way of life, it denotes simplicity, spontane-
ity, tranquility, weakness, and most important of all, non-action (wu-wei). 
By the latter is not meant literally “inactivity” but rather “taking no action 
that is contrary to nature” – in other words, letting Nature take its course.4
In Taoism, all individuals have and can find immanent Tao in themselves.5 
People are required to become “wu-wei” (無爲) or “weiwu wei” (為無爲). 
It means actions without actions, or just to follow the flow of the universe 
without any individual will, because the universe works harmoniously ac-
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cording to its own way and people must place themselves in harmony in the 
natural universe.6 Under these beliefs, the idea of “the great note is rarefied in 
sound (大音希聲)”7 has become the aesthetic standard and the innocence 
and the individual nature of practitioners have become the goal of creation.8
In contrast to Buddhism and Taoism, Confucianism emphasizes social 
relations. In Confucianism, the nature of an individual is examined in the 
context of social relations. Ruler and the ruled, son and father, younger 
brother and older one, wife and husband, and between friends are five 
fundamental social relationships. Confucianism firmly believes that the 
maintenance of these five social relationships makes the country prosper-
ous and harmonious. Therefore, the goal of education is to assist each in-
dividual with realizing the harmony of the five social relationships. Rites, 
music, Poetry, history or Liu-yi (六藝, the six subjects of ancient Chinese 
education: rites, music, archery (射), chariot riding(御), calligraphy or 
literacy (書), and arithmetic(數)) are elements of the education established 
to help individuals achieve this goal.
From the perspective of creativity and individual development, the 
above-mentioned artistic ideas of Confucianism are not attractive. How-
ever, it can not to be denied that social relationships are important parts 
of individual development. Confucian ideas of art may provide a different 
perspective to rethink the relationship between the arts and social life. 
What is the ideal individual who can fulfill the ideal social relations? What 
should the contents and significance of the arts be in order to help each 
person to become such an ideal individual? In fact, through responding 
to the above-mentioned questions Confucian philosophers had renewed 
and revised the contents and significance of the Confucian rites and music 
to respond to the challenges and changes of their times. The practice and 
philosophy of rites and music therefore have different meanings in various 
historical periods and regions.
3. Zhu Xi on the Role of Poetry, Rites and Music
Zhu Xi was an important Song Dynasty scholar who is considered the 
most important exponent of Neo-Confucianism. His teachings and writ-
ings have greatly influenced philosophers of Korea and Japan as well. Here 
I begin with outlining Zhu’s metaphysics, and then discuss the types of 
poetry, rites and music Zhu created for someone who wants to become 
an ideal individual.
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Zhu’s metaphysics is that everything contains  li  (sometimes trans-
lated as rational principle or law; 理) and qi (sometimes translated as 
vital force; 氣). Li  is the principle of everything. It represents what and 
why things should be.9 Furthermore, it is intrinsic in the individual 
mind.10 When a person realizes li, he/she becomes tranquil rather than 
anxious (思慮紛擾).11 He/she also becomes conscious and insightful (虛
明洞徹, 寂然不動).12 Li elevates an individual to the state of “following 
the Tao calmly without deliberation” (不待思勉而從容中道).13 When 
an individual attains this state, he/she becomes omniscient. “Because of 
the inherent li, each individual can be aware of everything’s li through their 
mind (以其理之同, 故以一人之心, 而於天下萬物之理無不能知).14 In 
addition, because of the comprehension of li, each individual spontaneously 
acts in perfect accordance with morality. For Zhu, the practice of morality 
is the foundation for achieving ideal social relations. Efforts of individuals 
contribute to the prosperity of the state and peaceful lives.15
The practice of morality is, without a doubt, the core principle in Zhu’s 
metaphysics but it does not mean that Zhu advocates ignoring or repressing 
individual’s feelings or will. The realization of ideal social relations depends 
on voluntary willingness and acts of individuals. It is assumed that each 
individual has the natural willingness and capacity to pursue morality. 
Yet, qi takes an individual away from li. Qi is also a part of everything. It 
creates features and differences in everything. Nonetheless, it obscures our 
perfect moral nature.16 In order to clean our qi, Zhu turns his attention 
to human beings’ desires. The task of poetry, rites and music is to restrain 
excessive or inappropriate desires.
Different from the influential ancient philosophy of music contained 
in the Record of Music (樂記) and the Discourse of Music (樂論篇), which 
only emphasize the function of rites and music in maintaining the social 
hierarchy, Zhu adds poetry to the rites and music and believes that it would 
create a new form of personalized education. As mentioned before, for 
Zhu, the realization of  li depends on voluntary willingness and acts of 
each individual. Therefore, Zhu suggests three aspects of study which 
represent the three stages of learning for the inspiration of such willing-
ness and acts by which excessive and unsatisfied desires can be controlled.
The first stage is the study of poetry. More specifically, it is the study 
of the Classic of Poetry (詩經; or Book of Odes, the first anthology of Chinese po-
etry). Zhu insists that the Classic of Poetry was edited by sages and reflects 
desires of individuals.17 For Zhu, the composition of poetry is defined as below:
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Where there is desire, contemplation would ensue. Where there is contem-
plation, discourse would follow. Where there is discourse, yet words are 
inadequate and exclamations deficient, natural sounds and rhythm would 
ceaselessly resonate. This why poetry is composed.
(夫既有欲矣, 則不能無思。既有思矣, 則不能無言。既有言矣, 則言
之所不能盡、而發於咨嗟詠嘆之餘者, 必有自然之音響節奏而不能
已焉。此詩之所以作也。)18
Human desires inevitably bring forth their satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 
which in turns arouse people’s feelings, such as happiness, anger, grief or 
joy. Naturally, people would want to express these feelings with language. 
But sometimes language is not enough to express these feelings properly. 
Therefore, with suitable sounds and rhythm, poetry is created to express 
such feelings. Studying poetry helps one understand various desires and 
feelings so that the good and the evil of human desires can be understood, 
and his/her conscience can therefore be stimulated.19
The second stage is the study of rites. In Zhu’s opinion, the individual cannot 
live without the desire because of human’s bodily nature: Because human 
beings are formed with flesh and blood, the pursuit of satisfaction of the 
five senses cannot be avoided. 
(人有是身, 則耳目口體之間, 不能無私欲之累。)20
People naturally seek physical satisfaction, so rites are used to restrain 
oneself when the pursuit of physical satisfaction becomes excessive and in-
appropriate. However, rites do not mean mandatory conventions. Rites 
should always be in accord with  li, the universal principles of nature, 
and are formed with various etiquette and ritual:
Rites are the etiquette and ritual of li, and the rules of human lives.
(禮者, 天理之節文, 人事之儀則也。)21
Through etiquette and ritual inspirations an individual would voluntarily 
behave himself/herself in accordance with li.22
The final stage is the study of music. Zhu stresses the importance of 
feelings in order to achieve li and believes the study of music can motivate 
people to practice li actively. Zhu has two viewpoints on feelings. First, 
every act of an individual responds to specific feelings. He emphasizes that 
an individual should express his/her real feelings, whether these feelings 
are positive or not. Zhu insists that “everything cannot go without feelings, 
like pleasure, anger, sadness and joy. When these feelings are directed in its 
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own way, then li is realized” (世間何事不係在喜怒哀樂上。…中略…即
這喜怒中節處，便是實理流行).23 Second, Zhu insists that a positive at-
titude is useful to encourage people to practice li. He says:
If an individual practices li with joy, tiredness would not ensue and progress 
would be made.
(若是中心樂為善, 自無厭倦之意, 而有日進之益。)24
More importantly for this essay’s purpose, Zhu maintains that the ideal 
music has the power to develop the said positive attitude and thereby 
encourage people to practice li.25
Music cultivates the moral virtue of people, making them tranquil without 
disharmony and unhappiness. This is the function of music at the final stage.
(涵養德性, 無斯須不和不樂, 直恁地和平, 便是『成於樂』之功。)26
People can practice li naturally through music. For Zhu, the study of 
poetry, rites and music is joyful:
The sage created the study of poetry, rites and music, which makes students 
happy and willingly continue to seek li.
(聖人做出這一件物事來, 使學者聞之, 自然懽喜, 情願上這一条路去。)27 
To sum up, Zhu’s philosophy of poetry, rites and music is based on his 
understanding of human desires. By studying poetry, rites and music, 
people become fully aware of their desires and learn how to control them. 
As a result, li is eventually realized. For Zhu, the core of poetry, rites and 
music is to help people realize li.
4. The Poetry, History(書, shu), Rites and Music 
in Ogyū Sorai’s Thought
The philosophy of poetry and music of Ogyū Sorai , who was one of the 
great philosophers in Edo Japan (1603–1867), had a profound influence on 
the development and ideology of arts for the upper class of his time. His 
philosophy of poetry inspired the refinement of Edo poetry.28 His philosophy 
of music also inspired the reform of gagaku (雅楽, ancient Japanese imperial 
court music and dances) and paved the way for the development of Minshin-
gaku (明清楽, the Chinese Folk songs from the Ming-Qing period) in Japan.29 
Sorai claimed his philosophy is based on ancient Chinese Confucianism and 
is heavily influenced by its rites and music. He argued that unlike his con-
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temporaries, only his philosophy is faithful to the ancient rites and music. 
However, a careful comparison between Sorai’s philosophy and the Record 
of Music (樂記) or the Discourse of Music (樂論篇) clearly shows that his 
ideas are different from those in the ancient texts.30 Sorai’s philosophy of the 
rites and music is based on his political ideology as well as metaphysics, 
which were formed in response to the economic and political crisis under 
the Tokugawa Bakufu (徳川幕府, the Edo period).31
Most studies agree that Sorai developed his own philosophy of rites and 
music by criticizing the School of Zhu Xi,32 but his critique was only osten-
sible. Sorai’s main concern was the social system of Japan and the self-cul-
tivation of samurai, the ruling class of the Edo period. He maintained that 
samurais’ study of the School of Zhu Xi overemphasized the aggressiveness 
of warriors and forgot their duty was to rule the country.33 Sorai euphe-
mistically voices his concern as follows:
The ruling class (samurai) has their own customs. The customs are consid-
ered as the Tao (道), the way of life and ruling country. Based on the Tao, the 
ruling class values bravery, loyalty, faith, honor and does not treasure their 
lives. …This is the wrong influence of studying Cheng and Zhu Neo-Con-
fucianism.
(この方の士大夫、おのづから一種の風習ありて、その道と以為へり。
大氐、勇を尚び信義を尚び、名を重んじ生を軽んず。…学者、程朱
の学に従事して、多く誤る所ある者も、またこれに緣るが故のみ。)34
How to rule the country is the core issue of Sorai’s thoughts on rites and 
music. He emphasizes the importance of uniting and utilization of the 
power of people, regardless of their classes. He says that “The Tao of the 
sage and Confucius is the way of ruling the country well. The Ruling of 
a country cannot just rely on one person; it needs power from each indi-
vidual.”(それ先王・孔子の道は、天下を安んずるの道なり。天下
を安んずるは、一人の能くなす所に非ず。必ず衆力を得て以てこ
れを成す。 )35
Based on this idea, Sorai defines the ideal ruling class and the purpose 
of self-cultivation through rites and music as follows:
The ruler is one who can combine the power of the millions. The Tao of the saint36 
is the way of assisting the ruler to develop his innate ability of loving for people.
(故に能く億万人を合する者は君なり。能く億万人を合して、その
親愛生養の性を遂げしむる者は、先王の道なり。)34
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In Sorai’s opinion, the study of history is the core of self-cultivation. The 
specified textbook is the Book of Documents (書經, Shūjīng, one of the 
Five Classics and a compilation of speeches of major figures and records 
of events in ancient China), which teaches political principles to the future 
ruler. The Book is difficult to understand, so the study of poetry, rites and 
music is to help the ruler to understand the Book of Documents.35 
Moreover, Sorai adopts a special classification to explain the role and 
content of the study of poetry, history, rites and music. Sometimes his 
“rites” denote both rite and music. And the word Gi (義) means the study 
of poetry and history.36 Sorai says:
Use rites to control the mind. Use Gi to deal with everything. Use rites 
to keep routines. Use Gi to respond to changes. 
(礼は以て心を制し、義は以て事を制す。礼は以て常を守り、義は
以て変に応ず。)37
What is Gi? Sorai’s explanation of Gi is as follows: 
Things are greatly different. Each has its own way…. Therefore Gi is estab-
lished to lead everything to go its own way.
(千差万別、おのおの宜しき所あり。…故に立てて以て義となす所
の者は、千差万別にいて、おのおのその宜しきに合す。)38
Therefore,  one  can say that the study of history and poetry is to 
help the ruler make everything go its own way. While studying history 
provides the ruler with political principles, studying poetry helps the rul-
er understand the feelings of others because poetry records the feelings 
of human beings.39 Additionally, since the poetry is written with suc-
cinct and beautiful words, it helps the ruler express himself appropri-
ately. Understanding the feelings of others and making appropriate expres-
sions would help the ruler establish proper relationship with the ruled.40 
Through these two studies, the ruler learns how to deal with everything 
and respond to changes, then let everything go its own way.
What does it mean to use rites to control the mind and to keep rou-
tines? The definition of rites and music of Sorai is as follows:
Rites and music are the norms of ethics of the ruling class. The ethics makes 
the rulers behaves as rulers. 
(礼楽なる者は徳の則なり。徳なる者は己を立つる所以なり。)41
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Sorai’s rites are established to help the ruler appropriately govern its peo-
ple. Adopting appropriate etiquette is to respect the ruled, and the ruled 
would be encouraged to voice themselves and show their loyalty to the 
ruler.42 He believes that when the ruler employs the solemn etiquette to 
govern, people would become solemn as well.
The study of music is established to help the ruler understand the opin-
ions of the ruled. Sorai’s music is a form of ensemble in which all players 
play the same melody with different pitches. Student-musicians learn to 
maintain their own pitches, but at the same time they must listen to other 
student-musicians’ pitches to make the music. The ruler is thereby trained 
in the ensemble to listen to others’ opinions.43 Through rites and music 
the ruler is well prepared to control his mind and then govern the country.
In sum, the study of history provides political principles for rulers. The 
study of poetry helps rulers understand feelings of the people. The study of 
rites and music shape rulers’ conducts and trains them to respect and accept 
opinions of others. For Sorai, the purpose of this comprehensive learning 
process, and of the arts in particular, is to “assist the ruler to develop their 
innate ability to love others”. And through this process, the ruler would 
become an ideal ruler, who “can unite the power of the millions.”
5. Conclusion
This brief discussion of the ideas of Zhu Xi and Ogyū Sorai shows that 
their central concern is the conditions under which the realization of ideal 
politics is possible. It is also the paramount theme in their philosophies 
with regards to the arts. But the audience to whom they speak is not the 
same. Zhu’s words are uttered, in principle, to all people. Sorai, on the other 
hand, addresses only the rulers. While Zhu tries to establish a universal 
and general learning process through which one can realize politics based 
on li, Sorai focuses on how to cultivate ideal rulers’ class. Therefore, poetry, 
rites and music have different content and significance in their respective 
philosophies and political thoughts. For Zhu, studying poetry, rites and 
music is a process helping people to be aware of their desires and learn how 
to control them. It is a relatively inward and individual-oriented exercise. 
For Sorai, studying history, poetry, rites and music is to equip the ruling 
class with political principles, the ability to understanding feelings of others, 
and the willingness to listen to and respect the opinions of others; the arts 
therefore have a more explicit and direct political purpose.
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But their ideas also share the same fundamental point of departure in 
theorizing the function of rites and music. That is, the arts ideally are means 
to achieve something else. This gives us an important and illuminating ap-
proach to the idea of art in pre-modern East Asia. Both Zhu and Sorai dis-
cuss art, in the form of poetry and music, not from the aesthetic value of 
artworks and the autonomy of art, but in terms of morality, politics and 
learning. For them, poetry and music cannot be separated with rites, and 
they are mainly useful and meaningful for self-cultivation. Through the 
learning of the arts, an individual understands diverse feelings of people 
and learns how to establish proper relationships with others. This view may 
be very different from the idea of art of the present day, but it influenced 
how the educated members of East Asia in the past viewed and evaluated 
the arts and artistic activities.
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City, Ruins and Landscape 
(Yuko Nakama)

Raffaele Milani
The Idea of Grace and the Ideal City
In the Christian world and in its artistic representation, theological grace 
lived alongside sublime grace, just as we can find the eros of the pagan tradi-
tion together with the agape of the new feeling of life. Sensitivity and emo-
tion, can attain the highest point as well as the lowest, but the descent can 
now reveal itself as an ascent; high and low are sometimes interchangeable. 
We can briefly explain, in historic evolution, the reasons which connect 
the theme of grace to its representation. In the New Testament, the word 
Charis means salvation donated by God to mankind through Jesus Christ 
with free and loving dedication. The word grace appears in Paul and Luke. 
Paul especially expresses what grace means in relation to the coming of 
Christ. On several occasions, in the offset of his letters, he wishes “grace 
and peace from God, our father, and from Jesus Christ. However he uses 
the concept of grace, especially with reference to redemption and vocation 
to apostolate mission. God has operated justification “gratuitously” and 
“for his grace”, Paul wants to highlight that God’s saving action on Christ’s 
redemption action has taken place for free consecration to love without 
mankind having done anything to deserve it. In short, grace is the love of 
God who operates freedom through Jesus Christ, his son. It refers to the 
whole of the divine action, but especially to the fact that mankind finds 
a vital communion with God himself. In mankind his intervention oper-
ates a change for salvation. 
In order to understand how theological grace is also a sublime grace 
and vice versa, we focus on the relationship between eros and agape in 
a comparison between ancient Greek, Roman, pagan and Christian culture. 
This is the only way to understand the relationship between the morality 
of the Ancients and that of their successors. Already in 1930, Anders 
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Nygren produced a reflection which is still important: in caritas the hu-
man being should elevate him/herself to the Creator in order to recognise 
in him his summum et incommutabile bonum.1 However, the opposite is 
also true: the more the created human being parts from the Creator, the 
more difficult the ascent of caritas is. A question comes to mind. Does the 
human being have the strength to reach up to God or is the human being, 
as creature, doomed to desiring only the created things which surround 
him/her? In the struggle between caritas and cupiditas is it not the latter 
which prevails? Can the human being feel a caritas similar to that which 
the commandment of love requires from him/her? Paul reserve the term 
“gratia” uniquely to divine intervention, without which such instruments 
on their own would not suffice. Indeed, “the fruit that does not come 
from the root of caritas is not good”. It is necessary for will to be freely 
conquered by the supernatural good. This interpretation says that, from 
the Fall onwards, there is in the human being a tendency towards the lower 
world and that, for this reason, the human being lacks the possibility to 
aspire to eternity. The human being does not have caritas in him/herself: 
it must reach him/her via a special act of divine grace, it must be instilled 
in him/her from outside. In this instilling (infusio caritatis) of love, some 
people have decided to find demonstration of the fact that Augustine had 
a magical and natural idea of grace.
How did Augustine imagine this instilling of love? In his/her quality of 
creature, the human being is forced to look for good outside him/herself, in 
the upper or lower world. The upper world can offer an eternal and infinite 
good, but one which is difficult to obtain; while the lower world offers the 
advantage of being immediately reachable: the competition between the 
two worlds is clearly unequal. The lower world assaults the human being 
and binds him/her with the pleasure it awakens in him/her. Compared 
to it, states Nygren, divine good appears to be so remote and unreal that 
it can only weakly attract human soul. The eternal, to act on the human 
being with similar strength, must approach him/her, getting so close that 
its power of attraction becomes bigger and irresistible compared to that 
of temporal properties. This is what happened precisely in Incarnation. It 
created a bridge on the abyss that separated the human being from the 
Creator. From that moment, God, our bonum eterno, is no more far away. 
He descended in Christ in the secular world, so close to us that each fuga-
cious bonum must necessarily fade. It is therefore the revelation of God 
in Christ the force that attracts us. 
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Gratia is the key word of the Augustinian interpretation of Christianism. 
For Augustine, everything in our life depends on the grace of God. This 
holds for both the natural and the Christian life. Taking this perspective, 
everything comes from God, nothing from ourselves: “Before being man 
you were dust, before being dust, you were nothing”. We exist by virtue 
of the grace of God and by his grace we have been justified: a gift which 
has been made gratuitously without the need of any acquired merit. Our 
good actions are not our own, they are actions of God who acts in us. Even 
faith, just like good actions, is due to grace. It is said: “if God had not loved 
sinners, he would have not descended from the sky to earth”. This is the 
point in which Augustine takes the greatest distance from the Hellenistic 
conception which his doctrine of caritas. The question for us is: by doing 
this has Augustine not shattered the scheme of eros reaching a conception 
which is totally dominated by Agape? Doesn’t the preaching of grace hold 
in itself the announcement that divine love is spontaneous and “without 
reason”? This doctrine of caritas reveals another aspect which requires our 
attention and which deeply modifies the first impression. Without grace 
there can be no access to God. Without grace it is not enough to inflate 
air in the wings of caritas in order to reach God. Grace “comes before” our 
every action just like the means “comes before” the end. The aim is and 
remains the ascent of caritas to God. What has been said about Augustine’s 
ascendant way to salvation still holds valid; grace is part of the ascendant 
scheme as a means one cannot do without for the ascent itself. What laws 
and free will were not able to accomplish because of our will bound to ter-
restrial objects, is accomplished by the grace of God given that it approaches 
the human being with the eternal and supernatural bonum awakening 
in him/her nostalgia of heaven. Grace does not abolish laws, it abides by 
what it requires. On the contrary of law, it does not force to good, actually, 
as Nygren says, makes good a pleasure. Grace does not exclude free will 
either; it gives it a new object, hence also a new direction improving it.
Augustine does not appear to be escaping the theory of Eros when, 
speaking about grace and about Incarnation, he stresses so much the di-
vine Advent. Here as well, communion with God is essentially conceived 
according to the ascending scheme. Faith and Incarnation are nothing 
but the means necessary to ascent: the aim of the descent of Christ is our 
ascent. God became man so that we would become gods.2 The fact that 
only to a little extent the idea of grace can be used as a counterbalance to 
the theory of eros, is demonstrated by the fact that Augustine, given that 
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grace identifies with the infusio caritatis, defines it in full consistency using 
the image of the ladder with which we can ascend to life thus opening up 
for ourselves the path to the heavenly home.
The continual objection of Augustine to the Neo-Platonists is that of not 
knowing Incarnation and not making any room for grace in their concep-
tion. It is clear, claims Nygren, that he wanted to introduce the Christian 
concept of agape. This does not trigger his complete refusal of Neoplatonic 
soteriology. We could say that, also as a Christian he seems to follow the 
salvation path of eros: he introduces it in his doctrine as caritas and he 
elaborates it together with the conception of grace. Caritas, which in its 
love towards heaven essentially bears the mark of the “celestial eros”, is 
the only real way towards God. However, till it is subject to law, it remains 
unproductive, for us it cannot be used. A “dynamic factor” shall intervene 
which wins our heaviness and every natural obstacle to the ascent. This 
takes place when God instils caritas in our heart. Grace is the engine that 
moves celestial eros, the force that allows for the ascent to succeed. This, 
once again, explains the weaving of the themes of love between ancient 
and modern times, between pagan and Christian ethics. 
Taking caritas and cupiditas into consideration, Augustine, writing De 
Civitate Dei, as a reaction to the accusations of the polytheists and, in de-
fence of Christianism and Christians, specifies some issues connected to 
the forms of community and of habitat in a frame-work of salvation. He 
illustrates the plane of two cities in an ideal projection. What makes us 
examine, still nowadays, Augustine who was, so close to Neo-Platonism and 
sensitive to Cicero of Hortensius, so cultivated in the high cultural rhetoric 
of the figures of order, of music, of beauty, so well versed in theological 
disputes, between Manichaeism, Aryanism, Pelagianesim, donatism? What 
makes us examine, still nowdays, a man who lived in such a tormented 
historical moment, marked the dissolution of the Empirealso due to the 
Barbarian Invasions? What attracts us in this piece of work is the form 
of the city, as he conceived and observed it on the whole, and by form 
we intend the idea in which interiorly human beings and things unite in 
an art of living for a common improvement in God. The divine city that 
binds human beings in a Christian love, and the eternal city, governed 
by evil, are seen in their progressive evolution which leads them to mix 
in history according to a design of Christian grace capable of holding 
in itself also the great ethical tradition of a master of paganism such as 
Seneca (De Beneficiis). It is good practiced through Christian love that 
The Idea of Grace and the Ideal City 315
redeems the entire community from the point of view of its total justifica-
tion. The city of Augustine is basically a social project for the future. The 
ascent to the heavenly city is redemption for humanity not only with an 
eye to Universal Judgement: the ascent is the complete fulfilment of the 
descent to create a human world following the example of the incarnation 
itself which ascends precisely because it despises itself: it is horrified by 
the pride and arrogance of power as well as by corruption. The time of 
conscience dissolves into divine Providence. It is the city of the future, as 
ideal city, Christian, we could also say comprising non Christians because 
it is universal in the spirit of caritas, absolute shelter of conflict. Even here, 
Augustine may have drawn inspiration from the Greek culture and civilisa-
tion for the relationship between polis and charis, in an obviously Christian 
translation. In a time of social and religious hybridism, in an attempt to 
include non Christians, we could refer to the segment where John (14.2) 
remembers Jesus when he affirms, with reference to Paradise: “God has 
several houses”. In this vision, peoples, cultures, races are not excluded, 
they are rather included in the Christian line of grace in order for them 
to move towards the heavenly city (place of the Paradise).
Christian Meier, years ago, portrayed the values that made up Greek 
society. Grace was an aristocratic project. He explains, how, in front of 
the popular council and assembly, the prestige of the individual came 
from how he introduced him/herself, from the power of persuasion, from 
peitho, which was connected to grace, a quality that was recognised as an 
ideal political virtue. In the seventh and sixth century B.C., Charis seems 
to have had a new function in a new way, Meier says3 especially in con-
nection to the religious festivals which contributed to increasing cohesion 
among participants, citizens. The strength was, in that world, providing for 
some solidarity. Festivals, sacrifices, choirs and dances, often, of antique 
origins were progressively created in an attempt to promote ostentation of 
luxury and of wasting to the benefit of the community, right to the extent 
of comprising donations for the poor. Actually it is possible to think of 
a relationship between grace in this sense as benefit, and democracy. At 
the same time, in such occasions it was important to communicate an 
atmosphere which was not based on something imperfect, obscure and 
ugly, but rather something nice, pleasant and virtuous. Grace was an added 
form, a quality desired to oppose good and equilibrium to the crude, rough, 
violent reality of human beings and things. An example: in the Athena of 
the Orestea by Aeschylus it is perhaps possible to recognise the sublime 
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and aristocratic spirit, so common in ancient Greece. The goddess often 
repeats she can use the weapons of her father, thunderbolts, but she also 
says she does not want to use them; renouncing violence expresses another 
power, another quality in which Athena makes this virtuous feeling shine 
with elegance and equilibrium. Also the connection between politics and 
grace, the conciliatory character that the aspect of Peitho acquires: Persua-
sion that often appears next to Grace, is part of the topicality of the Orestea, 
funding manifesto of democracy, as Meier defines it.
In Augustine the idea of the Greek polis is radically transformed. Even 
if there are still the above-mentioned reasons of grace and its relationship 
with politics, his city is the Roman one which, as Cacciari reminds us, 
puts under civitas the various ethnical, religious, linguistic components 
in a continual dynamism. What keeps citizens together is not origins, like 
in Athens, but the means, the fact of belonging to a regulatory model. 
We can add a further observation, as integration: on the one side there 
is civitas, the city in its institutions; on the other side there is the urbs, as 
a huge material artefact. Civitas and urbs are not separated because they 
have a common and visible nature. The walls, the houses, the streets, the 
public buildings make clear that kind of image and perception according 
to which we are at the same time citizens and people. Both build walls: 
conscience can become, we could say with a modern term, responsibil-
ity. They belong to each other in a moral and material space of belonging. 
Civitas aims at giving a physical form to its identity organising itself in the 
urbs, visible text and form of single individuals united in communities. 
Urbs places itself everywhere (orbis) and for all free human beings, citizens. 
The City of God is the spiritual project that becomes part of the universal 
quest for happiness which characterises humanity. In the nineteenth book 
of the City of God, Augustine values the superposition of values of the 
city on earth (power, riches, passion) and of the heavenly city. The secular 
and the sacred dimensions, Babylon and Jerusalem are different; however 
both cities have shared objectives because they are characterised by a com-
mon inspiration: justice and peace. It is a prospect of hope (a purification 
process) which unites, not yet separates Christians from non Christians, 
as we have explained earlier recalling and comparing the qualities of the 
ethics of Paganism.
What was the image of city that Augustine had before his eyes? What 
did Milan, Rome and other cities look like at his time? What was the con-
tribution of urban transformation from the point of view of the Christian 
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temples? From what suggestions among people, practices and rituals can 
this document of civilisation and culture such as The City of God be born?
The model that Augustine had in front of him was that of a big rapidly 
changing city with mausoleums and new religious and civil buildings. The 
pagan influence was being altered, it was becoming increasingly marginal, 
especially with the decree from Theodosius of 392, while basilicas were 
distributed close to the entrance gates of the city according to a kind of 
planning and with a progressive expansion of volumes developing com-
plex Episcopal groups and re-using pre-existing architectural structures, 
public and private, with annexation of other buildings. Augustine was 
experiencing a christianisation of space and could observe in the actions 
of the bishop an expression of civil power. 
Among the mosaics that date back to the end of the fourth century, 
let’s take one as an iconographic reference: the mosaic on the apsis of the 
Basilica of Santa Pudenziana (390 circa). We can recognise the form of 
Christian city. It could as well be Rome with mausoleums and a varied 
composition of public and private buildings, but also – because of the 
central position of the cross (Golgotha?), Jerusalem, the one which was re-
organised years before by Constantine with major works. We observe in the 
mosaic, Christ on the throne surrounded by the Apostles and two women 
(Pudenziana and Prassede?). Above are the four living of the Apocalypse: 
the angel, the ox, the lion, the eagle. Very interesting is the porticoed exedra, 
a place where people meet and converse particularly fitting for this new 
symbolism. This image of people conversing, behind the profile of the city, 
seems to be particularly fitting for our purposes because it shows what 
the overall Roman city at the time could look like. But especially because 
it creates a new design of relationships in the regal majesty of conversing, 
dialoguing, coaching. The exedra indicates precisely the act of placing 
oneself outside the door of a house with a chair in order to be with and 
about other people. A poor socialisation act, habitual, becomes the sign of 
the Christian meeting according to the indications of faith, hope, love. The 
home is the city and the city is the home. It is as if the entire city was made 
of an immense network of domus ecclesiae. We could say, with Augustine, 
that this house of God has greater glory than the first, it belongs to the New 
Alliance and follows the words of the Prophet (Aggeus): “I will give peace 
in this place.”4 This scene in front of the porticoed exedra shows the spirit 
of the heavenly city by emblematically comparing two paths or possibilities 
which concretely, historically and empirically act even mingling. On the 
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one side the city of the gods, earthly, on the other the heavenly city. Both, 
however, as Augustine specifies, use the temporalities and are hit by evils 
with different faith, hope, love, right up to the Final Judgement where they 
split up and each one reaches its own end which has no end: condemnation 
on the one hand and glory on the other. 
But the end is not a sunset, because this eschatological vision can be 
intended as an overcoming of evil in the course of history itself. 
Augustine outlines a metaphysics of the means and of the end casting 
light on the perception of a life as deprivation of good: a not being. The love 
for oneself taken to the extent of despising God mingles with the love of 
God taken to the extent of despising oneself: two sides of the same coin. It 
is a hope under way, not only hope for an improvement of humanity with 
the aim of a prefiguration of relentless condemnation to hell. Because grace 
could redeem the eternal city in a time of conscience which is also a time 
of history; it is here that we will notice how “God is all in us”. The ideal 
city is the city purified from violence, from hatred and from vices, city of 
waiting and of the living light, a city that sanctifies itself in the immense 
pain of a fratricide (Cain and Abel, Romulus and Remus) as a hideous 
foundation ritual. We seize, here and now, as in the dilated present of the 
conscience, the hint and the teaching, from reflection,5 as Augustine says 
the city of the elected, it is true, is in heaven, but it procures in the world 
the citizens with whom it walks together till the time of its reign comes. 
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Zoltán Somhegyi
The Aesthetic Attraction of Decay. 
From the Nature of Ruins to the Ruins of Nature
…Frost in the plaster, all the ceilings gape, 
Torn and collapsed and eaten up by age…1
It has not only been an anonymous Anglo-Saxon poet of the early Mid-
dle Ages, but all of us who have often experienced that certain ruins are 
aesthetically attractive, both perceived directly on the spot, or indirectly, 
represented in artworks. In my paper I would like to examine some aspects 
of the reasons of this attraction. Why do we like ruins, why are we attracted 
to these ruined sites? And, as a sub-question: why is simple rubble not 
pleasant for the viewer? For answering these questions, I will examine 
the role of Nature in the ruination process, its three elements or criteria, 
and then at the end propose an answer for the distinction between ruins 
and rubble.
I am particularly interested in these questions also because of the strange 
character of ruins. In fact, this attraction might be considered quite a para-
dox, since “normally” it is exactly the perfectness, harmonious complete-
ness, entirety and integrity what we admire in works that we observe from 
an aesthetic perspective. But ruins seem to be exactly the opposite: they 
are “ruined”, i.e. a formerly complete piece of art (architecture) became 
or gradually becomes incomplete, loses pieces and elements and Nature 
starts to overtake the sight.
Still, we find ruins fascinating and aesthetically attractive. Isn’t it para-
doxical, that we are so delighted to see something dying, destroyed and/
or still in the phase of being destroyed, when in other cases we look for 
the complete and harmonious? And what makes the question even more 
complicated is that we instinctively differentiate between ruins and rubble, 
considering the first as aesthetically pleasant, while the latter as unattrac-
tive and sad. We admire, represent and conserve the first, and clean up the 
latter. So, how is and why is this automatic distinction, that again brings 
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us back to the general question of what do we like in ruins? Why are we 
attracted to them?
It is not by chance that I mentioned Nature above, as it is strongly con-
nected to all aspects of ruins. It seems right to start the examination of 
ruins with Nature, since Nature is obviously the key actor and factor of the 
ruination process. Buildings are originally constructed “against” Nature, 
i.e. as shelters to protect men from natural elements, and this difference 
between natural and artificial starts to gradually dissolve in the case of ruins 
as Nature starts to take over buildings, steadily occupying them piece by 
piece, assimilating even its colours to her. Thus Nature accompanies the 
life of the ruin in all its stages, from the time when it is not yet a ruin, but 
a building standing against Nature, until when it is not a ruin anymore, 
since Nature overtook it so completely. And of course, this also explains well 
the preference of “putting” ruins explicitly in Nature, thus emphasizing the 
importance of Nature in this interaction; we can both think of the artificial 
ruins in landscape gardens and of the practice of picturesque landscape 
paintings with ruins as main motif, especially in the 18th century, or even 
the capriccio as a genre.
Ruins’ nature is their strong connection with Nature. It is Nature that 
ruins a building, making it unused and unusual. Nature therefore is the key 
actor in the ruination process, and encompasses the main elements of this 
process. On elements of the ruination process I understand the concepts 
that define a “real” ruin’s existence. We might as well call them as “criteria” 
for the becoming of a real ruin. I identify three such elements or criteria: 
functionlessness, absence and time.
1. Functionlessness
A ruin is defined by the loss of the function of the original building. Robert 
Ginsberg goes even further when he writes in his book on the aesthetics of 
ruins that: “The ruin liberates function from its subservience to purpose. 
(…) The ruin is the temple of the non-useful.”2 Functionlessness is therefore 
a decisive criterion in ruination, or, to put it in another way: until a building 
fulfills its original function, or can be used in a slightly modified function, 
it cannot be a “real” ruin, only a building that needs to be restored, recon-
structed or modernized. The function of the building may change or get 
modified, further functions can be added to the previous ones, but until 
the building has a function, i. e. until it can be used in any practical way, 
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it cannot be considered a ruin. Naturally, it is not a real function – and 
thus the building can be a ruin – if it is only “used” as temporary or even 
permanent settlement of wanderers, beggars and real or fake hermits, that 
was again a popular and widespread topic in 18th century painting, or we 
can even remember Goethe’s highly sensitive rendering when describing 
his night visit of the Colosseum on 2 February 1787: “Peculiarly beautiful 
at such a time is the Coliseum. At night it is always closed; a hermit dwells 
in a little shrine within its range, and beggars of all kinds nestle beneath its 
crumbling arches: the latter had lit a fire on the arena, and a gentle wind 
bore down the smoke to the ground, so that the lower portion of the ruins 
was quite hid by it, while above the vast walls stood out in deeper darkness 
before the eye.”3
“Real” ruins need to be functionless, not lastly because we consider them 
artworks – even if artworks created by Nature – and we expect an artwork 
not to have a function.
2. Absence
Absence is a second criterion that is also extremely important in under-
standing the process of ruination. Ruins have missing pieces nevertheless 
they don’t confront the viewer simply with this absence, but also with the 
birth and formation of this absence, i.e. with the way of becoming incom-
plete. It is about the slow disappearance – thus can we connect absence 
to our third ruin-criterion: time, to be discussed soon. During the slow 
destroying of the construction, absence is continuously growing. Naturally 
this connects back to functionlessness too, as the conservation and regular 
reparation of a building still in use guarantees that the activity in it can be 
done in a secure and pleasant ambience. On the other hand a construction 
that is not in use anymore lacks technical and aesthetic upkeep too, thus 
allowing absence to “shape” the building.
In fact, strange may it seem, but we can almost say that roles have 
changed: an artwork, a ruin is formed and constructed, but not in the 
classical sense of construction, through putting pieces together, but just 
the contrary, since here the absence is what is growing, not the material 
or “body” of the artwork. As the Italian archeologist and art historian 
Salvatore Settis formulated it in his 2004 book entitled Future of the 
“classic”: „According to the western tradition, ruins indicate in the same 
time an absence and a presence: they show, or, better to say they are the 
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intersection between visible and invisible.”4 It is a constant negative forma-
tion, so the ruin receives its actual form not by what is visible, but what 
is invisible. It might make us remember of the distinction between the 
possible ways of creating a three-dimensional artwork, i.e. a sculpture is 
either made through modeling or carving. We can add pieces of clay or 
plaster to create a work, or we can carve it out from a piece of marble or 
wood. In this sense carving might seem analogous to ruination, but we 
shall not forget the main difference at the end result: at the final sculptural 
work we don’t “miss” the pieces taken from the original block, while in 
the case of a ruin we continuously sense the missing elements. Ruin is 
therefore defined by the missing elements – were they not missing, we 
would not call the building a ruin. We sense and miss the void that defines 
the ruins, and thus ruins are constantly formed by Nature through the 
ever-growing absence.
However, we need to take into consideration a very important distinc-
tion: even if a ruin seems to make us face the absence, or the process of 
absence, at the end it is not simply about the passing, but exactly con-
trary: about the remaining. It loudly affirms that there is still something. 
A ruin is something remaining, a remnant. Even if it was originally entire, 
and in use, and now incomplete and functionless, but still partially it 
has survived. At first the lack of integrity might appear, but this can be 
transmitted only through the still-existing, the still-remaining, that 
reports on the original. Exactly that’s why we can distinguish between 
not-yet-ruin and not-anymore-ruin. The first is the above-mentioned 
situation, when a building is not a ruin yet, just in bad condition so that 
needs some restoration to maintain its original or new function and to 
guarantee the secure use. The latter case, not-anymore-ruin also often 
occurs, when the building or building complex or even entire cities 
disappear so much, that we can hardly or not at all imagine the original 
grandeur of it – in this case the vision counteracts our fantasy’s intention 
to complete the ruins and to get impressed by its authentic splendour. 
Therefore we can say that a ruin has its own life that is between not-yet-
ruin and not-anymore-ruin. During its life it constantly disintegrates, 
nevertheless observing the ruin it seems that its main affirmation is not 
decay but remaining. When we admire the ruin, we concentrate on the 
remaining, since this is what leads us to the original, and this remnant 
is what is constantly formed by absence.
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3. Time
As of our third criterion, obvious it may seem, though not as simple as it 
looks first: ruins must be old. If we remain at the classical appearance of 
ruins, i.e. slow disappearance of the elements of a building, then it requires 
time. In this way we can also affirm that it is time that offers the “time frame” 
for Nature for the tranquil work. Time provides the frame for Nature to 
shape – through the ever-growing absence – a building that has lost its 
function into a ruin. Crumble, drying, weathering, erosion through wind, 
rain or snow is an extremely slow process, but in these we can admire the 
unintentional anti-construction of Nature that nevertheless results in an 
aesthetically attractive artwork. We can almost call Nature herself as a kind 
of artist here, that creates a new work exactly by overcoming (a classical) 
artwork. Departing from Georg Simmel’s famous essay on the topic (1907), 
we can affirm that in the case of ruins it becomes spectacularly evident how 
Nature surmounts human creation. As Simmel formulated it: “… for now 
the decay appears as nature’s revenge for the spirit’s having violated it by 
making a form in its own image. (…) Nature has transformed the work of 
art into material for her own expression as she had previously served as 
material for art”.5 Natural elements form (or ruin) a building into a ruin, 
like an artist, but an important difference must be affirmed: here we have 
a never-ending process that only has a “temporary end-result”. It is really 
temporary, as we saw above how a ruin’s life stretches between not-yet-ruin 
and not-anymore-ruin. An artist stops at a certain point, while Nature 
continues until arriving to the final point of not-anymore-ruin. Only until 
this final point can we enjoy ruins aesthetically. Of course, we can stop 
or slow down the time of the ruination process – the art of Nature – by 
conserving a ruin, and this human activity in this case might be interpreted 
as taking up the battle again: constructing and conserving against Nature’s 
will. If we want to have a ruin preserved, we need constant maintenance 
and conservation; otherwise it becomes Nature’s playground again.
Another aspect of ruins’ connection with time: they always have a pe-
culiar kind of momentariness. They constantly change, even if this trans-
formation is not perceptible for us in the short time of a quick visit. But 
if we revisit the ruin after a certain period, we might notice a new crack, 
a missing brick, a freshly half-broken column or another fallen tower. The 
new appearance of the ruin naturally offers new aesthetic experience and 
quite often may also require a new interpretation. Also this aspect makes 
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the parallel even closer between artworks and ruins. Artworks too need 
to be reinterpretable and they should tell us new and more at their review.
We can see well that in all these aspects the amount of time becomes 
decisive. Converting a building into a picturesque ruin needs a lot of time, 
much more than a human’s life, since it takes imperceptibly slow steps. 
Therefore, we admire the sublime amount of time that has passed, that is 
picturesquely manifested at ruins, and that so much more surmounts our 
own given time.
In this way, we can say that the ruins’ attractiveness is very much based 
on the fact that here we can “aesthetically” encounter not only the power 
of Nature but also the passing of time. Through observing ruins we can 
admire the power of Nature in time and it becomes much more efficiently 
sensible than by simply “knowing” the date of the (original) building. 
A simple number of centuries doesn’t make us so astonished as the vision-
ary vision of decay. 
Obviously, here we come very close to the concept of sublime, so much 
discussed and analysed particularly in the 18th century that is at the same 
time the flourishing period of ruin-examinations, -excavations, -depictions 
and even of the building of fake ruins. Sublime, as a category describing 
the reasons of appeal given through a phenomenon that surmounts human 
limits helps us understanding why we can get aesthetic pleasure when visit-
ing and observing ruins, the decayed results of Nature’s power manifested 
through time, a power that is so uncontrollable for human force. Apart 
from the concept of sublime, picturesque is also a key concept connected 
with ruins. One of its most important theoreticians, William Gilpin in 
the 18th century intended to place it on the palette of aesthetic categories 
somewhere between beautiful and sublime.6 A main characteristic of pic-
turesque is that it does not generate such an intense emotional response 
in the viewer as sublime, i.e. it is not so strongly connected with an educa-
tive or moral function, it strives much more for a pure aesthetic pleasure, 
a simple joy of the view, that’s why the name of the concept comes from the 
objective materialization of the view: picture. So, while on the one hand 
sublime helps us describing the effect caused by the observation of the 
otherwise insensible amount of time, mediated by the ruins, on the other 
hand picturesque explains the popularity of ruins as a genre, particularly 
from the 18th century on. Especially if we consider that ruins are often 
associated with nostalgia and melancholy, and at the same time with the 
wish of regaining the original, at least through the imagination. As Jean 
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Starobinski put it: “The poetics of the ruin is always a meditation on the 
invasion of oblivion. (…) The melancholy of the ruin lies in the fact that it 
has become a monument of the lost meaning.”7 Of course, this lost mean-
ing gives immense space for imagination and poetics, that sometimes can 
result in even counter-scientific attitudes by refusing archeology’s and other 
disciplines’ necessity in the research and reconstruction of ruins. Exactly 
this feature is so notable in the romantic approach, as we can read in the 
highly informative book of Carolyn Springer, analyzing the relationship of 
archeological excavations and politics in 18-19th century Italy. “Byron’s bias 
is anti-archaeological; like Keats interrogating the Grecian urn, he implies 
that what is gained for erudition is lost to the imagination.”8 – she writes, 
and we can completely agree with English romantic poets’ point of view, 
creative poetical fantasy can take much more inspiration from something 
that is less researched scientifically, and more space is left for interpretation.
Thus, paradoxical it may seem, a real ruin is a very complex structure. 
Not only was it complex while the building was complete and in use, but 
even in its decay it remains complex, or becomes even more complex, 
through the void “added” to it. The artistic work of Nature, the slow anti-
construction makes it attractively visible how time has passed over human 
creation, and our aesthetic interest and pleasure very much depends on 
this almost touchable perception of the incomprehensible amount of time. 
And exactly this helps us answering our sub-question mentioned above: 
why rubble is not attractive? Just because of the lack of time in their decay: 
rubble, either results of human aggression (war), or natural catastrophes 
(earthquakes) can always be considered as “sudden”, related to the centu-
ries and millennia of “natural” ruins. So, even if at the beginning it might 
seem quite difficult to formally differentiate between ruins and rubble, as 
in both cases we have buildings that are not in use anymore, here the time-
factor becomes the decisive one. This is what Marc Augé put very briefly 
but extremely clearly in his 2003 book titled Le temps en ruins: “Future 
history will not create ruins any more. It will not have time for it.”9 And 
not only picturesque and sublime ruins will be hard to find in the future: 
since artificial is more and more surmounting natural, we cannot even be 
sure if in future there will be Nature at all, only her debris, without the 
aesthetic attraction.
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Aesthetics and Landscape: 
Crystallization of Nature Images 
Historically, sensing nature formed a fundamental character of Japanese cul-
ture that was evident in traditional paintings and poems. Seeing, hearing or 
even smelling the fragrance of nature was deeply related to Japanese aesthetics. 
It is well known that Japanese traditional landscape paintings have 
three major characteristics: the multiplication of visual points, cut off or 
fragmented feature, and fine details.1 If we take a look at Summer and 
Autumn Grasses (1821, fig. 1) by Sakai Hoitsu, a painter of the Edo Rinpa 
group, as an example, these three features are apparent. The sudden rain 
has made the grasses and flowers bow with the weight of the water drops 
and has created a small stream of water in the background. The space is 
composed as to emphasize the fragmental character of these motifs. Besides 
its delicate descriptions, two ways of vision are notable: a horizontal view 
of grasses, and a bird’s-eye view of the stream. Observers physically feel 
nature as if they were amid the painted space by freely moving their eyes. 
A fragmental piece, Maple Tree (1593, fig.2) of Hasegawa Tohaku forces 
us to take a closer look and experience the tactile sensations. The colorful 
flowers look as if they project out from the screen to reach us. 
In my view, the three characteristics I pointed out are, more precisely, 
devices for depicting the ‘atmosphere’. In Hoitsu’s painting we even feel the 
humid air after the rain and the scent of the flowers. This characteristic is 
also emphasized in a painting by Hoitsu’s disciple Suzuki Kiitsu with the 
strength of the color of the morning glory (fig. 3). Here the application of 
pigments was controlled to differentiate the reflection of light to make the 
brightness of the colors articulate the essence of the flower.
Haruo Shirane wrote an interesting paper titled “Matsuo-Basho and the 
Poetics of Scent”.2 Shirane discusses Basho’s haikus and how his phrases 
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suggest the ways in which a flower’s fragrance is carried by the wind. An 
example is his famous haiku from 1694: “Chrysanthemum scent – in old 
Nara the ancient statues of Buddha”
The Buddha statues in the temples of the old capital of Nara have no 
metonymic connection to the scent of chrysanthemums – the statues are 
not surrounded by flowers – and yet the overtones of the two parts fuse: 
both possess an antique and elegant atmosphere. The fragrance of the 
chrysanthemums and the ancient Buddha statues are not related by liter-
ary association but by non-canonical connotation. Here a space opens 
up, and this space is unlimited, filled with fragrance. In traditional Japan, 
atmosphere is remarkably significant for appreciating the aesthetics of 
nature. It is pointed out that the perspective of the totality of atmosphere 
has also been seen in the setting of Buddha statues since the latter Heian 
period – in the consideration given not only to the statues themselves but 
also to the beauty of the spaces where they are placed, especially of the 
moonlight and its reflection on the water. 3
The depiction or description of landscapes or nature reflects by how we 
have faced them culturally within historical perspectives. Let us compare 
the same motifs of waterfalls in the second half of the eighteenth century 
in Europe and Japan. 
Maruyama Okyo’s hanging scroll Green Maple and Waterfall (1787, fig. 4) 
articulates the force of water falling directly onto a pool and splashing as 
it hits stone. It conveys an atmosphere of light and mist, dispersed in the 
whole space, and a sense of coolness and the sounds of water beating the 
basin beyond the scroll frame. It reveals the characteristics of Japanese 
traditional paintings, which are unique in perception and perspective. 
In European landscapes of the same century, there are remarkable dif-
ferences in both perspective and context. A waterfall painting from 1790 
by Jakob Philipp Hackert (fig. 5) has turned from the ideal landscape of 
Claude Lorrain or Nicolas Poussin of the previous generation to a land-
scape without classical connotations, i.e. an objective description. The 
waterfall was painted under the influence of the popular vedute paintings 
or Vedutism of the century. 
One of the leading European painters of the time, Joseph Vernet depicts 
a tourist of the traditional “Grand Tour” gazing up at a waterfall in Landscape 
with Waterfall and Figures (1768, fig. 6). The scale of waterfall evokes the 
notion of the sublime, which had been articulated by Edmund Burke and 
enthusiastically received in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was 
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Burke’s theory that Denis Diderot referred to in introducing a stormy sea 
landscape by Vernet at the Paris Salon of 1767. According to the sublime 
notion, such landscape does not merely portray physical sensation of a man 
engulfed by extraordinary natural environment, but the threatening view is 
to make people aware of their existence as subject vis-à-vis nature.
Subsequent to Burke’s theory, Immanuel Kant’s transcendental analysis 
defined the sublime as an opposition to ‘beauty’, which originates from 
pleasure whereas the sublime originates from pain. Vacuity, darkness, 
solitude, silence, and infinity were considered its sources. The Great Fall 
of the Reichenbach, in the Valley of Hasle, Switzerland (exhibited 1804, 
fig. 7) by English painter, J.M.W. Turner reflects, so to speak, the spirit of 
the age of the sublime. 
In the German romantic period of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the sublime sea landscape in Caspar David Friedrich’s The Sea of Ice (1824, 
fig. 8), an image landscape of the North Pole with a shipwreck, was also 
connected with a cultural identity characterized by the intense national-
istic movements. The coldness of the iceberg symbolized the failure of the 
unification of Germany after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.4 However, 
it is not so well known that the first version of The Sea of Ice, entitled Ship-
wreck at the seashore of Greenland, was painted a year earlier. The patron 
who ordered this landscape painting was one of the establishers of the 
Saxon Art Union, who wished to have the ‘sublime’ northern landscapes as 
counterparts of the ‘beauty’ of southern landscape. It was a popular trend 
of the time to refer to the binary concept of Kant’s aesthetics.
A southern landscape, Hermit offering Hospitality to a Pilgrim was 
painted by Martin von Rohden in 1818 (fig. 9). Both of these paintings 
by Friedrich and Rohden are now lost, but an earlier sepia version of the 
latter survived. Rohden was one of the Deutschrömer, namely the German 
painters, admiring Italian landscapes, lived and painted there, especially 
in Rome. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Winckelmann and other 
classicists greatly influenced German longings for Italy. 
By giving a meal to the pilgrim, the hermit offers a product of nature that 
nourishes the human, suggesting the ideal relationship between humans 
and nature. The hermit himself could be a personification of intermediary 
existence of culture (religion) and nature. In a related oil painting (Hermit, 
1834), the rich and various plants as fern, pumpkins, dark-red oleanders, 
then an orange tree in sunshine, symbolize the comfortable climate of the 
Roma Campagna. An influential German art theorist of the time, Carl 
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Ludwig Fernow, wrote the following in On landscape painting in Roman 
Studies in 1809: “What nature under the favorable influence of mild sky 
produces, or what our fantasy creates to make the land as a happy living 
place, these elements are put together here with delightful richness and 
diversity. Therefore only in Italy the landscape paintings could go beyond 
the imitation of reality and be elevated to the ideal.”5
In contrast to this southern landscape by Rohden, Friedrich chose the 
landscape of the polar sea devoid of any signs of life after struggling to 
determine the theme of the landscape. 6 In my view, it is because in sublime 
phenomena, nature is revealed to us as something that transcends our ex-
istence. Wolfgang Welsch argued, “Beauty versus the sublime is a probe to 
pursue and to understand the history of aesthetics as a whole”.7 Moreover, 
according to Theodor Adorno, “With the eclipse of formal beauty it seemed 
as though the sublime was the only idea of traditional aesthetics to survive 
and to live on in modern art.”8 Thus, we can point out that the crystal 
northern landscape and the mild southern landscapes of the nineteenth-
century Germany are antipodes of different attitude toward nature, critical 
of or longing for nature in both symbolized and literal meanings. 
In the case of the sublime landscape, it could be said that it is a matter of 
conflict between man and nature in relationship of subject vs. object, which 
differs from the traditional Japanese attitudes towards nature. On the other 
hand the landscape paintings of Rohden show similarity to those of traditional 
Japan in their affection for nature. However, the hermit of Rohden played, as 
we saw, a role as mediator to nature, in which we could see the premise of his 
landscape paintings. The close-up perception, or the emphasis on sensitivity 
seen in the nineteenth-century paintings of Hoitsu or Kiitsu, reveals, as depic-
tion of atmosphere, distinct differences between the two cultures
The contemporary Japanese artists, however, face the age of technology 
and the global changes in the natural environment which surpass cultures. 
Miyanaga Aiko’s, The Beginning of Landscape (2011–12, fig. 10) is com-
posed, enormously, of 120,000 trimmed fragrant olive leaves gathered and 
sewn to make a huge curtain installed as an ever-continuing river. The 
artist describes her own artwork as follows: “Map-like veins give form to 
the time elapsed. – Tens of thousands of maps are woven into the layered 
pattern of the world, spreading out like lace. As wind breathes into the 
transparent neighboring landscapes, the smell of large invisible trees will 
reach you. Intimate landscapes, always connected to our small unnoticed 
breath, expand endlessly.”9
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Thus, the purpose of the work is closely related to ‘the art of scent’ of 
Japanese traditional painting or haiku. However, the leaves have undergone 
a chemical change as they were soaked in sodium hydroxide and trans-
formed into a transparent, golden, netlike pattern. Despite its beauty with 
its overwhelming yellow color, our impression focuses on its skeleton-like 
surface. Crystallized chemical leaves devoid of life on the one hand mys-
tify and eternalize the living element; on the other hand, they emphasize 
their organic character as we observe the veins of the leaves as if through 
a magnified lens. The Beginning of Landscape, therefore, could perhaps be 
summarized as follows: technology-intervened mystification of the natural 
landscape or a magnification of its organic composition. 
Nature’s beauty and fragrance, thus Japanese aesthetics of ‘atmosphere’, 
are crystallized and preserved in this installation work as a specimen. The 
preservation of organic substance has become more significant, as the art-
ist continuously sewed the pieces of leaves before and after the Great East 
Japan earthquake and nuclear disaster in 2011. 
The German artist, Mariele Neudecker engages with the notion of con-
temporary sublime (Think of one thing [Heaven, the Sky], 2008, fig. 11). Her 
ideas grew out of a process of collecting images and concepts related to 
predominantly Northern European romantic ideas especially those of Carl 
David Friedrich (Morning Mist in the Mountains, 1808, fig. 12). The work 
is composed of mixed media, including a chemical solution to produce 
mist around a mountain made of fiberglass, which slowly but constantly 
changes its flow. The artist describes her works as “quite a sensuous, physical 
thing that I want the viewer to experience.”10 She continues: “The use of 
technology in the work enables and destroys records of fiction and fact – 
in return science and technology become vehicles for the Sublime.”11 The 
three-dimensional installation offers the experience of a new perception 
and physicality toward the sublime. However, Neudecker’s constructed 
reality exists only within a glass vitrine as if preserved in stasis, just like 
Miyanaga’s specimen of the memory of fragrance.
Paul Klee wrote in his diary of 1915, “In the great pit of forms lie broken 
fragments to some of which we still cling. They provide abstraction with its 
material. A junkyard of unauthentic elements for the creation of impure crystals. 
That is how it is today. But then: the whole crystal cluster once bled. I thought 
I was dying war and death. But how can I die, I whom am crystal? I crystal.” 12 
Klee considered crystal as a purified form of abstraction as in Crystal Gra-
dation (fig. 13), and even saw it as his metaphor. His idea of impure crystal 
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derives partly from early romanticism based on the ideas, for example, of 
Novalis or Friedrich Schlegel. Schlegel once interpreted the Gothic cathedral 
as crystal, emphasizing that spirituality has overcome mass materiality.13 In 
Klee’s idea, however, in contrast to pure crystal, impure crystal existed as 
broken fragments or as a junkyard that symbolized the destruction of soci-
ety and even himself. Destruction and Hope in 1916 (fig. 14), created a year 
after the diary was written, reflects his oscillation between pure and impure 
crystal notions. Miyanaga commented just after the catastrophe in 2011 as 
follows, “Without our realizing it, the lush landscapes that we have taken for 
granted are disappearing. We all need to confront the landscapes that will 
emerge after this.”13 As Klee’s antipodal view of crystal implies, we are now 
desperately struggling to find our new relationship with nature. 
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Autumn Grasses, 1821. Color on pa-
per with silver leaf 164.5 x 181.8 cm 
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Fig. 2 Hasegawa Tohaku, Maples, 1593, Color on gold leaf, 4 panels, 
each 172.5 x 139.5 cm, Chishaku-in Temple, Kyoto
Fig. 3 Suzuki Kiitsu, Morning Glories, Edo period, 19th century, Ink, color 
and gold on gilded paper, 178.2x379.8 cm, New York Metropolitan Museum
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Maple and Waterfall, 1787, Color 
on paper 177.7 x 92.0 cm, Suntory 
Museum of Art, Tokyo
Fig. 5 Jacob Philipp Hackert, The Great Water-
fall of Tivoli near Rome, Oil on canvas 126x171 
cm,  Palace Museum Belvedere, Wien
Fig. 6 Joseph Vernet, Landscape 
with Waterfall and Figures 1768, Oil 
on canvas 176.2 x 135.2 cm, The 
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Fig. 7 Joseph M.W.Turner, The Great Fall of the 
Reichenbach, in the Valley of Hasle, Switzer-
land, exhibited 1804, Watercolour on paper 
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Fig. 8 Caspar David Friedrich, The Sea of Ice 1824, Oil 
on canvas, 96,7x126,9 cm, Kunsthalle, Hamburg
Fig. 9 Martin von Rohden, Hermit offering Hospitality to a Pilgrim, 1818, Sepia 43.5 x 58.2 
cm, Städel Museum, Frankfurt
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Fig. 11 Mariele Neudecker, Heaven, the 
Sky, 2008, Mixed media 77 x 107 x 221 
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Fig. 10 Miyanaga Aiko, The Beginning of Landscape 2011–12, cm, 120,000 trimmed 
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Fig. 12 Caspar David Friedrich, Morning Mist in the Mountains, 1808, Oil on 
canvas 71 x 104 cm, Museum Schloß Heidecksburg, Rudolfstadt
Fig. 13 Paul Klee, Crystal Grada-
tion, 1921, Watercolor on paper 
24.5 x 31.5 cm, Kunstmuseum, 
Basel
Fig. 14 Paul Klee, Destruction and Hope, 1916, 
Lithograph with color 40.3 x 33 cm, Kunstmu-
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Chinese Aesthetics and Art 
(Keping Wang)

Keping Wang
Waterscape Aesthetics in Perspective
As known in Chinese tradition, natural landscapes are called shan shui 
that literally means mountains and waters. These two types of things are 
inseparable as far as the intrinsic structure of scenic beauty is concerned. 
Their inter-connection goes to the degree that mountains would look as if 
alive with waters nearby, but as if dead without waters around. For they 
tend to mirror each other and make an organically interactive and inte-
grative whole in many aspects. Notwithstanding their complementary 
relationship, mountains and waters can be approached separately because 
of at least two primary reasons: in some spots waterscapes stand out to 
be more appealing than mountainscapes, and in some others, it could 
be the other way round; then, in certain sceneries, both of them tend 
to connote distinct characteristics, symbolisms, and aesthetic qualities, 
among others. 
This discussion attempts to examine waterscape aesthetics from Chi-
nese viewpoints with particular reference to Daoism (Taoism), Confucian-
ism and landscape poetry. It is sensuously engaging and philosophically 
provoking in the eyes of Chinese thinkers and poets alike. For it bears 
distinct values not merely appealing to aesthetic contemplation, but also 
stimulating to intellectual reflection. All this can be discerned at least 
in the three leading realms as follows: the philosophical implication of 
the water allegory in Daoism, the moral symbolism of the river image in 
Confucianism, and the aesthetic significance of the picturesque water-
scapes in landscape poetry. Now we proceed to analyze them for further 
elucidation and clarification.
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The Philosophical Implication of the Water Allegory
Daoism is one of the leading schools of ancient Chinese thoughts. It is 
renowned to distinguish between such binary categories as the Yin and 
the Yang, the soft and the hard, the weak and the strong, the inactive and 
the active, and so forth. It treats them as opposite forces that exist, interact 
and interchange within the myriad things of the cosmos. However, it is 
inclined to tender more attention to the Yin, the soft, the weak and the 
inactive rather than their counterparts in order to illustrate its dialectical 
mode of thinking. It retains this tendency ever since its founder Laozi. 
As read in Laozi, the soft is, for instance, often allegorized to water due 
to its special character that denotes something more than its surface. What 
is noteworthy is the water allegory below, 
The supreme good is like water. 
Water is good at benefiting all things 
And yet it does not compete with them. 
It dwells in places that people detest, 
And thus it is so close to the Dao.1 
Water is hereby compared to “the supreme good” because it pertains 
to such merits as altruism, selflessness, modesty and so forth. As the de-
scription shows, these merits underlie the positive features of water in that 
it is altruistic, always benefiting all things in growth; it remains selfless, 
never competing with others so as to become more outstanding; it appears 
modest, always flowing down to and dwelling in the low or humble places. 
However, it is potentially powerful, able to overcome all others encountered. 
It is therefore approximate to the nature of the Dao that is claimed to be 
invisible in form but invincible in essence. 
Along this line of thought, there arises a popular insight into the symbolic 
virtue of water. It is found inscribed on a stone built in a bulletin wall in Lijiang 
Ancient Town of Yunnan province. It proclaims, “The wise are like water, for 
the water benefits all things without contending with others; it flows shallow 
around stones and thus forms a stream; it stays on in a lower pit and thus forms 
a pool; it stumbles down with natural circumstances and thus forms a cataract; 
it moves into a great valley and thus forms a broad sea. It varies in shape but 
retains its same nature wherever it appears. That is to say, it has few desires 
and wants such that it changes itself in accord with the situations involved and 
enjoys its freedom of movement with no obstacles in its way.” 
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Quite interestingly, the allegorical exposition of water in view of the Dao 
inspires Martin Heidegger in a way when he is pondering over the problem 
with the “homelessness” of the people in the modern world. The problem as 
such is deeply concerned about the dominant function of technology that 
takes nature as “equipment” for humans to gratify their practical needs and 
other utilitarian purposes. For example, a river is revealed either as a source 
for generating electricity or as a place to attract tourists for sightseeing. 
Then the problem goes so far as to lead humans into “the forgetfulness 
of Being”, meaning a lost sense of the mysterious source of things. This 
sense once sustained human beings in their confidence that their lives had 
something to answer to and be measured by. As noticed in one his essays, 
Heidegger uses the term “Way” [Dao] for the mysterious source, the “great 
hidden stream which moves all things along and makes a way for every-
thing.”2 This reflects his fascination with Daoism…Heidegger’s son related 
that a well in the garden had special significance for his father’s metaphor 
for the mysterious ‘hidden stream’ that was itself a metaphor for the Way 
[Dao].3 The “well” is found in the garden of a small chalet or hut, on the 
edge of a village high in the mountains of the Schwarzwald.
According to David Cooper, the hut was built in 1922. Over the next 
50 years, most of Heidegger’s writing was done here. It was not simply 
that the place “up there” afforded peace and quiet in which to work. More 
importantly, as Heidegger explained in a radio broadcast, this work was 
“sustained and guided” by the landscape, where he “experienced the great 
comings and goings of the seasons”, and where mountains, trees and lakes 
“penetrated daily existence”. Consequently,
As soon as I go back up there…I am simply transported into [my] work’s 
own rhythm…People in the city often wonder whether one gets lonely up 
in the mountains…But it isn’t loneliness, it is solitude…Solitude has the 
peculiar and original power of…projecting our whole existence into the 
vast nearness of the presence of things.4 
“The landscape” that enriches Heidegger’s experience and inspiration is 
composed of “mountains, trees and lakes”. The “lakes” herein, just like the 
“river”, “stream” and “well” aforementioned, imply the “mysterious source” 
or water in terms of the Way [Dao]. All this creates an inspiring atmos-
phere that draws the German philosopher into an ontological awareness 
of the union of the “whole existence” of humankind with “the presence 
of things” in nature.
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Now let us turn to the water analogy again. Elsewhere Laozi goes on 
to explain more explicitly the heuristic message of water through such 
a eulogistic aphorism:
Nothing in the world is softer and weaker than water, 
But no force can compare with it  
in attacking the hard and the strong. 
For this reason there is no substitute for it. 
Everyone in the world knows 
That the soft can overcome the hard, 
And the weak can overcome the strong, 
But none can put it into practice.5 
Ostensibly, water is transfigured into something incomparable and un-
conquerable even though it seems softer and weaker than anything else. It 
is so unique and irreplaceable as a result of its twofold character: it helps 
things grow and flourish by virtue of its vital function on the one hand, 
and conquers all others by means of its hidden power on the other hand. 
All this turns out to be an evident justification of its being “close to the 
Dao” as Laozi declares. 
As a matter of fact, Laozi himself appreciates the wisdom and power 
exemplified by the qualities of water, and intends to apply them to per-
sonal cultivation in general and to political leadership in particular. To his 
mind, the best personality is expected to learn from the qualities of water 
aforementioned. For in reality, only those who are modest and selfless are 
most apt to enjoy more companionship or friendship from others. Likewise, 
only those who take up what others find too insignificant, unpleasant or 
difficult to do are most likely to succeed in their career development. This 
is also true of the leaders who are able to establish themselves and retain 
them in favorable conditions providing they manage to evade being ar-
rogant, dominant or bossy with peers and subordinates alike. Hence Laozi 
advices people, especially the leadership, to derive wisdom and virtue from 
the seemingly humble, soft and weak water. Just as he claims, “In dwelling, 
(the best man) loves where it is low. In the mind, he loves what is profound. 
In dealing with others, he loves sincerity. In speaking, he loves faithfulness. 
In governing, he loves order. In handling affairs, he loves competence. In 
his activities, he loves timeliness. Since he does not compete, He is free 
from any fault.”6 
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The Moral Symbolism of the River Image
The river image in Confucianism is perceptually appealing in an aesthetic 
sense, and philosophically provocative in a moral sense. All this is due to 
the moral symbolism of the flowing current. As recorded in the classical 
texts, the way to perceive delight from the river image is said to commence 
with Confucius. In The Analects (Lun yu) Confucius affirms,
The wise are delighted in waters while the humane in mountains. The wise 
are active while the humane tranquil. The wise are feeling constantly joyful 
while the humane enjoying longevity. 7 
Hereby “waters” are referred to “running rivers or swift currents” in the 
main. The distinction between waters and mountains is made in terms of 
their respective characteristics and appeals. The former is flowing and active 
by nature, transparent when shallow while unfathomable when profound, 
thus looking as if it is quick, witty, sensitive, observant and progressing all 
the time. The latter stays still and quiet by nature, ready to accommodate 
the myriad of things and provide them with what they need, thus appearing 
as though it is stable, reliable, firm, consistent and benevolent in any case. 
Likewise, the distinction between the wise and the humane is also made 
according to their respective traits and personalities. In short, the wise are 
corresponding to waters whereas the humane to mountains. Hence the wise 
are prone to feel delighted with the symbolism of the river image because 
they are intelligent and quick-witted, thus acting like the swift currents when 
perceiving things and handling problems encountered. Moreover, they tend 
to find pleasure (le) instead of confusion because they are able to attain the 
most insightful understanding and knowledge of what human life means 
and where it proceeds. With respect to the humane, they are saturated with 
the consciousness of reciprocal love and kindness for other fellow beings. 
They seem to go beyond such social bondages or shackles in the form of 
fame or profit. They remain therefore peaceful and tranquil to the extent that 
nothing could disturb or distract them at all. In their mentality, according to 
Li Zehou, they are well in the position to experience “the timeless time” that 
is metaphorically identified with longevity (shou). At this stage, both the wise 
and the humane have returned to nature as a consequence that they have 
succeeded in freeing themselves from any social alienation. Such a state of 
being is not merely psychical, but also physical. It is actually the outcome of 
“naturalization of humanity” (ren de ziran hua).8 
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Along this line of thought, the Confucian attitude towards the contempla-
tion of the river image is further extended when Zigong asked his Master 
Confucius about the reason why he found it a must to gaze at each big river 
encountered. The reply follows,
As regards the water flow of a torrential river, it is in a way like de as virtue 
because it benefits all beings without a deliberate purpose for itself; it is in 
a way like yi as righteousness because it flows into low places according to the 
natural courses; it is in a way like dao as principle because it runs ceaselessly 
forward; it is in a way like yong as courage because it is resolute and fearless 
while cutting through deep valleys; it is in a way like fa as justice because it 
keeps the same water level when it fills into low pits; it is in a way like zheng as 
uprightness because it spills over any container without being coerced when 
it is full; it is in a way like cha as sensibleness because it is soft and reaches the 
minute wherever it goes; it is in a way like shanhua as moral transformation 
because all things that grow out of water are fresh and clean; it is in a way like 
zhi as volition because it zigzags here and there but continues eastward with 
unshakable determination. It is due to all this above that a superior man finds 
it necessary to gaze at the water flow encountered each time.9 
Judging from the analogical characterization, we can observe a solid corre-
spondence between the natural phenomena and moral symbolisms. It is often 
recognized that human nature is fostered and moulded by human culture, but 
it preserves some resemblance originated from the natural world. This is due 
to mankind’s observing and imitating what has been happening in the living 
surroundings. In other words, when finding out what is going on in the natural 
world, humans would be aesthetically stimulated, intellectually provoked and 
morally enlightened one way or another. This is noticeable in the Confucian 
delight drawn from contemplating waters and mountains. Such being the case, 
Qian Mu (1895–1990) makes a remark from a moral and artistic viewpoint. 
He assumes that human morality is rooted in human nature. Human nature 
is stemmed from the natural world per se. The beautiful in the natural world 
is perceived and reflected through human mind. The beautiful as such is 
transformed into art when expressed by relevant media. Therefore, the morally 
virtuous tend to be those who know and enjoy art more than others. All this is 
associated with the natural world, because the ancient thinkers in China would 
be prune to equate the oneness between humanity and heaven [the natural 
world] with the oneness between goodness and beauty.10 
Here are at least four points to make with reference to the moral symbol-
ism of the river image. First and foremost, the delight or pleasure drawn 
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from waters and mountains as well is not merely an aesthetic reaction to 
the sensuous aspects, but also a spiritual feeling of the moral import. It 
reveals a vicarious experience of the natural beauty in landscapes that is 
parallel to a moral judgment. Secondly, the Confucian stance towards 
both waters and mountains manifests a special kind of affinity to natural 
objects that is further developed into the conscious oneness between na-
ture and humankind. It is then incorporated into the Chinese tradition 
of contemplating the beautiful in nature both aesthetically and spiritually. 
Thirdly, it is peculiar to the landscapes across China that contain rich 
cultural elements and historical traces, comprising an important part of 
Chinese aesthetic phenomenology and art creation, poetry and painting 
in particular. Fourthly, the way of appreciating the beautiful in landscapes 
involves a hierarchy of value judgment. According to Confucius, “Those 
who know it are no better than those who like it; those who like it are no 
better than those who are delighted in it.”11 
Why is that? Those who know it just as it exists are not feeling as strongly 
as those who like it. However, those who like it are simply fond of it but 
have not got hold of it yet, in other words, they are unable to put it into 
real practice in a joyful manner. As for those who are delighted in it, they 
are those who both know it and like it, and in addition, they have mastered 
it and thereby take pleasure from it in practice. In contrast to those who 
know it and those who like it, those who are delighted in it stand out as 
they are capable of experiencing and perceiving the aesthetic state of being 
in an ontological sense. For they enjoy the spiritual freedom through such 
experience, and go so far as to live an artistic life as it is. 
The Aesthetic Significance of the Picturesque 
Waterscapes 
Poetry does not merely exemplify the magic power of words, but also the 
aesthetic wisdom of times. As noted in Chinese literature, the general 
output of the poets in the Tang and the Song Dynasties contributes a great 
deal to the development of picturesque waterscapes through poetic expres-
sion or grotesque imagery. As a result, the value of waterscape aesthetics is 
enriched and promoted far and wide ever since then. It is generally the case 
that the aesthetic significance of the picturesque waterscapes boasts such 
four cardinal features as verbally expressive, visually evocative, thought-
provoking, and mood-affective. It is represented in differing modes that can 
348  Keping Wang
be displayed here by at least two broad categories including the beautiful, 
and the majestic.
The beautiful waterscapes
In accord with the essential properties of the beautiful aforementioned, the 
beautiful waterscapes are thus conducive to the harmonious interaction and 
joyful convergence between the subject and the object. They are therefore 
seen in the tranquil stream, the transparent pond, and the sensuous river 
in particular. In actuality they appear as the main scenes of poetic descrip-
tions owing to their aesthetic attraction and significant suggestiveness. 
Typical illustrations are easily available in the poems composed ever 
since the Tang Dynasty. For instance, we read first in Wang Wei (701–761) 
and then in Su Shi (1037–1101), 
Fresh rain has fallen on the vacant mountains; 
When autumn’s evening approaches. 
The bright moon is shining through the pines, 
The clear stream flowing over the stones. 
Bamboos rustle, as washing maids return. 
Lotuses stir, a fishing boat descends.12
In the pen of Wang Wei and as noticed in the above description, the 
waterscape is associated with the “fresh rain”, “clear stream”, “washing maids” 
and “fishing boat”, all of which are soaked in “the bright moon” and set out 
by the “pines”, “stones’ “bamboos” and “lotuses”. The tranquility is indicated 
by the “vacant mountains” as are devoid of any other intruders and noises. 
What could be audible are the sounds of flowing water over the stones in 
contrast to the rustling bamboos and rowing boat. The depiction invents 
a verbal painting that invites the reader to enjoy the beautiful scene and 
tranquil atmosphere.
By Sandy River pond the new-lit lamps are bright. 
Who sings “the Water of Melody” at night? 
When I come back, the wind goes down, the bright moon paves 
With emerald glass the river waves.13
What is noteworthy in the stanza above is the image of the pond pro-
duced by Su Shi. It is similarly placed against the background of the “bright 
moon”. The water surface mirrors as if it is like “emerald glass”. The song 
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in the tune of “the Water of Melody” is accompanied by the rhythmic ups 
and downs of the “river waves”, and vice versa. They interact to procure 
a symphonic effect. The entire setting strikes out the quietude “at night” in 
the moonlight. It is not only pleasing to the eyes, but also to the ears when 
you imagine your happening to be present on the occasion. 
The majestic waterscapes
In comparison with the beautiful waterscapes afore-exposed, the majestic 
counterparts become what they are owing to their dynamic, amazing and 
even awesome properties including rapidness, powerfulness, greatness and 
vastness, among others. They will likely lead to opposing interaction and 
even conflictive tension between the subject and the object in certain cases. 
As a rule they are exemplified in the rapid torrent, the powerful waterfall, 
the great waves, the vast lake and the like. 
Incidentally, the experience of the majestic waterscapes could be much 
more intensified when it goes through conventional mode of sightseeing. 
That is to say, it is to be done by traditional instead of modern means 
of transportation in varied kinds. This is simply because the poets who 
described the majestic scenes gained their access to and their feeling of 
such aesthetic objects by traditional means at that time. They would have 
felt something rather different if they could take up the modern means 
as we do nowadays. 
Here is an example to show what Li Bai has perceived and experienced 
on an old-fashioned boat along the Yangtzi River. 
Leaving at dawn the White Emperor crowned with cloud, 
I’ve sailed a thousand miles through Three Gorges in a day. 
With monkeys’ sad adieux the riverbanks are loud, 
My skiff has left then thousand mountains far away.14 
The rapid torrent is not directly mentioned in the poem. However, it 
is indicated by the fast speed that brings the persona “a thousand miles” 
away from the White Emperor Town down to the Jiangling City. Practically 
the distance between the two places is just a hundred miles or so. It is so 
exaggerated to strengthen the sensational experience of this unusual boat-
travelling. A skiff winding through the Three Gorges is always an adventure, 
either in the past or at the present. It requires a courageous spirit to face 
its tremendous risk. Furthermore, the ambiance is immensely magnified 
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by virtue of the fragile skiff along the swift current on the one hand, and 
on the other, by the sad adieux of the monkeys admit the mountains over 
the riverbanks. It is so breathtaking and heart-stirring, not merely for the 
traveller inside the scene, but also for the onlooker outside it. 
Moreover, the majestic qualities are demonstrated through the power-
ful waterfalls. Across the world there are a number of cataracts renowned 
for their overwhelming volume and power. They are thus developed into 
famous attractions for global tourists. As is read in the Chinese poetry of its 
prime age, the creative representation of waterfalls plays a crucial part even 
though it is not of high frequency. Notwithstanding this, we find the most 
familiar and outstanding image of all in Li Bai’s poetic composition. It goes, 
The sunlit Censer Peak exhales incense-like cloud; 
The cataract hangs like upended stream, sounding loud. 
Its torrent dashes down three thousand feet from high, 
As if the Silver River fell from azure sky.15 
Geographically the Censor Peak is one of the summits among the 
range of Mount Lushan in modern Jiangxi Province. Now according to 
the allegorical depiction, it is wrapped in sunlight while giving off purple 
cloud as if it is serving as a huge incense-burner. Flowing down from its 
top is a gigantic cataract in huge volume. It is hanging there “like up-
ended stream” and “sounding loud” enough to be heard miles afar. More 
amazingly, its torrent of an unexpected length is dashing down to the 
bottom of the deep valley, appearing as though the Silver River, a typical 
Chinese analogy for the Milky Way or Galaxy, falling “from azure sky”. 
The rhetoric hyperbole of the image for the Silver River or Milky Way 
is derived from unique imagination. Such features as unusual height, 
volume, length, loudness and powerfulness of the waterfall are vividly 
synthesized to expose what a majestic waterscape might be. More often 
than not, the poetic description of a waterfall cannot be identified with 
its real scene. For the poet tends to make an idiosyncratic judgment or 
comparison according to his own perceptual experience and productive 
imagination. Yet, he draws his inspiration one way or another from what 
he sees and feels after all.
In addition, certain traits of a majestic waterscape are reflected in the 
great waves or tides that occur in big rivers or seas. Many poets and paint-
ers alike are apt to contemplate and depict them in their works. Off-hand 
evidence can be found in the output of the Tang landscape poetry as a whole.
Waterscape Aesthetics in Perspective 351
A Two-dimensional Experience in Brief
Judging from the horizon of Chinese cultural heritage, we could arrive at 
a tentative conclusion that waterscape aesthetics plays an inevitable role in 
human life from the past to the present. It bears philosophical, moral, and 
aesthetic values altogether that can be perceived in the relevant expressions 
in Daoism, Confucianism and Chinese poetry at large.
To mention in passing, the experience of the aesthetic values of wa-
terscape works chiefly in two dimensions: perceptual and mental. One is 
pleasing to both eyes and ears (yue er yue mu) in a sensuously perceptual 
sense, while the other to the mind and spirit (yue zhi yue shen) in an intui-
tively cognitive sense. When it comes to the aesthetic contemplation, the 
psychological reactions are initially evoked by the hallo effect of the scenery 
that attracts the aesthetic attention of the viewer. During the process of 
psychological reactions in general, there are at least two acts involved: one 
is aesthetic detachment and the other aesthetic engagement. The former 
expects the viewer to free himself from cares and worries for a moment, 
directs and concentrate his attention to the aesthetic object alone. The latter 
advises the viewer to feel himself into the object concerned. It leads him to 
obtain an experience that could be sympathetic, vicarious or empathetic. 
Empirically the two acts procure an aesthetic attitude towards what is to 
be perceived and contemplated. 
In order to discover and appreciate more, we may well adopt four practi-
cal approaches to sightseeing as an aesthetic activity. They are termed as 
the eye-based approach (muyou), the body-based approach (tiyou), the 
mind-based approach (shenyou), and the lying-in-appreciation approach 
(woyou). They are to be exercised flexibly in accord with the specific situ-
ations and corporeal conditions. In practice, they are measured in no way 
other than effectiveness or validity with regard to the enhancement of our 
aesthetic sensibility and Erlebnis. 
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Chengji Liu
The Agricultural Trait of Chinese Aesthetics 
and its Manifestation in Landscape
Since the period of Wang Guowei (1877–1927) and beyond, in the sphere of 
Chinese modern aesthetics, reconstructing tradition from modern perspectives 
and interpreting thereby the spiritual connotation and value of Chinese aesthetics, 
have been the penetrating tasks for scholars for over a hundred years. Nonethe-
less, in so far as aesthetics originates from the West, particular difficulties are 
confronted with when people want to unfold the studies of the history of Chinese 
aesthetics.1 Comparatively speaking, howbeit the historical background wherein 
western aesthetics came into force is complicated, the commercial trade of an-
cient Greece and the citizen society with polis as the subject produced thereby 
are fundamental, which goes greatly different from Chinese social state based 
on agricultural civilization with village as the unit. For the part of aesthetics, the 
difference as such leads to the typical agricultural trait of Chinese traditional 
aesthetics specifically manifested as follows: first, the reliance of agricultural 
productive mode on nature brings the relation between man and nature to the 
centre of concern of Chinese aesthetics. Secondly, natural materials such as soil, 
vegetation etc. concerned with agricultural production are the most fundamental 
materials employed by Chinese artistic creation. Thirdly, the reliance on the 
earth of agricultural production has shaped Chinese conception of time and 
space which is of distinctive aesthetic characteristics. Fourthly, nature dominates 
Chinese environmental cognition and landscape fancy and “moving the nature 
to home” is the fundamental idea of landscape design.
1. National characteristics and artistic traits
It is generally held that Chinese agricultural civilization originates from 
the Neolithic Age and the condition of the early development of this sort 
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of civilization can be described, in manifold fashion, by virtue of Mr. Su 
Bingqi’s words, say, “clusters of stars in the sky”. Meanwhile, nevertheless, 
the manifold conditions are at last integrated into one, to which the agri-
cultural civilization of the drainage area of the Yellow River has laid the 
foundation for later Chinese economy, politics and culture. As regards the 
shaping role played by the agricultural civilization on Chinese economic 
mode, political construction and view of state, it can be understood in the 
following aspects:
To begin with, agricultural economy is a sort of natural economy wherein 
nature is the object of labour, and of obtaining living materials as well. The 
high degree of reliance of man on nature determines the complete approval 
of conceptual sphere with regard to natural value. It is by reason of this that 
in ancient Chinese thoughts, that the Dao of heaven is natural is, be it to 
Confucianism or Daoism, the schools of Moism, Dialecticians or Legalism, 
the starting point of philosophical cognition when “integrity of heaven and 
man” is the common value choice. In the second place, traditional Chinese 
politics is a sort of natural politics, and only when man’s socio-political 
action is put into natural order can it be of legitimacy. The political mode 
as such comes, plainly, from the recognition and discovery pertinent to 
natural law by agricultural productive mode. Take Liji Monthly Regulations 
礼记•月令as an example: in the 12 months of a year, the daily as well as 
political actions of the king, the ministers, the people engaged in various 
careers and commoners are all adopted into the alternation of the four 
seasons, and the temporal alternation of nature offers measurement and 
support to the operation of human affairs. In the 18th century, Quesnay the 
French Enlightenment thinker has once said, “In China, speculative science 
fails to progress greatly but studies as to natural law have reached a perfect 
stature.”2 This recourse to natural law on setting laws for human actions 
and the consideration of natural law as the general principle of politics are 
the typical characteristic of agricultural nations. In the third place, tradi-
tional China is a country limited to human-earth relation before a nation. 
Different from nomadic and commercial nations, the wealth (the earth) of 
agricultural nations are unmovable. The particularity of this sort of wealth 
determines the reliance of peasants on the earth, and that settling without 
easily moving becomes the most fundamental human-earth conception. In 
ancient China, that the Central Plains has long been the steady political and 
cultural centre of Chinese nation appertains, in close fashion, to the reliance 
of the nation on the earth. According to the early national geographical 
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state established by Shangshu Yugong 尚书•禹贡, the realm of the Central 
Plains fundamentally centres on the “the emperor’s reign demarcated by 
the Yellow River and Luo River” at the middle reaches of the Yellow River, 
extending in all directions in accordance with the arithmetic progression 
of “dianfu”甸服, “houfu”侯服, “suifu”绥服, “yaofu” 要服, “huangfu” 荒服3 
etc. till “the sea to the east end and desert to the west end”. Some hold that 
this view of state or world is Central-Plain-centrism, but I contend that 
it is agriculture-centrism. To put it another way, the earliest developed 
agricultural area of China is considered as the centre of the state or the 
world and the nearer to the centre, the more civilized, the farther, the more 
barbarous. The differentiation between civilized and barbarous Chinese 
societies is not eternally unchanged. When a nation in some border area 
occupies the Central Plains, it may obtain political legitimacy and hence 
represent Chinese national civilization. This indicates that nationality is 
not the determinant factor to the constitution of a state; rather, the earth 
and agricultural productive mode are essential.
Agricultural civilization is deeply rooted in soil. The earth determines 
Chinese economical, political and national states, but also the attributes of 
beauty and arts. In the history of Chinese aesthetics and arts, the employ-
ment of the media material of soil was dominant. E.g. according to archae-
ology, making tools is usually considered as the origin of beauty as well as 
man, and people position thereby, as a rule, the starting point of Chinese 
aesthetics at the Stone Age. In the early history of China, nevertheless, 
stoneware was plainly not the main labouring tool. In the area of central 
plains deposited by the silt from the Yellow River, stoneware is hardly 
available and the cumbersome stone tools are unsuitable for agricultural 
implantation. Contrariwise, trees qua the direct product of soil are avail-
able for making tools and suitable for the loose soil in the drainage area 
of the Yellow River. It is due to this that to China the agricultural nation, 
the earliest recorded labouring tools is not stone but wooden articles, say, 
Shennongshi神农氏’s “cutting the tree for ploughs, curving the tree for 
plows”(Yizhuan Xici Part B易传•系辞下). In addition, according to the 
dating as to Chinese early history of civilization by archaeology, the age 
(Yangshao Culture) when potteries appeared in large number in the drain-
age area of the Yellow River is called the Neolithic Age, which also remains 
to be precise. Qua the ware directly made of soil, pottery emerges on an 
important premise, viz. Chinese understand the attributes of soil, and this 
sort of understanding cannot live without agricultural civilization, either. In 
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later ages, Chinese process with regard to soil has been increasingly delicate 
which in consequence makes for wonderful china. It can be said that the 
evolution from pottery to china shows the surmounting path of Chinese 
agricultural civilization from cognition of soil via practical recreation to 
aesthetic sublimation, but also indicates that Chinese aesthetics starts from 
the age of ploughs, first develops in the age of pottery and gets mature in 
the age of china rather than that its starting point is in the so-called late 
Palaeolithic Age or early Neolithic Age.
Identical with ordinary utensils that are based on soil and pursuit 
aesthetic surmounting, Chinese literature and arts are also extended 
from agricultural practice. For example, the “艺” (skill)in oracle bone 
inscriptions originally means planting, “乐” (pleasant) whereas expresses 
the pleasure for harvesting crops.4 Another example is the character “美” 
(beautiful) illustrating “large sheep is beautiful” which, apparently, has 
bearings on the livestock breeding in the agriculture of remote antiq-
uity. In later ages, “艺” develops from agricultural planting into refined 
technique, i.e. “six art(s)”, and further into spiritual “art”, “乐”from ap-
praisal of crop harvesting into general pleasure and further into the 
artistic way of “music” that expresses pleasure, and “美” from clumsiness 
on sight and deliciousness on taste into general aesthetic appreciation. 
The evolution of the meaning of characters as such has embodied the 
advancing tendency of man from material to spiritual, from practical 
to aesthetic, from pleasant to aesthetic feeling on the one hand, and 
indicates the fundamentality of agricultural civilization for Chinese 
aesthetics and arts on the other. In the sphere of poetry, early Chinese 
poetry centres at agricultural affairs, as is said in “those who are hungry 
sing about food, those who labour sing about their work [via poetries]”. 
Later they transferred, step by step, to landscape and pastoral poetries. 
Comparatively speaking, poetries of agricultural affairs show the trait of 
plainness and decorum due to their more deeply rooted in human-earth 
relation based on agricultural production whereas landscape and pastoral 
poetries are characterized by vividness and aesthetic for their formal 
consideration as to the countryside. On this account, it is a must to set 
up the idea of the general evolution from practical to aesthetic so as to 
understand the genesis of Chinese aesthetic consciousness and arts. In 
this aesthetic continuum, the steadiness and reliability provided by the 
earth and planting for man’s subsistence are of founding significance to 
Chinese aesthetics and arts.
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2. Temporal experiences and spatial experiences
According to the view of French Physiocracy, nature participates in the 
productive process without asking for any reward. This selfless bestowing 
contributes to agricultural products’ being purely “new products”.5 Ap-
parently, that the nature is capable of realizing the bestowing as such is 
pertinent to the ceaseless reproducing capacity. In Chinese aesthetics, this 
sort of reproducing capacity of nature or the earth is given aesthetic signi-
fication in two aspects: in the first instance, nature’s reproductiveness is its 
liveliness. This active feeling of life differentiates itself from the ossifying 
and mechanic western modern nature on the one hand, and is naturally of 
the essence of beauty thanks to it containing life on the other hand. As is 
said in “The great virtue between heaven and earth is called reproducing”, 
the so-called essence of beauty is the essence of life of nature. Furthermore, 
natural life is forever embodied as a procedure during movement, and real-
izes its formal traits by dint of the blossoming and falling of flowers, the 
thriving and withering of grass on the earth. In this way, man’s experience 
of the changes of natural things becomes the experience of the process of 
natural life. This experience enables Chinese to discover time and further 
take this as the regulation for human affairs. We can see from Xiaxiaozheng 
夏小正, Yizhoushu.Shixunjie 逸周书·时训解 till historical books in later 
ages that the view of time of Chinese is based on the seasonal changes in 
agricultural sense and natural observations. Say, Xiaxiaozheng starts as 
follows: “In the first month, hibernated creatures wake up, migrated wild 
gooses begin to fly back to the north, pheasants begin to chirp, and fishes 
begin to appear on the surface of the melted river. These are hints for 
peasants to prepare for coming fieldworks by repairing their tools.” Here 
nature conceives time while agricultural practice regulates man’s percep-
tion of time. The consciousness of time embodied in Chinese poetries in 
later generations is mainly of this sort of nature-dominated aroma and 
style. As to the work and life of people from commoners to the kings and 
ministers regulated by seasonal changes and solar terms, they are full of 
sense of rhythm plainly due to their coordination with the changes of the 
four seasons, and hence are adopted into a unified aestheticized natural 
progression.
What is noteworthy, nevertheless, is that in the history, qua a state origi-
nating from the Central Plains and continuously keeping extending in 
all directions, China’s conception of time regulated by calendar is not 
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that popular. As was stated afore, Chinese ancient calendar is based on 
natural cognition with the warm temperate climate of the Central Plains 
as the standard, the reign of China however covers, from the Qin and Han 
Dynasties on, various climate forms like tropical, subtropical, temperate, 
and so on. Therefore, the agricultural calendar of the Central Plains is 
short of practical value to lives of nomadic, fishing and hunting nations, 
but also lacks instructive significance to people engaged in agriculture in 
non-central-plain areas. Zhang Jingzhong in the Tang Dynasty has written 
a poem Written at the Frontier (Bianci 边词), “In Wuyuan6, so late comes 
the spring / that willows have yet to bud, even in March/ when the ice in 
the river here is just melting, the spring flowers in Chang’an have begun 
to fall, standing no touch.” This poem reveals, in precise fashion, the area 
difference of the experience of time in the age of agriculture. Another 
point deserving our notice is, Chinese ancient calendar has never become 
manifold in accordance with area difference, and the constant standard 
for the establishing of the calendar is “central-plain time”. The compulsive 
unity of this sort of calendar obtained in virtue of political power gives 
rise to ideological traits of time, and adds institutionalism content to the 
understanding of the perception of time in Chinese aesthetics.
Just like the time in ancient China centred at the Central Plains, the space 
then also started there from. The earliest geographical literature of China, 
Shanghu Yugong classifies, in clockwise fashion, the country into such nine 
states as Ji, Yan, Qing, Xu, Yang, Jing, Yu, Liang, Yong, having fundamentally 
outlined the geographical map of early China with the Central Plains as 
the centre. In terms of pure space, nevertheless, there is no so-called centre 
of the world. As is stated in Zhuangzi 庄子, “The centre of the world in 
my view is north to Yue and south to Yan.” (Zhuangzi, Under the Heaven).7 
That the conception of the centre of the world is formed mainly due to the 
fact that the developed agriculture in the Central Plains at the time helped 
people to form the reliance on the earth and hence set, in accordance with 
their temporal experience, where the centre is and where borders are. It can 
be contended that the non-objectivity of the early spatial experiences of 
Chinese society makes for its poetic trait or aesthetic particularity, and the 
so-called geography hence is of poetic flavour. According to the “individual 
experience” purely relying on perception, the central-plain nations set the 
five directions of east, west, south, north and centre, and adopted five colours, 
five pentatonic tones, five flavours and four seasons into this steady spatial 
structure, making for the circling of various aesthetic elements around the 
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“centre” of the world. The territory transgressing this empirical scope is con-
sidered, under the manipulation of the theory of cultural superiority and 
inferiority barbarous which, nevertheless, is imagined by aesthetic sphere as 
the dwelling place of immortals. Shanhaijing 山海经 (Legend of Mountains 
and Sea) is the fruit of the aesthetic imagination as such and other works from 
Mutianzi zhuan 穆天子传 (Legend of Emperor Mu in the Zhou Dynasty) 
via Huannanzi Zhuixingxun 淮南子·坠形训 to Zhang Hua’s Bowuzhi 博
物志 (records of legends in various aspects), on the other hand, show the 
path of gradual change from the actual perception as regards the Central 
Plains to the aesthetic imagination pertaining to remote areas. In this vein, 
since the central areas are definite, relevant arts usually are actual copies 
with distinctive realism style; peripheral areas, on the other hand, are often 
appealed to imagination due to their transgressing the scope of experience, 
and relevant artistic creations are fantastic and magnificent, full of romantic 
flavour, showing distinctive traits of romanticism. This view of world of 
Chinese with clear centre but vague periphery indicates, seen at the level 
of aesthetics, the aesthetic system gradually passing over from empirical to 
imaginative, from actual to romantic.
I said ten years ago that man, time and space are the “one centre, two basic 
points” in the sphere of aesthetics.8 Insofar as Chinese aesthetic history is 
concerned, the categories that have been highly abstracted by modern science 
like time and space keep, under the setting of agricultural civilization, lively 
aesthetic traits thanks to their reliance on nature. In other words, time and 
space under the setting of agriculture are the time (four seasons) and space 
(landscape) manifested by nature, so their natural trait is their perceptibility 
which is also their aesthetic trait. In the mean while, when man participates 
in agricultural engagement, he is integrating himself into the nature or fus-
ing his individual into the life rhythm of natural space and time. As to this 
sort of beauty of agricultural life constituted by man, time and space, Zong 
Baihua has once said, “To ancient Chinese peasants, their houses are their 
world. They obtain the conception of space from their houses and that of 
time from “Engaging in labour at sunrise and resting at sunset” (Song of 
Hitting the Soil). Time and space constitute their cosmos and settle their life 
which is leisure and rhythmic. To them, time is inseparable from space and 
spring, summer, autumn and winter match up east, west, south and north. 
This sense is manifested in the philosophical thought of the Qin and Han 
Dynasties. The rhythm of time (one year, twelve months, twenty four solar 
terms) leads the spatial directions (east, west, south, north) so as to constitute 
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our cosmos. So our spatial perception is rhythmized and musicalized along 
with our temporal perception.”9 It can be easily seen from this argumentation 
that agricultural civilization has constituted the spatiotemporal experience 
and directional imagination, but also input, via the interpenetration of man 
and nature, essential aesthetic content into human subsistence.
3. Ideals of poetry and paintings and landscaping 
construction
Tao Yuanming (A.D.365–472) is a famous poet in the middle antiquity of China. 
Qua an aristocratic descendant and a famous scholar, he has been an official 
in the East Jin Dynasty for 14 years. In A.D.405, drastically tied of officialdom, 
he began to live in seclusion under the foot of Mount. Lu (belonging today’s 
Jiangxi province). In the following 22 years, he has written plenty of pastoral 
poetries and is thus called by later generations the first pastoral poet in China.
In terms of describing rural life by dint of poetry, there are poetries of 
agricultural affairs and pastoral poetries in ancient China. Comparatively, 
howbeit the objects of description of the two sorts are identical, great dif-
ference exists with regard to the cognition of rural life. Poetries of agricul-
tural affairs are generally authentic records of the agricultural productive 
activities, concerning such specific moments as sowing, harvesting etc. in 
a year. Hesiod’s Works and Days in ancient Greece and Cato’s On Agriculture 
in ancient Rome are of similar trait. In China, the most famous poetry of 
agricultural affairs is Shijing July 诗经•七月in the West Zhou period which 
is mainly developed in the form of agricultural calendar. Compared with 
poetry of agricultural affairs, pastoral poetry is different, in full measure, on 
it treating rural life as the object of appreciation (rather than participation). 
Pastoral poet is an onlooker of rural life, and he treats the countryside as 
an aesthetic landscape wherefrom he relishes the transcendental spiritual 
value and significance without necessarily being engaged in agricultural 
labour. Tao Yuanming is both an actual participant of agricultural labor and 
an aesthetic onlooker, which enables his poems to reveal the trait of pass-
ing over from traditional poetry of agricultural affairs to pastoral poetry.
To Chinese classic aesthetics, Tao Yuanming’s poems are of great signifi-
cance in that from him Chinese art begins to realize the landscape-oriented 
cognition as to the countryside. The landscape cognition as such turns the 
countryside in poets’ eyes into the pure form of beauty, representing their 
ideal of “poetically dwelling”. Qua the artistic expressions of this sort of 
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ideal, since the middle antiquity and beyond, pastoral and landscape poet-
ries have become the main form of Chinese poetry and landscape, flower 
and bird the main objects of painting art. These poetries and paintings 
are incapable of, due to lacking the concrete participation in agricultural 
production, reflecting the hard life of peasants. This “drifting” from content 
to form however has effectively ensured the pure form of beauty of rural 
landscape. That is to say, Chinese pastoral poetry and painting in the middle 
antiquity are of typical Utopian trait and are the most ideal expression of 
the class of scholars at the time insofar as poetic life is concerned.
In ancient China, the high degree of reliance of agricultural production 
on natural resources gives rise to man’s unconditional love for nature, and 
hence enables nature to be the value carrier for man. In the language of 
Chinese, nature is, insofar as its original meaning is concerned, is “be 
itself”, that is, a thing is itself. Further speaking, if a thing is completely 
itself, this means that it has broken away from artificial processing and 
restricting, representing the top freedom. Here the issue of the earth 
bestowing man wealth during agricultural labour leads, in consequence, 
to the issue of “taking nature as freedom” in Chinese philosophy. Fur-
ther speaking again, landscape is the illustrative revealing of nature and 
if nature represents the top freedom, landscape becomes the symbolic 
form of freedom. On this ground, we can see that in the middle antiquity 
of China, the copying and expressing of natural landscapes in pastoral 
poetries and paintings are not merely conveying a sort of rural fantasy; 
rather, they are intended to offer various copies worth following for man’s 
ideal of free life. Here the gist of life is, it seems, not to realize spiritual 
addiction and intoxication in this sort of fantastic landscape but to turn 
the ideal of landscape expressed via poetries and paintings into reality, 
making “human world” into “heaven”.
In China, the fruit of this sort of “turning” landscapes in paintings 
into reality is the landscape construction of the Ming and Qing Dynas-
ties. Some Chinese scholars contend that landscape is, in terms of its 
basic intention, to “move the nature back home”. On this account, we can 
obtain a sequence from nature to human life, viz. agriculture→ nature→ 
freedom→ poetry and painting→ landscape. The landscape manifestation 
of Chinese traditional agricultural civilization comes, in precise fashion, 
from the circling process from nature to art and again from art back to 
the reconstruction of nature.
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Hongbao Niu
Table Painting and Easel Painting: 
A Cross-cultural Analysis between Chinese 
and West Paintings
To encounter with others is the precondition of self-consciousness, because 
in the cross-cultural context formed by the encountering of different cul-
tures, one culture can discover who it is or not, from others, meanwhile 
discover one’s potentialities that leads to what it would be. But there are 
other respects of cross-cultural context, one culture always intensifies its 
specific characteristics for self identification by refusing universal values, 
or one culture uses its own epistemological logics to interpret others and 
to ignore the otherness. All aspects above will always mingle during the 
formation of knowledge in the cross-cultural context. 
After Chinese painting encountered Western painting at early the 20th 
century, there were three main models of interpreting traditional Chinese 
painting. In the first model, some scholars sharply criticized Chinese 
painting due to the lack of realistic and scientific spirits in accordance the 
Western perspective painting.1 The second model emphasized specific 
characteristics of “numerous points of view” (多点观看) or of “space with 
shifting point of view” (游目的空间) in Chinese painting, especially com-
pared with the “mono-perspective” of Western painting.2 The third main 
model originated from the West, regarding Chinese painting as “reverse 
perspective” (Ocvirk and Stison, 2009), or as “glance”, which is contrary 
with the “gaze” of western perspective3. Among all of these models, there 
is a common logic which uses the western visual theory to conceptualize 
Chinese painting.
In this paper, I intend to go back to the initial formation of Chinese 
painting and to rediscover its original roots. There are three key issues: 
firstly, contrary to the Western easel painting as free art, Chinese tradi-
tional painting as free art is table painting. Secondly, I will interpret the 
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main characteristics of table painting: the hand-writing, or the calligraphic 
language. Thirdly, I want to suggest that the suitable method of discover-
ing and understanding the aesthetic characteristics of table painting is the 
phenomenology of trace. 
The Western painting has been called the easel painting, because it is 
a kind of independent fine arts operated over a vertical plane on the easel. 
Accordingly, Chinese painting should be called the table painting, because 
it is operated over a horizontal plane on the table. This difference seemingly 
identifies the between two methods of painting manipulation. But in fact, 
it means that the painter setups different relationship with his operating 
planes, including different physical, visional and spatial relationships, as 
well as different methods and conceptualization of representations.
Historically speaking, the painting plane as a kind of the independent 
arts has been transformed from fresco. As we can find, the Western painting 
directly transforms the vertical plane of fresco into an independent verti-
cal plane on the easel. Because the plane of the easel painting is vertical, 
it builds a relationship of visual opposition between the painter and the 
vertical plane on the easel. In front of the plane on the easel, painter’s body 
can move forward and back, left and right. I therefore postulate that this 
kind of visual opposition between the painter and the vertical plane on 
the easel has significant function of calling up perspective methods, and 
makes the painter construct an illusive solid space on the vertical plane. 
On the contrary, when Chinese painting becomes an independent fine 
art, it transforms the vertical plane of fresco into a horizontal plane on 
the table. During painting operations, the visual relationship between the 
painter and the horizontal plane on the table is looking down. The painter 
can not move forward or back, but only left and right. Otherwise he or 
she has to move the whole operation plane on the table forward and back, 
or left and right. These moving gestures are the origin of the four kinds of 
Chinese painting formations: the long scroll (长卷), the vertical scroll (立
轴), the hand scroll (手卷) and the album of painting (册页).
Setting up a strict two dimensional flat is the beginning point that paint-
ing frees from its adhesiveness to instruments and buildings, becoming the 
pure and free painting. This kind of two dimensional flat suggests series 
challenges to any person who wants to paint images on the flat. The key to 
these challenges is that any images or pictures must fit to this two dimen-
sional flat of time and space. To meet these challenges, there have been 
two basic strategies in art history: one is to condense the image into a two 
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dimensional picture and make it fit into the two dimensional flat. Paint-
ings on wares and fresco use this strategy to settle the challenge coming 
from the two dimensional flat, on which images are drawn. Even though 
the image itself is three dimension, it must be predigested and condensed 
into the two dimensional image in order to fit the planeness of the two 
dimensional flat. The other strategy is to simulate the three dimensional 
image on the two dimensional flat, on which the painter manipulates in 
order to adjust to the planeness of the two dimensional flat. Through this 
strategy, the painting establishes a verisimilitude solid image that resembles 
the real scene. The first strategy is not more advanced than the second one, 
or vise versa. But the choice between these two strategies is not arbitrary. 
The different inquiries of painting and the historical context of different 
cultural traditions determine the choices.
According to the generation of the Western easel painting, when the 
adhesive flat of fresco transformed into the independent vertical plane on 
the easel, the sculpture-in-the-round which matured in Ancient Greek had 
made some guidance as a model. In spite of the painting in ancient Greece 
being plane, its sculpture-in-the-round had overcome the planeness of 
Egyptian sculpture, and transfused new aesthetic energy into the ancient 
Greek arts. Afterwards, the solid image and its reality set by sculpture-
in-the-round lifelikeness had established a model of three dimensional 
image for painting, called for European paintings that follows the model 
of sculpture-in-the-round, and made European painters to draw solid 
images on the plane. This is the direct inducement of the generation of 
perspective in Italy Renaissance. In Alberti’s On Painting, this inducement 
is described as following:
 “It would please me more to [have you] copy a mediocre sculpture 
than an excellent painting. Nothing more can be acquired from paintings 
but the knowledge of how to imitate them; from sculpture you learn to 
imitate it and how to recognize and draw the lights. It is very useful in 
evaluating the lights to squint or to close the sight with the eyelashes so 
that the lights are dimmed and seem painted in intersections. Perhaps it 
will be more useful to practice relief than drawing. If I am not mistaken, 
sculpture is more certain than painting. He who does not understand the 
relief of the thing he paints will rarely paint it well. It is easier to find relief 
in sculpting than in painting.”4
Following sculptures is the origin of drawing plaster figure as basic 
trainings of painting. In other words, after Ancient Greek, overcoming the 
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planeness of painting and drawing a solid image like a relief or sculpture 
on the painting plane continuously called up European painters. To fulfill 
this beckoning, using the Egyptian’s easel for painting by Roman was not 
just the inheritance of painting instrument, but acquiring aesthetic ef-
fects of sculpture which guided painters to choose the easel for painting. 
Painter’s operation over the vertical plane on the easel is like a sculptor’s 
operation in front of a vertical marble. This pursuit guided early artists of 
Italy Renaissance like Masaccio, Brunelleschi, to use solid space image of 
sculptures or buildings to imagine the painting plane. Masaccio’s fresco 
Trinity (1427–29) looks the painter digging a hole on wall. In Alberti’s On 
Painting, he imagines the painting plane as a window. The window through 
which people could see a solid picture with width, length and depth, re-
sembles the picture that any people acquire in the real scene through real 
window. So to speak, the origin of perspective is based on the aesthetic 
pursuit for solid real scene seen by real people at present. The poetics of the 
perspective painting on the easel is the poetics of seeing and eyewitness, but 
is not the plane drawing of “essential copy” as in the Medievalism any more.
The generation of Chinese free painting differs from the European free 
painting. Chinese painting transforming from the adhesive plane into the 
independent plane was not guided by sculpture, but by free calligraphy, 
because in Chinese art history, the first kind of free arts was not sculpture, 
but free calligraphy. Calligraphy metamorphosed from the practice of hand-
writing into free calligraphy in Eastern Han Dynasty (25B.C–220b.c). It 
developed the first kind of pure aesthetic form which is without practical 
utility and moral function, meanwhile inspired Chinese pure aesthetic 
interest. Till Eastern Jin dynasty, the calligraphic works made by Zhong 
You, Wang Xizhi and Wang Xianzhi, etc., advanced calligraphy as the most 
important and classic form of Chinese art that agglomerated Chinese 
aesthetic experience. In virtue of the inducement of calligraphy, the lines 
of painting that had been controlled by limners, was transmitted into lit-
erati’s and calligrapher’s hands, literati’s calligraphic lines had depressed 
the limner’s lines. Meanwhile, the abundant visional phenomenon that 
were developed in the relief stone and fresco of Han dynasty gradually 
gave their ways to literati’s and calligrapher’s creation of calligraphic lines. 
The vertical plane of fresco was not inherited by literati, but replaced 
by the horizontal plane on the writing table, which was the place where 
the literati and the calligrapher operated and played on. Then, from Gu 
Kaizhi of Jin dynasty to Wu Daozhi of Tang dynasty, the basic language 
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of Chinese painting, including table painting and the fresco of Buddhism, 
was the calligraphic lines. Zhang Yanyuan, an important critic of arts 
in Tang dynasty, summed up the four kinds of line models (笔法): Gu 
Kaizhi’s model of line, Lu Tanwei’s model of line, Zhang Sengyou’s model 
of line, and Wu Daozi’s model of line. This basic language was mainly the 
language of calligraphic and hand-writing lines. It was formulated around 
the horizontal plane of literati’s table and the ways of hand-writing, as the 
birth of Chinese table painting.5 
At the early days of perspective painting on the easel, the painter was 
induced as an observer. On contrary, Chinese table painting did not call up 
the painter as an observer, but a hand-writer or a calligrapher. In Alberti’s 
On Painting, the painter as an observer has very notable position. The 
observer is not a stander-by. The latter is passive and negative, does not 
treat himself as subject. Comparatively, the former is active and voluntary. 
The activity of the observer is that he/she casts his/her observing model 
into his/her observing action and process. The observer sets up itself as 
subject, he/she uses his/he’s prior visual space to manage objects on the 
vertical plane.6 Alberti focuses on the painter’s observing action: in the 
visual progress of observer and the appearance and visible aspects of the 
observed object, the aesthetics of perspective establishes, as well as the 
visual imaging in observer’s eyes. In this situation, the painter appears as 
the subject of observing and the center of measuring all things. How does 
the painter measure and what tools does he use to measure? The painter 
measures things he/she sees accidentally. The measure that the painter 
uses to scale is the observer’s visual ray or visual line. What the painter 
measures is a visual relationship between the position of the observer’s 
eye and object which he/she observed. At this moment, the observer as 
the observing subject is condensed into observer’s eye. In other words, the 
observer as the subject transforms into the visual center of observing. The 
body, the feeling and the mind of painter are also condensed into his/her 
eye. Thereby we can say, the birth of the perspective painting on the easel 
is the result of the painter as the observer, who has been transformed as 
the visual center. The perspective of easel painting is of the visual measure-
ment which includes the distance between the position of observer’s eye 
and the object he/she observes, the angles between the visual ray and the 
object observed, and the relationship between the lights of the visual rays 
and the visibility of the observed object, etc. The perspective of the easel 
painting shows the emergence of the integrative whole which integrates all 
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the relationships above. During this progress, the appearance that the object 
casts on one’s retina is completely transformed on the vertical plane on the 
easel. It means that the picture on the plane of the easel is a re-projection 
of the appearance that the object casts on the retina. In seeking the visible 
reality, the perspective painting hopes that it can realize zero distance 
between the appearance of the object reflected on retina and appearance 
on the vertical plane of the easel7 Hence we can say the perspective on the 
easel makes painting completely visualized. 
From 1920th, many Chinese scholars encountering with the perspec-
tive painting confirmed traditional Chinese painting as “perspective 
with numerous points”. In Vision and Painting: The Logic of Gaze (1997), 
Norman Bryson interprets the perspective painting coming from the 
logic of gaze, and the Chinese table painting from the logic of glance.8 
These interpretations all use the western visual theory to sum up the 
Chinese table painting. But the key problem is whether the Chinese table 
painting could be analyzed by the visual theory originated from Western 
perspective painting, or whether the Chinese table painting could fit 
into the western visualized theory. As we have said above, the perspec-
tive indicates observer’s techniques of painting, and is the technique of 
visualization and operation which makes painting as a visual progress. 
But the Chinese table painting is not only a visual progress. In the im-
agination over the horizontal plane on the table, the function of eye is 
just the receiver of the object outside, once the eye has received visual 
images, it at once transmits the visual image to mind, then its function 
is finished. Afterwards, mind works on the visual image and generates 
image in mind through the intuitions from spirit. Philosopher Zhuangzi 
calls this process as “being met by mind without looking at by eye” (以神
遇而不以目视, Zhuangzi ). When the image in mind has been formed, 
the painter writes it down on the table thereby realized the image in mind 
as “image in hand-writing”. A famous painter in Qing Dynasty, Zheng 
Banqiao analyzed this progress in three steps according the scenario he 
painted bamboo. The first step is “bamboo in eye”: when the painter looks 
at the real bamboo in yard. In this step, the painter mainly receives the 
appearance or the image of objects outside his eyes, and generates “visual 
image”. We must emphasize that the painter maybe not look at only one 
clump of bamboo, but many clumps of bamboo in different places and 
eventually form his “visual image” of bamboo. The second step is that 
the “visual image” is transmitted to mind and the painter understands or 
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intuits the “visual image” in his mind, hence forms the “mind image” of 
bamboo. In this step, the painter uses his internal life-force, feeling and 
spirit to understand or intuit the object’s internal life-force, feeling and 
spirit, through the “visual image”, arriving at the state where the painter’s 
ego and the object’s image fuse together with no distance, then form-
ing the “mind image”. If the first step can be called as “learning nature” 
(外师造化) then the second step can be called as “receiving the internal 
source of mind” (中得心源). In the third step, the painter spreads paper 
or silk on table, grinds ink, and writes or draws the “mind image” down 
on paper or silk. But in this step, the image on paper or silk realized by 
hand-writing is not the copy of the mind image, because during the op-
eration of hand-writing, the state of paper or silk, the state of the dip-dye 
of ink on paper or silk, and the movement, the force, the feeling and the 
spirit of painter’s body and hand etc., all involve in the same progress 
of hand-writing and the generation of image. As the result, the image 
realized by hand-writing is not the faithful copy of the “visual image” in 
the eye or of the “mind image” in mind, but the “image in hand-writing” 
(手中之竹), which is a fusion of “visual image”, “mind image” and the 
force of hand-writing. During the progress, the function of eyes is just as 
a receiver of the appearance of objects. The visual action is not the center 
of Chinese table painting. Examining the history of Chinese painting 
and corresponding theories, there is no system of visual theory based 
on a visual center, but the systemic theory of artistic or poetic mind, and 
of the hand-writing of brush-strokes and ink. Comparatively speaking, 
if the perspective painting on the easel is a visualized progress which 
projects the function of mind and the hand-drawing to visual imaging, 
well then, the Chinese table painting is a progress of transmitting from 
eye to mind and then from mind to hand-writing, step by step. If the 
perspective painting on the easel is projecting the function of mind and 
of hand-drawing into the eye, and makes the vision having the function 
of mind and hands, It can be understood as the mathematics of the per-
spective painting.9 By contraries, Chinese table painting is of projecting 
the function of eye to mind and to hand-writing, when the mind has 
the function of vision; it is called as the “eye of mind”. The Chinese table 
painting does not exploit the zero distance between the eye and the hand. 
The operation of hand-writing all along is mediated by mind. Therefore 
using Western visual theory can not interpret and discover the main 
characteristics of Chinese table painting properly.
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Comparatively speaking, the center characteristic of Western perspec-
tive language is its plasticity or formativeness, but the center characteristic 
of Chinese table painting language is its hand-writing figurative. When 
European painter paints over the vertical plane on the easel, his/her op-
eration focuses on how to faithfully project the visual image in his retina 
onto the vertical plane on the easel. During this progress, the strokes, the 
traces, the spirit and the movements of the painter, should be realized or 
concealed completely in the plastic image on the plane. The traces of the 
painter’s operation do not possess important position. But when Chinese 
painter paints, he is more like a writer or a calligrapher. These aspects 
bring up the calligraphic characteristics and unique ways of visual spatial 
representation. During the evolving history of Chinese free painting from 
Eastern Jin to Tang dynasties, the table painting gradually dominated, the 
tools on literati’s writing table: brushes, xuan paper, ink, inkstones became 
painter’s main tools. The basic language and technique of Chinese painting 
is formed around the writing-table and these tools. 
There are three main aspects of the basic language and technique founded 
on the table: the first is the methods of brush-stroke (笔法), the second 
is methods of ink-operating (墨法), the third is the principle of spiritual-
resonance among whole (气韵生动). Regarding to the formation of brush-
stroke methods, it mainly absorbed the sources of calligraphic language 
and techniques developed from Eastern Han dynasties, and completed 
in Tang dynasty: the calligraphic techniques and its basic language began 
to breed the language and the aesthetic theory of the table painting, and 
formed the training methods. For example, how to operate the tip, the 
middle tip and the tip-side of pen, and how to emphasize operating pen 
with wrist-strength, etc. In my opinion, Xie He’s famous “six principles” 
(about A.C. 400) is the summary of the aesthetics and techniques of cal-
ligraphic pen-operation in the context of table painting. The “six principles” 
are as follows: the first is “spiritual resonance among whole”; the second 
is “bone of painting generated by brush-strokes”; the third is “picturing 
correspondence to objects”; the fourth is “picturing colors fitting to the 
types of objects”; the fifth is “managing the space of plane”; the sixth is 
“transmission and copy of models and the classic works”. Emphasizing 
“spiritual resonance” and the “bone of painting generated by brush-stroke” 
among the “six principles” is the root of the aesthetics of calligraphy. We 
can find the obvious change from Gu Kaizhi’s “writing spirit through the 
appearance of object” to Xie He’s emphasizing “spiritual resonance” and 
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taking root in “bone of painting generated by brush-strokes”. Up to Tang 
Dynasty, Zhang Yanyuan summarized this change in his Records and Com-
mentaries on Historical Famous Paintings: “picturing objects must be similar 
in appearance, the similar in appearance must draw the bone and the spirit 
(骨气) of object. The bone and the spirit, similar in appearance, all take 
roots in mind and originate from the brush-operation of painters. There-
fore good painter should be good in calligraphy.”10 He also summarized 
that “calligraphy and painting have same principles in brush-operation”. 
I believe that aesthetic theory of painting interpreted by Zhang Yanyuan 
is a theory transformed from calligraphy.
The basic techniques and language of the table painting based on cal-
ligraphy include main aspects as below:
The first is the writing of calligraphic lines. The writing of calligraphic 
letters produces calligraphic lines, which shapes the dominative position 
of calligraphic lines in the table painting. This domination of calligraphic 
line also leads to the ignorance of the volume of objects. Different kinds 
of calligraphic lines predominated the development of the table paint-
ing from Gu Kaizhi to Wu Daozi. During this period, painters formed 
five styles of calligraphic line, Gu Kaizhi’s style, Lu Tanwei’s style, Zhang 
Sengyou’s style, Cao Buxing’s style and Wu Daozi’s style. I must emphasize 
that the calligraphic lines of Chinese table painting are not simple lines 
of contours, but the line which synthesizes two lines of contour (双钩) 
into one. So the calligraphic line is the line, but also the form or the shape, 
as Zhang Yanyuan says, “Just one or two lines, the form or the shape has 
been there.”11 The second is the writing character of operating ink. Up to 
Tang Dynasty, following the development of paper making, painting on 
paper became possible. The methods of operating ink on xuan paper had 
been developed. The principles of operating ink were developed also to 
offset the lack of volume, and can expand the lines to express the texture 
and the volume of image. There are two aspects of operating ink: one is 
the change of heaviness and lightness, dryness and wetness, and the “jiao” 
(焦) of operating ink; the other is the methods of “cun” (皴法), brushing 
dipped ink rubing against paper or silk and producing texture or forms. 
The methods of cun can be regarded as the expansion of calligraphic lines. 
But it is necessary to stress that both the methods of operating ink and the 
methods of cun have the character of writing quality of the table painting. 
The third is the “spiritual resonance among whole”, which originates 
from the expression of the life state, the feeling, and the body movements 
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of painter through his/her operations of brush-strokes. These movements 
of brush strokes are like dances, which can move speedily or slowly, heav-
ily or lightly, slantingly or uprightly, and produce the traces of life actions. 
Conclusion
According to Roman Ingarden, every literary work is composed of four 
heterogeneous strata: the physical elements of symbol (word sounds and 
phonetic formations of high order); meaning units (formed by conjoining 
the sounds employed in a language with ideal concepts; these also range 
from the individual meanings of words to the higher-order meanings of 
phrases, sentences, paragraphs, etc.); Schematized aspects (these are the 
visual, auditory, or other “aspects” via which the characters and places 
represented in the work may be “quasi-sensorially” apprehended); and 
represented entities (the objects, events, states of affairs etc., represented 
in the literary work and forming their characters, plot, etc.).12 If we adapt 
Ingarden’s “four heterogeneous strata” from literary work to analyze the 
table painting work, I want to say that Ingarden’s four strata should add 
another strata, the traces of brush-strokes and operating ink. I prefer to 
regard Chinese table painting as the art of trace of the hand-writing on 
horizontal plane.
According to Derrida, the trace is the writing of the absence of pres-
ence.13 Then, the language of Chinese table painting is an art of trace of 
hand-writing on the table. It is the hand-writing of the double absences of 
presences: one is the absence of the presence of painter’s life; the other is 
the absence of the presence of objects. We need a phenomenology of trace 
to understand and interpret the Chinese table painting. 
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Curtis L. Carter 
Aesthetics and Action: A Perspective on Chinese 
Contemporary Art*
Aesthetics embraces a life force that adds meaning to human actions extend-
ing beyond their logical connections and practical outcomes. My aim in 
this presidential lecture for the 19th International Congress of Aesthetics 
is to encourage philosophers, artists, and others engaged in Aesthetics to 
be mindful of the place of aesthetics in the enhancement of life beyond 
their respective tasks in creating theories and practicing the respective 
arts. As our Congress theme, for 2013 implies, aesthetics has a place in 
the wide range of activities that we engage in including nature, the built 
environment, technology, education, religion, the political, as well as other 
multiple expanses of everyday life.
As early as my days in graduate school in Boston, the need to create 
a bridge between aesthetics and other dimensions of life was clear to me. 
This interest and the desire to relate aesthetics and the arts to social change 
have served as a primary motivation throughout my career. My objective 
has been to activate aesthetics and the arts in as many areas of life as pos-
sible. The pursuit of this interest has taken me in directions not necessar-
ily typical of most academic aestheticians. It has led to a joint career as 
professor-scholar, a founding museum director, and active participation 
in numerous leadership positions of advocacy and practice aimed at ad-
vancing the aesthetics thru the arts in relation to social services, education, 
fostering of leadership in dance, theater and visual arts organizations, and 
the training of future political leaders. Such experiences once found me 
on the road with a dance company imparting aesthetics to the company 
members and the audiences. On another occasion these efforts found me 
* The text was presented during ICA 2013 as the IAA President’s Lecture.
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in a prison, fortunately not as an inmate. The visit to prison was part of 
a program aimed at taking aesthetics beyond its usual purviews. In this 
case it meant bringing the arts to persons inside the prison environment. 
It was a special moment of validation of our theme “aesthetics in action” 
when a prisoner sitting next to me leaned over and said, “If I had only 
taken ballet and could leap as high as the dancers on the stage, I might 
never have ended up here.” 
The recommendation for the theme of this 19th IAA Congress, “Aes-
thetics in Action,” came from a suggestion made to the IAA Executive 
Committee at our Congress in Beijing three years ago. The members of the 
IAA Executive Committee Initially expressed reservations. Nevertheless, 
the members of the Congress Planning Committee in Krakow decided to 
go forward with this theme, and here we are ready to engage the results 
which all of you helped shape.
There is one more preliminary mention that has had an important influ-
ence in validating and encouraging the pursuit of aesthetics in action. This 
is the example set by the philosopher Nelson Goodman, whose efforts to 
activate aesthetics through extending his efforts in a range of practices 
beyond his important contributions to aesthetic theory. As the founder 
of Project Zero at Harvard University Goodman was responsible for es-
tablishing a cognitive based research center dedicated to research in arts 
education, and grounded in his Languages of Art. His efforts at Harvard 
also led to the founding of the Harvard Business School program in Arts 
Management and the establishment of the Harvard Summer School pro-
gram for dance. As a means to connect theory and practice Goodman 
worked with choreographer, composer, dancers, video production crew 
and supporting designers to produce a dance-theater work, Hockey Seen 
which explored the relation of aesthetics to sport.1 Goodman’s example in 
extending his interest in aesthetics to education, business, sports, animal 
welfare, and the applied arts offers an important role model for bringing 
aesthetics into action in a variety of life activities. Hence, I would like to 
dedicate this lecture to, Nelson Goodman who helped me to see the pos-
sibilities for realizing aesthetics in action.
In deciding how to approach the subject of “Aesthetics in Action” for 
this occasion, I have chosen to focus on the area of contemporary Chinese 
art and aesthetics. The particular issue for consideration here will be the 
interplay of aesthetics and politics in the dynamics developments in of 
Chinese art since 1979. During this particular time period, the Avant garde 
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artists working in China engaged successfully in efforts toward opening up 
freedom of expression including, but not limited to, greater opportunities 
for artists to publicly display new forms of art. For example the Chinese 
Stars artists group, (1979–1989) was the first to launch an unofficial public 
exhibition within the People’s Republic of China. This protest exhibition 
challenged the Central Communist Party’s official policy that mandated 
that art should reflect the views of the people and conform to the aims 
of the Party. Some of the works produced by the Stars artists’ contained 
only lightly concealed censorious references Mao Zedong and the official 
views concerning art. The forced closure of the Stars exhibition outside 
the National Art Gallery was followed by a protest march thru the streets 
of Beijing.2
I. “Viewing the Development of Chinese Contemporary 
Art as Metaphor”
The progression of changes in the work of Chinese artists during the period 
initiated by the Stars artists in 1979 to the present can perhaps be examined 
fruitfully by likening the dynamics of its progression to the unfolding stages 
in a metaphor. My use of metaphor here is suggested by, but not confined 
to a discussion of metaphor as cited in Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art. 
According to Goodman, “a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with 
a past and an object that yields while protesting.”3 In its initial framing, Good-
man’s theory is applied mainly to linguistic predicates.However, its application 
broadly construed remains open for applications to any human activity capable 
of functioning as symbolization and thus able to inform understanding. In this 
respect metaphor will be used here as a way of seeing the events, activities, ideas 
characteristic of the respective stages of art during this period in relation to 
each other as the art develops. The leap from metaphor in a linguistic context 
(language or language-like system} to other social-political-artistic contexts 
thus offers a frame for our look at the dynamics occurring throughout Chinese 
contemporary independent art from 1979 to the present.4
Briefly, then how will we understand metaphor in this context? Meta-
phor functions as a conceptual device to aid in our understanding of the 
artistic practices and ideas taking place in the art of China in an important 
transitional period in history. For example Socialist Realism yields while 
protesting to avant-garde art as represented in the Stars Group. Similarly, 
the western influenced Chinese Political Pop initiates another stage of 
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development, and now the focus turns to more indigenous explorations 
of individual artists.
II. Western Juncture
In a 1982 visit to Tiananmen Square Andy Warhol posed before a large 
portrait of Mao thus affirming both his interest in and admiration for 
this Chinese icon. Earlier, in 1972 Warhol had made 400 portraits of Mao, 
echoing the sentiments of “Life” magazine where the Chinese leader was 
declared the most famous man in the world. When Warhol arrived in 
China at age 54, he was virtually unknown there, as was much of what was 
happening in western contemporary art. The China that he visited, was 
then devoid of the trappings of the commodity driven commercial culture, 
now common in Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese cities, consisting 
of “brand names, restaurants, luxury cars” familiar to Warhol in the West. 
“When asked what he thought about China not having a McDonalds, War-
hol commented, ‘Oh, but it will,’ ” as reported by the photographer Chris-
topher Makos, who accompanied Warhol during his 1982 visit to China.5
There was little hint of the impact that Warhol and Western pop art would 
have on the future of Chinese contemporary art. Perhaps, Warhol’s comment 
concerning the future of McDonalds in China, “Oh, but it will,” could have 
equally been said of his own and the West’s future impact on Chinese art. 
Subsequently, it seems, Warhol became the Godfather responsible in part for 
the aesthetic and philosophy of the new Chinese contemporary art during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps a Chinese perspective on this matter might 
wish to temper this claim as giving too much credit to Western influences.
Memories of Warhol’s 1982 visit to Beijing were stirred in 2008 at the 
time of the Olympics in Beijing by an exhibition of photographs of Warhol’s 
1982 visit to China taken by Makos. But not until this year (2013) was it 
possible to mount a major museum exhibition of Warhol’s art in China.His 
paintings were shown in China during 2013 in Andy Warhol: 15 Minutes 
Eternal, an exhibition of 300 works organized by the Andy Warhol Museum 
in Pittsburgh. The exhibition opened in Shanghai in April 2013 after venues 
in Singapore and Hong Kong, with additional venues planned for Beijing, 
and Tokyo. And even then this exhibition was not without controversy, 
as the Chinese officials objected to a proposed showing of Warhol’s 1972 
portraits of Mao. The result is that the current exhibition does not include 
Warhol’s 1972 paintings of Mao.
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Looking back again, to another possibly forgotten moment in the de-
velopment of Contemporary Chinese art, it is useful to take note of the 
1981–1982 exhibition, “Important Original Works from the American 
Paintings Collection of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. “ This exhibition 
was conceived under the watchful eye of the American government agency 
USIA in the shadow of protests by the Stars Group and other Chinese artists 
in 1979 and thereafter. The 70 masterpieces from Boston included works 
of the 18 to the 20th century by a selection of major American artists John 
singleton Copley, John Singer Sargent, Winslow Homer, Marsden Hartley, 
and Edward Hopper, as well as 12 abstract works by Franz, Kline, Jackson 
Pollock, Helen Frankenthaler, Hans Hoffman, and others. The selection of 
the works for the exhibition, organized at the initiation of the American 
government cultural agency USAIA, was intended as a statement in sup-
port of freedom of artistic expression, with the hope that it might influence 
the advancement of freedom of expression for artists in China. (Note that 
the timing of the Boston exhibition in 1982 coincides with the Stars art-
ists’ ongoing efforts to advance freedom of expression during the period 
after their initial protest in 1979.) Despite Chinese officials’ objections to 
the abstract works and a nude, the American lender insisted on an “all or 
nothing” acceptance of the proposed works. After intense negotiations 
between the American Ambassador and a Vice Minister, Chinese eventu-
ally agreed. The exhibition took place at the Zhongguo Meishugan, now 
known as the National Art Museum of China. According to reports of the 
Chinese bureau of cultural affairs, the exhibition was a resounding success 
marked by daily attendance of some six to seven thousand visitors. The 
first run of 30,000 catalogues sold out the first week of the month long run 
in Beijing, followed by a month in the Shanghai museum.6
The significance of the Boston exhibition for the future of Chinese art 
is of considerable weight, given that it offered many Chinese artists their 
first opportunity to see original modern abstract from the West, and to 
contemplate its relevance for the future of Chinese art. For better or for 
worse concerning the future influences of Western art on Chinese inde-
pendent artists, this exhibition was an important point of departure for the 
intervention of non-Social Realist Western art into China after the Cultural 
Revolution. A photograph of students at the Central Academy of Fine Arts 
in Beijing posed in front of a Jackson Pollock painting, Number 10, 1949, 
from this exhibition no doubt conveys the excitement generated by a first 
sighting of the painting in the Boston Museum exhibition.7
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A testimony to the importance of the Boston Museum Exhibition is 
documented in the reflections of Chinese artists Zhang Wei (part of the No 
Name or Chumin Group of dissident artists) and Zhi Yong, and the critic 
Li Xianting on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the exhibition that 
took place in 2012. All in their twenties when the exhibition occurred, these 
artists might have been hesitant to speak about the art with foreigners at 
the time when the Boston exhibition came to Beijing. Li Xianting recalled 
being punished for publishing articles on abstract art in 1983. Thirty years 
later, the artists felt able to speak freely with Meredith Palmer, a member 
of the USIA who helped organize the Boston Museum exhibition of 1982. 
On the occasion of the exhibition’s anniversary in 2012, the artists reflected 
openly on their experiences of the 1982 exhibition. They recalled gaining 
mental and spiritual support, and then being inspired to consider alterna-
tive ways of working in their art.8
III. The Stream of History in Chinese Art from 1979 
to the Present
The problems of how to deal with the past thirty years of Chinese art weighs 
heavily on the present. Where to begin? Would it be a visit to Tiananmen 
Square to reflect on the meaning of Mao Tsedong for art during this period, 
and observe the veneration of throngs of both curious and devout visitors 
(as many as 30,000 on some days) as they pass though this memorial to 
the architect of modern China and the Cultural Revolution? Within the 
monument Mao lies in a transparent coffin augmented by live orchids, 
a four man honor guard, and a large banner which proclaims: “Long Live 
the memory of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Zedong.” Is this 
monument which opened in 1977 not itself a metaphor of the tensions in 
Chinese art and culture as it aims toward greater freedom for the develop-
ment of new art in China? The monument symbolizes a state of culture 
that at once embraces resistance to what is to come, while at the same time 
yielding to the inevitability of change as the nation seeks to position itself 
as a global power. Is not the persistence of Mao’s image in contemporary 
Chinese art, despite his demise, now some 47 years past, a witness to his 
continuing metaphorical participation in the art of China from then to 
now? Reinforcing the metaphor are giant sculptures of Mao in his home 
city of Shao Shan and elsewhere in China that continue to evoke reverence 
among the people toward his lingering presence.
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Each of the two narratives from 1982 respectively points to important 
sets of events pertinent to our theme concerning aesthetics in action. One 
is focused on the visits of Andy Warhol to China and the subsequent 
influence of Western art and culture on the future of independent artists 
in China. The other addresses the importance of the Boston Museum 
exhibition of 1982 in underscoring the role of aesthetics in the political 
realm. The problem of how to understand such events from the past and 
their implications for the context of contemporary Chinese art is expressed 
succinctly in the words of a journalist on his first visit to the Tiananmen 
Square monument: “Weighing how to look back without seeming to stare. 
Wondering if the whole thing is over.”9 Subsequent views of Mao Zedong by 
artists created beginning in 1979 are themselves indicative of the struggles 
both metaphorical and actual, taking place within Chinese art. The artists’ 
Mao paintings of this era and beyond pass thru stages of reverent respect 
and on to irreverent critiques as the metaphor embedded in the art yields 
to the changing political and artistic conditions of the time.
For example, Wang Guangyi’s series of Mao portraits, such as Mao 
A O created in 1988 reveals a very different attitude and the emergence of 
diverse artistic means to address its subject. In Wang Guangyi’s paintings, 
Mao’s image is encapsulated behind a grid of lines. Another artist Zhang 
Hongtu represents Mao in whimsical portraits showing traces of abstrac-
tion, and also as parodies on commodity images, for example Mao Quaker 
Oats, Fashion Mao, and a decorative motif for a ping-pong tabletop.10 The 
fact that such irreverent images can coexist in Chinese society along side 
the reverential sculptures of Mao and his tomb in Tiananmen Square 
suggests that the aesthetic tolerance sought by the Stars and other Avant 
garde Chinese artists has been to some degree successful in advancing the 
freedom of artistic expression in China. 
IV. The Current Generation
Philip Tinau, Art Director of the Ullen Centre in Beijing describes the 
current generation of Chinese artists as a “schizophrenic generation” with 
a multiplicity of concerns and resonances in their art, perhaps offering 
a direct reflection of how the country changes from day to day. For exam-
ple, Li Zhangang’s Rent, 2007 is a farcical recasting of a Socialist Realist 
sculpture, Rent Collection Courtyard, 1965. The 1965 sculpture in Sichuan 
Province tells the story of Chinese feudal landlords’ exploitation of peasant 
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farmers before Communist rule, while Li Zhangang’ s Rent portrays famous 
characters of the contemporary art world.11 Rent consists of some 34 life 
sized colored fiberglass figures representing Chinese and Western artists, 
art dealers, curators, collectors. This work offers a none too flattering satire 
on the dynamics of the contemporary international art world figures. One 
of his numerous groupings in the installation shows artist Joseph Beuys 
along side a seated sculptural representation of Chairman Mao Zedong. 
It is as if these two were presiding over the art scene from their respective 
privileged positions, Beuys as a star in the contemporary art world, Mao 
as recurring figure in the art of the period we are examining.
Li Zhangang’s Rent carries a double critical wallop as it challenges the 
political viability of the original sculpture Rent Collection Courtyard 1965, 
which was intended to celebrate the Cultural Revolution’s accomplishments, 
while also directing a humorous, skeptical look at the pretentiousness of 
the international art world. It is as if the art world figures had replaced the 
tyrannical landlords of the 1965 Socialist Realist work. (Regular attendees 
of the Venice Biennale will recall that another Chinese artist, Cai Guoqiang, 
presented his own version of the original 1965 Rent Collection Court Yard 
as a conceptual performance at the 48th Biennale in 1999.)
In January 2013, The Economist published an informative review of the 
exhibition On/Off: China’s Young Artists in Concept and Practice, discussing 
the works of artists born after the death of Mao Zedong. The article pointed 
out that in contrast to “old guard contemporary artists who lived thru or in 
the shadow of the Cultural Revolution, the new generation represents “art 
more rooted in everyday competition of urban life, and the rapid changes 
that China has gone through as they grew up.”12 For example the artist Li 
Liao created a work focused on his experience as a factory worker in A Fox 
Conn plant where he worked inspecting circuits for Apple products, and 
used his pay to purchase an I Pad. The resulting art work, Consumption, 
2013 as displayed in the exhibition “On/Off ” included the artist’s uniform, 
security badge, and contract and the I Pad he had purchased placed on 
a pedestal beside the other items.13 
Another work from the same exhibition by artist Zhao Zhao consisted 
of cut cubes of stone from Buddha statues destroyed by the Red Guards 
during the Cultural Revolution. The aim in Zhao’s work was to juxtapose 
metaphorically a moment in the history of Chinese Buddhist sculptures 
as altered by Red Guard political action with the creation of his own work 
of contemporary art. In this case the memory of the past art acquires new 
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meaning through the artist’s creative intervention. Along the same path, 
He Xianagyu’s contemporary piece Tank, references through a sculptural 
metaphor the tanks rolling into Tiananmen Square. Tank is a conceptual 
art piece consisting of a deflated military tank made of leather that lies 
crumpled and impotent on the gallery floor, nevertheless “charged with 
meaning.”14
Among the issues advancing in current discussions of Chinese independ-
ent artists is an increasing self-reflection of women artists on their role in 
independent Chinese art.15 Moving beyond the history of male hegemony 
and the problem of how to distinguish art with reference to gender, the 
women artists of the 1990s and thereafter increasingly choose to explore 
their own spiritual world and personal experiences. In fact, themes such 
as striving for freedom, artistic or personal self-discovery, or “feelings of 
‘alienation, anxiety, fear, insecurity” or distrust of men, do not suffice to 
differentiate art on the basis of gender. Instead, women artists today may 
choose to focus the value of the individual in everyday life. For example, 
the painter Yu Hong uses personal images taken from shopping, swimming, 
and family photos as subjects for her art.16 This trend points increasingly 
toward the necessity of moving beyond the search for women artists who 
create a particular gender based grounding for their art.
The facility of women artists in creating art with the new artistic vo-
cabularies offered by performance art, installation art, and new media arts 
such as video, internet, and everyday life, as well as traditional art media, is 
evidenced in a quietly growing number of exhibitions perhaps more outside 
of China than inside, dedicated to women artists. For example, the 2011 
exhibition Half the Sky: Women in the New Art of China, co-curated by 
the National Art Museum of China and the Leonard Pearlstein Gallery at 
Drexel University in the USA, offered a look at some of the leading Chinese 
women artists of today.17 Among the growing populations of experimental 
women artists in China are these artists tagged in a 2008 article by Holland 
Cotter in the “New York Times”, “China’s Female Artists Quietly Emerge.18 
Lin Tianmiao who initially created works in her apartment from used 
household utensils such as teapots, woks, and scissors wrapped in white 
cloth later escalated her creative productions to include floor to ceiling 
self-portraits made of braids of yarn. The installation artist Xin Xiuzhen 
makes art from unraveling yarn from second hand men’s and women’s 
sweaters, and reconstructing it into gender-neutral garments. Lu Qing 
applies marks on 82-foot bolts of silk with reference to the Chinese tradi-
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tion of scroll making. On a more provocative note, Cui Yiuwen employs 
a hidden video camera to film a gathering of women including prostitutes 
engaged in conversation, making contact with clients, etc. in the bathroom 
of a Beijing karaoke bar. The result is her video Lady’s Room, which explores 
the role of women as active agents in consumer eroticism.
It is interesting to note that amidst all of the clamoring of the independent 
artists of China for ways to explore installation, video, electronic media for 
creating art, there is at the present time a significant revival of interest among 
Chinese artists working today in brush and ink painting. It may come as 
a surprise to think of brush and ink as a contemporary art medium. But no 
less a major artist than Feng Meng Bo, known for his experimental video 
games in 2013 announced that he has ceased working with the computer and 
video game technology to seek mastery in the art of ink painting, A closer 
look will show that ink painting has a strong place in the works of many 
independent artists working today. Among these artists Xu Bing has probed 
deeply into the symbolic powers of ink painting to articulate important 
themes in contemporary culture. Among these is the role of language as 
articulated in his Book from the Sky, 1987–1988, which confounded Chinese 
viewers when they discovered the characters to be unreadable. Wu Genda’s 
reflections on the implications of intense social changes in China during the 
1980s in such works as Pseudo-Character Series also produced experiments 
with unreadable characters aimed examining the place of language and art 
in a changing Chinese society. Pan Gongkai, who continues to practice ink 
painting alongside his other interests as a contemporary artist, finds new 
meanings for ink paintings. Others who mark new paths for ink painting 
include Ghen Guangwu who has developed his own postmodern visual 
language rooted in calligraphy and Daoism and Buddhism. In working with 
ink on paper, Qin Feng articulates his reluctance to part with ink painting in 
a series called Bird’s Painting 2008 which bridges his grounding in Chinese 
ink painting with western abstract expressionism.
Why is this current interest in ink painting taking place at the present 
time? The question was addresses in a symposium at Peiking University 
and the Today Museum in 2013 with no clear answer emerging. Is it not in 
part a desire to assess what it means to be a Chinese in the face of so many 
competing forces arising in part from western influences and globaliza-
tion, as well as from the rapid transformation of China from a socialist 
to a modified capitalist society? Clearly this new interest in ink paintings 
is not simply an attempt to halt advances made over the past thirty years. 
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The experiments represented take the medium well beyond traditional cal-
ligraphy and ink painting. Viewed in the context of a recurring metaphor, 
might the present day return to ink paintings show the tradition of callig-
raphy and ink painting yielding to new threads of Chinese art and culture, 
while resisting other western driven influences? The metaphorical protest 
expressed in the return to ink paintings against influences of Western art, 
whether passive or active, is a reminder that calligraphy and ink paintings 
are after all the root of all Chinese art and culture.
V.  Issues Driving Contemporary Chinese Independent 
Art/Artists
From these brief observations it seems clear that the current generation 
of Chinese artists is still sorting out options both remembering the past 
and trying to make sense: personal sense, national sense, global sense of 
the present and the future. The successes of the best known of these artists 
who now command multi-million dollar prices in the global art market 
are equal to or surpassing the economic power of the best known western 
artists. We need only mention a few of the global stars: Wang Guangyi and 
Yue Minjun connected with the political pop and cynical realism or the 
conceptual art of Xu Bing and Gu Wenda. Thousands more must struggle 
with finding their own vision and the means for its communication with 
greater and lesser degrees of artistic success.
There is not time here to go more deeply or to advance an overriding 
theory to connect the issues raised by these recollections of the sometimes 
forgotten moments in the past 30 years of Chinese Independent Art. Let 
me end with one issue that will be necessary to address as we try to sort 
out the developments that have taken place and their place in art history.
This is the problem of methodology. It is tempting to proceed accord-
ing to methodologies developed in western aesthetics and art history for 
assessing these recent developments in Chinese art. This would mean 
using categories such as modernism, post-modernism, or pluralism. But 
some Chinese scholars would argue that modernity as understood in 
the West does not fit the contemporary art developments in China. For 
example, Gao Minglu contrasts western modernity based on a progres-
sion of temporal-historical epochs (pre-modern, modern, post-modern, 
pluralism) where art emerges in the conflict between aesthetic autonomy 
seeking individual creative freedom and capitalist bourgeois materialist 
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values, with “total modernity” in Chinese contemporary culture. Instead, 
Gao Minglu embraces “total modernity” a new Chinese modernity that 
unifies politics, aesthetics and social life. According to Gao Minglu, Chinese 
history does not fit the linear periodization of the western system. Total 
modernity, as Gao Minglu argues, consists of “particular time, particular 
space, and truth of mine,” and represents a century-long effort in China to 
realize an ideal environment by focusing on specific physical spaces and 
social environments. The new art in China as understood in the context 
of total modernity thus aims toward integrating art and life as a whole by 
concatenating art into particular social projects and taking into account 
changes in the social and political environments.19 Given these assumptions, 
as Gao Minglu would argue, Chinese art today is best understood in the 
context of specific local time and space embodiments. This does not mean 
that the Chinese embodiments occur in isolation from external influences 
or artistic movement from the west, as Gao Minglu acknowledges the 
influences of western art movements such as Dada, Surrealism, and Pop 
art explicitly. Similarly he recognizes the complexities of globalization and 
other shifting social and political forces for Chinese avant-garde artists.
Metaphor as I have applied the concept here does not give us a new 
theory that replaces modernism or post-modernism, or pluralism. However 
it does offer a way to think of the dialectical relations that occur among the 
developing stages of independent art being produced in China since 1979. 
Given the rapid changes and diversity evident in Chinese contemporary 
art, understanding these relations seem more useful than attempting to 
forge discrete stylistic differences as in western art history. 
Are there any measures to employ in acknowledging when a metaphor 
is relevant to our understanding? Goodman would likely suggest novelty 
and fitness as measures of the contribution of a metaphor to understand-
ing. Novelty suggests keeping an eye out for innovation through careful 
observation, comparison, and taking measure so as to gather the full rich-
ness and diversity of what is happening. Fitness as applicable here refers 
to efficaciousness or usefulness for aiding understanding what is being 
examined. What seems clear is that the stages in the progression of the 
works of independent artists in China since 1979 are based on resisting, 
while at the same time embracing aspects of Western art. Similarly, the 
current interest in renewed exploring contemporary ink painting offers yet 
another dynamic of resistance to traditional Chinese art, while continuing 
to explore its relevance for Chinese independent artists today.
386  Curtis L. Carter 
Endnotes
1. Curtis Carter, Nelson Goodman’s Hockey Seen: A Philosopher’s Approach to Performance 
in: Congress Book 2: Selected Papers: XVII International Congress of Aesthetics, ed. Jale 
N. Erzen, SANART, 2009, pp. 57–67.
2. Paul Gladson, Avant garde groups in China, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2013.
3. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1968, 
pp. 68–71. 
4. See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Wive By, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980; Richard Nordquist, Conceptual Metaphor, 
About.com “Grammar and Composition”, http://grammar.about.com/od/c/g/
conceptmetaphorterm.htm, accessed on May 19, 2013.
5. Christopher Turner, Andy Goes to China, “Blouin ArtInfo”, http://www.blouinartinfo.
com/news/story/271329/andy-goes-to-china#, accessed on January 5, 2009. Originally 
appeared in “Modern Painters”, September 2008
6. Nancy Berliner, Not so Abstract: Reconsidering the 1981 Exhibition of Masterpieces 
from the Museum of Fine Art Boston, “China Story”, https://www.thechinastory.
org/2013/03/not-so-abstract-re-considering-the-1981-exhibition-of-masterpieces-
from-the-museum-of-fine-arts-boston/, posted on March 8, 2013. 
7. Photograph reproduced in Nancy Berliner, Not so Abstract: Reconsidering thee 1981 
Exhibition of Masterpieces from the Museum of Fine Art Boston, “The China Story”, https://
www.thechinastory.org/2013/03/not-so-abstract-re-considering-the-1981-exhibition-
of-masterpieces-from-the-museum-of-fine-arts-boston/, posted on March 8, 2013.
8. Meredith Palmer, When Public Policy Made a Difference: American Paintings in China 
1981, “Washington Post”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/when-
public-policy-made-a-difference-american-paintings-in-china-in-1981/2011/11/14/
gIQAMYrfDP_story.html, accessed on December 23, 2011, See also Art Raider Asia, 
February 6, 2012.
9. Holland Cotter, The Power of Mao, Multiplied, “New York Times”, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/08/03/arts/design/03cott.html?_r=0, accessed on August 3, 2013.
10. Gail Pellett, Is There Art After Liberation? Mao’s Scorched Flowers Go West, “The Village 
Voice”, New York, NY 1986. Updated by Gail Pellett, 
11. Nataline Colonnello, ’Rent’—Rent Collection Yard, “Asia Archive”, http://www.aaa.
org.hk/Collection/Details/23552 , accessed on May 8, 2013. See also Chuan Tan, Li 
Zhanyang in Beijing, “Blouin Artinfo”, August 8, 2008, http://es.blouinartinfo.com/
photo-galleries/li-zhanyang-beijing , accessed on May 19, 2013.
12. A.A., On/off: China’s Young Artists in Concept and Production, “The Economist”, 
January 21, 2013. 
13. Evan Osnos, What is an iPad Doing on a Pedestal at a Chinese Art Museum?, “The 
New Yorker”, January 18, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/what-
is-an-ipad-doing-on-a-pedestal-at-a-chinese-art-museum, accessed on May 19, 2014.
14. Ibid.
Aesthetics and Action: A Perspective on Chinese… 387
15. Artistic Questions of Women’s Art, eds. Lv Peng et all; Thirty Years of Adventures: Art and 
Artists From 1979, Hong Kong: Timezone, Blue Kingfisher Limited, 2011, pp. 123–129.
16. Yu Hong, “A Woman’s Life,” Exhibition, 2003, Halsley Institute.
17. Sue Wang, Half the Sky: Women in the New Art of China, “Cafa Art Info”, October 
9, 2011, http://en.cafa.com.cn/half-the-sky-women-in-the-new-art-of-china.html, 
accessed on May 19, 2013.
18. Holland Cotter, China’s Female Artists Quietly Emerge, “New York Times”, July 30, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/arts/design/30arti.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
accessed on May 19, 2013.
19. Gao Minglu, Total Modernity and the Avant-garde in Twentieth Century Art, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 2011, pp. 3, 4.

Applied Social Art: The Potential of Art 
and Criticism After March 11, 2011 
(Akiko Kasuya)

Akiko Kasuya
Introduction
The massive earthquake and tsunami that caused extensive structural 
damage in eastern Japan on March 11, 2011 were also responsible for 
the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. This devastating crisis showed us that 
every seemingly solid foundation and assumption was actually completely 
unreliable. It also revealed that advanced technology was no match for nu-
clear power, as the menace of radioactivity forced people to take concrete 
action in every field. 
Situations of this kind have been discussed in metaphoric terms since the 
emergence of postmodernism. Since March 11, however, these imaginings 
have taken on a much more realistic aspect. Against this backdrop, the 
third installment of the International Convention on Manga, Animation, 
Game and Media Art (ICOMAG) was organized by Professor Hiroshi 
Yoshioka and the Agency for Cultural Affairs in Tokyo in February. The 
central theme of the event concerned “criticism” in the context of hybrid 
culture. Since the advent of postmodernism, the hybrid nature of culture 
has been recognized in both politics and industry, leading to a curious 
situation in which a variety of heterogeneous fields coexist while remaining 
segregated from each other. In today’s politically neutered, hybrid culture, 
the conference considered what form criticism might take in the future. 
In this panel discussion, we will attempt to build on and develop the con-
clusions of ICOMAG 2013. With “applied social art” as a key phrase, we 
hope to explore the potential of art and criticism in a post-March 11 world.
Artur Żmijewski, a Polish artist who acted as curator of the 7th Berlin 
Biennale in 2012, advocates “applied social arts,” declaring that artists 
do not work isolated from the world, but must recognize themselves as 
embedded in the inherently politicized world, functioning as a part of the 
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power network and the ideology machine. Żmijewski calls his own activi-
ties “critical art.” During the Berlin Biennale he invited activists from the 
Occupy movement to set up camp in the main venue, and not only pro-
vided a venue for debate, but also clarified his own stance as a provocative 
social critic. Art in Western Europe has a long history of seeking autonomy 
from politics, religion, economics, authority or any other outside force 
that would turn art toward other ends. Artists have intentionally chosen 
engagement with the here and now, and they willingly accept political 
entanglements so as to meet their responsibilities as members of a group. 
They do not hide behind a veil of otherworldly esotericism, nor do they 
shirk danger. Żmijewski once said that art means responsibility for him. 
“The artist is not an innocent and secluded monk or nun living through 
his or her own individual obsessions - the artist is part of a power network, 
an ideological machine” (My History of Art series of lectures at the Centre 
for Contemporary Art at Ujazdowski Castle in Warsaw, 2008). Similar art-
ists who feel strong responsibility to society had also turned up in Japan 
especially after the catastrophe, tragic earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku 
area on 11 March 2011.
Recent artists have gotten involved with society, producing works that 
transcend the boundaries of art and infiltrate every aspect of daily life, and 
such actions have found an increasing number of venues and an apprecia-
tive audience. They have changed the way information is disseminated, and 
altered the very structure of society. By referencing Żmijewski‘s “Applied 
Social Art” and extending it, we’d like to discuss the potential of art and 
criticism in a post-March 11 world.
Miki Okubo
Proposition for Participative Art as an Avenue 
Toward Open-Mindedness in Criticism
1. The state of web writing after 3.11
Since the popularization of various types of web writing such as blogging 
services which allow us to disseminate our writings across a vast online 
network, the recent upsurge in social network activity which has begun 
to dominate daily life, and the development of virtual communities, we 
observe new characteristics in the mode of discussion in Japanese society. 
These changes may relate to the social and political environment in Japan 
following the tragedy of Fukushima on March11, 2011. Japanese relations 
with foreign countries were complicated by the nuclear disasters. As a result, 
some Japanese come to keep a closed-off/unsociable attitude, an attitude 
reminding us of the seclusion during the Edo period. This may sound like 
an exaggeration or figure of speech, but take one glance at Japanese online 
writing activity and it is impossible to ignore a renewed existence of this 
closed-off attitude among the Japanese.
Tadasu Takamine, one of the most renowned Japanese artists today 
is famous for his politically and socially radical messages (See his inter-
view videos, Japan Syndrome, God Bless America (2002), Kimura-san). 
His recent exhibition titled Tadasu Takamine’s Cool Japan, illustrates 
a remarkable observation. Takamine produced one chapter, entitled “the 
room of free expression” which presents hate speeches written by Japa-
nese people. We encounter critically violent and discriminative words 
aimed at others, including foreigners living in Japan or people who differ 
from “the standard.” Colourful language blasts the Japanese government, 
people of other generations, disabled people, and any other category of 
people imaginable.
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The ensemble of hate speeches sounds shocking and scandalous. Keep 
in mind, these were not invented but are extracted from real posts online. 
We are obligated to accept this horrible fact as we begin our deliberations. 
In order to understand the conditions which made this hate speech possible, 
it is important to consider the role of cyber activity in Japanese society, dat-
ing back to the start of the Internet boom. Japanese have tended to clearly 
distinguish cyberspace from the real world in terms of human relationships 
and behaviours, considering the Internet as an ideal space to chat freely 
and without accountability, even for discussing sensitive or secret subjects. 
People remain anonymous in their online relationships and activity, hiding 
their identity with pseudonym. The Japanese have maintained this attitude, 
even in the recent era of social network services, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, which generally ask members to use their own names.
The exhibition explains this particular tendency as following:
Japanese prefer eloquent silence, and tend to avoid expressing their own 
opinions in a high-handed or assertive say. (…) Online bulletin board, so-
cial networking services have given them a relatively free and anonymous 
channel to voice their thoughts without fear of reprisal.
The violent attitude toward foreign countries and people is considered 
a sort of psychologically defensive attitude against overseas attacks and 
bashings on radioactive pollution caused by the accident of Fukushima 
Daiichi Plant. Strong bashing of the Japanese government and Tepco’s inap-
propriate operations traumatized some sensible people. Some decided to 
close themselves off to avoid being hurt by others. Whatever reasons they 
have, malicious hate speeches can result only in a vicious circle.
Curiously, people writing these hate speeches are often unaware of the 
possibility of their influence on foreign Japanese speakers. They innocently 
believe as if Japanese language were a kind of secret code allowing them 
to communicate only with other Japanese, keeping their discussions away 
from the eyes of foreigners. Needless to say, the Japanese language is not 
a minority language and cannot function as a protective suit from poten-
tial aggressive adversaries. Japanese violent online writing activity is due 
to a shortage of imagination. Now, I identify a current trend in certain 
groups: violent criticism of foreigners or socially weak people with no 
specific reason, as an otaku-like policy.
It is necessary to examine the meaning of the term “otaku” or “otakish” 
in this context. The term, “otaku,” is commonly used in Japanese society 
Proposition for Participative Art… 395
to describe any situation that is difficult to understand, or a person’s non-
communicative, closed attitudes, or as a kind way to describe experts in 
any field who are unable to make themselves understood without using 
technical terms. In this sense, professors, doctors, researchers and crazed-
fans or maniacs of a certain subject can all be called otaku. This way of using 
the term “otaku” is very usual in Japan. The term “otaku” implies a certain 
level of communicational impossibility. Until recently, multidisciplinary 
studies such as cultural studies, sociology and psychology have focused on 
important social phenomena surrounding the otaku culture. In “otakism,” 
the theory of otaku, otakish attitude means a non-communicative attitude 
in which people use technical terms used in computer programming, medi-
cal fields, or advanced research, in order to be understood only within their 
own field. In fact, even the language itself is transformed into an otakish 
tool if people deny the possibility of a translation.
2. Moving beyond otaku-like exclusivity in criticism
The 3rd International Convention of Manga, Animation, Games and media 
arts on February, 2013 (commonly called ICOMAG), chaired by Hiroshi 
Yoshioka, examined current trends in criticism in order to consider new 
appropriate/possible contemporary criticism for today’s hybrid culture. 
Despite the inclusion of multiple disciplines, including literature and the 
arts, far more exclusive, extremely specialized discourses are becoming 
widespread. Otaku culture and its closed-off mode of discussion are seen 
as responsible for shutting down any possibility for open criticism. It is 
necessary to position this discussion differently. Done appropriately, this 
could encourage a different outcome and help overcome the current trend 
of exclusivist tendency in Japanese art criticism. 
After Mr.Yoshioka’s announcing of a questionnaire concerning 3rd ICO-
MAG’s aim, Professor Jean-Louis Boissier (University Paris 8), media artist, 
and the attendees of his seminars met together to discuss the possibility 
of criticism in hybrid culture.
France, the second greatest manga consumer worldwide, is a country that 
keenly accepts Japanese pop-culture. Even it is government promotes Cool 
Japan or Japanese kawaii Culture. In early July every year, Japan Expo, one 
of the most important events in France celebrating Japanese culture, attracts 
more and more visitors (In 2012, this event attracted more than 210,000 
visitors). Nevertheless, many young French find it difficult to comprehend 
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what’s really happening in Japanese pop culture because of the linguistic 
barriers Most Japanese websites are presented only in Japanese. Young 
foreigners generally have no chance at comprehension even in considerably 
attractive fields. They navigate online Japanese communication through 
online automatic translators. Unfortunately, one cannot translate directly 
between French and Japanese so this process often fabricates modifications 
or distortions, making the language difficult to de-code even with the aid 
of translation software.
The Otaku community maintains an attitude of exclusivity and a non-
communicative nature. It is especially difficult for foreigners experiencing 
linguistic problems to recognize the otaku communities’ disposition. Based 
on this current situation, how could we take a step towards open criticism? 
How does the criticism contribute to dialogue that is useful in examining 
contemporary hybrid culture? Following is a brief report on our discussion 
of this subject in a seminar at the University Paris 8.
To look deeply into this theme, we read an article uploaded on Mr. Yosh-
ioka’s personal blog, titled Why Be Ashamed of “Cool Japan”? (The text is 
Japanese, French version by my translation is available at: Pourquoi avoir 
honte du “Cool Japan”?, http://www.mrexhibition.net/wp_mimi/?p=1427). 
The article provides a clear background of the negative attitude among 
Japanese people toward “Cool Japan”, focusing our attention on historic 
conflicts between high culture and popular culture in Japanese society. 
The article is available for viewing on the blog. This report will cover only 
key points.
There is a widely shared impression that Japanese high culture is no 
more than an imitation of other cultures. Before modern times, everything 
Japanese did was in imitation of Chinese Culture. In modern days, Oc-
cidental Culture has infiltrated Japan. Foreign countries express a much 
greater attraction to Japanese popular culture than to their high culture, 
which Japanese have made sophisticated through great effort. Devoted 
appreciation of popular culture is doomed to be considered an “exotic” 
subject abroad. This is why Japanese reject their Cool Japan. The notion of 
“exoticism” gives off an offensive air, reminding us of historical frustration 
regarding colonialism. Accepting Cool Japan might mean yielding to these 
implications. Japanese people, therefore, maintain an inevitable negative 
attitude toward Cool Japan.
As a result, Japanese people do not appropriately assess their own culture. 
They avoid making an effort to understand different people and aspects 
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of their culture, or they develop their discussions exclusively within their 
familiar community circle using jargon, thus closing the doors of the con-
versation on the wider public. The negative stance toward Cool Japan has 
aggravated this current impasse in criticism. While cultural structure in 
a country is very complex, Japanese are often willing to divide it into just 
two: high and low culture. Even taking a glance at popular culture, different 
degrees coexist: culture for the majority, culture consumed by the major-
ity, avant-garde culture in which the majority turns over the conventional 
culture, culture developed as well as consumed by the majority, transitional 
culture at the limit of high culture and so on. It is impossible to draw a line 
between high and pop culture. Therefore, the said hypothesis: Japanese high 
culture as no more than an imitation is not persuasive. Furthermore, this 
kind of inferior stance and pessimistic thought has probably obstructed 
any possible conversation between different fields.
Otakish attitude appears in a certain self-sufficient system where a cul-
ture can develop by itself. To illustrate, fields of derivative work, such as Co-
mikets, fanzines, Japanese manga and animation have a self-reproductive 
mechanism in place. Inside of these communities, authors and consumers 
exchange mutually, working as both authors and consumers. Understand-
ing this characteristic of the otaku-world is crucial: the closed otaku-ism 
system rejects outsiders’ involvement. Although any specific otaku-like 
use of language can be difficult to comprehend, we cannot ignore any 
specialized discussion among otaku people because they are themselves 
creators and supporters of culture, so the otaku world is the actual scene 
of production and creation. Finally, “otaku” is not a particular group but 
a specific mental attitude restricting communications. It is necessary for the 
revival of criticism, for the respect of written word and for the recovery of 
human beings’ authentic conversation, to unblock the otaku-like attitude.
3. Shinbunonna (Newspaper Woman) – proposition 
for participative art
How could we open “otaku-ism discourse”? What do we do to overcome 
the current closed off situation? To begin with, this closed-off feature is 
a part of otaku communities according to its definition. We have to change 
our minds concerning this point.
Instead of using incomprehensible technical terms to avoid being un-
derstood, or using secret languages as a violent tool to attack others (as 
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we saw Takamine’s outstanding work in his exhibition, the room of free 
expression), we can talk each other and most importantly, share something. 
“Open-minded” communication occurs at the moment where people are 
ready to share something with others.
I would like to introduce a proposition of “participative art” as series of 
artistic practices enabling people to realize a reciprocal communication.
Generally, media arts and games are considered participative, however, 
they are not truly interactive because games are based on programmed 
codes and fixed roles are often pre-established. True interaction consists 
of a commitment to events and participation in actions.
Newspaper Woman, a Japanese artist, whose real name is Miyuki Nishi-
zawa, is the direct successor of the late Shozo Shimamoto, Gutai’s founding 
member. Her art’s aimed principally to liberate people’s mind. Through her 
art, she always delivers joyfulness and happiness she experienced herself. 
Anyone lucky enough to encounter her dynamic performance finds their 
mind liberated from the ennui of daily life. Newspaper Woman proposes 
her spectators to get involved in the performance, to act together and 
share the experience.
On March 9, 2013, having been invited by the Guggenheim Museum 
in New York, she carried out her performance for more than 1000 visitors. 
I had the opportunity to experience the special occasion, being involved 
instantly in the spectacle as one of her staff. The three hour long perfor-
mance began with a work titled Please Walk under Here (2013), in which 
the staff form together a sort of an arch made from her 30 meter long 
newspaper dress hem. In experiencing this piece, visitors could walk under 
the long hems of her dress. Please Walk under Here is the homage paid to 
her later mentor Shozo Shimamoto whose performance Please Walk on 
Here took place in 1955. Following this opening performance, visitors were 
invited to participate in the Newspaper costume parade with Shinbunonna 
and her fellows wearing newspaper dresses. Various collaborative and 
participative performances engaged the public, making everyone happy. 
I believe participative propositions such as these could effectually drive 
otaku-minded people to communicate openly not only by means of words 
but also in physical ways.
Shinbunonna was also invited for the congress of Japan Association for 
Semiotic Studies (JASS) in Kobe Fashion Museum in May 2012. She gave 
a successful performance, wrapping students, professors and museum staff 
participants in newspapers. An unusual situation created by Shinbunonna, 
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who played the important role of making people feel free from any kind of 
daily troublesomeness, transformed a meeting place of academic confer-
ence into an alien space.
Moreover, her performances are not limited only to art museums and 
cultural centres. She appears on city streets, in commercial shopping cen-
tres and under arcaded streets! She gives beautiful dreams to children and 
families during their holidays as well as workshops to craft amateurs to 
teach newspaper cloth know-how. She bravely appears on TV and in other 
media. Through her practice of using newspapers, she brings to people 
a certain alien experience, making a hole our tedious routine, freeing 
participants from the reality. It is the alienation effect, as Brecht said in his 
theory regarding the theatre, that helps people join and relate each other, 
turning their attitude toward mutual conversation. When we encounter 
what we have never seen, we are driven by necessity of altering our habitual 
convention into another unknown. Such experiences could transform 
into an overture of alternative interaction adapted to our hybrid culture’s 
era, reviving authentic discourse and meaningful written communication. 
Participative art and experimental expression could offer new possibilities 
in overcoming the dead-end situation in criticism.
Takafumi Kato
A Tentative Theory: the Actual/Possible Matrix 
Extracted From Art
After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, children who had directly 
and indirectly suffered as a result of the earthquake began to play a seem-
ingly strange game called “jishin-gokko”.1 “Jishin” is the Japanese word for 
earthquake, and “gokko” is the Japanese word that means make-believe play. 
“Jishin-gokko” is thus a kind of game of make-believe. Children participat-
ing in this game pretend that they are now experiencing a devastating earth-
quake, a catastrophic tsunami after it, or an extremely tense atmosphere 
in disaster shelters and other places of refuge. For example, in some cases, 
children shout “Earthquake!” and violently shake chairs and desks around 
them. In other cases, children pretend that a huge tsunami is approaching: 
some of them play the role of the tsunami making the growling noises of 
huge waves, while others exclaim “Hurry up! Take shelter!” Such games 
might seem tactless; these games might recall to adults and children the 
overwhelming nightmare and sometimes hurt them seriously. However, 
some health practitioners and those who are engaged in the educational 
profession argue that such games should not be prohibited because they 
may work as a kind of self-managing therapy for children.2
This article focuses on the aspect of self-managing therapy that games 
of make-believe might have, following K. L. Walton’s theory about make-
believe games.3 In addition, it will be argued that experiences of artworks 
can be regarded as participations in games of make-believe in some cir-
cumstances; experiences of artworks can have an aspect of self-managing 
therapy. However, it must be noted that the word “therapy” in this article 
is used in a broad sense; “therapy” may take place not only in a hospital or 
a counseling room, but also in a museum or a temple, or on more common 
occasions, for example, in a classroom, at home, or in a community space. 
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When aesthetic experiences are considered as games of make-believe, sev-
eral “actual” and “possible” aspects of the experiences can be pointed out, 
and such “actual” and “possible” aspects are complexly intertwined. These 
aspects will be listed in the last section, and then, a theory of “the actual/
possible matrix of art” will be suggested. When a catastrophic disaster 
strikes, the sufferers are forced to face a harsh reality. To discuss potentiali-
ties of art, it is essential to examine several actual/possible aspects of art; it 
is needed to extract “the actual/possible matrix” from art.
1. A game of make-believe: “jishin-gokko”
“Jishin-gokko” is, as explained above, a kind of game of make-believe. 
“Jishin-gokko” can be described in reference to K. L. Walton’s book Mime-
sis as Make-Believe.4 Because there is no space here to comprehensively 
follow Walton’s discussion, only three important concepts are picked out 
from his theory: 1) fictional truths, 2) props, and 3) fictional worlds. Each 
of these concepts can be applied to the case of “jishin-gokko”.
1.1. Fictional truths
Fictional truths are defined as propositions which are believed in the games 
of make-believe.5 For example, two kids, say, Eric and Gregory play a game 
of make believe; Eric says “let’s say that stumps are bears”, and Gregory 
agrees; when there is a tree stump in front of them, the proposition “there 
is a bear in front of them” is a fictional truth. When a given proposition 
(p) is a fictional truth, Walton calls (p) fictional. To put this concept in 
cases of “jishin-gokko”, propositions such as “a violent lateral vibration is 
happening” or “a huge tsunami is approaching” are fictional.
1.2. Props
Props can be used in order to generate fictional truths in the games of make 
believe.6 In the case of Eric and Gregory’s make believe play described above, 
it is tree stumps that generate the fictional truths; the tree stumps are thus 
props. Here is a critical point; if there is a tree stump, the proposition “there 
is a bear” is fictional, while if there is no tree stump, this proposition is not 
fictional. This means that who or what make propositions fictional are not the 
participants in the games, but the props themselves. For example, in the case 
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of Eric and Gregory’s play, if there is an actual tree stump buried in a thick 
bush behind Eric but neither Eric nor Gregory realises it, the proposition 
“there is a bear” is a fictional truth; the actual existence of the tree stump 
makes the proposition fictional even if both Eric and Gregory do not notice 
the tree stump. As long as the participants generate fictional truths in the 
games, they may also be regarded as props; when Eric finds a tree stump in 
front of him and pretends to be dead to wait till the “bear” goes past, Eric 
as a prop makes the proposition “Eric is pretending to be dead” fictional.
In the case of “jishin-gokko”, chairs and tables being violently shaken 
are regarded as props. Moreover, participants shouting “Earthquake!” or 
“Take shelter!” can also be regarded as props.
1.3. Fictional worlds
When children play a game of make believe, they build up a fictional world 
in which some propositions are fictional truths.7 For example, when Eric 
and Gregory agree to say “stumps are bears”, they make up a fictional world. 
Propositions such as “there are bears in front of them” are fictional in this 
world. Each fictional world has its own fictional truths; each play of “jishin-
gokko” generates its own fictional world and holds its own fictional truths.
More remarks should be made on fictional worlds. Walton argues “there 
are fictional world of games of make-believe, fictional world of represen-
tational works, and fictional worlds of dreams and daydreams.”8 In other 
words, he argues that representational works may also function as props 
and generate fictional truths. Thus, art works may also build up fictional 
worlds. An analogy between participating in games of make-believe and 
experiencing artworks can be seen at this point; both participating in games 
of make-believe and experiencing artworks can be regarded as activities 
of generating a fictional world. Moreover, those who are engaged in such 
activities are, so to speak, imaginatively settling themselves in the fictional 
world. Here is a key to understand the potential of artworks this article is 
trying to clarify: a therapy-like function of artworks.
2. How do games of make-believe work as therapy?
As argued above, experience of artworks may well be identified with ex-
perience of participating in a game of make-believe. Then, how do games 
of make-believe work? This section would like to address this question, 
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as a first approximation, by explaining games of make-believe in terms of 
children’s practices that prepare them to live their future social life. However, 
“jishin-gokko”, a special case of game of make-believe in which children have 
confronted overwhelming reality, should be more carefully considered; it 
may involve a therapy-like process rather than a mere practice.
2.1. Games of make-believe as practices
Consider a case of children playing house. When children play house, they 
take the roles of mother, father, children or neighbours, and pretend to 
chat with each other like adults. Playing house is a sort of game of make-
believe. Children play roles they will possibly take in the future; children 
can be regarded as engaging in a rehearsal of the life they will possibly 
lead when they grow up. When children play house, even though they 
make fictional truths, these fictional truths usually correspond with real 
facts to some extent. For example, while the economic situation is serious, 
children playing house may say “it’s difficult for me to find a job in this day 
and age” or “we must buy a lottery ticket because I’m not earning enough.” 
Although children could generate fictional truths independently from the 
reality, arbitrary fictional truths might ruin the game. Therefore, fictional 
truths in house play should not be too arbitrary; they should be based on 
reality to some extent.
To summarise what is argued above, children engaging in house play are 
following the reality to some extent, and thereby, they rehearse the social 
lives of adults. This argument can be generalised in the following way. 
Children playing games of make-believe are generating a fictional world, 
to some extent based on the reality. Games of make-believe are devices to 
generate such a fictional world and put participants in the world, in which 
participants do try and error, or introduce new props, and rearrange the 
world. The children become accustomed to the fictional world in the pro-
cess of doing so, and this leads them to learn how to manage their lives in 
the future. Fictional worlds generated from the games of make-believe can 
thus be considered as practice fields for children to prepare for the future.
2.2. Games of make-believe as therapy
Then, consider the cases of “jishin-gokko”, in which children are over-
whelmed by the cruel reality. It seems too difficult, virtually impossible, to 
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become accustomed to such a harsh situation. It is true that also in the cases 
of “jishin-gokko” a fictional world is generated and participants come to 
reside in the world. When a catastrophic disaster strikes, however, children 
are helplessly exposed to the reality: in the past, they were leading their life 
with several social bonds, norms and conventions functioning well, but 
after the disaster, such social functions have been in disorder. They confront 
the severe new reality, so it is certain that practice for the future like house 
play will not function in fictional worlds generated from “jishin-gokko”. 
What children attempt to carry out in “jishin-gokko” may not be a re-
hearsal of their future life, but a self-managing therapy. They introduce 
several props into “jishin-gokko”, and generate a fictional world that reflects 
the reality to some extent. The children put themselves in this world, and 
again and again, they imaginatively re-experience the overwhelming facts. 
Participating in “jishin-gokko” can be understood as a process of trying to 
re-capture who they are. Social bonds, norms, and conventions have been 
in disorder since the disaster, so the children have had trouble in finding 
themselves. At least, socially defined identity does not work anymore. 
Therefore, what the children seek is not the self as they were, but quite 
a new one: it is this process of seeking a new self that this article is trying 
to propose as a self-managing therapy process in “jishin-gokko”. 
This idea can be applied to experiences of artworks. As argued above, 
experiences of artworks can be regarded as a sort of games of make-believe. 
Artworks function as props and generate a fictional world. Once we un-
dergo a huge disaster, we are exposed to the severe new reality, and we are 
forced to abandon the past self. Now, we have to find a new self to live 
in the actual world. Artworks can come to function as props to generate 
fictional worlds in which therapies are taking place.
3. Conclusion: the actual/possible matrix of art
Taken the above arguments into account, several aspects of possibility 
and actuality about artworks can be suggested. Firstly, artworks exist in 
the actual world, but at the same time they may work as props to gener-
ate possible worlds. Secondly, while those who experience artworks are 
actual entities in the actual world, they sometimes make use of artworks 
in order to glimpse at a possible way to deal with the actual facts. However, 
it should be noted that they may usually enjoy placing themselves in pos-
sible worlds generated from artworks, but a very harsh reality sometimes 
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overwhelms the people and prevents them from enjoying possible worlds. 
In such cases they cannot even rehearse in possible worlds, and moreover, 
they might consequently refuse to participate in such games of make-
believe. At this moment, experience of artworks may begin to involve 
a therapy-like process. 
When it comes to experiencing artworks, three factors of art should be 
considered: “artworks”, “viewer-participants”, and “experiences”. Each factor 
has its possibility and actuality. As shown in Matrix 1, art viewer-partic-
ipants experience both the actual side and the possible side of artworks, 
and rearrange possible worlds in which they imaginatively reside. What 
is taking place here can be called a therapy or a negotiation. By traversing 
the actual world and possible worlds in the process of art experience, art 
viewer-participants negotiate with their actual selves and their possible 
selves. In doing so, they are trying to find their new selves, even after social 
functions have been broken by a catastrophe.
In conclusion, artworks can offer a negotiating field to art viewer-par-
ticipants. This factor enables the experience of artworks to function as 
therapy. To discuss potentialities of art, actual/possible aspects of art should 
be examined; a negotiation (or therapy-like process) can be occurring in 
the process of experiencing art, and there is here the potential power of art.
Matrix 1
ARTWORKS Actual entities 
existing in the 
actual world
Props to generate 
possible worlds
EXPERIENCES
Negotiation
VIEWER-PARTICI-
PANTS
Actual entities 
residing in the 
actual world
Possible selves 
sought in possible 
worlds
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Miho Iwata
Performance
Miho Iwata took part in the panel discussion with her performance. The 
participants were invited to the court space. This court is opened to the 
parking and the former garage space, which keeps the different atmosphere, 
contrasting with the solid modern building of Auditorium Maximum, 
Jagiellonian University. It was something from our daily history, some-
thing fragile in our life. She used three flags from FUKUSHIMA! Project 
http://www.pj-fukushima.jp/jp/ which was conceived by various artists in 
order to remember Fukushima through art festivals just after the tragic 
earthquake in 2011. They sewed a huge sheet together with clothes from 
the world, and then cut it to make many smaller FUKUSHUMA Flags next 
year. Iwata has been engaged in this project and performed and travelled 
with it in Poland. It was a small action to remind of the common people’s 
life and to bond them. The audience might not know where the clothes 
are from. But the clothes may get the more universal sense. 
Akiko Kasuya
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Aesthetic Account on Japanese 
Pop Culture 
(Hisashi Muroi)

Hisashi Muroi
Introduction – How We Should Think 
about Pop Culture
1. Introduction 
In this round table, we would like to discuss how we think about Japanese 
pop culture or pop culture in general. 
My original field of study is art theory or aesthetics. In the field of art 
theory and aesthetics, it is said that you should think about the theoretical 
condition of traditional Western art in general. Of course, art of a differ-
ent age and ancient or medieval art will also be in the subject, but even in 
those cases, studies about modern Western art would be always thought 
as a standard.  
In such a context, it is a little bit difficult to think about pop culture 
seriously.
Talking about myself, I have been much influenced by pop culture in 
general. I was born when TV broadcasting had started. Since then, I have 
been fascinated by movies, pop music and computer games, etc.
However, when I decided to think about pop culture theoretically, why 
did I feel there was a big wall in front of me? Is it because there is a strict 
border between high culture and pop culture inside myself and uncon-
sciously I think that I should not see such pop culture as a serious object? 
Or, was I hesitating to talk about pop culture for it would show my affinity 
orientation or childishness to the public? Both seem to be true and false 
and I cannot decide which it is.
2. What is Pop culture?
Firstly, I would like to distinguish what pop culture is.
It can be said that before pop culture, there was what is called Traditional 
Culture and Folklore.
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These contain festival, ritual, mythology and customs of dress on a cer-
tain day, and eating certain things, and singing and dancing in some cases. 
These are also overlapped in the concept of Folk Culture. However, you 
should keep in mind is that those are different from official court culture. 
Then, there appeared the civic culture or bourgeois culture in the 18th 
century. By taking over the aristocratic culture, it accompanied behavior 
like collecting oil paintings or going to the theater or opera frequently, and 
the bourgeoisie obtained their class satisfaction. Such a style of bourgeois 
life was called “snobbism”.
At last, was the birth of popular society, which is called Popular culture or 
Mass culture, appeared. It is totally different from the previous Folk culture, 
because it is based on Mass media like printing technology and photography. 
It is important that cultural commodities were born by the appearance 
of media technologies like printing technology or photography and the 
reproduction of culture spread out on a large scale. With the appearance 
the record, the movie and further digital technology, these forms of culture 
have been extended further and further.
Movies created a complex entertainment industry with a huge worldwide 
network and the CD or record created a huge music business market that 
sells tens of millions of copies worldwide. Digital technology is becoming 
produced by the license business, called the content industry.
In short, a new cultural industry was born by the maturation of the 
industrial society that enabled mass production and mass distribution.
It provides a large amount of cultural goods for people with an unprec-
edented wide range. Only from its contents, it looks like very similar to 
previous popular cultures like the freak show, circus or Panorama in urban 
areas, but it is totally different in its overwhelming quantity in terms of the 
distribution amount. Hundreds of thousands of consumers and hundreds 
of thousands of cultural goods appeared and media technologies like 
newspapers, photos, posters, telegraph, telephone, movie and the Internet.
3. How has pop culture been discussed? 
So, how has pop culture been discussed?
“Culture and Anarchy”(1869) by Mathew Arnold and “The revolt of the 
masses”(1929) by Jose Ortega y Gasset are well known. Both described 
the huge threat of mass culture from the viewpoint of intellectuals in the 
early years.
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“Avant-garde and Kitsch”(1939) by Clement Greenberg was also opposed 
to the vulgar popular culture called kitsch. It was intended to defend the 
authentic culture like “modernism” or “Avant-garde” opposed to the pop 
culture or political art like socialist realism of the Soviet Union at the same 
age. Looking from the standpoint of traditional principles of intellectuals, 
they could not put up with flood of vulgar and bad taste of popular culture.
Among the thought dealing with this problem from the side of the in-
tellectuals, “Dialectic of enlightenment”(1947) by Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno and “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction”(1936) of Walter Benjamin are noteworthy and very important.
Benjamin argued that “duplicating media” such as photography and film 
stripped out the privileged “aura” from the culture based on the originality 
and had the potential to make a revolutionary and truly rational new culture. 
However, Horkheimer and Adorno accused popular culture of being the 
apparatus of domination by the ruling class which pumps cultural products 
continuously to the masses. We should keep attention here that both positions 
keep the idea of “enlightenment”. Whereas Benjamin talked with great hope 
about the possibility of new culture which will bring people a true awakening, 
Holkheimer and Adorno claimed the so-called dialectic of enlightenment 
will lead to barbaric inevitably and the standardized vulgar popular culture 
is the inevitable consequence of the movement of enlightenment.
Post-war sociological studies have tried to argue about popular culture 
not from such a perspective of the intellectuals, but rather from the view-
point of the masses themselves. 
In “The lonely crowd”  (1950) by David Riesman the writer defined three 
social characters of the masses “other-oriented”, “tradition-oriented” and 
“internal-oriented” and described the loneliness of rich urban consumers 
in the United States.
In his  “Culture and Society” (1958), by abandoning the traditional nar-
row “culture” concept from the viewpoint of Marxism, Raymond Williams 
presented a viewpoint that Culture should be regarded as “everything in 
daily life” such as football, picnics and cooking, etc. 
In other words, he made the standpoint affirming popular culture as it 
is, and claimed that we should create a road map to political revolution 
and cultural innovation.
Stuart Hall and the British cultural studies group took over this wide 
ranged concept of culture by Williams. They inherited the semiotic research 
by Roland Barthes on Fashion, Pro-wrestling and photographic magazines 
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that appeared around the same time in “Mythologies” (1957). They tried 
to approach to popular arts and popular culture at the same way.
In “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse” (1973), Hall 
had shown the possibility of making a revolutionary stream by “reading”. 
That is to make revolutionary flows by finding and rescuing the potential 
move to change the status quo in society inside the dominant discourses.
If you take such a position, Michael Jackson and Madonna will be able 
to be read as a text that leads to a better direction to society. They will 
be “good” if they can change the cultural hegemony on the issues of race 
and gender and it will be possible when they are “read” revolutionarily by 
researchers and critics.
We can summarize that there is a class conflict between popular culture 
and high culture. 
The privileged class, who has high cultural capital, supports high culture 
while the wide range of lower class, without any complex knowledge and 
training, supports pop culture. However, the benefit of pop culture will 
finally be sucked into the company of the ruling class.
Therefore, it is important which position we take, whether it is the view-
point of the privileged intellectuals or the viewpoint of the uneducated 
masses, when we discuss pop culture.
If you take the position of the intellectuals, you can accuse pop culture 
of being a false culture and claim the necessity of making authentic true 
culture from the perspective of intellectuals like Greenberg; you can find 
a meaningful message inside pop culture and implant it into the inside of 
academic discourses like aesthetics or sociology; you can rescue the hidden 
message in pop culture and enlarge it to reform society.
In addition, from the point of view of the masses side, in the forms of 
such pop culture criticism without any academic discourses, there are so 
many non-historical, horizontal or private discourses. In the past, film crit-
ics and literary criticism were the center of such discourse, but now there 
is a greater amount of critical discourse about animation, comic and pop 
music are spread out on Internet. Those discourses are all non-integrated 
and non-historical and horizontal.
 On the other hand, since the 1960s, the border of high culture and pop 
culture has been gradually becoming ambiguous. Since Pop Art in the 
60s and simulationism in the 80s, the art works on the high culture side 
themselves have been dissolving the distinction between pop culture and 
contemporary art.
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Such a trend is particularly apparent in the case of Japan.
In Japan, the class difference is not so clear; most people consume high 
culture and popular culture equally including us. We read Jacques Der-
rida’s text and at the same time we watch “Evangellion” or other animation, 
too. We have graduate schools of Manga and Pop culture in college and 
don’t have an aversion to pop culture. By contrast, it seems there remains 
a stubborn borderline between pop culture and authentic culture among 
the intellectuals of Europe and the United States,
However, the hierarchies of culture are certainly dissolving in the world. 
Everything has been absorbed in the global capitalistic supermarket. Con-
temporary art, pop culture, fashion, ethnography, web-design or characters of 
animation film; All are included in the art museum as a cultural supermarket.
Under these circumstances, some artists, architects, animators, cartoon-
ists, musicians, and various craftsmen resist being commodity providers 
in the global supermarket like this. However, such behavior itself would 
be commercialized in the global supermarket culture like the case of Jimi 
Hendrix or Kurt Cobain of Nirvana.
4. What kind of research do we need? 
The difference between high culture and pop culture is becoming ambigu-
ous at a certain level, but it doesn’t mean it has been completely eliminated.
And there remains the difference between the class who was highly 
educated and has a high cultural capital and the class who is listening pop 
music, reading only comics and free Internet content.
And we must notice that the ruling class all around the world create the 
museums, music halls and institutions. And they also control the journal-
ism and media for circulating those contents.
In short, everything still depends on the old paradigm of the bourgeois 
high culture.
However, I do not think it will continue in the future.
In a sense, pop culture will be the main stream in the future. Therefore, 
I think the research on pop culture should inevitably be on the politics 
of culture. 
So rather than individual analysis of the work of pop culture in a non-
integrated or horizontal way, I think that we should consider the politics 
of pop culture.
Although not enough, but this is my problematic of this roundtable.
Fuminori Akiba
Can Aesthetics Treat Hybridity in Pop Culture? 
In Case of Aesthetics of MOMOCLO
The aim of this paper is to examine the book Aesthetics of MOMOCLO (2013) 
written by Professor Anzai (University of Tokyo). This book treats the famous 
Japanese girls’ idol group, MOMOIRO CLOVER Z, abbreviated as MOMO-
CLO. In the first two sections of this paper, I pay attention to the procedures 
by which Professor Anzai analyzes MOMOCLO, especially, to the way he 
analyzes the ‘hybridity’ that he regards as the most essential character of MO-
MOCLO. Through these two sections I point out the problems in his analysis; 
oxymoronic expression and too much juxtaposition. In the final section, I in-
troduce the idea of “being out of place” proposed by Hiroshi Yoshioka, and 
raise a question about the possibility how aesthetics can speak of hybridity.
Introduction
MOMOIRO CLOVER Z, commonly abbreviated as MOMOCLO1, is one 
of the most popular girls’ idol groups in Japan. On this group Professor 
Shin-ichi Anzai (University of Tokyo, suddenly died on February 10, 2014, 
at the age of 53) authored a book entitled Aesthetics of MOMOCLO (the 
original Japanese title is MOMOCLO No Bigaku).2 The book drew much 
attention not only because the author himself was a fanatic fan of MOMO-
CLO but also because as a university Professor he treated the idol group 
in an academic way.
At this point some fans showed displeasure saying that we must directly 
feel MOMOCLO’s music and performance, so we must not read it3. But 
I do not agree with this opinion. On the contrary, as Professor Muroi says, 
it is quite important for academics to speak popular culture in order “to 
restore the circuit or discourse that cuts across various genres and layers.”4 
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However, at the same time, it is also important for academics to examine 
the procedure by which Professor Anzai treats the idol group. 
In the following sections, therefore, I pay attention to his procedure, 
especially, to the way how he analyzes the ‘hybridity’ of the group that he 
regards as the most essential character of MOMOCLO. I begin with the 
general procedure of this book.
1. General Procedure of Aesthetics of MOMOCLO
The book Aesthetics of MOMOCLO consists of four chapters. It begins with 
the most elementary constituents of MOMOCLO’s live performance; the 
movements of bodies, their music and staging (Ch. 1, Ch. 2). Then it moves 
to the broader cultural contexts; the relationship between MOMOCLO 
and Japanese girls’ growing-up movies such as “Hula-girl” and “Shodo-
girls” (Ch. 3).5 Finally it goes beyond such cultural contexts to the much 
wider social contexts; their relationship to nationality and patriotism, to 
the narrative types of Sekai-kei and Nichijo-kei,6 to another narrative type 
of girls who save helpless male adults, and to the religiousness (Ch. 4).
Here I focus only on the first two chapters (the movements of bodies, 
their music and staging) and point out the characteristics of his analytic 
procedure. As shown below, he begins his analysis with the description of 
phenomena, and then interprets them by using the frameworks of existing 
aesthetics. I take his analysis of the body movements in MOMOCLO’s live 
performance as an example.
Firstly he describes the body movements from the point of harmonious 
cooperation between performers (MOMOCLO) and audiences (Otaku). 
According to his description, in the live performance of MOMOCLO, 
MOMOCLO aggressively moves their bodies and audiences (Otaku) also 
aggressively move their bodies imitating MOMOCLO’s movements. As 
the result it emerges the harmonious cooperation between them.7 Fur-
thermore, he points out the existence of different body movements of 
audiences, that is, the original (not imitative) movements that correspond 
to the performers’ movements. These movements are called Ota-gei (active 
performance by Otaku audience).8 Then he concludes that these three kinds 
of body movements create the feeling of unity in the live performance of 
MOMOCLO.
After the description he interprets it from the point of existing aesthetics. 
In this case he borrows the framework of interpretation from Hiroshi Ichi-
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kawa’s influential book entitled Structure of the Body (the original Japanese 
title is Mi No Kozo). In the book Ichikawa classified the synchronization 
between body movements into two types; one is ‘imitative’, the other is 
‘responsive’ or ‘role-playing.’9 As we can easily imagine, Professor Anzai 
interprets the imitative body movements of Otaku audience as ‘imitative 
synchronization,’ and original body movements of Otaku audience (Ota-
gei) as ‘responsive or role-playing synchronization.’10 
In this way he connects MOMOCLO to existing aesthetics. In other 
words, he generalizes the singular event in MOMOCLO’s live performance 
into the event that academic persons who have never seen it can understand. 
At this point, however, one familiar question comes up to my mind. Does 
he open MOMOCLO to the general public or close MOMOCLO into tra-
ditional aesthetics? To this question I will give an answer in the last section.
2. Problems in Depicting Hybridity: Oxymoron 
and Juxtaposition
As I mentioned above, Professor Anzai regards the hybridity as the most 
essential to MOMOCLO. Therefore, he repeatedly points out how MO-
MOCLO realizes various kinds of hybridity through various kinds of hy-
bridization in their activities. To explain such hybridity he borrows and 
uses various oxymoronic phrases. 
I can take at least three examples of oxymoron from his explanation on 
the body movements. He writes, “they [the aggressive body movements 
of MOMOCLO] have virtual powers like exploding chaos, but at the same 
time, they have certain order,” that is, “Chaosmos” (chaos and cosmos, 
from Guattari’s Chaosmos: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm). Another two 
oxymoronic phrases are used to express the same characteristics of body 
movements; one is “Dionysian and Apollonian” (from Nietzsche’s The Birth 
of Tragedy), and the other is “matriarchal/ introverted/ body-liberating/ 
fantastic/ abstract and paternalistic/ extroverted/ body-binding/ sensuous/ 
empirical” (from Sachs’ World History of Dance).11 
In his explanation of the music and staging of MOMOCLO, he repeats 
the same procedure, that is, he makes a long list of various hybridity. Ac-
cording to him, the music and staging of MOMOCLO, at least, consist of 
hybridization of 1) real and virtual,12 2) of bodily performance of male idols 
and female idols.13 3) of various dance styles such as Japanese, ethnic, clas-
sic, etc.,14 4) of various nationalities,15 5) of various genres,16 6) of various 
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music styles,17 7) of various voice characters,18 8) of heterogeneous musical 
fragments,19, 9) of heterogeneous historical recognition.20 
Here I feel two problems. The first one is about the oxymoronic expres-
sion such as Chaosmos, Dionysian and Apollonian, and body-liberating 
and body-binding. Of course I know that oxymoron is an established 
rhetoric and that it combines two words that seem to be the opposite of 
each other in order to bring shocks to the readers. However, at the same 
time, oxymoron weakens the shock of the uncanny things because it sets 
two opposite poles and locks the uncanny things in between these two poles. 
It reduces their uncanniness. In other words, oxymoron, or the dualistic 
way of thinking, cannot express the impact of hybridity. It only shows us 
two ingredients before hybridization.
The second problem is in his too much juxtaposition of the ideas from 
different philosophers or researchers such as Guattari, Nietzsche, and 
Sachs. I cannot imagine how I can relate their ideas each other (Should 
I understand this juxtaposition as another kind of oxymoronic expression?) 
About the procedure by which he treats hybridity in music and staging 
of MOMOCLO I feel the same problem. He picks up various hybridity 
one after another. Probably they are so. However, as I said above, such 
juxtaposition does not create images of MOMOCLO’s hybridity at all. It 
only shows the ingredients before hybridization.21
3. How Can Aesthetics Speak of Hybridity?
In the previous sections I offered a question and problems about the pro-
cedure of Aesthetics of MOMOCLO:
1. Does Aesthetics of MOMOCLO open MOMOCLO to the general public 
or close MOMOCLO into traditional aesthetics?
2. Oxymoronic expression weakens the shock of the uncanny things 
because it locks hybridity in between two opposite poles. In other words, 
it reduces their uncanniness. It only shows us two ingredients before hy-
bridization.
Now it is easy to answer the first question. His dependence on oxymo-
ronic expression closes MOMOCLO into existing aesthetics. But then, how 
can we give expression to the hybridity of MOMOCLO without reducing 
it to the ingredients before hybridization?
Here I introduce the idea of “being out of place,” originally proposed 
by Professor Yoshioka. He said, “The first step I suggest for reinvigorating 
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linguistic criticism in a hybrid culture is to disobey the implicit rules of 
the forum and to be insensitive to the situation.”22
At first sight Professor Anzai seems to be out of place because he diso-
beyed the implicit rule that a university Professor must not treat popular 
culture in an academic way (or popular culture must not be treated in an 
academic way). As the result he succeeded in drawing the attention of 
academics to MOMOCLO and drawing attention of fans to an academic 
field called aesthetics. However, his procedure completely obeys the rules 
of existing aesthetics. He should have spoken of MOMOCLO in such a way 
that MOMOCLO completely destroys frameworks of existing aesthetics. If 
he did so, he could open a new channel through which academics and fans 
can discuss MOMOCLO with each other, though I do not know whether 
we still call such discourses ‘aesthetics.’ Then, again, how can we speak of 
hybridity? This is what I would like to discuss in this penal session.
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Morihiro Satow
Railfan and Photographic Collection: A Way to 
Possess the World
Otaku subculture, Japanese term for enthusiasts, or geeks, especially for 
manga, anime and videogames, started to be known in the world. Otaku 
phenomenon started to be widely known in Japan from the 1980s. But long 
before their emergence, there were the enthusiasts for railroad in Japanese 
popular culture. The emergence of Japanese rail fandom can be traced 
back as early as 1930s when magazines for the enthusiast were started 
to be published. Since then, railfans have been one of the representatives 
of Japanese fan culture, before otaku sat the throne. Still, railfans are one of 
the most important subculture in Japan. Many celebrities, including some 
important policians, declare that they are railfans.
Railfan is sometimes called tetsu in Japanese. Tetsu is derived from tetsudō, 
the Japanese word for “railroad” (tetsu means “iron” and dō means “road”). Also, 
sometimes they are called tetsu-ota, shortened form of tetsudō otaku, which 
shows railfan subculture and otaku subculture sometimes link. Anthropomor-
phism of Trains movement shows their linkage. Although we can find some 
linkage between railfans and otaku subculture, we cannot totally identify them 
each other. Still, they have something in common, which is the desire to collect. 
Japanese railfans can be divided into several sub-categories depended 
on their object of obsession. Some love to take photos of train, some love 
to record the sound. Some love to collect parts of train, tickets, plates, 
timetables, etc. Some love to ride trains and some try to get off at every 
little station in Japan. Among them, one of the most popular sub-category 
is one of photography. They are equipped with expensive cameras. They 
also seek advantage points to photograph trains’ figure.
In this paper, I would like to pay attention to railroad photography and 
its collection. There are some attempts to explore the relationship between 
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railroad and photography. Tokyo Station Gallery held an exhibition called 
Railroad and Painting, which included the section on photography.1Tokyo 
Metropolitan Museum of Photography held an exhibition called “Iron 
Heroes” which exclusively focused on the photographic representation of 
steam engines.2 Among them, the exhibition by J. Paul Getty Museum in 
Los Angeles, Railroad Vision explored the interactions between railroad 
and photography.3
Regarding the relationship between railroad and photography, a histo-
rian of photography, Clemént Chéroux presented the concept of Railroad 
vision (Vision ferroviaire). His argument is, of course, based on the issue 
on the change of perception with the emergence of railroad in the 19th 
century raised by Wolfgang Schivelbusch.4 Cheroux argues that the railroad 
vision is, like the photographic capture, not only instantaneous, but also 
fragmented and focused. From inside train, what is offered to the travellers 
is a vision framed, defined and fragmented.5
Chéroux’s argument is very insightful in discussing the similarity and 
affinity between railroad and photography. But, as he himself admits, he’s 
mainly interested in “view from train,” not “look at train.” On the other 
hand, in this paper, I would rather like to focus on “looks at train.” 
***
Railroad and photography were the modern technology developed in the 
19th century. The railroad constructed between Stockton and Darlington in 
the United Kingdom in 1825 was the first commercial railroad ever made. 
Nicéphore Niépce (1865–1833)’s experiment on photography was done at 
the same time. And the invention of photography was officially announced 
in 1939, when the network of railroads started to cover Western Europe.
A landscape image photographed from a station in Edinburgh by David 
Octuvius Hill (1802–1870) and Robert Adamson (1821–1848) in 1845 is 
said to be the oldest Railroad Photograph. Also, Sir Daniel Gooch, the senior 
engineer of Great Western Railway was shot along with the scale-model 
of the train he designed at the same year. In the United States, Langen-
heim brothers (William; 1807–1874, Friedrich; 1809–1879) took photos of 
documentary of railroad construction, station and trains in the mid-1850s 
(figure 1). By the late nineteenth century, many railroad companies hired 
photographers to photograph their trains as advertising materials. Hired 
by a maker, Bayer Peacock, James Mudd (1821–1901) and John Stewart 
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(1831–1907) took many photographs of such kind (figure 2). By the 1860s, 
as photography had already diffused, photographic postcards and stereo-
grams of railroad became to be sold at the waiting rooms at stations, or 
the newsstands near stations. A photographer, Alfred Hart (1816–1908), 
who worked exclusively for Central Pacific Railroad, printed 30 thousand 
stereocards from 3 hundred negatives just for 3 years (figure 3).6 
Here, I would like to overview the history of railroad and photography in 
Japan. Railroad was introduced by the American fleet lead by Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) who came to Japan to conclude the Japan–US 
Treaty of Peace and Amity (Kanagawa Treaty) in 1854. He brought a scale 
model of steam engine as a gift from American president. At the same time, 
the war photographer of American fleet, Eliphalet Brown Jr. took some 
photographs of the Japanese. Therefore, it can safely be said that railroad and 
photography were simultaneously introduced to Japan as modern technology. 
In 1872, the first commercial railroad was laid in Japan, between Shinbashi, 
Tokyo and Yokohama. The railroad cars called “Black Ox” (slightly different 
from Western “Iron Horse”), and its majestic existence made the Japanese 
surprise. Many representations of trains were produced in prints and pho-
tography (figure 4). Lynne Kirvy calls such desires to represent the railroad 
as “techno-fetishism” which fetishizes modern technology and industry.7
In the beginning of this paper, I pointed out that the emergence of 
Japanese rail fandom started in 1930s. But long before that, two bourgeois 
young men, Iwasaki Teruya (1887–1956) and Watanabe Shirō (1880–1921) 
had enthusiastically collected railroad photographs. Both were sons of 
millionaires and commissioned the top photographer of the age, Ogawa 
Kazumasa (1860–1929) to take photographs of all the steam engines existed 
in Japan at the time, between 1902–1907 (figure 5). Their collection, con-
taining over 3 thousand glass-negatives, is now called Iwasaki-Watanabe 
collection and preserved in Railway Museum in Saitama, Japan.8
Most of the images in the collection are so-called “train type pictures,” 
which illustrate the significant features characterize a certain type of train. 
Train type pictures are different from images which capture the running 
form of trains or the combination of landscape and train.
In an example from the collection, iron-made black body of a steam 
engine with tender car shines glossily. Details of the features of the train 
body are accurately depicted. At the same time, it seems to praise the 
magnificent, even phallic existence of the iron horse.
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***
Then why did they want to collect such images? Here, I’d like to explore 
the desire of the collectors, Iwasaki and Watanabe, by referring Claude 
Levi-Strauss (1908–2009)’s discourse on miniature. He points out, “the 
vast majority of works of art are small-scale [models],” or miniatures. In 
this case, “small-scale” does not necessarily mean small in size. Any paint-
ings or sculptures involve “giving up certain dimensions of the object: 
volume in painting, colour, smell, tactile impressions in sculpture and the 
temporal dimension in both cases9.” Railroad photographs shrink huge 
trains to palm-size, transfer the three dimensional to the two dimensional 
and abstract only visual aspect by omitting auditory, olfactory and tactile 
aspects. In this sense, railroad photographs are nothing but a miniature.
Furthermore, Levi-Strauss points out that the reduction of scale causes 
“a sort of reversal in the process of understanding.” When we “understand 
a real object in its totality we always tend to work from its parts.” On the 
other hand, in the case of miniatures, “Being smaller, the object as a whole 
seems less formidable. By being quantitatively diminished, it seems to 
us qualitatively simplified. More exactly, this quantitative transposition 
extends and diversifies our power over a homologue of the thing, and by 
means of it the latter can be grasped, assessed and apprehended at a glance.” 
Thus, “knowledge of the whole precedes knowledge of the parts.” 10
A Japanese critic, Taki Kōji (1928–2011) comments that the miniatures are 
the lingualization of reality. Because we are involved in the syntactic com-
bination of various elements in the real world, we can just perceive parts by 
parts we contact. By repeating various perceptual experiences over and over, 
we can finally grasp the whole with the inference of the relationship. We are 
inevitably inside the reality. On the contrary, miniatures or scale-models are 
so small and exist at our external world. By those miniatures, we can reach 
the whole immediately. In short, we become the subject of understanding by 
the existence of miniatures. Lévi-Strauss points out that in a doll and through 
a doll “a person is made into a subject.” 11 Like this, in a railroad photograph 
and through a railroad photograph, a railfan is made into a subject. 
A Japanese sociologist, Ukai Masaki comments on the railfans that the 
railfans can easily ride on trains, but it is difficult to possess trains or drive 
a train. Only things they can possess are all secondary objects; that is, 
“photography, models, goods, train timetables, and experiences.” 12 All of 
these objects have a kind of rhetorical relationship with the real, gigantic 
material called railroad. 
428  Morihiro Satow
Krzysztof Pomian once comments on collections saying that objects 
lose their use-values and only possess exchange-values by preserved at 
a specific place as a collection. Thus, the collected objects turn to visible and 
perceivable signs and thus represent the invisible and unreachable whole13. 
Pomian stresses the principle of the representation is based on language’s 
rhetorical functions; that is, partiality, contiguity and causality, and similar-
ity.14 In the terms of rhetoric, partiality means synecdoche, contiguity and 
causality mean metonymy, and similarity means metaphor. Photographs 
are metonymical when we consider they are the traces of light. Railroad 
tickets are the part of railroad. Rail models are metaphorical. 
Rail models are, just like photography, the objects of collectors who 
wish to possess the whole world of railroads in visible form. Susan Stewart 
analyses the rail models in her On Longing. Rail models, or the miniature 
railroad were originally made for the demonstration or display models 
which had an utilitarian function. But by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the models found their primary function in the aesthetic or play 
sphere. Stewart observes, “in the miniature railroad we have a reduction 
of scale and a corresponding increase in detail and significance, and we 
are able to transcend the mechanical as well as the natural that forms its 
context.” Originally, railroad was machinery served to labor and produc-
tion in the capitalism. But once its size was reduced and miniaturized, it 
became playful and aesthetic object. At the same time, in the railroad 
georama for example, nature surrounding the railroad became playful and 
aesthetic one. “The movement here is correspondingly one from work to 
play, from utility to aesthetics, from ends to means.”
Stewart also mentions although the miniature itself is the mimicry of the 
real world, it lives in totally different and closed world. The closed world 
has its own order which is different from the real world. “The metaphoric 
world of the miniature makes everyday life absolutely anterior and exterior 
to itself. The reduction in scale which the miniature presents skews the time 
and space relations of the everyday life world, and as an object consumed, 
the miniature finds its “use value” transformed into the infinite time of 
reverie.” Thus, miniature creates “other” time, which negates change and 
the flux of lived reality.15
Just like railroad miniatures, the world of railroad photography is isolated 
from the real world of railroad. By the power of photography, the trains 
become miniatures, losing their use-values, separated from the original 
context, which is rails and stations. The sizes are reduced and lost their own 
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aura and collected by the hand of the collectors, a part and the whole, the 
train and their optical traces. These double metonymical transformations 
connect Japanese railroad as an invisible whole and closed semiotic world 
of the collection of railroad photographs. 
Thus, railroad photographs rhetorically are linked with the real world. 
By reproduced by photography, all Japanese trains were collected by the 
railfans like André Malraux (1901–1976)’s le Musée imaginaire.16 
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Fig. 1: William and Frederick Langenheim, Niagara Falls, Summer View: 
Suspension Bridge and Falls in the Distance, ca. 1855-56, Glass Stereograph, 
8.3×17.1cm, J. Paul Getty Museum.
Fig.2: John Stuart, Nielson Locomotive Engine (Cape Government Railway, 
South Africa), 1880, Albumen print, 21.6x34cm, Santa Barbara Museum of Art.
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Fig. 3; Alfred A. Hart, Scene near Deeth—Mount Halleck in Distance, 1870, 
Albumen Stereograph, 8.7x17.5cm, J. Paul Getty Museum.
Fig. 4. Tsukioka Yoshitoshi, Famous Site in Tokyo: Steam Engine in Takanawa, 
1871, Ukiyo-e Woodblock Print, 35.1×71.2cm, Railway Museum, Saitama.
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Fig. 5: Ogawa Kazumasa, Steam Engine Type 5500, 1902-1907, Railway Museum, 
Saitama.
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He has academic interests in aesthetics in Germany in the 18th cen-
tury and intercultural aesthetics. His publications in German include: 
“Ästhetische Subjektivität. Romantik und Moderne” (Würzburg 2005) and 
“Kulturelle Identität und Selbstbild. Aufklärung und Moderne in Japan und 
Deutschland” (Berlin 2011). He is a coeditor of the “JTLA” (an international 
journal for aesthetics on behalf of the University of Tokyo). He is President 
of the Japanese Society for Aesthetics, an EC of the International Society 
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for Eighteenth-Century Studies and a board member of the International 
Schelling-Society.
ELSE MARIE BUKDAHL , PhD, affiliated professor at the University of Aal-
borg, Denmark. Former president of the Royal Danish Academy of Fine 
Arts. - Member of The Royal Danish and Norwegian Society of Sciences and 
Letters. - Honoured member of international Who’s Who - Selected as one 
of the Leading Educators of the world by International Biographical Centre. 
Cambridge. - Officier des Palmes Académiques and Chevalier de l’Ordre des 
Arts et des Lettres. Paris. - She has a long list of publications spanning from 
philosophy, aesthetics, literature to visual art and architecture, among oth-
ers articles on somaesthetics and postmoderne philosophy and books on 
art and architecture, e. g. The Baroque. A Recurrent Inspiration (1998), The 
Re-enchantment of Nature and Urban Space. Michael Singer Projets (2011) 
She has also been involved in exchanges programs with the Academies and 
Universities in China and The United Arab Emirates and Jordan. 
KRYST YNA WILKOSZEWSKA is professor of philosophy and aesthetics and 
Head of the Department of Aesthetics at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, 
Poland. She is President of the Polish Society of Aesthetics and Director of 
John Dewey Research Center founded by her at the Jagiellonian University. She 
is a delegate in  the Executive Committee in the International Association for 
Aesthetics and a member of Board in Central European Pragmatist Forum. She 
was awarded research grants from ACLS and Humboldt Foundation. Her main 
interest is in pragmatist philosophy and aesthetics, somaesthetics, postmodern 
philosophy and art, eco-aesthetics, transcultural studies. She published Art as the 
Rhythm of Life: Reconstruction of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Art; Postmodernism 
in Philosophy and Art and edited among others three volume Japanese Aesthetics; 
Vision and Revision; Transcultural Aesthetics; Aesthetics and Cultures. She is editor 
of the series: “Aesthetics in the World”, “Classics of Polish Aesthetics”. 
PANEL 04
WOLFGANG WELSCH, born in 1946, is professor emeritus of philosophy 
(Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) and lives in Berlin. In 1992, he received 
the Max Planck Research Award. His main fields of research are anthropol-
ogy, epistemology and ontology, theory of evolution, aesthetics and art theory, 
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philosophy of culture, and contemporary philosophy. He has lately developed 
a strictly evolutionary conception of the human, comprising both natural and 
cultural evolution.
His main publications are: Aisthesis (1987); Unsere postmoderne Moderne 
(1987, 7th ed. 2008); Ästhetisches Denken (1990, 7th enlarged ed. 2010); Ver-
nunft (1995, 4th ed. 2007); Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (1996); Undoing Aesthetics 
(1997); Immer nur der Mensch? (2011); Blickwechsel – Neue Wege der Ästhetik 
(2012); Mensch und Welt (2012); Homo mundanus – Jenseits der anthropischen 
Denkform der Moderne (2012, 2nd ed. 2015); Der Philosoph: Die Gedankenwelt 
des Aristoteles (2012).
PENG FENG, Professor of Aesthetics and Art Theory, School of Arts, Peking 
University, China.
EDUARDO KAC is internationally recognized for his telepresence and bio 
art. A pioneer of telecommunications art in the pre-Web ‘80s, Eduardo Kac 
(pronounced “Katz”) emerged in the early ‘90s with his radical works combin-
ing telerobotics and living organisms. His visionary integration of robotics, 
biology and networking explores the fluidity of subject positions in the post-
digital world. His work deals with issues that range from the mythopoetics 
of online experience (Uirapuru) to the cultural impact of biotechnology 
(Genesis); from the changing condition of memory in the digital age (Time 
Capsule) to distributed collective agency (Teleporting an Unknown State); 
from the problematic notion of the “exotic” (Rara Avis) to the creation of 
life and evolution (GFP Bunny). At the dawn of the twenty-first century Kac 
opened a new direction for contemporary art with his “transgenic art”--first 
with a groundbreaking piece entitled Genesis (1999), which included an “art-
ist’s gene” he invented, and then with “GFP Bunny,” his fluorescent rabbit called 
Alba (2000). Kac’s work has been exhibited internationally at venues such as 
Exit Art and Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, New York; Maison Européenne de la 
Photographie, Paris; Castello di Rivoli, Turin, Italy; Mori Art Museum, Tokyo; 
Reina Sofia Museum, Madrid; Zendai Museum of Modern Art, Shanghai; 
and Seoul Museum of Art, Korea. Kac’s work has been showcased in bien-
nials such as Yokohama Triennial, Japan; Biennial of the End of the World, 
Ushuaia, Argentina; Gwangju Biennale, Korea; Bienal de Sao Paulo, Brazil; 
International Triennial of New Media Art, National Art Museum of China, 
Beijing; and Bienal de Habana, Cuba. His work is part of the permanent col-
lection of the Victoria & Albert Museum, London, the Museum of Modern 
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Art in New York, the Museum of Modern Art of Valencia, Spain, the ZKM 
Museum, Karlsruhe, Germany, and the Museum of Modern Art in Rio de 
Janeiro, among others. Kac’s work has been featured both in contemporary 
art publications (Contemporary, Flash Art, Artforum, ARTnews, Kunstforum, 
Tema Celeste, Artpress, NY Arts Magazine), contemporary art books (Phaidon, 
Thames and Hudson, Oxford, MIT Press) and in the mass media (ABC, BBC, 
PBS, Le Monde, Boston Globe, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, New York 
Times). Kac has received many awards, including the Golden Nica Award, 
the most prestigious award in the field of media arts and the highest prize 
awarded by Ars Electronica. He lectures and publishes worldwide. His work 
is documented on the Web: http://www.ekac.org.
PANEL 05
POLONA TRATNIK is the president of the Slovenian Society of Aesthetics. She 
is the head of the Department for Cultural Studies, docent for philosophy of 
culture at Faculty of Humanities and research associate at Science and Research 
Centre of the University of Primorska, director of Horizonti Institute. She was 
a Fulbright Visiting Scholar and Guest Professor at University of California 
Santa Cruz in 2012 and a guest professor in Beijing, Helsinki, Mexico etc. She 
is an author of five monographs, one forthcoming: Hacer-vivir más allá del 
cuerpo y del medio, Mexico City: Herder, and one just written (Conquest of 
Body. Biopower of Biotechnology).
MARÍA ANTONIA GONZÁLEZ VALERIO is a philosopher working in the fields 
of aesthetics and ontology, with a focus on biotechnologies and the arts. She is 
full professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, National Autonomous University 
of Mexico (UNAM). She is the author of three books: Prolegómenos a una 
filosofía natural (Herder, forthcoming) Un tratado de ficción. Ontología de la 
mimesis (Herder, 2010) and El arte develado (Herder, 2005). She is co-editor 
of five books, the most recent is: Pròs Bíon: Reflexiones naturales desde el arte, 
la ciencia y la filosofía (UNAM, 2015). She is the head of the interdisciplinary 
research group Art+Science, based at the UNAM, Mexico.
DR. MELENTIE PANDILOVSKI is Director of Video Pool Media Arts Centre 
in Winnipeg, Canada. He is a media art theorist and historian, curator, and 
critic. He has curated more than 150 exhibitions and organized numerous 
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symposia, conferences, and workshops, in Europe, Australia, and Canada, 
such as: “Toxicity” in 2013-14, and “Marshall McLuhan & Vilém Flusser Com-
munication & Aesthetics Theories Revisited”, in Winnipeg, Canada in 2012; 
“SEAFair” (Skopje Electronic Art Fair) in the period 1997 – 2011; “Biotech Art – 
Revisited” in Adelaide, South Australia in 2009, etc. His theoretical research 
deals with examination of the links between art, culture, technology. He was 
Consultant editor of Artlink’s “Bio Art: Life in the Anthropocene”(2014); Co-
Editor of Marshall McLuhan & Vilém Flusser Communication & Aesthetics 
Theories Revisited” (2015), Editor of “Energy, Biopolitics, Resistance Strategies 
and Cultural Subversion” (2012), “The Apparatus of Life and Death” (2012), 
“Art in the Biotech Era” (2008).
JOS DE MUL studied philosophy, art history and social sciences at the uni-
versities of Amsterdam, Utrecht and Nijmegen. At present he is full professor 
Philosophy of Man and Culture at the Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam. He has also taught at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) 
and Fudan University (Shanghai) and in 2012 he became a visiting fellow at 
the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA. From 2007-2010 he was 
president of the International Association for Aesthetics. His research is on 
the interface of philosophical anthropology, aesthetics, philosophy of technol-
ogy and history of 19th and 20th century German philosophy. His English 
publications include: Romantic Desire in (Post)Modern Art and Philosophy 
(State University of New York Press, 1999) , The Tragedy of Finitude. Dilthey’s 
Hermeneutics of Life (Yale University Press, 2004), Cyberspace Odyssey. Towards 
a Virtual Ontology and Anthropology (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 
and Destiny Domesticated. The Rebirth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Technology 
(State University of New York Press, 2014) He is the winner of the Praemium 
Erasmianum Research Prize (1994) and the Socrates Prize (2003). 
His work has been translated in more than a dozen languages. See for 
an extended CV and full list of publications: http://www.demul.nl/en. His 
e-mail addresses are: demul@fwb.eur.nl and jos@demul.nl. Tel: +31614000250. 
PANEL 06
SIDEY MYOO is Michał Ostrowicki’s net name. He is an associate professor 
in the Department of Aesthetics in Institute of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian 
University and in the Department of Theory of Media Arts at the Academy of 
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Fine Arts, in Krakow. The subject of his interest is aesthetics and theory of the 
contemporary art, especially electronic art. Since 2003 he investigates the 
phenomena in the Web. In 2007 he established Academia Electronica (www.
academia-electronica.net) – non-institutionalised academic school, function-
ing in electronic environment in Second Life. 
PIOTR ZAWOJSKI, an associate professor in the Department of Film & Media 
Studies at the University of Silesia, Katowice. He also works at Academy of Fine 
Arts in Cracow. His research interest focuses on the theory of photography, film 
and cinema, new media, digital arts and cyberculture. He is a chief of the Film 
and Media section at Polish cultural quarterly Opcje, member of the Board of 
the magazine CyberEmapthy and artistic director of festival “digital_ia”. 
www.zawojski.com   
ANTONI PORCZAK, an artist and professor, the Head of Department of In-
teractive Media Study at the Academy of Fine Arts in Cracow. He participated 
in more than 120 joint exhibitions (about 40 of them held abroad), including, 
among others, the 43rd Biennial of Venice in 1988. He devotes himself to 
sculpture, drawing, actions, multi-media forms and installations. The author 
of numerous articles on the interactive media art and artistic education.
PANEL 07
TAKAO AOKI, Professor at Hiroshima University. M.A. in Tokyo University. 
His main interests: Japanese aesthetics and the philosophy of culture. He is a 
Chief Editor of the Journal of Comparative Aesthetics and an editor of Engeki to 
Eiga (Theatre and Film), Geijutsu-Kotenriron Shusei (Anthropology of Classical 
Theory of Arts in East Asia).
CHEN-CHU CHEN, an Adjunct Associate Professor at Taipei National Uni-
versity of Arts in Department of Traditional Music. Her research focuses on 
the traditional arts and artistic theories of East Asia, especially comparative 
studies in the Chinese and Japanese traditional arts. She is a Chinese Guqin 
player, she also learned the Japanese tea ceremony and “Noh” which is a clas-
sical Japanese musical drama.
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JOOSIK MIN, Professor of Aesthetics at Yeungnam University, President of 
Korean Society of Aesthetics, Co-organizer of the Conference of East Asian 
Aesthetics. His field of interest is Korean Traditional Aesthetics, Comparative 
Aesthetics and Theory of Art. He has published academic books including 
Language, Culture and Art in East Asia (Tokyo: Maruzen, 2011), Cultural 
Conents in Time and Space (Seoul: Oskoworld, 2009), and Arts and Aesthetics 
in East and West (Seoul: Sol, 2007).
PANEL 08
RAFFAELE MILANI is Professor of Aesthetics  at the University of Bologna, 
Italy, and the author of  numerous books , including The Art of Landscape (2009, 
McGill-Queen’s U.P. Montreal), The adventure of Landscape (2005, Feltrinelli, 
Milano), The Aesthetics of Grace. Philosophy, Art, and Nature (2013, Peter Lang, 
New York).  Chief of the “Institute of research on the cities” (Institute for Ad-
vanced Studies), Director of Summer School: “Italian Design. Art, Society and 
Industry” (University of Bologna - Osaka University). Member of the European 
Commission at French Ministry of Ambient and Sustainable Development on: 
“De la connaissance des paysages à l’action paysagère” (from 2004). 
DR. ZOLTÁN SOMHEGYI is a UAE-based Hungarian art historian, holding 
a Ph.D. in aesthetics, and working as an Assistant Professor at the University 
of Sharjah, in the College of Fine Arts and Design. He is specialised in 18-19 
century art and aesthetics, and has additional scholarly interests in contem-
porary arts and art market trends. He has curated international exhibitions, 
authored several books and artist catalogues, and has published more than 
two hundred articles, critiques, essays and art fair reviews.
YUKO NAKAMA is professor of art history and aesthetics, Ritsumeikan Uni-
versity, Kyoto. She serves as member of the Board of Directors, The Japanese 
Society of Aesthetics and the Advisory Committee at Art in Translation (The 
Getty Foundation). Her main research focuses on the comparative aesthetics 
of landscape and her related publications include Caspar David Friedrich und 
die Romantische Tradition, 2011, The Perception of Nature – Construction of 
Landscape. Global Perspectives, 2014.
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WANG KEPING (Keping Wang) is a professor of Beijing International Studies 
University, and a fellow of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He has aca-
demic interests in aesthetics and acient philosophy. His main publications in 
Chinese and English include The Moral Poetics in Plato’s Laws (2015); A Study 
of Poetics in Plato’s Republic(2005); Towards a Transcultural Aesthetics(2002), 
Reading the Dao: A Thematic Inquiry (2011), Spirit of Chinese Poetics (2008), 
Chinese Way of Thinking (2009). He is currently Vice President of Chinese So-
ciety for Aesthetics (CSA), and formerly Vice President of International Society 
for Universal Dialogue (ISUD). He was a visiting fellow of St. Anne’s College 
of Oxford University in 2000, and visiting professor of School of Philosophical 
and Historical Inquries of Sydney University in 2011.
LIU CHENGJI, Professor in College of Philosophy in Beijing Normal Uni-
versity of China. Director of Aesthetic and Art Education Center in Beijing 
Normal University, standing council member of Chinese Aesthetic Society. He 
received his doctorate from Wuhan University in Philosophy and continued his 
post-doctoral research granted from Peking University. His studies focus on 
Chinese Aesthetics. He has published ten monographs and over 100 academic 
papers in leading journals in China.
NIU HONGBAO, professor of School of Philosophy of Renmin University 
of China. PhD. in philosophy, Shandong University, China,1995; BA. in Chinese 
literature, Northwest University, China,1988. Published A History of Western 
Modern Aesthetics (Peking University Press, 2014), Introduction of Aesthet-
ics (Renmin University Press, 2005, 2007,2013; Linguistic View of Aesthetics 
(coming soon).
CURTIS L. CARTER is professor of Aesthetics Marquette University, Haggerty 
Museum of Art founding director 1984-2007.  He has held numerous leadership 
positions for national and international Organizations. President of the Interna-
tional Association for Aesthetics 2010-2013; FISP:International Philosophical 
Committee on Aesthetics, 2015-; Honorary Director Sunshine Museum Beijing, 
and Beijing Museum of Contemporary Art. Art Critic, Shepherd Express, 
2011-pesent. Active in promoting global cultural exchange. Previous Activities: 
Secretary-Treasurer of American Society for Aesthetics 1996-2006, East/West. 
President, Dance Perspectives Foundation, 1888-1998. New York. Museum 
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exhibitions, catalogues: artists Jean Fautrier, Wifredo Lam, Richard Lippold, 
Barbara Morgan, and over 150 other exhibitions of American, European, Chi-
nese modern and contemporary artists.  Current research topics include  art 
and philosophy, modernism and aesthetics, aesthetics and urban life, history of 
20th century aesthetics, contemporary Chinese art, cultural identity, hegemony, 
globalization and art, art photography and everyday life. Recent Publications 
include: Book Border Crossings: Aesthetics into the Arts, (in press). Book, 
Editor, Art and Social Change: International Yearbook of Aesthetics in Chinese 
Series: Aesthetics and Art, 2014 ( Chinese edition); Co Editor, Aesthetics of 
Everyday Life, 2014;.  Selected recent Journal Articles:” Video Art,” Journal 
of Asian Arts & Aesthetics, 5, 2015; Aesthetic “Philosphy and Art: Changing 
Landscapes of Aesthetics, “ Diogenes, 59, 2013; “Characters and Images in Art,” 
Chinese Literature and History, 2014; “Toward a History of Aesthetics of the 
Twentieth Century,” Annals for Aesthetics, 46 A, 2010-2012; “La Philosophie 
et L’Art: De Nouveau Paysages Pour L’Esthetique” Diogene, Janvier-Avril, 2011.
Recent Projects:  Conference Organizer: 2011, Unsettled Boundaries: Phi-
losophy, Art, Ethics, East/West with Chinese and Western Scholars. Marquette 
University USA. 
Note: See Curtis L. Carter, e publications, Raynor Library Marquette Uni-
versity for additional cv details.
PANEL 10
AKIKO KASUYA, Associate Professor at Kyoto City University of Art. She spe-
cializes in aesthetics, art theory and Polish and Japanese contemporary art. She 
has worked as part of the National Museum of Art, Osaka (NMAO) Curatorial 
Department. Major Publications: Modern Art of Central Europe, (Sairyusya, 
2013, Joint authorship), Contemporary Art of Central Europe (Sairyusya, 2014), 
Polish Avant-garde Art: Applied Fantasy for Survival (Sogensha, 2014). She is 
the artistic director of Tatsuno Art Project from 2011 to 2014.
TAKAFUMI KATO received his Master’s Degree in Aesthetics and Art His-
tory from Kyoto University. He is now a doctoral student at Kyoto University. 
Miki Okubo, born in Sapporo, studied aesthetics at Kyoto University. Since 
2009, she studies and teaches at University of Paris 8, where she received her 
master’s degree in aesthetics, specializing in conceptual art and new media 
art. Her thesis’ title is “Exposition de soi à l’époque mobile / liquide». She was 
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a student-researcher of École Nationale Supérieure des Arts Décoratifs, 2010-
2013. As an essayist, she published many articles on contemporary art and 
fashion, artist interviews and exhibition reviews. She organizes art projects 
as well as creates performances. 
MIHO IWATA, a performance artist living in Kraków since 1986. Born in 
Ichinomiya-shi, Japan 1962 ; Study of architecture in Kyoto Prefectural Univer-
sity; Study of Polish Philology in Jagiellonian University in Kraków. She started 
her artistic activity with the performance in Krzysztofory Gallery in Kraków 
in 1994. She took part in „FUKUSHIMA!” action with her performance. Her 
works are presented in many important artistic places and festivals; ex. @KCUA 
/Kyoto/, Kyoto Art Center, Tatsuno Art Project 2014 FLOW /Hyogo, Japan/, 
Tesla /Berlin/, ART POINT Parkmusic /Trombache Hof, Germany/, Liang’s 
Garden /Foshan, China/, Ujazdowski Castle Contemporary Art Centre, Za-
cheta Gallery /Warsaw/, Krzysztofory Gallery, Otwarta Pracownia /Krakow/.
PANEL 11
HISASHI MUROI, Professor of Yokohama National University. He specializes 
in aesthetics, art theory and semiotics. He is the delegate of Yokohama Culture 
Laboratory since 2012 and organizes many cultural projects.
FUMINORI AKIBA (Dr. of Letters) is Associate Professor of the Graduate 
School of Information Science at Nagoya University, Japan. His research field 
is aesthetics and philosophy of art. His most recent book was Atarashii Bigaku 
wo Tsukuru [A New Type of Aesthetics] (2011).
MORIHIRO SATOW, Professor in The Faculty of Design, Kyoto Seika Univer-
sity. After a master degree from Columbia University in New York he obtained 
a doctoral degree in Art Theory from Doshisha University. He specializes in 
the fields of Art History and Visual Culture, and is the author of Topografi 
no Nihon Kindai – Edo d Doro-e, Yokohama Shashin, Geijutsu Shashin (To-
pography and Japanese Modernity: Edo Doro-e, Yokohama Photography and 
Art Photography) (Seikyusha, 2011). He was one of the Japanese translators of 
Geoffrey Batchen’s Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography (joint 
translation, Seikyusha, 2010).


